tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/social-protection-17583/articlessocial protection – The Conversation2023-10-09T13:31:59Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2142362023-10-09T13:31:59Z2023-10-09T13:31:59ZWitchcraft in Ghana: help should come before accusations begin<p>Witchcraft is generally understood to refer to a supernatural power possessed by an individual. In Ghana, particularly in the northern parts of the country, the subject continues to <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Should-witch-camps-in-Ghana-be-closed-down-1023430">spark fierce debates</a>.</p>
<p>In regions such as Northern, Savanna and North East, people accused of witchcraft are banished from their communities. In response, other communities have provided refuge for displaced people. These places of refuge have themselves <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/witch-camps-elderly-women-die-ghana-1754907">sparked controversy</a>. Critics contend that they have become centres of “abuse” and have called for their closure. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://findanexpert.unimelb.edu.au/profile/821110-matthew-mabefam">lecturer</a> in anthropology and development studies. I set out to understand the controversy around what are often called “witch camps” and whether they should be abolished. I conducted a year long ethnographic study in the Gnani-Tindang community in northern Ghana. Gnani-Tindang provides refuge for people accused of witchcraft who have been banished from their communities.</p>
<p>I conclude from my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21681392.2023.2232052">findings</a>
that government and NGOs aren’t proving capable of managing the problem, because they are starting at the wrong place. The focus is on witchcraft accusations, by which time people have already been stripped of their “social citizenship” and been forced to relocate. </p>
<p>Engaging with the experiences of people accused of witchcraft and their communities shows that intervening at an earlier point matters more.</p>
<h2>The background</h2>
<p>Victims of witchcraft accusations face alienation or exclusion from their communities. Exclusions can be social, physical, economic or psychological.</p>
<p>Some villages in northern Ghana have become known as places that provide refuge to people banished from their communities. These villages were not created for this purpose. Rather, they are already existing communities that have chosen to provide such refuge. </p>
<p>Banishment happens when someone accused of witchcraft is no longer welcomed in their community. They are asked to leave and never return. Not heeding such advice comes with consequences including violence, abuse, social exclusion and murder. </p>
<p>Sometimes people relocate to a village that’s offering them safety after they’ve been forced to leave their homes following direct threats. In some instances people move when they hear rumours that they risk being accused of witchcraft. </p>
<h2>What people who had been banished told me</h2>
<p>The purpose of my research inquiry was to gain insights into how individuals accused of witchcraft speak about themselves and their circumstances.</p>
<p>The experiences of those accused varied. As one told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>They finally threatened that they were going to do their juju, and if I had any knowledge about the child’s sickness, I was going to die within four days. I told them they should go ahead; I was willing to die if I were the one responsible for the child’s sickness. After the ritual, I didn’t die. However, they said I could no longer stay with them in the community.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another gave this account: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>After the death of my husband, the relatives accused me of witchcraft. My in-laws said I killed my husband, but I don’t know anything about it. He fell sick and died afterwards. How can I kill my husband? I was lucky I wasn’t killed. There were lots of chaos, and some of the people suggested that I should be killed. Others disagreed and suggested that I should be brought to Gnani-Tindang … It’s my husband’s people who brought me here.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>We also observed that elderly people with little strength to fend for themselves were often targeted. One person, who was 80 years old, said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Look at me; I’m old and weak now. I can’t do much for myself. But I must fetch water, firewood and beg for food to eat. It is lonely here. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>Ghana’s parliament has recently <a href="https://www.songtaba.org/wp-content/uploads/Press-Release_antiWitchcraftBill-28072023.pdf">passed</a> an anti-witchcraft bill. It seeks to criminalise the practice of declaring, accusing, naming, or labelling people as witches. Making such an accusation would lead to a prison sentence.</p>
<p>But, in my view, the bill alone isn’t the solution. This is because declaring certain behaviour illegal – and therefore punishable in a court of law – doesn’t address the issue of prejudice and discrimination which often relates to people’s age, gender and economic status. In other words, the law won’t deal with the tensions that emerge when culture intersects with the reality of people who become victims of witchcraft accusations.</p>
<p>Additional steps need to be taken. </p>
<p>Firstly, attention needs to be given to the underlying social issues driving accusations of witchcraft. For example, extreme inequalities among men and women, old and young, rich and poor. Creating avenues that provide a balance in society will have an effect on witchcraft accusation and banishment. </p>
<p>Early gender-tailored education needs to be introduced by the government and development actors on the value of both boys and girls. This is particularly important in the patriarchal societies of northern Ghana. This could help address gender inequalities that lead to witchcraft accusations. Witchcraft accusation is gendered: more women than men are accused, confronted and banished. </p>
<p>There is a need to engage widely with the Ghanaian society about the dangers of witchcraft accusation and to put in mechanisms to protect those who are abused and violated as a result of such accusations. </p>
<p>Finally, there is a need to listen to the voices and experiences of those who are victims of witchcraft accusations. This will ensure that interventions aren’t detached from their reality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214236/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Mabefam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Victims of witchcraft accusations face alienation or exclusion from their communities.Matthew Mabefam, Lecturer, Development Studies, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1925162022-10-16T07:51:36Z2022-10-16T07:51:36ZSocial grants offer cash, but they aren’t a magic bullet response to inequality in the global south<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489805/original/file-20221014-20-h2hfjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A vendor in South Africa's Alexandra with the backdrop of the Sandton Towers, one of Africa's most prestigious shopping centres.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo credit Mujahid Safodien/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the last three decades, there has been a proliferation of social protection programmes across the global south in what some have dubbed <a href="http://oro.open.ac.uk/20877/">a development revolution</a>. International development agencies across the ideological spectrum have <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialprotection/">embraced social protection</a> as an effective and efficient instrument to reduce poverty and inequality. </p>
<p>The advent of digital technologies has further strengthened support for social protection, including among development agencies sceptical of local state administration. Payments can be delivered electronically directly into the pockets of the poor. This seemingly <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/give-a-man-a-fish">circumvents networks</a> of patronage and corruption.</p>
<p>This apparent <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43694770#metadata_info_tab_contents">counter-movement</a> in development thinking reflects a growing consensus that economic growth does not invariably lead to a reduction in poverty and inequality. Social protection can play an important role in ensuring inclusive growth by providing income support along the life cycle. </p>
<p>However, measures tied to employment such as social insurance have limited reach given widespread unemployment and growing informality. Women, in particular, have been excluded due to gender discrimination. Therefore, publicly funded cash transfers are a key pillar of any strategy towards universal social protection. And studies show that they are affordable at all stages of economic development. </p>
<p>But cash transfers are not a magic bullet response to poverty and inequality.</p>
<p>Economist <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/102709/7.pdf">Thandika Mkandawire warned</a> about the diminution of social policy to cash transfers. He said it would ultimately leave unchecked the structures of accumulation which dispossessed, exploited and excluded the working classes in the first place. It also threatened to reproduce highly stratified, segmented and segregated forms of social provisioning. </p>
<p>Take the example of South Africa. It has one of the most expansive cash transfer systems, buttressed by a progressive tax structure. It <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/563112/46-of-south-africans-are-now-on-grants-ramaphosa/">provides nearly half</a> of the population with publicly funded cash transfers. Yet it remains the most unequal country in the world, both in terms of income and wealth, and along the lines of race, gender and geography. </p>
<p>So, what role can social protection play in reducing inequality? </p>
<p>In my view, social protection is fundamentally contradictory. On one hand, it reflects the relative surplus value which the working classes have been able to claw back from capital via the state. </p>
<p>On the other hand, it has historically served to preserve rather than disrupt exploitative <a href="https://academic.oup.com/sw/article-abstract/17/1/108/1940978">processes of accumulation under capitalism</a>. Ultimately, the impact of social protection on inequality depends on its terms, which in turn are shaped by the relative balance of power between social forces. </p>
<h2>No guarantees</h2>
<p>The objectives of social protection have varied across <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/The_Three_Worlds_of_Welfare_Capitalism.html?id=Vl2FQgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y">time and place</a>. Its terms have been influenced by dominant conceptions of citizenship, underlying assumptions about the roots of poverty and inequality and ideological positions vis-a-vis the state. </p>
<p>To be sure, social protection has the potential to decommodify labour. It can enable people to pursue meaningful activities outside the labour market. It can reduce social stratification through the provision of universal, high quality benefits, complemented by other meaningful forms of public provisioning. However, as history shows, this is not guaranteed.</p>
<p>Across colonial Africa the majority were excluded from emerging forms of social protection by racist labour-citizenship regimes. In Mozambique, for instance, social insurance was only available to “skilled” and “semi-skilled” workers. Four fifths of these were white. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, “unskilled” workers, all of whom were black, were excluded. The official justification was that they did not have contributory capacity. Colonial officials further claimed that black workers could rely on the mythical rural family.</p>
<p>At independence, many postcolonial African states introduced expansive social policy measures. But the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s resulted in the roll back of public provisioning. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, it was during this period that development agencies began to embrace cash transfers as a response to the fallout from structural adjustment. This led some scholars to argue that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09578819608426658">cash transfers were little more than a smokescreen</a> to eliminate more radical forms of redistribution.</p>
<p>Since then, there has been a consolidation and expansion of social protection systems across Africa. But only <a href="https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/RessourcePDF.action?id=57822">17.4% of Africans</a> are effectively covered by at least one social protection programme. Most cash transfers are short term, highly targeted, and insufficient to meet households’ reproductive needs.</p>
