tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/social-media-propaganda-57666/articlessocial media propaganda – The Conversation2020-10-15T13:28:36Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1478832020-10-15T13:28:36Z2020-10-15T13:28:36ZFacebook, YouTube moves against QAnon are only a first step in the battle against dangerous conspiracy theories<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363453/original/file-20201014-21-m275ip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C6%2C4210%2C2612&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Romanian supporters of the QAnon conspiracy theories shout slogans against the government's measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 infections, like wearing a face mask, during a rally in Bucharest in August.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent decisions by Facebook and YouTube to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/technology/facebook-qanon-crackdown.html?searchResultPosition=1">crack down on the far-right conspiracy theory movement known as QAnon</a> will disrupt the ability of dangerous online communities to spread their radical messages, but it won’t stop them completely.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2020/08/addressing-movements-and-organizations-tied-to-violence/">announcement by Facebook</a> on Oct. 6 to take down any “accounts representing QAnon, even if they contain no violent content,” followed earlier decisions by the social media platform to down-rank QAnon content in Facebook searches. YouTube followed on Oct. 15 with <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/15/youtube-tightens-rules-on-conspiracy-videos-but-no-qanon-ban.html">new rules about conspiracy videos</a>, but it stopped short of a complete ban. </p>
<p>This month marks the third anniversary of the movement that started when someone known only as Q posted a series of conspiracy theories on the internet forum 4chan. Q warned of a deep state satanic ring of global elites involved in pedophilia and sex trafficking, and asserted that U.S. President Donald Trump was working on a secret plan to take them all down. </p>
<h2>QAnon now a global phenomenon</h2>
<p>Until this year, most people had never heard of QAnon. But over the course of 2020, the fringe movement has gained widespread traction <a href="https://www.mediamatters.org/qanon-conspiracy-theory/here-are-qanon-supporters-running-congress-2020">domestically in the United States</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/usa/how-qanon-conspiracy-theory-went-global">internationally</a> — <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/12/politics/qanon-congressional-candidates/index.html">including a number of Republican politicians who openly campaigned as Q supporters</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/qanon-conspiracy-theory-followers-step-out-of-the-shadows-and-may-be-headed-to-congress-141581">QAnon conspiracy theory followers step out of the shadows and may be headed to Congress</a>
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<p>I have been researching QAnon for more than two years and its recent evolution has shocked even me.</p>
<p>What most people don’t realize is that QAnon in July and August was a different movement than what QAnon has become in October. I have never seen a movement evolve or radicalize as fast as QAnon — and it’s happening at a time when the socio-political environment globally is much different now than it was in the summer. </p>
<p>All of these factors came into play when Facebook decided to take action against “militarized social movements and QAnon.”</p>
<p>In the weeks leading up to the ban, I had seen a trend in more violent content on Facebook, especially with the circulation of memes and videos promoting “vehicle ramming attacks” with the slogan “all lives splatter” and other racist messages against Black people. </p>
<p>In explaining its ban, Facebook noted while it had “removed QAnon content that celebrates and supports violence, we’ve seen other QAnon content tied to different forms of real world harm, including recent claims that the (U.S.) West Coast wildfires were started by certain groups, which diverted attention of local officials from fighting the fires and protecting the public.”</p>
<h2>Prior action was ineffective</h2>
<p>Prior to the outright ban, Facebook’s earlier attempts to disrupt QAnon groups from organizing on Facebook and Instagram were not enough to stop its fake messages from spreading. </p>
<p>One way Q supporters adapted was through lighter forms of propaganda — <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/the-feed/pastel-qanon-the-female-lifestyle-bloggers-and-influencers-spreading-conspiracy-theories-through-instagram">something I call Pastel QAnon</a>. As a way to circumvent the initial Facebook sanctions, women who believe in the QAnon conspiracies were using warm and colourful images to spread QAnon theories through <a href="https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/lifestyle/health-and-wellness/playing-with-fire-the-curious-marriage-of-qanon-and-wellness-20200924-p55yu7.html">health and wellness communities</a> and by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/28/technology/save-the-children-qanon.html">infiltrating legitimate charitable campaigns against child trafficking</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An image with a pink background shows three balloons with the false message that COVID IS OVER" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363504/original/file-20201014-21-3s19yp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363504/original/file-20201014-21-3s19yp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363504/original/file-20201014-21-3s19yp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363504/original/file-20201014-21-3s19yp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363504/original/file-20201014-21-3s19yp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363504/original/file-20201014-21-3s19yp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363504/original/file-20201014-21-3s19yp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">QAnon followers have used softer messaging and female-focused imagery to infiltrate lifestyle social media communities — a tactic researcher Marc-André Argentino calls ‘Pastel QAnon.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Twitter)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The latest move by Facebook will still allow Pastel QAnon to exist in adjacent lifestyle, health and fitness communities — a softening of the traditionally raw QAnon narratives, but an effective way to spread the conspiracies to new audiences.</p>
<h2>Some QAnon pages have survived ban</h2>
<p>Facebook will certainly be monitoring any attempts by the QAnon community to circumvent the ban. And while Facebook’s action reduced the number of QAnon accounts, it didn’t eliminate them completely — and realistically will not. My research shows the following:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>QAnon public groups pre-ban 186; post-ban 18.</p></li>
<li><p>QAnon public pages pre-ban 253; post-ban 66.</p></li>
<li><p>Instagram accounts pre-ban 269; post-ban 111.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Facebook’s actions will do permanent damage to the presence of QAnon on the platform in the long run. Short and medium term, what we will see are pages and groups reforming and trying to game the Facebook algorithm to see if they can avoid detection.</p>
<p>However, with little presence on Facebook to quickly amplify new pages and groups and the changes to the search algorithm, this will not be as effective as it was in the past.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A photo of a sign at Facebook headquarters in Menlo Park, Calif." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363522/original/file-20201014-13-6ampjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363522/original/file-20201014-13-6ampjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363522/original/file-20201014-13-6ampjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363522/original/file-20201014-13-6ampjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363522/original/file-20201014-13-6ampjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363522/original/file-20201014-13-6ampjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363522/original/file-20201014-13-6ampjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">While Facebook has banned groups and pages affiliated with QAnon, followers of the wild conspiracy theories have turned to other social media platforms.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ben Margot)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Where will QAnon followers turn if Facebook is no longer the most effective way to spread its theories? Already, QAnon has further fragmented into communities on Telegram, Parler, MeWe and Gab. These alternative social media platforms are not as effective for promoting content or merchandise, which will impact grifters who were profiting from QAnon, as well as limit the reach of proselytizers.</p>
<p>But the ban will push those already convinced by QAnon onto platforms where they will interact with more extreme content they may not have found on Facebook. This will radicalize some individuals more than they already are or will accelerate the process for others who may have already been on this path.</p>
<h2>Like a religious movement</h2>
<p>What we will likely see eventually is the balkanisation of the QAnon ideology. It will be important to start considering that QAnon is more than a conspiracy theory, but closer to a <a href="https://religiondispatches.org/in-the-name-of-the-father-son-and-q-why-its-important-to-see-qanon-as-a-hyper-real-religion/">new religious movement</a>. It will also be important to consider how QAnon has be able to absorb, co-opt or adapt itself to other ideologies.</p>
<p>Though Facebook has taken this important step, there will be much work ahead to make sure QAnon doesn’t reappear on the platform.</p>
<p><a href="https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/harmful-conspiracy-theories-youtube">YouTube said its new rules for “managing harmful conspiracy theories”</a> are intended to “curb hate and harassment by removing more conspiracy theory content used to justify real-world violence.”</p>
<p>In the initial wave of takedowns, YouTube shut down the channels of some of the QAnon influencers and proselytizers, in particular <a href="https://www.insider.com/wayfair-human-trafficking-conspiracy-theory-tied-to-qanon-2020-7">Canadian QAnon influencer Amazing Polly</a> and <a href="https://ici.radio-canada.ca/recit-numerique/1030/qanon-conspirations-complot-canada-quebec-trump">Québec QAnon influencer Alexis Cossette-Trudel</a>. Though this will cut off some of the big influencers, there is more QAnon content on YouTube that falls outside the platform’s new rules.</p>
<p>The new rules will not stop the role YouTube plays in radicalizing individuals into QAnon, nor will it curb those who will radicalize to violence until the platform bans all QAnon content.</p>
<p>Video is the most used medium to circulate QAnon content across digital ecosystems. As long as QAnon still has a home on YouTube, we will continue to see their content on all social media platforms. QAnon will ultimately require a multi-platform effort.</p>
<p>Technology and platforms provide a vector for extremist movements like QAnon. However, at its root, it’s a human issue and the current socio-political environment around the world is fertile for the continued existence and growth of QAnon.</p>
<p>The action by Facebook and YouTube is a step in the right direction, but this is not the end game. There is much work ahead for those working in this space.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147883/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marc-André Argentino receives funding from Concordia University.
