tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/south-african-diplomacy-114258/articlesSouth African diplomacy – The Conversation2023-09-29T15:56:49Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2146482023-09-29T15:56:49Z2023-09-29T15:56:49ZAziz Pahad: the unassuming South African diplomat who skilfully mediated crises in Africa, and beyond<p><a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/funeral-category-2-honour-mr-aziz-pahad-29-sep-2023-0000">Aziz Goolam Pahad</a>, who has died at the age of 82, was a South African anti-apartheid activist, politician and deputy minister of foreign affairs in the post-1994 government. </p>
<p>Together with a small group of foreign policy analysts, I worked with Aziz over the span of 30 years, shaping the post-apartheid South African government’s approach to international relations and its foreign policy. We spent countless hours debating foreign affairs and the numerous crises and challenges government had to face as a relative “newcomer” in continental African and global affairs. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/aziz-goolam-pahad#:%7E:text=Aziz%20Pahad%20was%20born%20on,University%20of%20the%20Witwatersrand%2C%20Johannesburg.">Aziz</a> was generous with giving his time to formulate positions that would allow for the unlocking of a crisis. He remained open to intellectual challenges throughout his career. He was a keen participant in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2015.1090912">academic research projects</a> dealing with <a href="https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/items/eb0f44d3-a550-4740-8db1-6463330b0f82">foreign policy</a>.</p>
<p>He made a monumental contribution to the struggle against apartheid and colonial oppression in South Africa, the continent and the Middle East. And he contributed significantly to the development and execution of a progressive African-centred foreign policy doctrine. Sadly, towards the end of his career as a diplomat he witnessed the <a href="https://www.pulp.up.ac.za/images/pulp/books/edited_collections/foreign_policy/SA%20Foreign%20Policy%20Book%20Chapter%201.pdf">slow decline</a> of South Africa’s <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedafrika/18180.pdf">stature and influence</a> in global affairs. </p>
<h2>The Mandela and Mbeki years</h2>
<p>Under presidents <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/nelson-mandela-presidency-1994-1999">Nelson Mandela</a> (1994-1999) and <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/former-president-thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> (1999-2008), South African diplomats who’d sharpened their skills during many years of exile became sought-after as facilitators and mediators. Under their guidance Africa converted the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union, and reset relations with the international community via the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. </p>
<p>South African diplomats were articulate and visible in the corridors of the United Nations and in gatherings such as the Group of 7, Group of 20 and the Non-Aligned Movement. They were able to advance Africa’s quest for peace and development. In Africa, political and security crises, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Burundi, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518768">were given attention</a>.</p>
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<p>However this “golden era” of South Africa’s foreign policy, as fellow scholar Chris Landsberg calls it, was unable to withstand the corroding effects of foreign meddling in African affairs. Neither could it withstand the <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">grand corruption</a> which reached its apogee in South Africa under former president <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">Jacob Zuma</a> (May 2009 - February 2018). </p>
<h2>Preparatory years</h2>
<p>Aziz was born <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/aziz-goolam-pahad">on 25 December 1940</a> in the former Transvaal, the current North West province in South Africa. His parents were <a href="https://theconversation.com/essop-pahad-a-diligent-communist-driven-by-an-optimistic-vision-of-a-non-racial-south-africa-210413">Amina and Goolam Pahad</a>, activists in the Transvaal Indian Congress, a political organisation established in the early 1900s by Mahatma Gandhi and others. The congress became involved in the broader anti-apartheid struggle in later years. His elder brother, Essop, also became an activist. Essop passed away <a href="https://theconversation.com/essop-pahad-a-diligent-communist-driven-by-an-optimistic-vision-of-a-non-racial-south-africa-210413">in July</a>.</p>
<p>In 1963, Aziz completed a degree in sociology and Afrikaans at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. As an activist, he was served with a <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/aziz-goolam-pahad">banning order</a> and arrested on several occasions. After the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/rivonia-trial-1963-1964">Rivonia Trial</a> from 1963 to 1964, in which ten leaders of the African National Congress (ANC) were tried for sabotage designed to overthrow the apartheid system of racial oppression, he and Essop left South Africa and went into exile.</p>
<p>Aziz spent some time in Angola and Zimbabwe but lived mostly in London. He completed a master’s degree in politics and international relations <a href="https://www.sussex.ac.uk/broadcast/read/61351">at the University of Sussex</a>. He worked full-time for the exiled ANC and supported the development of the <a href="https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/anti-apartheid-struggle-south-africa-1912-1992/">Anti-Apartheid Movement</a>.</p>
<p>Even before his return to South Africa in 1990, he contributed to the transition from apartheid to democracy, a role well described in his book <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Insurgent_Diplomat_Civil_Talks_or_Civil.html?id=mbR9BAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Insurgent Diplomat: Civil Talks or Civil War?</a>. </p>