<p>It is in this context one could argue that cash transfers have a limited impact on poverty and inequality.</p>
<h2>From short term transfers to long term entitlements</h2>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic propelled governments across the globe to introduce <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/dech.12665">unprecedented social protection measures</a>. These included one-off universal payments, short term cash transfers for informal workers, and the extension of employer responsibility. However, the pandemic also exposed the fragility of social protection systems. </p>
<p>In Mozambique, for instance, the government approved a cash transfer of 1,500 meticais (about US$23.50) over a period of six months. This was provided to vulnerable households in urban and peri-urban areas. It also covered the province of Cabo Delgado under insurgency. But the transfer was entirely funded by development agencies. </p>
<p>The reliance on foreign funds subjected the state to the whims of World Bank <a href="https://rightsindevelopment.uwazi.io/en/entity/8mm38jusvx6">conditionalities</a>. These included the outsourcing of cash transfer payments to private service providers. Ultimately, the conditionalities proved impossible to implement. This undermined the pandemic response.</p>
<p>Globally, most COVID-19 measures have been short term. But <a href="https://www.iej.org.za/policy-brief-jobs-versus-grants-are-employment-and-basic-income-a-policy-trade-off/">civil society organisations</a> in some countries have been mobilising for them to be institutionalised and expanded through a universal basic income guarantee. </p>
<p>Proponents of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-basic-income-versus-jobs-debate-a-false-dilemma-165541">grant</a> argue that it would fill the cracks of the social protection system. These largely exclude able-bodied adults of working age. </p>
<p>It would also enable people to pursue more meaningful activities outside the labour market, such as unpaid care work. Finally, it has the potential to boost economic activity and increase investment, all while promoting social cohesion.</p>
<p>However, critics point out that a universal basic income guarantee is only meaningful if set at a high enough level for recipients to be able to withdraw from the labour market. In addition, its impact can be easily eroded by other aspects of life such as the commodification of public services. </p>
<p>And finally, it can be unsustainable, if it ends up absolving employers of the responsibility to provide labour and social protection. In other words, it is important not to let capital off the hook.</p>
<h2>Towards a transformative social policy</h2>
<p>Social protection alone cannot fundamentally change the organisation of production and the structure of accumulation, which lie at the heart of deepening inequality.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, social protection can play a transformative developmental role. What form social protection takes is a matter of political contestation between social forces.</p>
<p>For the International Labour Organisation, a high road approach would involve universal, comprehensive, adequate and sustainable social protection systems. The Social Protection Floors <a href="http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:3065524">Recommendation</a> proposes the extension of coverage through publicly funded minimum guarantees along the life cycle, and higher quality benefits through many policy instruments, including social insurance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192516/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ruth Castel-Branco does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Social protection on its own doesn’t shift the dial. Radical economic policies are needed to tackle poverty and inequality.Ruth Castel-Branco, Research Manager, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1838512022-06-01T15:04:27Z2022-06-01T15:04:27ZZimbabwe’s 2023 elections: how to judge candidates’ social protection promises<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465668/original/file-20220527-17-v9r9jp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Traders examine bales of tobacco, which is among Zimbabwe's key exports, at a March 2022 auction in Harare.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is heading for general polls <a href="https://www.eisa.org/calendar-comprehensive.php">in 2023</a> amid an ongoing macroeconomic crisis. In the decade starting from 2001, the state-led economy started to show <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-inflation-idUSL1992587420070919">signs of strain</a>. Unemployment <a href="https://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp197654.pdf?iframe">reached 85%</a>. Inflation, which was a staggering <a href="https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/Hanke_zimbabwe_091708.pdf">79,000,000%</a> in 2008, came down but has been rising in the <a href="https://take-profit.org/en/statistics/inflation-rate/zimbabwe/">past two years</a>. It is still <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/zimbabwe/inflation-cpi">among the highest in the world</a>.</p>
<p>The economic crisis has heightened the vulnerability of households and the need for social protection to prevent hunger among poor households, complement the risk mitigation mechanisms of informal workers, and improve access to social services such as education, health and water.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-informal-sector-organisations-in-zimbabwe-shape-notions-of-citizenship-180455">How informal sector organisations in Zimbabwe shape notions of citizenship</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<p>It is highly unlikely that the formal economy will turn the tide soon to create formal employment, which is vital for the stability of household income, and reduce the need to support food insecure households. </p>
<p>In the last presidential election in 2018, several presidential candidates promised to provide social protection for citizens.</p>
<p>The ruling party, <a href="https://webcms.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/495/country_documents-2020/Zimbabwe/ZANU_PF_2018_MANIFESTO_ENGLISH_%20(39.51).pdf">Zanu-PF promised</a> to create safety nets and enhance access to health and education services. Safety nets are also called <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29115">social assistance</a> and typically include cash and food transfers, public works, subsidies and fee waivers for education and health.</p>
<p>The Zanu-PF government’s safety net package includes cash transfers to <a href="https://social-assistance.africa.undp.org/data">52,049 households</a>, public monthly maintenance allowances in form of food and or cash to <a href="https://social-assistance.africa.undp.org/data">6,688 households</a> and paltry tuition grants and examination fee subsidies <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/outcry-over-paltry-beam-allocations/">for underprivileged students</a>. </p>
<p>The main opposition party, MDC-Alliance (now <a href="https://www.facebook.com/CitizensCoalition4Change">Citizens Coalition for Change</a>), promised to bolster social protection and <a href="https://t792ae.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MDC-ALLIANCE-SMART-MANIFESTO.pdf">reform the National Social Security Authority</a>. The terms <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_604882/lang--en/index.html">“social protection” and “social security”</a> are used interchangeably, and typically include social assistance and social insurance measures.</p>
<p>Little-known opposition parties also made promises. For instance, the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/People%E2%80%99s_Rainbow_Coalition">People’s Rainbow Coalition</a> promised to <a href="https://www.slideshare.net/povonews/peoples-rainbow-coalition-2018-election-manifesto-idea">provide social security</a>, and the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/APAZimbabwe">Alliance for the People’s Agenda</a> undertook to <a href="https://t792ae.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/APA-Manifesto-2018.pdf">deliver social packages</a> such as support for education and health care.</p>
<p>As Zimbabwe heads for 2023 presidential elections, due to be held on <a href="http://www.news.cn/english/africa/2021-11/11/c_1310303313.html">23 April 2023</a>, new or recycled promises will be made to voters. </p>
<p>Voters must judge candidates by the soundness of their promises to improve the reach of cash and food transfers to poor households, extend social insurance coverage to informal workers, and facilitate access to education, health and water for all citizens.</p>
<h2>What’s in place</h2>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/state-social-assistance-africa-report">researched</a> <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/social-protection-operational-tool-humanitarian-development-and-peace-nexus-linkages">social protection</a> <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2516602620936028">in Zimbabwe and beyond</a> for the past decade. There are a few key social protection measures to consider. Among them are social insurance, such as pension, sickness, maternity and unemployment benefits. These depend on contributions from formal economy workers and their employers. </p>
<p>The coverage of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfers programme is <a href="https://social-assistance.africa.undp.org/data">limited to 52,049 households</a>. So, it covers only 6% of the food insecure households. But over four million Zimbabweans, out of a population of <a href="https://populationstat.com/zimbabwe/">15 million</a>, <a href="https://www.unicef.org/zimbabwe/press-releases/zimbabwe-rated-one-worlds-top-global-food-crises-new-united-nations-report">are food insecure</a>.</p>
<p>The flagship social assistance programme gives households between US$20-50 bimonthly, depending on household size.</p>
<p>Since inception in 2011, the programme has covered <a href="https://socialprotection.org/discover/programmes/harmonised-social-cash-transfer-hsct">less than 20 districts</a>. There are 59 districts in Zimbabwe and all have food insecure households. </p>
<p>Then there’s <a href="https://www.nssa.org.zw/news-blogs/talking-social-security/schemes-for-social-protection/">social insurance</a> which covers pensions and worker compensation. But this doesn’t cover the risks faced by most workers as it only applies to formal employment. Only 15% of Zimbabweans are employed in the formal economy while 85% work in the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2020-09-16-outlook-for-informal-economy-in-zimbabwe-is-dire-after-harsh-covid-19-response/">informal economy</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/insights-from-zimbabwe-on-how-to-link-formal-and-informal-economies-182353">Insights from Zimbabwe on how to link formal and informal economies</a>
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<p>Many informal workers create their own risk mitigation mechanisms such as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0020872815611196">burial societies</a> or subscribe to funeral insurance policies to cover funeral expenses, which can be as high as their <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11150-020-09498-8">yearly income</a>. </p>
<p>Another cost that could be covered by social protection is school fees. According to the Zimbabwe National Vulnerability Assessment Committee <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-vulnerability-assessment-committee-zimvac-2020-rural-livelihoods-assessment">2020 report</a>, 50.3% of children of school-going age were sent away from school in the first term of 2020 because they could not pay fees. </p>
<p>The report also notes that 75% of all rural residents who are chronically ill miss their medication because they cannot afford it. </p>
<p>In the short-term, social protection must focus on fee waivers to improve access to education and health care services for all citizens. In the medium term, all these critical social services must be brought within acceptable travelling distances.</p>
<h2>Lessons from elsewhere</h2>
<p>A number of countries in Southern African Development Community region have national social cash transfers for all vulnerable people of a certain demographic group. For instance, in Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa, older people receive an <a href="https://social-assistance.africa.undp.org/data">old age grant</a>.</p>
<p>Some governments in Africa complement the risk mitigation mechanisms of informal workers. For instance, the Rwandan government adds a matching contribution plus life and funeral insurance policies on the contributions that informal workers make <a href="https://ejoheza.gov.rw/ltss-registration-ui/landing.xhtml;jsessionid=BFC430CED41625AEB78C47507D381B8C">towards their pension</a>.</p>