Marc-André Argentino is affiliated with the Global Network on Extremism & Technology, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, and le Centre d'expertise et de formation sur les intégrismes religieux, les idéologies politiques et la radicalisation</span></em></p>Facebook and YouTube have brought in measures to stop the spread of dangerous QAnon conspiracies, but members of the Q community have found new ways to promote false theories on social media.Marc-André Argentino, PhD candidate Individualized Program, 2020-2021 Public Scholar, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1081962018-12-12T13:45:26Z2018-12-12T13:45:26ZMemes are taking the alt-right’s message of hate mainstream<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250215/original/file-20181212-76974-6rnkbq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Alt-right forums are turning the heads of mainstream social networks.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/disloyal-man-walking-his-girlfriend-looking-297886754?src=jDbtlOvRixeUv-ldJOyVfg-1-0">Antonio Guillem/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Think of an internet meme and you’ll probably smile. The most memorable viral images are usually funny, from <a href="https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/distracted-boyfriend">Distracted Boyfriend</a> to classics like <a href="https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/grumpy-cat">Grumpy Cat</a>. But some memes have a much more sinister meaning. They might look as innocuous <a href="https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/pepe-the-frog">as a frog</a>, but are in fact <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-an-ancient-egyptian-god-spurred-the-rise-of-trump-72598">symbols of hate</a>. And as memes have become more political, these hateful examples have increasingly found their way onto mainstream social media platforms. </p>
<p>My colleagues and I <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.12512">recently carried out</a> the largest scientific study of memes to date, using a dataset of 160m images from various social networks. We showed how “fringe” web communities associated with the alt-right movement, such as 4chan’s <a href="https://boards.4chan.org/pol/">“Politically Incorrect”</a> board (/pol/) and Reddit’s “<a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/thedonald/">The_Donald</a>” are generating a wide variety of racist, hateful, and politically charged memes – and, crucially, spreading them to other parts of the internet.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/BKMtdN5Bam5/?hl=en","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<p>We started by looking at images posted on Twitter, Reddit, 4chan, and Gab. The latter is a Twitter-like social network positioning itself as a “champion” of free speech, providing shelter to users banned from other platforms. You might have heard of it <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting-gab-tree-of-life/">in the context</a> of the recent Pittsburgh synagogue shooting.</p>
<p>We grouped visually similar images from this collection using a technique called <a href="https://www.phash.org/">perceptual hashing</a>, which involves creating a unique fingerprint-style way to identify each image based on its features. Then we identified groups of images that belonged to the same meme and annotated them using metadata obtained from <a href="https://knowyourmeme.com/">Know Your Meme</a>, a comprehensive online encyclopedia of memes. This allowed us to analyse different social networks just by looking at the memes that appeared on them. What we found was very revealing (and, at times, disturbing). </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248751/original/file-20181204-34131-1aghk3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248751/original/file-20181204-34131-1aghk3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248751/original/file-20181204-34131-1aghk3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248751/original/file-20181204-34131-1aghk3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248751/original/file-20181204-34131-1aghk3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248751/original/file-20181204-34131-1aghk3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248751/original/file-20181204-34131-1aghk3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248751/original/file-20181204-34131-1aghk3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Memes obtained from /pol/, The_Donald, and Gab. Red labels indicated racist memes, green labels indicate political ones.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://memespaper.github.io/">Emiliano De Cristofaro</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Fringe social networks like /pol/ and Gab share hateful and racist memes at an impressive rate, producing countless variants of antisemitic and pro-nazi memes such as the <a href="https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/happy-merchant">Happy Merchant</a> caricature of a “greedy” Jewish man with a large nose, or those including some version of Adolf Hitler in another image. Memes like Pepe the Frog (and its variants) are often used in conjunction with other memes to incite hate or influence public opinion on world events, such as Brexit or the advance of Islamic State.</p>
<p>Also, fringe web communities have the power to twist the meaning of specific memes, change their target context, and make them go viral on mainstream communities. A perfect example is the <a href="https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/npc-wojak">NPC Wojak</a> meme, which refers to non-playable characters in video games that are controlled by computers. In September 2018, 4chan and Reddit users began <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/16/us/politics/npc-twitter-ban.html">creating fictional accounts</a>, mocking liberals by referring to them as NPCs, meaning people with no critical thinking, bound by unchangeable programming, and manipulated by others. </p>
<h2>Measuring influence</h2>
<p>However, looking at web communities in isolation only provides a limited view of the meme ecosystem. Communities influence each other and memes posted on one site are often reposted on another. To measure the interplay and influence of different web communities, we turned to statistical models called <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.02822">Hawkes processes</a>, which let us say with confidence whether a particular event is caused by a previous event.</p>
<p>This lets us determine, for example, whether someone posting a meme on 4chan results in the same meme being posted on Twitter. In this way we were able to model how the more niche platforms were influencing the mainstream ones and the wider web.</p>
<p>We found that /pol/ was by far the most influential disseminator of memes, in terms of the raw number of images originating there. In particular, it was more influential in spreading racist and political memes. However, The_Donald subreddit is actually the most “efficient” at spreading these memes onto other fringe social networks as well as mainstream ones such as Twitter.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>Negative or hateful memes generated by fringe communities have become a tool of political and ideological propaganda. Shedding light on their origins, spread and influence provides us with a better understanding of the dangers they pose. As such, we hope that making our data and methods <a href="https://github.com/memespaper/memes_pipeline">publicly available</a> will allow more researchers to monitor how weaponised memes might influence elections and broader political debate.</p>