<p>Aziz worked closely with Thabo Mbeki, at the time head of the exiled ANC’s international relations department, and a small team of academics in formulating the ANC’s position on foreign policy. The <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/anc_foreign_policy_perspective_in_a_democratic_south_africa.pdf">paper</a> formed part of preparations by the ANC and its <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03161.htm">alliance partners</a>, the <a href="https://www.sacp.org.za/">South African Communist Party</a> and the <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/">Congress of South African Trade Unions</a>, for governing the country. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-new-paper-sets-the-scene-but-falls-short-on-specifics-188253">South Africa's foreign policy: new paper sets the scene, but falls short on specifics</a>
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<p>The foreign policy paper provided a broad roadmap for diplomats post-apartheid. It eventually shaped government’s more formal foreign policy of 2011, entitled Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. In the mid-1990s, Aziz was instrumental in the establishment, with support from the German government, of an ANC-aligned think-tank called the <a href="http://www.globaldialoguefoundation.org/">Foundation of Global Dialogue</a>, run by foreign policy expert and academic <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/authors-editors/garth-le-pere">Garth le Pere</a> and myself. It lives on as the <a href="https://igd.org.za/">Institute of Global Dialogue</a>, based at the University of South Africa.</p>
<h2>Role in government</h2>
<p>Following the victory of the ANC in South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, Aziz was elected to parliament. From there, he was appointed by President Mandela as deputy minister of foreign affairs. He was re-elected to parliament in 1999 and 2004, and kept his position as <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/aziz-goolam-hoosein-pahad-mr-0">deputy minister of foreign affairs </a> throughout the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies. </p>
<p>Holding the post for 14 years meant that he was able to create and nurture a wide network of political, academic and diplomatic connections. This enabled him to play an unassuming but key mediating and facilitation role dealing with major crises on the continent and beyond.</p>
<p>But Aziz also showed his activist roots when he <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/war-can-be-averted-says-pahad-101327">spoke out against</a> the American-led <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War">invasion of Iraq in 2003</a> and the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/">Nato-led invasion</a> of Libya and assassination of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. He supported the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-mourns-passing-former-deputy-minister-foreign-affairs-aziz-pahad">Palestinian struggle</a> for recognition over many decades.</p>
<p>Aziz resigned from government and parliament in 2008, shortly after Mbeki was removed as president of the ANC <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president/">in 2007</a>.</p>
<h2>The ‘diplomat-scholar’</h2>
<p>In retirement, Aziz remained active as a “diplomat-scholar”. He played a prominent role, with his brother Essop, in a small but influential think-tank, the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ConcernedAfricansForum/">Concerned Africans Forum</a>. In 2015 he headed the short-lived South African Council on International Relations.</p>
<p>The council was established by the government as a body of experts and a sounding board for senior decision-makers. However, its semi-autonomous identity brought it into conflict with the ruling party’s foreign affairs structures. Politicians allowed it to wither away. </p>
<p>In 2018 the administration of President Cyril Ramaphosa asked Aziz to lead a commission of experts <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-04-17-pahad-panel-missteps-noted-but-no-overhaul-of-sa-foreign-policy-on-the-cards/">to review South Africa’s international relations</a>. In a sad repeat of the council’s demise, the commission was never given a proper hearing and its value remains untapped.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-its-time-south-africas-foreign-policy-was-driven-by-ideas-again-50407">Why it's time South Africa's foreign policy was driven by ideas (again)</a>
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<p>This is perhaps illustrative of the reality of policy-making in dynamic settings such as South Africa’s foreign affairs. The essence of Aziz’s contribution to a progressive African-oriented worldview was ultimately ignored by the foreign policy mandarins. </p>
<p>The country will miss having a “diplomat-scholar” of his calibre to turn to for sage advice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214648/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthoni van Nieuwkerk is affiliated with Umlambo Foundation.</span></em></p>South Africa will miss having a “diplomat-scholar” of his calibre to turn to for sage advice.Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Professor of International and Diplomacy Studies, Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1895752022-09-06T17:48:58Z2022-09-06T17:48:58ZColombia’s new left-wing government: three opportunities to build stronger ties with Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482953/original/file-20220906-20-9rrrcy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Inauguration ceremony of Colombian President Gustavo Petro, left, and vice president Francia Marquez in Bogota, on 7 August.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Mauricio Duenas Castaneda</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/in-historic-shift-gustavo-petro-sworn-in-as-colombias-first-leftist-president">election</a> of Colombia’s first left-wing president, Gustavo Petro, and first black vice-president, Francia Márquez, creates a new opening to revitalise ties with Africa.</p>