<p>In Ghana, the government contributes 5% to the new national pension scheme, which <a href="https://www.ssnit.org.gh/faq/the-new-pension-scheme/#:%7E:text=The%20new%20National%20Pension%20Scheme,benefits%20as%20and%20when%20due.&text=The%20New%20Pension%20Scheme%20was,implementation%20started%20in%20January%202010">includes informal workers</a>.</p>
<p>Free access to education has had positive impact on enrolment in <a href="https://world-education-blog.org/2016/01/27/can-africa-afford-free-education/#:%7E:text=Among%20the%2053%20countries%20with,of%20Tanzania%20and%20Uganda%20show">Kenya, Malawi and Uganda</a>. There are fee waivers for health care in countries such as <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29115">Eswatini and Burundi</a>.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>It’s important to address two issues when it comes to social protection in Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>The first is the lingering view that social protection creates a dependency syndrome – not only in Zimbabwe, but Africa-wide. This <a href="https://academic.oup.com/wbro/article/33/2/259/5127165">myth has been busted</a> by scientific evidence showing that cash transfers do not lead to fewer people seeking jobs.</p>
<p>The second is whether the state can afford to finance the extension of social protection to all food insecure households. </p>
<p>In a constrained macroeconomic environment such as Zimbabwe’s, funding social protection among other competing needs is about budget priorities more than it is an issue of sourcing new revenue.</p>
<p>Where there is high unemployment and food insecurity, it is socially and legally justified for the poor to depend on social assistance as it is their right, for which the government must be held accountable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183851/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gift Dafuleya does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Zimbabwe heads for 2023 presidential elections, there are key things voters should watch out for in the social protection promises made by candidates.Gift Dafuleya, Lecturer in Economics, University of VendaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1802382022-04-06T20:01:03Z2022-04-06T20:01:03ZPandemic pain remains as Australia’s economic recovery leaves the poor behind<p>“Our recovery leads the world,” treasurer Josh Frydenberg told Australia <a href="https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/josh-frydenberg-2018/speeches/budget-speech-2022-23">on budget night</a> last week. “We have overcome the biggest economic shock since the Great Depression.”</p>
<p>The government has repeatedly emphasised forecasts of the lowest unemployment rate since the end of the post-World War II economic boom, a time when “full employment” was the norm. </p>
<p>But a bigger story lies beneath the headlines. Our new report, titled <a href="https://www.acu.edu.au/-/media/feature/pagecontent/richtext/about-acu/community-engagement/_docs/scarring-effects-of-the-pandemic-economy.pdf?la=en">Scarring Effects of the Pandemic Economy</a>, shows Australia’s recovery has not been the rising tide that lifts all boats. </p>
<p>While JobKeeper and related policies cushioned the worst impacts of the crisis, the federal government has failed to address rising financial pressure or exclusion of the poorest and most marginalised in our community. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455981/original/file-20220404-15-8begca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455981/original/file-20220404-15-8begca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455981/original/file-20220404-15-8begca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455981/original/file-20220404-15-8begca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455981/original/file-20220404-15-8begca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455981/original/file-20220404-15-8begca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455981/original/file-20220404-15-8begca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455981/original/file-20220404-15-8begca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The report, launched this week, shows jobs and labour force participation are far from fully recovered in Victoria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-record-vacancies-australians-shouldnt-expect-big-pay-rises-soon-180416">Despite record vacancies, Australians shouldn't expect big pay rises soon</a>
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<h2>An uneven economic recovery</h2>
<p>Based on two years of research, the report looks at the ongoing impact of the pandemic on social service providers in Victoria. That included organisations offering emergency relief such as food and clothing, temporary accommodation, or help for victims of family and domestic violence. </p>
<p>The report, launched this week, shows jobs and labour force participation are far from fully recovered in Victoria. </p>
<p>Melbourne had fewer jobs at the end of the Delta wave in late 2021 than before the pandemic. This problem was much worse for women already overburdened due to school and childcare centre closures and who were also more likely to be exposed to sectors with the highest job losses during lockdown, such as hospitality or retail trade. </p>
<p>A further sign of the recovery’s unevenness is the number of people registered with <a href="https://www.dese.gov.au/jobactive">jobactive</a> providers, which are supposed to provide services to the unemployed. This number was almost double pre-pandemic levels even before the Delta wave began in mid-2021. By early 2022, numbers remained over 50% higher than pre-pandemic levels.</p>
<h2>Unable to leave, unable to work, unable to get welfare support</h2>
<p>The social protection afforded by emergency government spending measures in 2020 were denied to hundreds of thousands of people on temporary visas. </p>
<p>This is far from a marginal issue. By the eve of the pandemic, every 18th worker in Victoria had arrived from overseas within the last five years; nearly half of these came from central or south Asian countries. As one social service provider told us:</p>
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<p>We had many international students from India and Bangladesh with no income, no family structures and no social safety net. Their resilience was limited.</p>
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<p>This provider’s experience was typical of the sector. Unemployment for workers from this region peaked at 24% – four times higher than peak unemployment for workers born in Australia. </p>
<p>Joblessness, border closures and government exclusion from JobKeeper and JobSeeker caused untold suffering, forcing many migrants to seek emergency relief for the first time in their lives. Many found themselves in an impossible situation – effectively unable to leave, unable to work, and unable to access welfare support.</p>
<p>In 2020, emergency relief providers reported up to a 13-fold increase in the proportion of their clients who had no income. This proportion is lower today but still yet to fall to pre-pandemic levels.</p>
<p>The cohort of clients with no income correlates strongly with migrants on temporary visas.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455980/original/file-20220404-11-gudagm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455980/original/file-20220404-11-gudagm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455980/original/file-20220404-11-gudagm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455980/original/file-20220404-11-gudagm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455980/original/file-20220404-11-gudagm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455980/original/file-20220404-11-gudagm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455980/original/file-20220404-11-gudagm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455980/original/file-20220404-11-gudagm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Joblessness, border closures and government exclusion from JobKeeper and JobSeeker forced many migrants to seek emergency relief for the first time in their lives.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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<h2>People still struggle long after the worst of the crisis</h2>
<p>Despite a brief fall during the peak of the first wave of the pandemic, thanks to JobKeeper and JobSeeker, the pandemic drove people to emergency relief providers in record numbers.</p>
<p>In Melbourne, demand for food increased by up to 2.5 times in 2020. </p>
<p>As volunteers withdrew due to lockdowns, the pressure on active volunteers increased. In 2021, hours per active volunteer increased by up to five times and did not decline by the end of the year, even after the Delta wave lockdown ended. One worker assisting victims of family violence told us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The burden has been huge. [Victims] were locked down with the person that’s abusing [them]. [In bound] calls have just continued to increase.</p>
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<p>These are just some of the “scarring effects” of the pandemic which the rhetoric of high growth and low unemployment do not address. </p>
<p>The report shows the impact of lost jobs and income are not one-off events but have effects which persist long after the worst of the crisis has ended. </p>
<p>In response to these lasting effects, the report reiterates widespread calls across the sector for new investment in public housing and a significant rise in the JobSeeker payment. This would help address working poverty.</p>
<p>The report also calls for renewed government attention to the challenges faced by social service providers trying to assist the poor and vulnerable. These organisations and the people they’re trying to help continue to struggle despite talk of economic recovery.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/things-look-worse-for-casual-workers-than-at-any-time-during-the-pandemic-175065">Things look worse for casual workers than at any time during the pandemic</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180238/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The report on which this story is based was researched in partnership with Catholic Social Services Victoria, the peak body for over 40 organisations which collectively assist over 200,000 Victorians every year, and St Mary’s House of Welcome, a non-profit centre in central Melbourne which provides basic essential services to people experiencing homelessness, poverty and social marginalisation. The research was activated through the Stakeholder Engaged Scholarship Unit at ACU. This story is part of The Conversation's Breaking the Cycle series, which is about escaping cycles of disadvantage. It is supported by a philanthropic grant from the Paul Ramsay Foundation.</span></em></p>A new report on the ongoing impact of the pandemic on social service providers in Victoria found jobs and labour force participation are far from fully recovered.Tom Barnes, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, Australian Catholic UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1655412021-08-12T14:48:55Z2021-08-12T14:48:55ZSouth Africa’s basic income versus jobs debate: a false dilemma<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414840/original/file-20210805-13-1mlszx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An unemployed man collects trash for resale in Diepsloot Johannesburg. Calls are growing for a basic income grant for poor South Africans.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Once considered a utopian ideal, a basic income guarantee has become a distinct political possibility, as the South African government scrambles to respond to <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-pandemic-has-triggered-a-rise-in-hunger-in-south-africa-164581">growing hunger</a>, and <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2021/08/a-terrifying-vision-of-south-africas-future?fbclid=IwAR1l79nkfhXFjwe7FMFXgnFKTH2vwtbym2dCZoqm-3hGG39rzqSGvkwJ8L4">anger</a> in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. Spurred by recent <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/south-africa-most-looted-shops-still-shut/a-58731196">unprecedented riots</a>, the state reinstated the “social relief of distress” grant, after it was terminated at the end of April, until March 2022. Furthermore, it expanded the R350 (US$23) monthly payment to caregivers, who were previously excluded.</p>
<p><a href="https://c19peoplescoalition.org.za/about-us/">The C-19 coalition</a>, made up of community groups, trade unions, NGOs and social movements, has <a href="https://c19peoplescoalition.org.za/c19pc-statement-on-recent-civil-unrest-sa-deserves-more/">called</a> on government to transform the grant into a monthly basic income guarantee of at least R1268 (US$85). This is equivalent to the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/1_Stock/Events_Institutional/2020/womens_charter_2020/docs/05-03-2021/StatsSa_presentation.pdf">upper-bound poverty line</a>. There are calls for a guarantee rather than a grant and to reframe the transfer as a right based on citizenship, rather than a government gift to the deserving few.</p>