<p>For example, we worked with Facebook to help the social network’s efforts to mitigate manipulation campaigns during the 2018 US midterm elections, providing them with real-time examples of politically-motivated memes that originated from fringe communities. This allowed them to gain a better understanding of dangerous memes and monitor their spread through the platform in politically relevant contexts. Overall, this line of work can help mainstream social networks identify hateful content, for example by improving automatic detection of hateful variants of popular memes, and hopefully remove it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emiliano De Cristofaro currently receives funding from the EU Commission, EPSRC, GCHQ, Nokia Bell Labs, and Google.</span></em></p>Hateful images are making their way from niche sites onto popular social networks at an alarming speed. Here’s how it works.Emiliano De Cristofaro, Associate professor, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1077632018-12-07T11:37:57Z2018-12-07T11:37:57Z3 ways Facebook and other social media companies could clean up their acts – if they wanted to<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249371/original/file-20181206-128199-bq5q9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1392%2C155%2C3882%2C3481&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Under fire, but not without options.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/France-Facebook/d0af80e71f8e4f5a82547d5f5217590a/25/0">AP Photo/Francois Mori</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Facebook is in crisis mode, but the company can take major steps to fix itself – and the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/building-global-community/10154544292806634/">global community</a> it says it wants to promote. Facebook founder, CEO and majority shareholder Mark Zuckerberg need not wait for <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/mark-zuckerberg-six4three-facebook-data-damian-collins-internal-documents/">governments to impose regulations</a>. If he and other industry leaders wanted to, they could make meaningful changes fairly quickly. </p>
<p>It wouldn’t be painless, but Facebook in particular is in a world of hurt already, facing criticism for <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/france-paris-yellow-jackets-facebook">contributing to civil unrest</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-07/facebook-admits-platform-used-to-incite-hate-attacks-in-myanmar">sectarian turmoil</a> around the world, delayed responses to <a href="https://theconversation.com/weaponized-information-seeks-a-new-target-in-cyberspace-users-minds-100069">disinformation campaigns</a>, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/facebooks-very-bad-month-just-got-worse">misleading users</a> about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html">data-handling policies</a>, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/technology/facebook-data-russia-election-racism.html">efforts to discredit critics</a> – not to mention a <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/charliewarzel/facebooks-tensions-zuckerberg-sandberg">budding employee revolt</a>.</p>
<p>Facebook, Twitter, Google and other social media companies are causing <a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-is-killing-democracy-with-its-personality-profiling-data-93611">society-wide damage</a>. But they tend to describe the problems as much smaller, resulting from <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/04/facebook-said-the-personal-data-of-most-its-2-billion-users-has-been-collected-and-shared-with-outsiders/">rogue individuals and groups</a> hijacking their systems for nefarious purposes. Our <a href="https://datasociety.net/output/weaponizing-the-digital-influence-machine/">research</a> into how social media can be exploited by manipulative political operatives, conducted with Joan Donovan at the <a href="https://datasociety.net/">Data & Society</a> research institute, suggests the real problem is much larger than these companies admit. </p>
<p>We believe the roots lie in their <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/25/facebook-first-quarter-2018-revenues-zuckerberg">extremely profitable advertising systems</a>, which need a major overhaul. We have identified some key changes that these giant powerhouses could make right away. These moves could reduce opportunities for political manipulation and limit the <a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-is-killing-democracy-with-its-personality-profiling-data-93611">harm to democratic societies</a> around the world.</p>
<h2>Users’ minds in the crosshairs</h2>
<p>Facebook, Google, Twitter and other social media companies have built an enormous <a href="https://datasociety.net/output/weaponizing-the-digital-influence-machine/">digital influence machine</a> powered by user tracking, targeting, testing and automated decision-making to make advertising more effective and efficient. While building this supercharged surveillance system, companies have <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zoEXifWBtAs">promised users</a> and <a href="https://publicpolicy.googleblog.com/2007/09/our-senate-testimony-on-online.html">regulators</a> that targeted advertising is mutually beneficial for both consumers and advertisers. </p>
<p>In this bargain, users are supposed to receive more relevant ads. Facebook, for instance, explains that its “interest-based advertising” serves users who “<a href="https://www.facebook.com/help/585318558251813?helpref=uf_permalink">want to see ads that relate to things they care about</a>.” It’s true that these methods can identify ads that connect with users’ actual interests. But the very same data-driven techniques that tell a surfer about a new board design can also identify strategic points where people are <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604307/is-facebook-targeting-ads-at-sad-teens/">most vulnerable to influence</a>.</p>
<p>In particular, the leading social media advertising systems let political operatives <a href="https://theconversation.com/solving-the-political-ad-problem-with-transparency-85366">experiment with different ads</a> to see which are the most effective. They can use these tools not only to see if certain issues resonate with particular targets but also test for fears or prejudices that can be invoked to influence political behavior.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248858/original/file-20181204-34131-1g32tu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248858/original/file-20181204-34131-1g32tu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248858/original/file-20181204-34131-1g32tu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248858/original/file-20181204-34131-1g32tu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248858/original/file-20181204-34131-1g32tu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248858/original/file-20181204-34131-1g32tu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=978&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248858/original/file-20181204-34131-1g32tu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=978&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248858/original/file-20181204-34131-1g32tu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=978&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This misleading ad impersonated racial justice activists to urge black Americans not to vote for Hillary Clinton.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/social-media-advertisements.htm">U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Intelligence – Democrats</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One key way to do this is to make people feel that someone else represents an emotionally charged <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.004">threat to their identity</a>. In 2016, for instance, Russia-linked operatives bought <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/10/russian-facebook-ads-house-intelligence-full-list/">thousands of Facebook ads</a> targeted to specific audiences suggesting Hillary Clinton had insulted their group’s dignity or threatened their safety. Some ads alleged <a href="https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a13135811/russian-facebook-ads-2016/">Clinton espoused disrespect</a> for specific occupations, like coal miners, or racial groups, like African-Americans. <a href="https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/social-media-advertisements.htm">Others claimed</a> she would confiscate guns or supported radical political movements seeking to overturn familiar ways of life.</p>