<p>Colombia is often overlooked as a nation of interest because of its <a href="https://cntraveler.com/story/how-colombia-once-consumed-by-violence-became-your-next-destination">reputation for violence</a>. Its negative standing results mainly from the decades-long armed conflict between previous governments and the Marxist-Leninist group FARC. The conflict has been linked to the production and export of <a href="https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/drug-trafficking-colombian-conflict/?location=colombia&theme=">illicit drugs</a>. It ended with the signing of a <a href="https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/1845/Final%20Agreement%20to%20End%20the%20Armed%20Conflict%20and%20Build%20a%20Stable%20and%20Lasting%20Peace">peace agreement</a> in 2016. </p>
<p>Despite such a reputation, the country is an important regional economic hub. In 2021, its <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CO">GDP</a> was US$315 billion, the third largest in South America, after Brazil and Argentina. The International Monetary Fund <a href="https://blogs.imf.org/2022/04/26/latin-america-faces-unusually-high-risks/">predicts</a> that the country’s economy will grow at 5.8% in 2022.</p>
<p>The election of Petro and Márquez provides three opportunities for stronger Africa-Colombia relations that can yield mutual benefits. These are Colombia’s cultural and historical ties with Africa, strong trade potential and south-south cooperation.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-gustavo-petro-and-francia-marquez-have-achieved-a-historic-victory-for-the-left-so-who-are-they-186221">Colombia: Gustavo Petro and Francia Márquez have achieved a historic victory for the left – so who are they?</a>
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<h2>Three opportunities</h2>
<p><strong>Colombia’s strong African roots</strong></p>
<p>Márquez is Colombia’s first black woman vice-president. Her election could enhance Afro-Colombians’ <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/06/world/americas/francia-marquez-colombia-vp-style.html">consciousness</a> of their African ancestry. It’s also an opportunity to diversify Colombia’s foreign policy, by strengthening cultural connections
with African nations.</p>
<p>The Afro-Colombian community includes <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1277501/download">4.7 million</a> people, around 10% of Colombia’s population of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CO">51 million</a>. They are the descendants of Africans who came to Colombia during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/transatlantic-slave-trade">transatlantic slave trade</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/book-review-how-africa-was-central-to-the-making-of-the-modern-world-175656">Book review: how Africa was central to the making of the modern world</a>
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<p><strong>Unlocking the trade potential</strong></p>
<p>Colombia lags considerably behind countries like Brazil in trade and political ties with Africa. Colombia and African nations can better explore and exploit their comparative advantages in goods and services. </p>
<p>Their trade volumes are still <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/colombia/">low</a>, showing a significant opportunity for new commercial relations. In 2021, Colombia imported around $150 million in goods and services from Africa, only 0.25% of its total imports. Its exports to Africa were around $400 million, only 0.98% of its exports. No African country features among Colombia’s top 30 trading partners. </p>
<p>In his inaugural speech, Petro said Colombia would seek to build stronger economic alliances with <a href="https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/asi-fue-el-discurso-de-posesion-de-gustavo-petro-KJ18337973">African</a> countries. Colombia’s focus on energy, mining and agrifood means that African countries have much to gain from partnerships with it. </p>
<p>Visa systems on both sides need to be relaxed. South Africa, for example, does not have an embassy in Bogotá. Its diplomatic relations with Colombia are led by its embassy in Caracas, Venezuela. The countries have had a healthy relationship since 1994, but it has often faced difficulties in getting visas. </p>
<p>Another challenge is related to connectivity between South America and Africa. In the past, most flights between Africa and South America went through São Paulo, Brazil. The COVID pandemic reduced the number of flights. By 2022, the only connections between South America and Africa were via Angola or Ethiopia. <a href="https://www.avianca.com/">Avianca</a>, Colombia’s national airline, could provide a new route to help improve connectivity. </p>
<p><strong>Promoting south-south cooperation</strong></p>
<p>During the election campaign and her activist history, Márquez often used the African idea of <a href="https://indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Francia-Marquez-III.pdf">ubuntu</a> (humanness) to promote interdependence within (and between) societies. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-archbishop-tutus-ubuntu-credo-teaches-the-world-about-justice-and-harmony-84730">What Archbishop Tutu's ubuntu credo teaches the world about justice and harmony</a>
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<p>Colombia could also look to Africa for lessons, share experiences and identify opportunities to deal with land use and distribution. Márquez has presented views that show the importance of dealing with land issues in a way that <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/vice-presidential-candidates-lay-out-visions-colombias-future">empowers poor people</a>.</p>