<p>President Cyril Ramaphosa recently <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2021-07-18-ramaphosa-says-basic-income-grant-will-show-government-cares/">affirmed</a> government’s commitment to considering a basic income grant, stating that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This will validate our people and show them that we are giving serious consideration to their lives.</p>
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<p>But, not all within the government agree. </p>
<p>New finance minister Enoch Godongwana has <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/511790/south-africas-new-finance-minister-speaks-out-on-a-basic-income-grant/">warned</a> against fostering dependency among youth in particular. He has emphasized the importance of investing in skills instead. </p>
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<p>What we need to do is invest in skilling these kids, and obviously, they will have some cash which will be a stipend or per diem. And in addition let’s get them better development of skills.</p>
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<p>However, skills training alone cannot address the problem of structural unemployment. South Africa’s unemployment crisis reflects decades of sluggish growth, declining investment in productive sectors, growing capital intensity in key industries and the <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-university/faculties-and-schools/commerce-law-and-management/research-entities/scis/documents/9%20Naidoo%20emerging%20trends%20in%20South%20Africa.docx.pdf">casualisation of standard employment relations</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/five-key-reasons-why-basic-income-support-for-poor-south-africans-makes-sense-165328">Five key reasons why basic income support for poor South Africans makes sense</a>
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<p>Ultimately, the basic income versus jobs debate is a false dilemma. After all, redistribution and production are two sides of the same coin. A publicly funded basic income would not only provide much needed relief amid high levels of poverty and inequality, but has the potential to increase demand for consumer goods and services, thereby boosting economic activity and increasing investment. This <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/27/what-billionaires-say-about-universal-basic-income-in-2017.html">dynamic of basic income</a> is well accepted by American billionaire backers.</p>
<p>However, basic income is not a magic bullet of itself. It must be embedded within a broader strategy of economic transformation, buttressed by progressive social forces.</p>
<h2>Structural unemployment</h2>
<p>The finance minister’s concern with giving something for something has been a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/dech.12665">recurring theme</a> in debates on welfare globally. Historically, decision-makers have been drawn to schemes which oblige the poor to work because they’re considered effective in imposing order, funnelling the dispossessed into ultra-low-wage labour and dissuading further claims on the state.</p>
<p>Interestingly, <a href="https://www.swop.org.za/post/incorporating-bomahlalela-reconceptualising-unemployment-and-labour-in-the-age-of-uncertainty">study</a> after <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/labour-laziness-and-distribution-work-imaginaries-among-the-south-african-unemployed/B9DBDA172DB42F855DD499AF6D186646">study</a> shows that South Africa’s unemployed – <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/Media%20release%20QLFS%20Q1%202021.pdf">43.2%</a> of the working age population, according to the expanded definition – would also prefer not to depend on the state and aspire to a proper job. The problem is that proper jobs, with standard employment protections, are increasingly scarce.</p>
<p>Indeed, between 1995 and 2021, youth unemployment rose from 28% to <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14415">63%</a>. But even those lucky enough to find a job, cannot necessarily meet their basic needs. Prior to the introduction of the national minimum wage in 2018, <a href="http://nationalminimumwage.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/NMW-RI-Research-Summary-Web-Final.pdf">54%</a> of full time workers earned below the line of working poverty.</p>
<p>While some try to cobble together a livelihood from informal activities, these are largely <a href="https://theconversation.com/stereotypes-about-young-jobless-south-africans-are-wrong-what-theyre-really-up-to-162633">survivalist</a> and insufficient to make ends meet. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-needs-to-ensure-income-security-beyond-the-pandemic-137551">Why South Africa needs to ensure income security beyond the pandemic</a>
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<p>In the last quarter, discouraged job seekers <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/Media%20release%20QLFS%20Q1%202021.pdf">increased by 6.9%</a>. One reason is the exorbitant cost of looking for work, including: accessing information, submitting applications, travel costs and skills training. These place <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-south-african-case-study-how-to-support-young-job-hunters-110511">an additional burden</a> on households already struggling to survive. A basic income guarantee could partially address this problem. </p>
<h2>The case for a basic income grant</h2>
<p>South Africa has one of the most <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-university/faculties-and-schools/commerce-law-and-management/research-entities/scis/documents/5%20Matthews%20traversing%20the%20cracks%20South%20Africa.pdf">expansive</a> social grants systems in Africa. It reaches <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2021/review/Chapter%205.pdf#page=9">more than 18.5 million people</a> or almost third of its population.</p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-university/faculties-and-schools/commerce-law-and-management/research-entities/scis/documents/5%20Matthews%20traversing%20the%20cracks%20South%20Africa.pdf">grants</a> have significantly reduced the incidence and severity of poverty, they exclude the unemployed, placing a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/eating-from-one-pot/733BDE2B0C233288A6408E5C7D4D0833">burden</a> on existing recipients, and effectively eroding the value of the transfer.</p>
<p>Proponents of a basic income guarantee argue that it would <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/scis/publications/opinion/universal-basic-income/">fill the cracks</a> in South Africa’s social security system. Furthermore, it could support activities outside of the labour market such as care work, and establish a reservation wage below which workers could refuse to work, <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/scis/publications/opinion/universal-basic-income/">strengthening their bargaining power</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, proponents argue that because the basic income guarantee would apply to all, it could foster social cohesion while avoiding the costly targeting processes inherent in means-tested-schemes. Meanwhile, its unconditional nature would prevent the state from coercing recipients into ultra-low wage work, as has been the case with South Africa’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-programmes/expanded-public-works-programme">public works programme</a>.</p>
<p>Of course, like the <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/national-minimum-wage-increased-r2169-hour">national minimum wage</a>, the impact of a basic income guarantee would hinge on the value of the benefit and how it is structured.</p>
<h2>Rethinking redistribution, reclaiming production</h2>
<p>Recent projections by the <a href="https://www.iej.org.za/financing-options-for-a-universal-basic-income-guarantee-in-south-africa/">Institute for Economic Justice</a>, a progressive policy think tank, suggest that a monthly basic income guarantee of R840 (US$58) - which corresponds to the lower bound poverty line - could be easily funded through tax revenue, using a phased approach.</p>
<p>With increased revenue from VAT recoupment due to increased consumption, and the introduction of a wealth tax, a basic income grant would be affordable for the entire adult population.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, critics are right to point out that production matters. On the one hand, production generates the revenue required for redistribution as well as goods and services. On the other, redistributive schemes contribute to capital accumulation through increased demand for goods and services, thereby shaping the organisation of production.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-pandemic-has-triggered-a-rise-in-hunger-in-south-africa-164581">COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a rise in hunger in South Africa</a>
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<p>Ultimately, what is produced, how it is produced and for whom are critical questions. One of the pitfalls of the global debate on basic income is that it has tended to ignore struggles around the organisation of production at precisely the moment when it is most urgent to contest the casualisation of labour.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/scis/publications/opinion/universal-basic-income/">history has shown</a>, if redistributive reforms such as basic income are not paired with labour, social and consumer protections, their impact can be easily undermined.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Ultimately, the basic income versus jobs debate represents a false dilemma. Redistributive reforms have the potential to increase demand for goods and services and wealth accumulation. This, in turn, can drive investment and generate jobs, while creating the basis for further redistribution.</p>
<p>But, progressive proposals for basic income must conceive of it as part of, rather than a replacement for, a broader set of reforms aimed at decommodifying life under capitalism and improving the conditions of work.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165541/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ruth Castel-Branco is the Research Manager for the Future of Work(ers) project at the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies. She has received funding from the International Centre for Development and Decent Work, and the Open Society Foundation.</span></em></p>Basic income must be embedded within a broader strategy of economic reform, aimed at increasing the social wage and improving working conditions.Ruth Castel-Branco, Research Manager, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1653282021-08-01T09:13:04Z2021-08-01T09:13:04ZFive key reasons why basic income support for poor South Africans makes sense<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/413749/original/file-20210729-25-1rnv3s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Marie Coetzee and her husband Fanie Coetzee live in the poverty stricken shanty town community of Munsieville, west of Johannesburg.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The basic income grant debate has been rumbling in South Africa for two decades, ever since the grant was recommended by the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of <a href="https://sarpn.org/CountryPovertyPapers/SouthAfrica/march2002/report/Transforming_the_Present_pre.pdf">Social Security for South Africa</a> in 2002. </p>
<p>The reintroduction of the “social relief of distress” grant by President Cyril Ramaphosa, for unemployed people and unpaid caregivers who don’t receive any other social grant or <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-progress-national-effort-contain-covid-19-pandemic-4">unemployment insurance</a>, provides the ideal moment to introduce permanent basic income support for poor and unemployed adults.</p>
<p>I prefer the argument for <a href="http://www.blacksash.org.za/images/campaigns/basicincomesupport/BasicIncomeSupport2020.pdf">basic income support</a>, rather than a universal basic income grant. That’s because South Africa already has <a href="https://www.gov.za/faq/services/how-do-i-apply-social-grant">social grants</a> for poor children up to 18 years of age, poor older people over 60 and other vulnerable groups.</p>
<p>What is needed is a social protection instrument that would address the <a href="https://mg.co.za/business/2021-06-01-sa-hits-new-unemployment-record/">country’s unemployment pandemic</a> by assisting people aged 18 to 59 who are living in poverty – basic income support.</p>
<h2>The case for basic income</h2>
<p>There are at least five arguments for basic income support. First is the moral case for providing support to the poor, which in South Africa is also a <a href="https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Reports/4th_esr_chap_6.pdf">constitutional right</a>. </p>