<p>Targeting political ads is not unique to online advertising, but the tools of digital ad systems are vastly more powerful than traditional mass media. Advertisers can try out <a href="https://www.wired.com/2012/04/ff-abtesting/">several versions of an ad simultaneously</a> and receive almost instant feedback on which ones most effectively drive specific audiences to share, like or comment on them. This <a href="https://lucian.uchicago.edu/blogs/mediatheory/keywords/cybernetics/">digital feedback loop</a> helps political operatives refine their tactics, probing for just the right images, words and emotions to influence very specific subgroups of citizens.</p>
<h2>Move fast and fix things</h2>
<p>Members of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-13/new-social-media-rules-can-get-majority-in-congress-warner-says">Congress</a> and even some key <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/23/salesforce-ceo-marc-benioff-says-regulate-facebook-like-tobacco.html">Silicon Valley figures</a> have begun discussing the need for tighter <a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-begins-to-shift-from-being-a-free-and-open-platform-into-a-responsible-public-utility-101577">government oversight</a> and <a href="https://www.publicbooks.org/the-big-picture-misinformation-society/">greater accountability</a> in digital advertising. Change need not wait for politics.</p>
<p>Based on our analysis, here are some steps companies could take right away – on their own. These moves may hurt the firms’ finances, but would demonstrate serious and lasting commitment to limiting their platforms’ usefulness in political manipulation campaigns.</p>
<p>As their first move, social media companies could stop allowing their ad services to be used as freewheeling experimental laboratories for examining their users’ psyches. Just as <a href="https://www.insightsassociation.org/issues-policies/mra-code-marketing-research-standards">marketers</a> and <a href="https://www.apa.org/advocacy/research/defending-research/review-boards.aspx">academic researchers</a> must obtain permission from their test subjects, political advertisers that run online ad experiments could get <a href="https://gdpr-info.eu/issues/consent/">informed consent in advance</a> from every user who is involved. Companies should ask for users’ consent in specific notifications about ad experiments and not penalize users for opting out by limiting their access to services. We suspect many users would opt out of these tests if given the choice, but in any case this policy would help draw public attention to the hidden manipulation tools that platforms offer to their real customers: the political and commercial advertisers who pay the bills.</p>
<h2>Make targeted political advertising transparent</h2>
<p>To increase transparency and limit the ability of special interests to secretly influence politics, social media companies could refuse to work with so-called <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/basics">dark money</a> groups. All political advertisers should be required to disclose their major donors in a format users can easily access. </p>
<p>A new policy banning dark money ads would respond to evidence that political operatives have used impersonation and manipulative ad tactics to <a href="https://journalism.wisc.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/41/files/2018/08/nonwhite-recruitment-and-suppression.Russia.Kim_.v.3.080818.pdf">stir in-fighting or sow division</a> among coalitions of their adversaries. Impersonation clearly work best when ad sponsors are able to hide their identities and motives. Anonymous ads are also more likely to violate ethical standards simply because no one fears being held responsible for them. </p>
<h2>Make platforms more democratic</h2>
<p>A more significant change social media companies could make would be to introduce democratic oversight of how they collect and use people’s data. </p>
<p>Facebook’s Zuckerberg recently took an initial step in this direction, announcing that he will create <a href="https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/facebook-zuckerberg-content-moderation-appeals-independent-council.html">independent review panels</a> to handle users’ appeals against the company’s removal of content it judges inappropriate. He explained that he wanted to ensure “<a href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-blueprint-for-content-governance-and-enforcement/10156443129621634/">these decisions are made</a> in the best interests of our community and not for commercial reasons.” </p>
<p>Whatever you think about this plan – and it has been greeted with plenty of <a href="https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/facebook-zuckerberg-independent-speech-content-appeals-court.html">skepticism</a> – Zuckerberg’s reasoning acknowledges that because social platforms have become so central to democratic life, their own policies and design decisions require democratic accountability. </p>
<p>A more ambitious vision would let independent ethics panels representing diverse communities of users set enforceable policies for ethical political advertising. Similar sorts of groups are common in <a href="https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/why-did-hospital-ethics-committees-emerge-us/2016-05">medicine</a> and are emerging in <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/zarastone/2018/06/11/the-artificial-intelligence-ethics-committee/">artificial intelligence</a>, among other fields. The details of <a href="https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/facebook-zuckerberg-content-moderation-appeals-independent-council.html">how such committees operate</a> will be critical to their success. If these committees are set up in partnership with nonprofit organizations with proven records of advocating for <a href="https://www.commoncause.org/">democratic communication</a> and <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/">campaign finance transparency</a>, perhaps they could help social media companies earn greater public trust by prioritizing democracy over maximizing their profits.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107763/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony M. Nadler is a Fellow at the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University. Data and Society provided funding for this research on digital advertising and political influence operations. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Crain is an assistant professor of Media, Journalism and Film at Miami University. Data and Society provided funding for this research on digital advertising and political influence operations. </span></em></p>Without much delay, Facebook and Twitter could make significant changes to limit political manipulation and propaganda. Will they? And will users ask it of the social media giants?Anthony M. Nadler, Associate Professor of Media and Communication Studies, Ursinus CollegeMatthew Crain, Assistant Professor of Media, Journalism and Film, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1064762018-12-05T11:40:57Z2018-12-05T11:40:57ZWhatsApp skewed Brazilian election, showing social media’s danger to democracy<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/18/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-whatsapp-fake-news-campaign">Misinformation via social media</a> played a troubling role in <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/12/fraude-com-cpf-viabilizou-disparo-de-mensagens-de-whatsapp-na-eleicao.shtml">boosting far-right Congressman Jair Bolsonaro</a> to into the Brazilian presidency. </p>
<p>Bolsonaro did not <a href="https://theconversation.com/bolsonaro-wins-brazil-election-promises-to-purge-leftists-from-country-105481">win 55 percent of votes</a> thanks to misinformation alone. A powerful desire for political change in Brazil after a yearslong corruption scandal and a court decision compelling the jailed front-runner <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazil-in-political-crisis-over-jailed-president-4-essential-reads-91143">Luis Inacio Lula da Silva</a> to withdraw from the race both opened the door wide for his win. </p>
<p>But Bolsonaro’s candidacy benefited from a powerful and coordinated disinformation campaign intended to discredit his rivals, according to <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/empresarios-bancam-campanha-contra-o-pt-pelo-whatsapp.shtml">the Brazilian newspaper Folha</a>. </p>
<p>Days before the Oct. 28 runoff between Bolsonaro and his leftist competitor, leftist Fernando Haddad, an investigation by Folha revealed that a conservative Brazilian business lobby had bankrolled the multimillion-dollar smear campaign – activities that may have constituted an illegal campaign contribution. </p>