<p>Technical cooperation programmes can be essential in realising the potential benefits of interdependence. For instance, Colombia has a long experience in developing public <a href="https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10139712/">transport systems</a>. These have become essential for social integration and environmental sustainability. </p>
<p>Cities like Medellín have already become an example of how to provide efficient public transport for <a href="https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10139712/">poor urban neighbourhoods</a>.</p>
<p>Colombia’s Agency of International Cooperation has already signed a framework agreement with the <a href="https://www.nepad.org/">African Union Development Agency</a> to bolster technical assistance in Africa.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>African countries should seek further interactions with the global south to increase their voice and agency in pursuit of a fairer international order. For instance, agriculture, food security and climate change are important areas where Colombia and the African continent could jointly influence global <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220221/working-relations-key-continued-africa-latin-america-ties">discussions</a> that directly affect the developing world.</p>
<p>Colombia’s chargé d’affaires to South Africa, Jose Ignacio Julião Alí, told me the new moment</p>
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<p>marks an opportunity to close gaps between emerging countries with similar challenges, in terms of social cohesion and reconciliation, climate and environmental focus as part of megadiverse regions.</p>
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<p>The world’s economic relationships are shifting and new powers such as China, Brazil and India are rising. Petro’s and Márquez’s election offers a chance to deepen Africa-Colombia relations and cooperation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189575/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gustavo de Carvalho is also affiliated with the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). </span></em></p>Colombia is an important South American regional hub and potentially important trade partner for Africa.Gustavo de Carvalho, Research Fellow at Institute for Global African Affairs, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1882532022-08-18T09:38:53Z2022-08-18T09:38:53ZSouth Africa’s foreign policy: new paper sets the scene, but falls short on specifics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478721/original/file-20220811-2390-8puemz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African foreign minister Naledi Pandor hosts US secretary of state Antony Blinken for a strategic dialogue.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jacoline Schoonees/Dirco</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s international relations department published a document on 1 August setting out the country’s new foreign policy. The <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2022/sa_national_interest.pdf">outline of South Africa’s national interests</a> is an important paper that sets out how the country will relate to the rest of the world for some time to come. </p>
<p>The title of the document is: Framework on South Africa’s National Interest and its Advancement in a Global Environment.</p>
<p>Governments are often cautious, for various reasons, about communicating their national interests. This is a first effort by the <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/">Department of International Relations and Cooperation</a> to contextualise South Africa’s national interests. </p>
<p>But the document falls short in key respects.</p>
<p>The first flaw is its title. It speaks of the national “interest” rather than interests (plural) – but in international relations there isn’t just one. </p>
<p>It’s also unclear what practical purpose its drafters envisaged it serving, or who its intended audience is. It’s unclear if it is to guide government policy, direct South African investment, or inform the country’s allies and friends.</p>
<p>That’s not to say that the document has no value. It will be used extensively in future debate and analysis of South African foreign policy. And it may be a guideline for policy.</p>
<h2>Shortcomings</h2>
<p>Three general points ought to be made.</p>
<p>Firstly, the document doesn’t have a geographical outline of South Africa’s interests. The business sector will be looking for the importance of specific geographical regions. </p>
<p>Reading between the lines, Africa seems to be a critically important region for South Africa. But the country, traditionally, has important export interests in Europe. It is the EU’s largest trading partner in Africa. The EU, excluding the UK, <a href="https://www.tralac.org/resources/infographic/15536-south-africa-s-global-trade-2021-update.html">accounts for 22%</a> of South African trade. Trade with the rest of Africa constitutes <a href="https://www.tralac.org/resources/infographic/15536-south-africa-s-global-trade-2021-update.html">16%</a>.</p>
<p>More recently the <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/brics-brazil-russia-india-china-south-africa-1">BRICS bloc</a> – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – has become important for South Africa’s national interests. Trade with BRICS constitutes 59% of the country’s imports and 41% of its exports; 94% of this trade is done with China and India and <a href="https://www.tralac.org/documents/publications/trade-data-analysis/4471-south-africa-global-trade-update-2021/file.html">only 2% with Russia</a>. </p>