<p>Second is the positive economic impact: boosting the purchasing power of the poorest will create <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387818300105">income multipliers</a>, stimulating local economic growth and livelihoods.</p>
<p>Third is social solidarity and cohesion. The recent spate of <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/everything-you-need-to-know-south-africa-protests/">looting</a> in parts of the country, ostensibly triggered by the imprisonment of former president Jacob Zuma, was just as much an outburst of frustration and anger against a system that excludes millions of citizens who see no hope for their future. </p>
<p>The social relief of distress grant will alleviate some of this hardship and make everyone feel recognised and included.</p>
<p>The fourth argument for a basic income support is COVID-19. The pandemic and the lockdowns affected low-paid and informal workers badly, and prompted a R500 billion (US$34 billion) social and economic support package from the government, including a <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_documents/Covid%2019%20TERS%20Easy%20Aid.pdf">temporary employer/employee relief scheme</a> and the special relief grant.</p>
<p>Though temporary, these interventions highlighted the underlying problems of chronic poverty and unemployment that receive too little policy attention in “normal” times. This has prompted calls to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14680181211021260">make these emergency relief measures permanent</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, a basic income support would improve the effectiveness of the existing social grants. The <a href="https://www.sassa.gov.za/newsroom/articles/Pages/SASSA_Social_Grants_Increase_2021.aspx">child support grant</a> is intended to meet the basic needs of <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2021/review/Chapter%205.pdf#page=9">13 million children</a> in low-income households. But instead this cash is diluted among the entire family because unemployed parents and carers also need food and clothes.</p>
<p>This is one reason why there has been <a href="https://foodsecurity.ac.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Final_Devereux-Waidler-2017-Social-grants-and-food-security-in-SA-25-Jan-17.pdf">no decline in child malnutrition</a> in post-apartheid South Africa. Child stunting rates have plateaued at around one in four children since the early 1990s, despite the introduction of the child support grant in 1998, and its subsequent rollout to two-thirds of all children by 2020. Basic income support that targets low-income adults would allow more child support grant cash to be allocated to the needs of the child.</p>
<h2>The case against basic income</h2>
<p>Two commonly heard arguments against basic income relate to its supposed behavioural effects (“dependency”) and its cost (“unaffordability”). The first refers to the claim that cash transfers make people lazy.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://socialprotection-humanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/IWP-2017-06.pdf">myth of the lazy welfare claimant</a> has been comprehensively disproved in the social policy literature. Nonetheless, influential commentators like <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a-KSZCtaETs">Mamphela Ramphele</a> have recently argued that South Africans should pull themselves out of poverty through “self-liberating” hard work, and should not continue to depend on the “dummies” of social grants. </p>
<p>This pejorative view implies that poor people are lazy (they choose leisure rather than work, as economists phrase it), that they prefer to live on handouts from the state, and that there are plenty of job vacancies waiting to be filled.</p>
<p>This view is not aligned with reality. South Africa’s social grants are too little to live on, ranging from R460 a month for the child support grant to R1,890 a month for the older person’s and disability grants. Also, the economy is characterised by high structural unemployment. There simply aren’t enough jobs to absorb the millions of unemployed job-seekers. </p>
<p>People who argue against basic income are effectively saying that unemployed South Africans, who cannot find nonexistent jobs, should also be denied their constitutional right to social assistance from the state.</p>
<h2>Is basic income unaffordable?</h2>
<p>The second argument against a basic income grant or basic income support is its cost, and the assertion that it is “unaffordable” or “unsustainable”. </p>
<p>It is true that it will be expensive. Even at its low R350 a month (less than the <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03101/P031012020.pdf">food poverty line at R585 a month</a>), if 10 million people claim the special relief grant (there are <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02111stQuarter2021.pdf">10.3 million unemployed and discouraged work-seekers</a>, only a small minority of whom can claim UIF) the cost would amount to R42 billion (US$2.85 billion) each year. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DK7v9dGWNqI&list=PL5SgYUH3ZX3qa--NbIjFN2ZXmRhxxosmS&index=1">Where will this money come from?</a></p>
<p>One possible source is more efficient government. Reducing corruption, mismanagement and wasteful expenditure would release billions. Cutting <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14484">government spending</a> by 2%-3% would be enough to cover the cost of the basic income support. </p>
<p>The second source of revenue is to raise taxes. This is never popular. If personal income tax is raised, the middle classes will complain that they are already overtaxed. If corporate taxes are increased, business will complain, and some private sector jobs could be at risk. If value added tax is raised, this will <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-23-explainer-budget-vat-rise-will-hurt-poor-despite-mitigating-efforts/">affect the poor negatively</a> as well as those better off.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, South Africa is an upper-middle-income economy, and <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview">one of the most unequal countries in the world</a>. That suggests that there is much scope for redistribution. And the gap between rich and poor South Africans is so great that more redistribution is a moral, social and political imperative.</p>
<p>A third way of managing the costs of expanded social protection is to grow the economy. The flip side of the ANC government’s social policy success in establishing Africa’s most comprehensive and generous social protection system is the failure of its economic policy to generate broad-based economic growth that creates jobs for the poor. If that can be addressed, then poverty will fall, and the number of people claiming the country’s means-tested social grants will fall in the coming years.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>A comprehensive social protection system is one that provides social assistance and social insurance to everyone who needs support from the state when they need it, at an adequate level. </p>
<p>R350 is not enough for anyone to live on – and certainly not enough for any recipient to “choose leisure” rather than look for work – but it’s a good start. Most important of all, now that the special relief grant is back, civil society will start campaigning hard to raise it to an adequate level – and to make it permanent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165328/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Devereux receives funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa (Grant Number: 98411), and the Newton Fund, administered by the British Council.</span></em></p>There is no substance to the view that poor people are lazy and prefer to live on handouts from the state rather than seek work.Stephen Devereux, Research Fellow, Institute of Development StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1612882021-05-25T14:56:06Z2021-05-25T14:56:06ZCOVID-19: Global South responses have shown up social policy challenges – and strengths<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401844/original/file-20210520-21-1cbkgte.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A volunteer delivers food parcels in Masiphumelele informal settlement in Cape Town, South Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID-19 pandemic is more than a health crisis. It has also revealed other fault lines such as weak and inadequate social service delivery systems and institutional challenges. The poverty and inequality fault lines are unlikely to be redrawn or removed if new and innovative evidence-based solutions are not found to respond to these interlocking problems.</p>
<p>One of the questions I attempt to answer in this article is what we might learn from social policy and social development responses in the <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/en/country-rankings/global-south-countries">global South</a> to mitigate the impact of the pandemic and to help COVID-19 recovery.</p>
<p>My lens is a southern one largely because the social development approach – and related social protection policies that have come to be the bedrock of government responses to the pandemic – originated in development contexts in the <a href="https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol45/iss4/6/">mid and late 1990s</a>. </p>
<p>During the 1990s the exponential growth of social protection policies to reduce poverty, vulnerability and inequality served to reset development thinking and action internationally. Examples of pioneering programmes are child support grants in South Africa and <a href="https://theconversation.com/landmark-study-shows-how-child-grants-empower-women-in-brazil-and-south-africa-157537">Brazil’s Bolsa Familia</a>.</p>
<p>By 2018, over <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29115/9781464812545.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y">140 countries</a> had implemented a diversity of social protection measures. Across Africa close to <a href="https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2019/African-governments-committing-more-resources.html">50 new programmes</a> have been initiated in the last 20 years.</p>
<p>Different strategies have been used such as food assistance, school feeding schemes and public employment programmes. But cash transfers that are paid regularly to selected beneficiaries or categories of people based on an assessment of need have led the way. </p>
<p>Some authors <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198754336.001.0001/oso-9780198754336">label this</a> a “revolution from below”. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/landmark-study-shows-how-child-grants-empower-women-in-brazil-and-south-africa-157537">Landmark study shows how child grants empower women in Brazil and South Africa</a>
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<p>Social protection policies have been the bedrock of social policy responses to the pandemic. They have played a big role, protecting people from falling deeper into poverty or from the brink of starvation. </p>
<h2>Impact of social protection</h2>
<p>Advocates of social protection in the global South have argued that social policies have had positive social and economic multiplier effects. Evidence from <a href="https://www.proquest.com/openview/b11f17a88671217a6cb5ddaa10d0a012/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=6289">a systematic review</a> of non-contributory social assistance (funded from taxes and or development assistance as opposed to schemes made up of employer and employeee contributions) shows improvements in monetary poverty, education, health and nutrition. There were also improvements in savings, investment and production as well as work seeking and empowerment. The study was done in low- and middle-income countries over 15 years, based on data from 165 studies. </p>
<p>Social protection programmes have come in for criticism, particularly from policy makers and politicians on the right of the political spectrum. They have been accused of <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/we-need-change-how-we-think-and-talk-about-social-grants/">making people work shy</a>, and for <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-policy-and-society/article/abs/relationship-between-the-child-support-grant-and-teenage-fertility-in-postapartheid-south-africa/5F083EC4C6C245AA6DD4AF524FAE2FCC">encouraging teenage pregnancy</a>.</p>
<p>The review found no effects of the payments on adult work effort or increased fertility. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316081860_The_impact_of_cash_transfers_on_women_and_girls_A_summary_of_the_evidence">Another study</a> found positive effects on women’s and girls’ well-being, especially in education and employment, along with increases in women’s decision-making power and choices.</p>
<h2>Pandemic responses</h2>