<h2>Election scandal fallout</h2>
<p>Using WhatsApp, a Facebook-owned messaging service, Bolsonaro supporters delivered an onslaught of daily misinformation straight to millions of Brazilians’ phones. </p>
<p>They included doctored photos portraying senior Workers Party members celebrating with Communist <a href="https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/lupa/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Relat%C3%B3rio-WhatsApp-1-turno-Lupa-2F-USP-2F-UFMG.pdf">Fidel Castro</a> after the Cuban Revolution, audio clips manipulated to misrepresent Haddad’s policies and fake “fact-checks” discrediting authentic news stories.</p>
<p>The misinformation strategy was effective because WhatsApp is an essential communication tool in Brazil, used by <a href="http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/brazil-2018/">120 million of its 210 million citizens</a>. Since WhatsApp text messages are forwarded and reforwarded by friends and family, the information seems more credible. </p>
<p>The fallout from Folha’s front-page report compelled WhatsApp to issue an apologetic <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/opiniao/2018/10/como-o-whatsapp-combate-a-desinformacao-no-brasil.shtml">op-ed</a>.</p>
<p>“Every day, millions of Brazilians trust WhatsApp with their most private conversations,” wrote WhatsApp’s vice president, Chris Daniels, in Folha. “Because both good and bad information can go viral on WhatsApp, we have a responsibility to amplify the good and mitigate the harm.” </p>
<p>The company announced that it would <a href="https://newsroom.fb.com/news/h/how-whatsapp-is-fighting-misinformation-in-brazil/">purge</a> thousands of spam accounts in Brazil, clearly label messages to show that they had been forwarded, tighten rules on group messaging and partner with Brazilian fact-checking organizations to identify false news.</p>
<p>Brazil’s highest electoral court also created an <a href="http://www.tse.jus.br/imprensa/noticias-tse/2018/Outubro/conselho-consultivo-sobre-internet-e-eleicoes-discute-impacto-das-fake-news">advisory board on internet and elections</a> to investigate disinformation in Brazil’s 2018 election and propose regulations to limit its impact in future political processes.</p>
<h2>It’s a WhatsApp-defined world</h2>
<p>Brazil is only the latest country to learn that <a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-is-killing-democracy-with-its-personality-profiling-data-93611">social media can undermine the democratic process</a>. </p>
<p>Numerous studies have confirmed that a toxic blend of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/25/facebook-fined-uk-privacy-access-user-data-cambridge-analytica">data mismanagement</a>, targeted advertisement and online misinformation also influenced the outcomes of the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-a-post-truth-election-clicks-trump-facts-67274">2016 U.S. presidential race</a>.</p>
<p>Brazil’s WhatsApp election scandal should be a wake-up call particularly for other developing world democracies, as revealed in <a href="https://public.tableau.com/profile/zeroratingcts#!/vizhome/zeroratinginfo/Painel1">research I recently presented</a> at the United Nations’ Internet Governance Forum. </p>
<p>That’s because the conditions that allowed fake news to thrive in Brazil exist in many Latin American, African and Asian countries.</p>
<p>Internet access is very expensive in Brazil. A broadband connection can cost up to 15 percent of <a href="http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/economia/noticia/2017-02/brazils-national-average-household-income-capita-40016-2016">a household’s income</a> and mobile plans with unlimited data, common in rich countries, are rare.</p>
<p>Instead, mobile carriers entice users by offering “zero rating” plans with <a href="https://internet-governance.fgv.br/sites/internet-governance.fgv.br/files/publicacoes/belli_arcep_zero_rating_minitel_en.pdf">free access</a> to specific applications, typically Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter. Nearly three-quarters of Brazilian internet users had these prepaid mobile-internet plans in 2016, according to the technology research center <a href="http://cetic.br/media/docs/publicacoes/2/TIC_DOM_2016_LivroEletronico.pdf">CETIC.br</a>.</p>
<p>Most Brazilians therefore have unlimited social media access but very little access to the rest of the internet. This likely explains why 95 percent of all Brazilian internet users say they mostly go <a href="https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/media/com_mediaibge/arquivos/c62c9d551093e4b8e9d9810a6d3bafff.pdf">online for messaging apps and social media</a>.</p>
<p>Yet the “rest of the internet” is precisely where Brazilians might have verified the political news sent to them on WhatsApp during the 2018 election. Essentially, fact-checking is <a href="https://www.cetic.br/noticia/acesso-a-internet-por-banda-larga-volta-a-crescer-nos-domicilios-brasileiros/">too expensive for the average Brazilian</a>.</p>
<h2>Concern over Africa’s elections</h2>
<p>Democracies in Africa, where more than a <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-africas-democratic-temperature-as-a-dozen-countries-prepare-for-polls-107675">dozen countries will hold elections in 2019</a>, are vulnerable to the same kind of lopsided access to information that influenced Brazil’s presidential vote.</p>
<p>As in Brazil, many Africans get <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/27/facebook-free-basics-developing-markets">stripped-down internet access</a> through Facebook’s Internet.org and Free Basics platforms. But, worryingly, most African countries have little or no data protection and no <a href="http://www.networkneutrality.info/sources.html">net neutrality</a> requirements that internet providers treat all digital content equally, without favoring specific apps. </p>
<p>In my analysis, Facebook and a handful of tech companies are now racing to <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/luca-belli/scramble-for-data-and-need-for-network-self-determination">collect and monetize</a> the data gathered through sponsored apps, allowing them to profile millions of Africans. Lax government oversight means that <a href="http://fortune.com/2017/01/11/nir-eyal-hook-model/">people</a> may never be informed that they pay for these “free” apps by exposing their personal information to data mining by private companies. </p>
<p>Such personal information is exceedingly profitable to advertisers in Africa, where Western-style public polling and consumer surveys is still rare. It is easy to imagine how valuable targeted advertising would be for political candidates and lobbies in the lead-up to Africa’s 2019 elections. </p>
<h2>Move fast and break democracy</h2>
<p>Democracy cannot thrive when the electorate is intentionally misinformed about candidates, parties and policies. </p>
<p>Political debate driven by likes, shares and angry comments on social media increases <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-each-side-of-the-partisan-divide-thinks-the-other-is-living-in-an-alternate-reality-71458">polarization</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-there-are-costs-to-moral-outrage-78729">distorts healthy public discourse</a>. Yet evidence shows that <a href="https://theconversation.com/audiences-love-the-anger-alex-jones-or-someone-like-him-will-be-back-101168">insults, lies and polemics</a> are what best drive the user engagement that generates that precious personal data. </p>
<p>For over a decade, social networks have been associated with free communication, unfettered by gatekeepers like news editors or fact-checkers. Many in Silicon Valley and beyond saw this <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-internet-freedom-a-tool-for-democracy-or-authoritarianism-61956">innovative disruption</a> as broadly beneficial for society. </p>
<p>That can be true when social networks are just one of many ways that people can engage in open and pluralistic debate. But when just a handful of apps are available to the majority of users, serving as the sole channel for democratic dialogue, social media can be easily manipulated to poisonous ends. </p>
<p>Mark Zuckerberg’s longstanding motto was, “Move fast and break things.”