<p>Early in the pandemic, countries had to address several questions as the virus spread and lockdowns became inevitable. These included: who needed the most help; what types of interventions were needed; what coverage levels should be; and how long they should be in place.</p>
<p>Consideration also had to be given to what the most cost effective interventions would be, how to ensure accountability of public spending and the long-term implications.</p>
<p>The responses that emerged were largely adaptive, built on existing social protection systems. Most countries increased benefit levels. In others, new beneficiaries were added to existing programmes and new programmes were established, such as in South Africa. About half (47%) of cash transfers are new programmes in 78 countries (reaching 512.6 million people), while one-fifth (22%) of measures are <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33635">one-off payments</a>. </p>
<p>In December 2020, Ugo Gentilini, who is the social protection lead at the World Bank, and his colleagues at the bank and UNICEF collated the first <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33635">Real-Time Review of Country Measures</a> to respond to COVID-19 in developing countries. This shows that:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Country-level responses increased significantly, with 1,414 social protection policies planned and implemented in 215 countries. </p></li>
<li><p>Social assistance made up close to two-thirds of all the programmes in this data base while the rest complemented these with social insurance schemes and labour market programmes. But cash payments were by far the most popular response in low-income countries (90%) and less than half in high income countries. Social assistance strategies included cash transfers (conditional and unconditional), social pensions, in-kind food as well as food voucher schemes and school feeding schemes.</p></li>
<li><p>There were major regional differences. In sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean there was a much bigger emphasis on social assistance. Europe and Central Asia and North America used more social insurance measures.</p></li>
<li><p>Social insurance programmes such as paid unemployment, sick benefits, health insurance, pensions, contribution waivers or subsidies were identified.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The overview provided a number of valuable insights and lessons.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-president-extends-special-covid-19-grant-why-this-is-not-enough-153942">South African president extends special COVID-19 grant. Why this is not enough</a>
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<h2>Lessons</h2>
<p>The first lesson is that countries with pre-existing systems of social protection and institutional capability were able to scale up more rapidly, and to implement the programmes fairly effectively.</p>
<p>Second, those that had registration systems and databases were able to do so faster. For example, India was able to reach <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33635">30 million beneficiaries</a> in a month in the early stages of the pandemic because of effective digital registration and inter-system data sharing. Access to identity documents, mobile phones and bank accounts also facilitated the outreach and impact in India. </p>
<p>This points to powerful innovation that is continuing to evolve in the global South. </p>
<p>The analysis also gives insights into the weaknesses of the current systems. One is that low-income countries with limited resources were more reliant on external resources such as development assistance to fund social protection. Middle and upper middle-income countries had a little more fiscal leverage to do so themselves. </p>
<p>For instance, South Africa, an upper middle-income country with high levels of <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29614">inequality</a>, was able to fund its relief programme through its own resources. This brought an additional <a href="https://cramsurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/1.-Spaull-N.-Daniels-R.-C-et-al.-2021-NIDS-CRAM-Wave-4-Synthesis-Report..pdf">5.3 million people</a> into the social protection net.</p>
<h2>Community level support</h2>
<p>There was an additional factor in the global South that came to the fore during the crisis that shouldn’t be ignored. This is the contribution of humanitarian assistance and community level mutual solidarity responses such as food relief that emerged in response to the pandemic.</p>
<p>Bottom-up community social solidarity initiatives have not been adequately documented but played a critical role in some countries to fill the holes in the safety nets. </p>
<p>These are age old indigenous and resilience building systems that should not go unnoticed.</p>
<p><em>This is an edited version of <a href="https://www.iassw-aiets.org/announcements/6603-katherine-kendall-memorial-award-lecture/">the speech</a> Professor Patel delivered to the International Association of Schools of Social Work and the International Council on Social Welfare on Social Work Education and Development Online Conference as the recipient of the 2020 Katherine Kendall Memorial Award.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161288/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leila Patel receives funding from the Department of Science and Technology and the National Research Foundation for her Chair in Welfare and Social Development. </span></em></p>Early in the pandemic, countries had to address several questions as the virus spread and lockdowns became inevitable.Leila Patel, Professor of Social Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1253852019-10-17T05:41:01Z2019-10-17T05:41:01ZWe must go beyond singular responses in the fight against child poverty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297305/original/file-20191016-98640-mycz1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">One in five children in sub-Saharan Africa live in poverty.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://ophi.org.uk/childrens-multidimensional-poverty-disaggregating-the-global-mpi/">Two-thirds of children</a> in sub-Saharan Africa face all manners of hardship. These include poor living conditions, low educational outcomes, high levels of malnutrition and often high risks of exposure to different forms of violence. <a href="https://www.unicef.org/publications/index_92826.html">One in five children</a> in sub-Saharan Africa are estimated to grow up in extreme “monetary” poverty, meaning they live in families without adequate incomes to make basic ends meet.</p>
<p>Growing up in poverty has long-lasting adverse consequences for children and the societies that they live in. <a href="https://marlin-prod.literatumonline.com/pb-assets/Lancet/stories/series/ecd/Lancet_ECD_Executive_Summary.pdf">Poverty undermines children’s immediate wellbeing as well as biological and cognitive development</a>. In the long-run, this untapped potential hampers economic and social progress.</p>
<p>As the world marks the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/events/povertyday/">international day for the eradication of poverty</a> it’s worth trying to identify answers and evidence in the fight against child poverty.</p>
<p>A recently published <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/putting-children-first/9783838213170">book</a>, “Putting Children First: New Frontiers in the Fight Against Child Poverty in Africa”, offers insights based on evidence in support of more effective policy initiatives that can address child poverty in Africa in all its different dimensions. </p>
<p>The book follows an <a href="https://www.theimpactinitiative.net/event/event-putting-children-first-identifying-solutions-and-taking-action-tackle-poverty-and">international conference in Addis Ababa in October 2017</a> that brought together researchers, policy makers and civil society to share lessons learned and identify new efforts in tackling child poverty in the region. Main themes included the measurement and analysis of child poverty, the use of social protection in addressing child poverty, and opportunities and obstacles for children as they transition into adulthood. The book includes contributions on these themes based on research from across sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>Across the range of diverse and rich research, we can distil two key messages in moving forward. </p>
<p>The first is that child poverty has strong psychosocial and relational dimensions that are frequently overlooked. They deserve more attention. This holds in relation to both measurement of child poverty and efforts to reduce it. </p>
<p>The second is that policies need to address the complex nature of child poverty – not simply one or two dimensions. </p>
<h2>The psychological and the social effects</h2>
<p><a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg1">Sustainable Development Goal 1</a> (SDG1) stipulates that poverty should be ended in all its forms. It also calls for the reduction of poverty in all its dimensions for all children. Against this backdrop, it is now widely accepted that different measures lead to <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41287-017-0082-7">differential estimates of poverty</a>. Each identifies different groups of children as being poor. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, current quantitative understandings of poverty overlook important psychosocial and relational issues that are core components of children’s experiences of living in poverty.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/poverty-reduction-strategies-humiliation-by-keetie-roelen-2017-11">importance of the psychosocial </a> side of poverty – also for children – is gaining acknowledgement. It is increasingly reflected in efforts to measure and understand child poverty. For instance, this includes a greater focus on the experience of shame and stigma in relation to poverty.</p>
<p>For example, children in Uganda experience the shame of poverty at home, in school and within the community. <a href="https://www.slideshare.net/YoungLivesOxford/shame-stigma-and-childrens-development-dornan-for-slideshare">Such experiences</a> may in turn hold children back in their development. Incorporating these issues in the study of child poverty is crucial for understanding the complex realities of children’s lives. </p>
<p>Acknowledgement of the psychosocial side of poverty is also important for formulating policies that more adequately respond to children’s multifaceted needs and vulnerabilities. This is shown in research that highlights the importance for relations and social connectedness. </p>
<p>In South Africa, research found that young people who were engaged in a programme that aimed to reduce social isolation and to improve social relations <a href="https://www.socialconnectedness.org/synergos-social-connectedness-programme-overview/">gave</a> them a sense of energy, discipline and a more positive attitude. In turn, this increased their chances of getting a job.</p>
<h2>No quick fixes</h2>
<p>Policies need to address in all the complexities of child poverty. </p>
<p>A case in point is social protection policy. SDG1 specifically refers to social protection as the policy measure to address poverty. In the last decade, social protection has become a central part of global and national development agendas. It is now <a href="http://www.endchildhoodpoverty.org/publications-feed/2017/11/1/9v61mcxy3mw336oilgamomko1p12it">widely recognised</a> as one of the foremost policy interventions for fighting child poverty.</p>
<p>A wide evidence base <a href="https://www.odi.org/publications/10505-cash-transfers-what-does-evidence-say-rigorous-review-impacts-and-role-design-and-implementation">provides testimony</a> that social protection – and cash transfers in particular -— can increase school enrolment, reduce child labour and improve access to health services. </p>
<p>Notwithstanding these positive effects, research also increasingly points to the limitations of a cash-only approach. Malnutrition is a poignant example. Cash transfers, which have led to improved food security and dietary diversity among families and children, <a href="https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/782-cash-transfers-and-child-nutrition-what-we-know-and-what-we-need-to-know.html">have done litte </a>to reduce malnutrition.</p>
<p>This lack of impact has given rise to the call for interventions that combine cash with complementary support and services. Such <a href="https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/915-how-to-make-cash-plus-work-linking-cash-transfers-to-services-and-sectors.html">‘cash plus’</a> approaches combine regular cash transfers with benefits such as food supplements; information provision and coaching; or referral to other services. New initiatives also integrate insights from behavioural science, which seek to make it easier for people to make positive change. </p>
<p>In Madagascar, for example, women engage in <a href="https://www.ideas42.org/blog/cash-plus-goals-help-families-invest-in-their-childrens-futures/">goal-setting activities</a> that allow for more careful planning on how they spend their cash transfers. Early feedback suggests that women felt better being able to prioritise their spending, particularly in relation to children.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>The reality is that many children and their families continue to struggle to make basic ends meet. It is therefore imperative that we find new ways of addressing child poverty that build on and extend successes from the past. </p>
<p>Lessons learned and a wealth of research allow us to cast a way forward. New frontiers in the fight against child poverty must move beyond singular responses. They must consider children’s multiple needs and vulnerabilities, including relational and psychosocial ones.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125385/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The publication of the book 'Putting Children First: New Frontiers in the Fight Against Child Poverty in Africa' was supported by CROP and the Global Coalition to End Child Poverty. </span></em></p>Child poverty has important psychological and social consequences. This means solutions need to cover very many different angles.Keetie Roelen, Research Fellow, Co-Director, Centre for Social Protection, Institute of Development Studies, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/818492017-08-22T15:10:18Z2017-08-22T15:10:18ZKenya maternity fee waiver is great - but there are still gaps in the policy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182974/original/file-20170822-30494-mpa9jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya's pregnancy policy hasn't addressed the inequalities between rich and poor.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>About 21 pregnant women die every day in <a href="http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/monitoring/maternal-mortality-2015/en/">Kenya</a> due to complications from childbirth. That’s equivalent to two 10-seater commuter micro minibuses, known as matatus, crashing every day with the loss of all the passengers on board. </p>
<p>Pregnant women in Kenya die <a href="http://www.unfpa.org/news/promise-action-ending-preventable-maternal-deaths-kenya">because</a> they either do not receive appropriate care during pregnancy or are unable to deliver with the help of skilled health attendants.</p>
<p>The World Health Organisation <a href="http://www.who.int/maternal_child_adolescent/documents/9241591692/en/">recommends</a> four antenatal visits and skilled care during and immediately after delivery. It also recommends emergency obstetric care in cases of complications as key to reducing maternal and neonatal deaths. </p>
<p>But the costs for antenatal care and skilled delivery are simply too high for many poor women in Kenya. Based on data collected before the maternity subsidy policy was introduced <a href="http://www.healthpolicyproject.com/pubs/745_KHHUESReportJanuary.pdf">the costs</a> associated with a normal pregnancy and delivery was more than 20% of the country’s gross national income of USD$1,380 per capita.</p>
<p>The intention of the maternity fee waiver, implemented in 2013, was to remove out-of-pocket fees for skilled delivery in public health facilities across the country. This would enable thousands of pregnant women delivering at home to access proper services. The direct payments for normal and c-section deliveries was replaced by a national government budgetary allocation to reimburse health facilities for deliveries provided. </p>
<p>The effect of the new policy was immediate. There was a 22% increase in skilled deliveries in facilities between 2013 and 2015. </p>
<p>What the policy hasn’t done is address the entrenched inequity between rich and poor women. In fact, women who are better off have benefited more than those with a low income. A <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/fr308/fr308.pdf">national survey</a> carried out a year after implementation showed that the use of skilled delivery services was about three times higher among the richest 20% of women as compared to the poorest 20% of women.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182978/original/file-20170822-22283-6fbudb.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182978/original/file-20170822-22283-6fbudb.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182978/original/file-20170822-22283-6fbudb.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182978/original/file-20170822-22283-6fbudb.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182978/original/file-20170822-22283-6fbudb.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182978/original/file-20170822-22283-6fbudb.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182978/original/file-20170822-22283-6fbudb.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182978/original/file-20170822-22283-6fbudb.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Proportions of women who had a skilled delivery by wealth index
and indicators of equity. Demographic and Health Survey Data.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>An added problem is that poor women in both urban and rural areas were still delivering their babies in private facilities. To close the gap, there must be a concerted effort to target free services at the poorest women who cannot otherwise afford care. In addition, proposed changes to expand the free service offering to some private health facilities need to be implemented urgently.</p>
<h2>Public versus private</h2>
<p>National <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/fr308/fr308.pdf">survey</a> data from 2014 shows that the proportion of the poorest women in urban settings who delivered at public health facilities had declined from 95% to 87% between 2008-09 and 2014. This suggests that more urban poor women sought and paid for services in the private sector despite the availability of free services in the public sector. Similarly, about 11% of the poorest rural women delivered at private facilities in 2014. </p>
<p>The reasons for this could be due to a deficit of public health facilities nearby, a lack of trust in the public health system, and shorter waiting times in private health facilities.</p>
<p>Changes are under way to expand the programme even further. Next year the maternity fee waiver will be implemented through the <a href="http://www.nhif.or.ke/healthinsurance/">National Hospital Insurance Fund</a>, a state-run fund established in 1966 to provide affordable and equitable social health insurance to all Kenyans. This will extend availability of free services beyond public facilities to include select low-cost private and faith-based health facilities. </p>
<p>The changes planned for next year also include an enhanced maternity package that goes beyond one-time labour and delivery. It will include antenatal care, postnatal care, deliveries, family planning and any hospitalisations arising from pregnancy related complications. The programme is currently being piloted under an <a href="http://www.babybandafair.com/government-of-kenya-launches-national-expanded-free-maternity-services-program-dubbed-linda-mama/">initiative</a> called Linda Mama, which means “protect the mother” in Kiswahili. </p>
<p>The additions to the policy will go a long way in expanding the choice of health facilities. This is especially the case in settings with limited number of public health facilities. Working with the National Hospital Insurance Fund will also benefit from well-established mechanisms for monitoring quality of care. </p>
<p>But there are additional measures that the government needs to take to promote universal and equitable access to maternal health services.</p>
<h2>Closing the equity gap</h2>
<p>Kenya has committed itself to leave no pregnant woman behind. Realising this commitment requires identifying areas of inequality, understanding the drivers of the inequalities, and monitoring the progress made at reducing them. </p>
<p>As the programme is expanded and placed under the National Hospital Insurance Fund, the government should take into consideration three important issues. </p>
<p>The first is increased awareness. A national campaign should be carried to ensure that more pregnant women, especially those in remote communities, register with the National Hospital Insurance Fund to access free services. </p>
<p>The second is robust monitoring and evaluation system as part of the national strategic plan. This will help in assessing improvements in coverage of services. This in turn will help uncover and target inequalities so that the most disadvantaged women have the same access to quality maternity care as the richest women.</p>
<p>The third is to implement additional non-health health interventions to encourage the poorest women to demand and access services. Multi-layered barriers combine and reinforce each other to undermine utilisation of maternal health services.</p>
<p>These include demand side barriers such as formal and informal fees, transportation costs and opportunity cost as well as education and health information. Supply side barriers include quality of care. </p>
<p>All these factors should be carefully considered to achieve real progress in utilisation of services among the poorest women.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81849/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Estelle Monique Sidze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Free maternal services introduced in Kenya in 2013 had the immediate impact of increasing access. But it exposed a divide in which the richest 20% of women were the biggest beneficiaries.Estelle Monique Sidze, Associate Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research CenterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/772202017-05-08T15:48:53Z2017-05-08T15:48:53ZOne year on: lessons from Zanzibar’s universal old-age pension<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168397/original/file-20170508-20729-1rdgnyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pensions have made a big difference in the lives of Zanzibar's elderly men and women.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">HelpAge/Courtesy</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kombo Mohamed, then aged 72, was the first person in Zanzibar to receive the new old-age pension <a href="http://www.ilo.org/addisababa/media-centre/pr/WCMS_489536/lang--en/index.htm">introduced</a> in April 2016. “My whole family has benefited,” he says, “I can pay my daughter’s school fees and transport to school and our diet has improved as we eat more fruit and vegetables.” </p>
<p>The value of the pension is modest at only 20,000 Tanzanian shillings per month, or just under $10. The age threshold for eligibility is high at 70 years. Nonetheless, over the past year Zanzibar’s new pension has brought some material comfort and dignity to elderly men and women on this island territory off the east African coast.</p>
<p>Zanzibar’s pension programme is a pioneer in East Africa. It is universal, meaning that it is paid to every older man and woman. There is no “means test” – a test of income or wealth – or requirement of past contributions. It is funded fully through the budget of the government of Zanzibar, without any direct funding by foreign aid donors. </p>
<p>Most of the countries in Africa with universal or near-universal pension programmes are middle-income countries like Mauritius, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. <a href="http://www.pension-watch.net/about-social-pensions/about-social-pensions/social-pensions-database/">Their pension programmes</a> cover all elderly men and women, except for the rich (in the South African case). The cost ranges between 0.3 and 2.2 percent of GDP, depending on the generosity of benefits.</p>
<p>Governments in poorer African countries (including <a href="http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za/sites/cssr.uct.ac.za/files/WP%20377%20Ulriksen.pdf">Tanzania</a>) have been reluctant to introduce similar programmes, usually citing concerns over “affordability” – meaning that pensions are not a priority. Care for the elderly is left to kin, who more and more often fail to provide.</p>
<p>The case of Zanzibar shows that, given certain political conditions, even low-income countries in Africa can introduce and pay for a universal pension programme.</p>
<h2>Responsibility, not dependency</h2>
<p>Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous part of the United Republic of Tanzania. It comprises an archipelago of islands with a total population of about 1.3 million people, almost all Muslim. Poverty remains widespread. Social change has rendered older people especially vulnerable, with very few people able and willing to support older relatives.</p>
<p>The “revolutionary” government of Zanzibar has long professed to be pro-poor. Since colonial times, the state administered a system of poor relief, making minimal payments or allowances, called posho, to the most destitute people. The government’s preference, however, was to rely on Muslim religious charity called zakat. In the past few years, a World Bank-driven programme began to operate a conditional cash transfer programme for poor families with children. But this did not cover older people, many of whom were compelled to continue working despite infirmity. </p>