That <a href="https://mashable.com/2014/04/30/facebooks-new-mantra-move-fast-with-stability/">catchphrase was retired in April 2018</a>, perhaps because it is increasingly evident that democracy is among the things that Facebook and friends have left broken.</p>
<p><em>The headline of this story was changed slightly after publication.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106476/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luca Belli receives funding from the Open Society Foundations, the Council of Europe, the Internet Society. The views expressed in this article do not represent the opinions of any entity with which he is associated.</span></em></p>Facebook retired its ‘Move fast and break things’ slogan – perhaps because, as new research from Brazil confirms, democracy is among the things left broken by online misinformation and fake news.Luca Belli, Professor of Internet Governance and Regulation, School of Law, Fundação Getulio VargasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1027542018-09-20T10:36:06Z2018-09-20T10:36:06ZWhy do so many people fall for fake profiles online?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236755/original/file-20180917-158216-t52jx0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Do you want to be friends with this person?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/man-white-mask-dark-1121249159">Sasun Bughdaryan</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The first step in conducting online propaganda efforts and misinformation campaigns is almost always a fake social media profile. Phony profiles for nonexistent people worm their way into the social networks of real people, where they can spread their falsehoods. But neither social media companies nor technological innovations offer reliable ways to identify and remove social media profiles that don’t represent actual authentic people.</p>
<p>It might sound positive that over six months in late 2017 and early 2018, Facebook detected and <a href="https://www.recode.net/2018/5/15/17349790/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-fake-accounts-content-policy-update">suspended some 1.3 billion fake accounts</a>. But an <a href="https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement#fake-accounts">estimated 3 to 4 percent of accounts</a> that remain, or approximately <a href="https://www.inc.com/bill-murphy-jr/facebook-says-it-disabled-almost-13-billion-fake-accounts-and-numbers-only-get-more-insane-from-there.html">66 million to 88 million profiles</a>, are also fake but haven’t yet been detected. Likewise, estimates are that <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/10/nearly-48-million-twitter-accounts-could-be-bots-says-study.html">9 to 15 percent</a> of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/27/technology/social-media-bots.html">Twitter’s 336 million accounts</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/technology/twitter-fake-followers.html">are fake</a>.</p>
<p>Fake profiles aren’t just on Facebook and Twitter, and they’re not only <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-russian-government-used-disinformation-and-cyber-warfare-in-2016-election-an-ethical-hacker-explains-99989">targeting people in the U.S.</a> In December 2017, German intelligence officials warned that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42304297">Chinese agents using fake LinkedIn profiles</a> were targeting more than 10,000 German government employees. And in mid-August, the Israeli military reported that <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-facebook-hamas-turns-to-instagram-to-lure-idf-soldiers-army-says/">Hamas was using fake profiles</a> on Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp to entrap Israeli soldiers into downloading malicious software.</p>
<p>Although social media companies have <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/09/05/644607908/facebook-twitter-heavies-set-to-appear-at-senate-hearing-google-may-be-mia">begun hiring more people and using artificial intelligence</a> to detect fake profiles, that won’t be enough to review every profile in time to stop their misuse. As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=BPdPhmkAAAAJ&hl=en">my research</a> explores, the problem isn’t actually that people – and algorithms – create fake profiles online. What’s really wrong is that other people fall for them. </p>
<p>My research into why <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2017.09.004">so many users have trouble spotting fake profiles</a> has identified some ways people could get better at identifying phony accounts – and highlights some places technology companies could help.</p>
<h2>People fall for fake profiles</h2>
<p>To understand social media users’ thought processes, I created fake profiles on Facebook and sent out friend requests to 141 students in a large university. Each of the fake profiles varied in some way – such as having many or few fake friends, or whether there was a profile photo. The idea was to figure out whether one or another type of profile was most successful in getting accepted as a connection by real users – and then surveying the hoodwinked people to find out how it happened.</p>
<p><iframe id="fCmc9" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/fCmc9/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>I found that only 30 percent of the targeted people rejected the request from a fake person. When surveyed two weeks later, 52 percent of users were still considering approving the request. Nearly one in five – 18 percent – had accepted the request right away. Of those who accepted it, 15 percent had responded to inquiries from the fake profile with personal information such as their home address, their student identification number, and their availability for a part-time internship. Another 40 percent of them were considering revealing private data. </p>
<h2>But why?</h2>
<p>When I interviewed the real people my fake profiles had targeted, the most important thing I found was that users fundamentally believe there is a person behind each profile. People told me they had thought the profile belonged to someone they knew, or possibly someone a friend knew. Not one person ever suspected the profile was a complete fabrication, expressly created to deceive them. Mistakenly thinking each friend request has come from a real person may cause people to accept friend requests simply to be polite and not hurt someone else’s feelings – even if they’re not sure they know the person.</p>
<p>In addition, almost all social media users decide whether to accept a connection based on a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2017.09.004">few key elements in the requester’s profile</a> – chiefly how many friends the person has and how many mutual connections there are. I found that people who already have many connections are even less discerning, approving almost every request that comes in. So even a brand-new profile nets some victims. And with every new connection, the fake profile appears more realistic, and has more mutual friends with others. This cascade of victims is how fake profiles <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10796-014-9509-2">acquire legitimacy and become widespread</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236970/original/file-20180918-158213-xfgysd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236970/original/file-20180918-158213-xfgysd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236970/original/file-20180918-158213-xfgysd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236970/original/file-20180918-158213-xfgysd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236970/original/file-20180918-158213-xfgysd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236970/original/file-20180918-158213-xfgysd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236970/original/file-20180918-158213-xfgysd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236970/original/file-20180918-158213-xfgysd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Who actually wants to be your online friend?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/social-network-new-media-cyber-safety-584684845">niroworld/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The spread can be fast because most social media sites are designed to keep users coming back, habitually checking notifications and responding immediately to connection requests. That tendency is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12100">even more pronounced on smartphones</a> – which may explain why users accessing social media on smartphones are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2017.09.004">significantly more likely to accept fake profile requests</a> than desktop or laptop computer users.</p>
<h2>Illusions of safety</h2>
<p>And users may think they’re safer than they actually are, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/asi.23894">wrongly assuming that a platform’s privacy settings</a> will protect them from fake profiles. For instance, many users told me they believe that Facebook’s controls for granting differing access to friends versus others also protect them from fakers. Likewise, many LinkedIn users also told me they believe that because they post only professional information, the potential consequences for accepting rogue connections on it are limited. </p>
<p>But that’s a flawed assumption: Hackers can use any information gleaned from any platform. For instance, simply knowing on LinkedIn that someone is working at some business helps them craft emails to the person or others at the company. Furthermore, users who carelessly accept requests assuming their privacy controls protect them imperil other connections who haven’t set their controls as high.</p>
<h2>Seeking solutions</h2>
<p>Using social media safely means learning how to spot fake profiles and use privacy settings properly. There are <a href="https://www.wikihow.com/Reveal-a-Fake-Facebook-Account">numerous online sources</a> for advice – including platforms’ own help pages. But too often it’s left to users to inform themselves, usually after they’ve already become victims of a social media scam – which always begins with accepting a fake request. </p>
<p>Adults should learn – and teach <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/22/health/social-media-for-kids-parent-curve/index.html">children</a> – how to examine connection requests carefully in order to protect their devices, profiles and posts from prying eyes, and themselves from being maliciously manipulated. That includes reviewing connection requests during distraction-free periods of the day and using a computer rather than a smartphone to check out potential connections. It also involves identifying which of their actual friends tend to accept almost every friend request from anyone, making them weak links in the social network.</p>
<p>These are places social media platform companies can help. They’re <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/22/your-time-on-facebook/">already creating mechanisms</a> to track app usage and to pause notifications, helping people avoid being inundated or needing to constantly react. That’s a good start – but they could do more. </p>
<p>For instance, social media sites could show users indicators of how many of their connections are inactive for long periods, helping people purge their friend networks from time to time. They could also show which connections have suddenly acquired large numbers of friends, and which ones accept unusually high percentages of friend requests.</p>
<p>Social media companies need to do more to help users identify and report potentially fake profiles, augmenting their own staff and automated efforts. Social media sites also need to communicate with each other. Many fake profiles are reused across different social networks. But if Facebook blocks a faker, Twitter may not. When one site blocks a profile, it should send key information – such as the profile’s name and email address – to other platforms so they can investigate and potentially block the fraud there too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102754/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arun Vishwanath receives funding from NSF. </span></em></p>Almost every online deception, fraud and scam – even propaganda and misinformation campaigns – begins with a fake social media profile. How do fakers get real people to agree to be friends?Arun Vishwanath, University at BuffaloLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1008742018-08-07T21:57:07Z2018-08-07T21:57:07ZSyrian refugees — the need for an image reboot<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231153/original/file-20180808-191025-vx1l2s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">To help with the rebuilding of Syria, we need to curb the rising tide of xenophobia online. Syrian refugees get ready to cross back into war-torn Syria from the eastern Lebanese border town of Arsal, June 28, 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2018, the <a href="https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts">Syrian refugee crisis</a> entered its eighth year. The <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/23/return-of-syrian-refugees-event-6897">return of expatriates</a> to Syria is challenging. More and more Syrians are displaced.</p>
<p>Since the series of terrorist attacks that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-new-normal-one-year-since-terror-attacks-paris-is-a-city-afraid-and-divided-66707">shook Paris</a> and the Western world in 2015, propaganda, often masquerading as news, has dehumanized Syrian refugees. Agitators online and even some journalists have depicted Syrians as terrorists and as an <a href="http://laps.yorku.ca/2017/10/canada-research-chair-unpacks-ethnocentric-narrative-relevant-to-syrian-refugee-crisis/">existential threat to the Western way of life.</a> </p>
<p>This has led to significant <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-impossible-migration-dilemma/?utm_medium=Referrer:%20Social%20Network%20/%20Media&utm_campaign=Shared%20Web%20Article%20Links">political shifts</a> in many host countries, including Canada.</p>
<p>In 2015, a “<a href="https://www.petitions24.com/no_immigration_of_25000_refugees">No immigration of 25000 refugees petition</a>” was launched to suspend the resettlement of the 25,000 Syrian refugees. The petition collected more than 75,000 signatures. </p>
<p>In 2016, Angus Reid Institute (ARI) surveyed 1,507 Canadians. The results stated that <a href="http://angusreid.org/canada-refugee-resettlement-plan/">two-in-five respondents opposed the resettlement of Syrian refugees</a>. In 2017, ARI conducted another <a href="http://angusreid.org/syrian-refugee-travel-ban/">survey</a> with 1,508 Canadians: 41 per cent of the respondents urged the government to stop taking more refugees, and 40 per cent disagreed with how the federal government handled the resettlement of Syrian refugees.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230984/original/file-20180807-160647-a9g6xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230984/original/file-20180807-160647-a9g6xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230984/original/file-20180807-160647-a9g6xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230984/original/file-20180807-160647-a9g6xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230984/original/file-20180807-160647-a9g6xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230984/original/file-20180807-160647-a9g6xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230984/original/file-20180807-160647-a9g6xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Of Syria’s estimated 10 million children, nearly 6 million are displaced or living as refugees: Here, some play in the village of Jibreen south of Aleppo in Dec. 2016. To help with the rebuilding of Syria, we need to curb the rising tide of xenophobia online.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Hassan Ammar</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So while many Syrians succeeded to escape the deadly conflicts in Syria, the population now has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/13/what-is-canada-like-for-a-refugee">new battles to win</a>. Many will have to survive labour-market discrimination, residential segregation, xenophobia, racism and social exclusion, to name just a few of the challenges.</p>
<h2>Migration benefits the host country</h2>
<p>A recent World Bank report on <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29806/211281ov.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y">global migration and labour markets </a> explains that migration provides large overall benefits to the destination country. However, bad policies or a lack of helpful ones can create barriers to success.</p>
<p>One of the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/">World Bank’s</a> mandates is to prepare for the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/overview">post-conflict reconstruction of Syria</a>. While the World Bank focus is on rebuilding physical and human capital, I believe an image reconstruction of Syrians and Syrian refugees is also crucial. </p>
<p>Syria <a href="http://www.mei.edu/events/regional-cooperation-middle-east-baghdad-declaration">needs its skilled population</a> to help with the reconstruction — by returning home or by contributing to the country through remittances, that is, wages sent back. But the Syrian diaspora is at high risk of being unable to do either of these things because of the negative propaganda targeting its image. </p>
<p>And in this way, the crisis becomes more than a civil war.</p>
<h2>The global rise of xenophobia</h2>
<p>Elsewhere in the world, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-the-far-right-has-reshaped-the-refugee-debate-in-europe/">anti-immigrant and refugee sentiments are on the rise.</a> United States President Donald Trump triggered a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-trump-effect-in-canada-a-600-per-cent-increase-in-online-hate-speech-86026">600 per cent rise of online hate speech.</a> President Trump uses <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-so-many-americans-continue-to-believe-in-donald-trump-100498">the negative image of immigrants </a>to justify <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/us-politics/article-trump-family-separation-detention-camps-explainer/">outrageous and inhumane behaviour</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-politics-farright/polands-far-right-opportunity-and-threat-for-ruling-pis-idUSKBN1ES0BK">The anti-immigrant Law and Justice Party</a> gained power in Poland.