<p>As across much of Africa, pensions – and other forms of social protection – were put on the policy agenda in Zanzibar by international agencies. In 2009, <a href="http://www.helpage.org/">HelpAge International</a>, a non-government global network, combined with Zanzibar’s Department of Social Welfare to produce a report on the needs of older people in Zanzibar. </p>
<p>HelpAge had recently become enthusiastic advocates of old-age pensions. The report on Zanzibar recommended a universal pension of the equivalent of about $9 per month, from the age of 60. The report costed this at 0.85 percent of GDP. Zanzibar’s president endorsed the general proposal when he spoke at the report’s launch. </p>
<p>The Zanzibari state did not yet have any capacity to implement the proposal. It began work on a social protection policy, established a social protection unit, and sent officials to related specialist courses. In 2013 a group of government officials and politicians <a href="http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Tanzania-learns-from-Mauritius-Experience/1840340-2013608-evrfba/index.html">toured Mauritius</a>, which has had a universal old-age pension for decades. </p>
<p>The study tour to Mauritius had a huge effect. As one participant put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Seeing is believing. We saw the enthusiasm of their leaders. They showed us how the system works. The way they told us about their experiences, we were motivated.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>When the draft Social Protection Policy was presented to the Cabinet in early 2014, however, some ministers expressed concern over the cost of a universal pension in light of tight budget constraints. President Ali Mohamed Shein referred the proposal to an inter-departmental team. The team quickly agreed that pensions should be universal and benefits should be set at about $10 per month, but could not agree on the age threshold. </p>
<p>Eventually it recommended an age threshold of 65, which would cost 0.7% of GDP. But it added that, if resources did not permit this, the threshold should be 70, which would cost only 0.5 percent of GDP. In March 2015 the President and Cabinet agreed to introduce pensions, but with the high age threshold. After a further year of preparations, the first pensions were paid out in April 2016.</p>
<p>The context in Zanzibar was favourable to the introduction of a pension in several respects. Firstly, there was a clear need for financial assistance for older people. This is especially given the decline of agriculture and fishing, and the erosion of kinship obligations. </p>
<p>Secondly, Zanzibar had traditions of both public responsibility and religious charity for the poor, through posho and zakat. These traditions made it easier for advocates of pensions to represent their proposals as improvements of existing policies. The dominant discourse in Zanzibar was one of responsibility, not of dependency. </p>
<p>The political situation also facilitated the reform. In the 2010 presidential election, the incumbent party’s candidate Shein defeated the opposition candidate very narrowly. Following his election, Shein proceeded to bring the opposition into a Government of National Unity, which resulted in more constructive political debate and policymaking. The backdrop of close-fought elections probably also inclined Shein to be sympathetic to popular reform.</p>
<h2>Making a big difference</h2>
<p>Zanzibar’s case indicates that low-income countries can choose to introduce reforms such as old-age pensions. But its experience suggests also that successful reform requires a careful process of coalition-building beyond the Ministry for Social Welfare. This includes a willingness to deliberate and compromise with those parts of the government that are anxious about the cost. External actors, such as HelpAge in this case, can play important support roles. But it is crucial that local officials and politicians own the initiative. </p>
<p>Reports from Zanzibar indicate that the pensions have made a big difference in the lives of elderly men and women. They have allowed them not only to purchase basic necessities but also to invest in the education of their children or grandchildren, and in income-generating activities. </p>
<p>The Zanzibar model might well become more general. In 2017, the Kenyan government announced a similar scheme would be <a href="http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2017/03/universal-social-welfare-for-those-over-70-meant-to-foster-inclusivity-ps/">introduced</a>, also with an age threshold of 70.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77220/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeremy Seekings does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The case of Zanzibar shows that, given certain political conditions, even low-income countries in Africa can introduce and pay for a universal pension programme.Jeremy Seekings, Director, Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/413262015-06-05T04:42:40Z2015-06-05T04:42:40ZThe perfect package for reducing poverty is made up of different parts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/83333/original/image-20150529-12358-1hi1plh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Multiple approaches to alleviating poverty help cater for different contexts and groups of people.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Pascal Rossignol</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Enabling people to move out – and stay out – of poverty is a complex process that requires more than just one intervention. Multiple approaches that take in education, social protection, health and agriculture help cater for different contexts and groups of people.</p>
<p>A popular intervention, adopted in many developing countries, from Bangladesh to Ghana to Mexico, is regular and predictable cash and asset transfers to the poor. This small, regular income transfer directly secures basic food needs. It has an indirect benefit of enabling access to health and education. It also enables poor people to make small investments. </p>
<p>No one perfect package for alleviating poverty exists. But there is some agreement on what the elements should be. The most <a href="http://www.ids.ac.uk/publication/new-pathways-for-the-poorest-the-graduation-model-from-brac">common packages</a> of support include a combination of a micro-credit component, public works, training, agricultural extension services, financial literacy and links to credit unions. A few have also started to facilitate links to early childhood development and childcare services, such as <a href="http://www.bettercarenetwork.org/BCN/details.asp?id=32438&themeID=1001&topicID=1009">VUP in Rwanda</a>.</p>
<h2>Graduating out of poverty</h2>
<p>This focus on building resilience and enabling households to move out of poverty, and out of programme dependence using a number of interventions, has become the driver of a range of new-generation social protection approaches known as graduation programmes. </p>
<p>“Graduation” is the point at which someone is able to exit from a classic safety net programme because their circumstances have improved. This improvement is often measured using indicators such as an increase in assets or level of food security.</p>
<p>But graduating is not simply about exiting a social protection programme. It should not simply be an end in itself. It must be linked to a sustainable and positive change in a person or household’s livelihood. </p>
<h2>What’s worked?</h2>
<p>Different combinations of support for people in different contexts can have <a href="http://www.ids.ac.uk/publication/graduating-from-social-protection">lasting positive impacts</a> on their livelihoods and thus on poverty reduction. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s <a href="http://www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/PSNP%20Factsheet.pdf">Productive Safety Net Programme</a> combines cash and/or food transfers with micro-credit, agricultural extension services including financial literacy training, household asset building and community asset development.</p>
<p>Rwanda has developed a community <a href="http://www.gicumbi.gov.rw/uploads/media/Public_Works_manual_V_200209_incl_annexes.pdf">manual</a> to complement the cash transfer, micro-finance and public works programmes. These are used to provide information about a whole range of issues including rights to social benefits, nutrition, early childhood education, financial planning and livestock care.</p>
<h2>Graduation is not for everyone</h2>
<p>Graduation programmes are attractive to politicians looking to achieve poverty reduction targets and to donors with fixed budgets looking for exit strategies. But this raises the risk that political pressure to demonstrate success will undermine the fundamental safety net or social insurance function of social protection.</p>
<p>Not all households have the <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/idsb.2015.46.issue-2/issuetoc">capacity to graduate</a>. Realistic levels of support are not always available and some households are made up entirely of elderly people or those who have no labour capacity due to illness or disability. These households might need long term social assistance and should not be expected to graduate. </p>
<p>But for households with labour capacity, graduation programmes have been shown to have <a href="http://tup.brac.net/images/BRAC_Briefing_Document_on_TUP.pdf">a positive impact</a> in Latin America, Africa and Asia. The non-material benefits, such as improved self-confidence and participation in community activities, often emerge as being equally significant as the impacts on incomes and assets.</p>
<p>The importance of understanding graduation as a sustained improvement in livelihoods over time – rather than simply a movement off a social security programme – has substantial implications for the type of support policymakers and programmes need to provide. </p>
<h2>What’s next</h2>
<p>The combination and sequence of interventions most likely to promote building livelihoods varies, depending on the context and type of beneficiaries. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>In <a href="http://www.brac.net/sites/default/files/BRAC%20Briefing%20-%20TUP.pdf">Bangladesh</a>, the most common assets transferred are livestock and land. </p></li>
<li><p>In Ethiopia, <a href="http://www.future-agricultures.org/publications/research-and-analysis/1864-graduation-from-the-food-security-programme-in-ethiopia-fac-ethiopia-final-report/file">Household Asset Building Packages</a> support a number of occupations, such as beekeeping. </p></li>
<li><p>In <a href="https://www.concern.net/where-we-work/africa/burundi">Burundi</a>, households receive a cash lump sum as working capital to invest.</p></li>
</ul>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/0Xej2GgZk9c?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Burundi’s extreme poor graduate from poverty into sustainable livelihoods after two years.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are also operational challenges to creating and implementing sustainable graduation packages. While the starting point is defining eligibility and identifying participants, choosing the right assets to transfer is equally important. </p>
<p>Participants must have the skills and means to manage their assets. A package of support, including some chickens and supplies, may be suitable for a farmer with land yet totally unsuitable for someone who raises livestock. There is a need to understand the best combinations of support for people in different contexts, and the best ways to build links and make the most of overlap across different sectors.</p>
<p>One graduation project in <a href="http://www.sciencemag.org/content/348/6236/1260799.full">Honduras</a> gave chickens to participants. Most of the chickens died in a poultry epidemic, leaving many participants worse off than before the project. </p>
<p>Co-ordinating policies within and across sectors is critical for good social protection policy and programming. There is a need to understand the best combinations of support for people in different contexts, and the best ways to build links and make the most overlap across different sectors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41326/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachel Sabates-Wheeler receives funding from DFID/UNICEF.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Devereux does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is no one perfect package for alleviating poverty, but there is agreement on what the elements should be. Combination and sequence of interventions varies, depending on context and beneficiaries.Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of SussexStephen Devereux, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.