<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-latest-news-leave-eu-immigration-main-reason-european-union-survey-a7811651.html">Brexit</a> happened. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/18/europe/austria-government-intl/index.html">Austrians included the far-right Freedom Party</a> in their government. The authoritarian anti-immigrant Prime Minister <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/09/viktor-orban-re-election-hungarys-anti-immigrant-leader-major-challenge-for-eu">Victor Orbán</a> returned to office in Hungary. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-trump-effect-in-canada-a-600-per-cent-increase-in-online-hate-speech-86026">The Trump effect in Canada: A 600 per cent increase in online hate speech</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<hr>
<p>In a stunning turn-around, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/world/europe/angela-merkel-migration-coalition.html">Merkel accepted</a> the idea of a migrant border camp after being a fierce supporter of integration and resettlement. Giuseppe Conte, Italy’s Prime Minister, formed a government of a coalition of far-right and Eurosceptic parties, calling for an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/06/italy-prime-minister-giuseppe-conte-migrants-austerity-maiden-speech">“obligatory” redistribution of asylum seekers</a>. <a href="https://theconversation.com/doug-fords-challenge-keeping-the-ordered-voter-97976">Conservative Doug Ford</a> who recently became premier of Ontario made recent comments about “<a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ford-wynne-horwath-immigration-north-development-1.4660539">taking care of our own first</a>.”</p>
<p>An infamous white supremacist, Faith Goldy is running for mayor in Toronto. In this way, racists, xenophobes, Islamophobes and bigots are forcing their way into public debates. </p>
<h2>The digital war</h2>
<p>The Syrian crisis consists of more than the displacement of millions of people. It also includes “overreaction and panic, fueled by a series of misconceptions about who the migrants are, why they come, and what it means for Europe,” according to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/profile/daniel-trilling">Daniel Trilling</a>, editor of <em>New Humanist</em> magazine. He says, “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/05/five-myths-about-the-refugee-crisis">the cameras have gone, but the suffering endures</a>.” </p>
<p>Hate speech propagandists and <a href="https://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/rcis/documents/RCIS%20Working%20Paper%202017_3%20Tyyska%20et%20al.%20final.pdf">news media spread many of these misconceptions</a>. Social media propaganda can be a powerful <a href="https://theconversation.com/social-media-can-be-information-poison-when-we-need-facts-most-100495?utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1532659016">information poison</a> and harm both expatriates and host societies.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230966/original/file-20180807-191038-1kllwn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230966/original/file-20180807-191038-1kllwn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230966/original/file-20180807-191038-1kllwn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230966/original/file-20180807-191038-1kllwn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230966/original/file-20180807-191038-1kllwn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230966/original/file-20180807-191038-1kllwn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230966/original/file-20180807-191038-1kllwn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">International Amnesty NGO placed pictures of Syrian people who fled due to the war in downtown Madrid, demanding an agreement with the EU in 2015 to shelter around 17,000 refugees.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Francisco Seco; Amnesty photos by: Samuel Aranda and Maria Jou Sol)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Feeling excluded and labelled as the enemy can have detrimental consequences on the Syrian diaspora’s emotional, psychological and thus productive capabilities. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7777651">Pyschologists</a> have long explained that belongingness is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NSqRZNNZd3Y">a fundamental need</a>.</p>
<p>Economist, <a href="https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29778/social-exclusion.pdf">Amartya Sen explains</a> that intolerance and racism lead to the waste of productive power. Unemployed and underemployed refugees are at risk of losing their skills and cognitive abilities. Many become discouraged. Some may lose their self-esteem and suffer from intense mental agony.</p>
<p>How can a crushed diaspora become a productive and self-sufficient entity in destination countries to help rebuild Syria?</p>
<h2>People become prejudiced when they feel threatened</h2>
<p>Propagandists use <a href="https://nowtoronto.com/news/danforth-shooting-islamophobia/">several strategies</a> to exploit an ignorant public through social media. </p>
<p>Social psychologists Cookie W. Stephan and Walter G. Stephan’s <a href="http://communication.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228613-e-490">integrated threat theory (ITT)</a> explains that people become prejudiced when they feel threatened. </p>
<p>Propagandists use <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/2158244018768657">“us/them”</a> dichotomy narratives to depict Syrian refugees as incompatible with Western culture and as a risk to the safety, well-being and political and economic environment of the west. They cash in on the lack of contact between host societies and refugees to spread their lies. The <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZunC2u7pUd4&index=112&list=WL&frags=pl%2Cwn">lack of contact</a> prevents people from verifying and validating any hypothesis they may have about the “Other.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230979/original/file-20180807-191025-15mph9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230979/original/file-20180807-191025-15mph9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230979/original/file-20180807-191025-15mph9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230979/original/file-20180807-191025-15mph9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230979/original/file-20180807-191025-15mph9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230979/original/file-20180807-191025-15mph9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230979/original/file-20180807-191025-15mph9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghan and Syrian refugees practice sweeping during a refugee curling day at the Royal Canadian Curling Club in Toronto on March 15, 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Frank Gunn</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This leads to an increased bias in favour of one’s own group and against all the others. Categorization is a normal psychological process essential to making sense of others’ behaviours. But, it is an excluding act when associated with stereotyping and racism. </p>
<p>Social media propagandists are also exploiting a perception of a general loss of control. A recent study conducted in Canada, the U.S., and the U.K. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301280467_Locus_of_Control_and_Anti-Immigrant_Sentiment_in_Canada_the_United_States_and_the_United_Kingdom_Locus_of_Control_and_Anti-Immigrant_Sentiment">shows that residents in a host society who believe they have no control over who enters their country have higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiments</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/welcome-syrian-refugees.html">Canada has accepted 40,081 Syrian refugees</a> since November 2015. Far-right extremists and politicians with agendas exploit the perception that many Canadians have no control.</p>
<h2>An image re-boot to save the diaspora</h2>
<p>Social media propaganda has caused a paralyzing mistrust between many members of host societies and refugees. Hosts worry about refugees’ “real intentions,” and refugees worry about being excluded by those who want to keep them in Syria despite the deadly conflicts. </p>
<p>A distrust also exists between Syrians, a divided population torn by the civil war.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/05/five-myths-about-the-refugee-crisis">Telling human stories about successful refugees is not enough</a> to change people’s perception of refugees. <a href="https://montrealgazette.com/opinion/opinion-elton-john-is-wrong-to-suggest-a-social-media-boycott">Boycotting social media</a> to stop the spread of hate speech or misinformation is not a viable option.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230991/original/file-20180807-191038-1ld4dkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230991/original/file-20180807-191038-1ld4dkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230991/original/file-20180807-191038-1ld4dkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230991/original/file-20180807-191038-1ld4dkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230991/original/file-20180807-191038-1ld4dkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230991/original/file-20180807-191038-1ld4dkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230991/original/file-20180807-191038-1ld4dkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Prime Minister Justin Trudeau greets members of a Syrian refugee family during Canada Day celebrations on Parliament Hill, in Ottawa on Friday, July 1, 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Justin Tang</span></span>
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<p>To rebuild Syria, we must start by including and trusting its people. To trust them, <a href="http://www.pcp-net.org/journal/pctp16/naffi16.pdf">we must create ways to view them differently</a>, free from the manipulations of those with xenophobic, racist agendas.</p>
<p>We need image reconstruction — to ensure the inclusion of Syrian expatriates. It should focus on two aspects. First, a plan for image reconstruction must build trust between refugees and their welcoming societies. Second, it must rebuild trust and confidence between Syrians themselves. </p>
<p>Failing to reconstruct the image of Syrians and Syrian expatriates can lead to their irreversible exclusion and collapse, and thus to the loss of any hope for a prosperous Syria. Both Syria and hosts countries will bear the consequences.</p>
<p>The World Bank needs to add an image reboot of Syrians and Syrian refugees to its agenda. But also, we, global citizens, all have ethical, moral and social responsibilities to <a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-be-a-bystander-five-steps-to-fight-cyberbullying-91440">counter social media propaganda</a> and to ensure this image reconstruction before it is too late.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100874/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nadia Naffi Ph.D. received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). She is affiliated with Milieux Institute for Arts, Culture and Technology and the Centre for Immigration Policy Evaluation (CIPE) at Concordia University.</span></em></p>One of the World Bank’s mandates is to prepare for the physical and human capital reconstructions of post-conflict Syria. But an image reconstruction of Syrians and of Syrian refugees is also neededNadia Naffi, Assistant Professor in the Education Department (Educational Technology), Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.