<p>The war in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of a clear articulation of South African national interests in geographical terms. A lot has recently been said about Pretoria’s diplomatic support for Russia; and the dichotomy between South African support for the Palestinians as the victims, but not for Ukraine. This raises a question as to the guiding principles of <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-07-13-south-africa-and-the-russian-federation-pause-before-engaging/?fbclid=IwAR2lQvvvz_oSpA0nFRkPjwhW3e0LYtUqKtXVh3VJRjbN311PsPG5YYUd4ig">human rights in South Africa’s foreign policy</a>.</p>
<p>Also, how is South Africa’s position on Israel and Russian aligned with its bigger material interests in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe; specifically in terms of trade?</p>
<p>Secondly, the document’s outline of South Africa’s national interests is stating the obvious. The different interests address the general well-being of society, nothing else. The constitutional order, the safety of society, economic prosperity, a better world are not national interests. They are the general responsibilities of government. </p>
<p>In short, the outline of the interests is superficial and insignificant. It’s not clear how these interests are to define and direct South Africa’s foreign policy.</p>
<p>The focus seems to be on domestic interests – public interests. A better Africa and world is the only interest that is defined <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2022/sa_national_interest.pdf#page=5">within the context of foreign policy</a>. </p>
<p>What are the things South Africa would be willing to deploy its military to protect and defend if threatened? Is the <a href="http://www.lhda.org.ls/lhdaweb">flow of water from Lesotho</a> of vital interest to South Africa; and to the extent that it will use military force to protect the access? When is illegal immigration a threat to vital interests, how will citizens know and who is to decide? These questions are left unanswered.</p>
<p>Thirdly, the outline of the national interest, without the “s”, raises questions as to why government appears reluctant to be explicit. This, at a time where direction is urgently needed in an international order that is increasingly complex. </p>
<p>Domestic and historical realities – the eradication of the legacy of apartheid and overcoming the triple challenges of <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12930">inequality</a>, <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=15407#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%20Quarterly%20Labour,stands%20at%2034%2C5%25">unemployment</a> and <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12075">poverty</a> – seem to be the key drivers, rather than the</p>
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<p><a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2022/sa_national_interest.pdf">dynamic nature of global and national affairs</a> (p.9-13).</p>
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<p>The document seems to express the ideological orientation of the ruling elite, more than material interests that ought to drive good governance. It is more of a policy document than a guideline for the practice of diplomacy, military statecraft and trade.</p>
<p>The document’s objective seems to be to outline how to think about South African national interests, rather than to specify what those interests are. </p>
<p>The objectives outlined in the document are to:</p>
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<li><p>propose a definition of South Africa’s national interest and its elements </p></li>
<li><p>propose the means for the pursuit of South Africa’s national interest </p></li>
<li><p>propose guidelines for the practical application of national interests in an international environment </p></li>
<li><p>reflect on the current and potential future global environment </p></li>
<li><p>provide for predictability in South Africa’s international relations.</p></li>
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<p>The discussion of who is responsible for implementing the country’s foreign policy is limited to generic realities. It emphasises the responsibility of the <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/">Department of International Relations and Cooperation</a>.</p>
<p>It’s not clear what part South Africa’s diplomats, military and business community can play in pursuing its national interests. </p>
<p>The military, for example, is often the lead instrument of foreign policy in Africa, especially <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.5787/43-2-1123">in the conduct of peace missions</a>. The business community is also at the leading edge of South Africa’s foreign policy interests. What practical realities should the business community keep in mind when they do business in Europe, China, or South America? </p>
<p>These questions are not answered.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abel Esterhuyse does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s unclear what practical purpose the drafters of South Africa’s foreign policy document envisaged it serving, and who its intended audience is.Abel Esterhuyse, Associate Professor of Strategy, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1884072022-08-09T10:15:56Z2022-08-09T10:15:56ZWashington wants to address anti-west sentiment in Africa: Blinken is doing his bit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478121/original/file-20220808-26-tldg8o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US state secretary Antony Blinken seeks closer ties with Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Wong/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to three African countries this week is another sign of the Joe Biden administration’s US-Africa policy of reengaging with the continent. </p>
<p>This was first unveiled in visits to Nigeria, Kenya and Senegal <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/africa-reacts-secretary-blinkens-africa-tour">at the end of 2021</a>.</p>
<p>This time he is visiting South Africa, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).</p>
<p>These are welcome visits following the previous administration’s disengagement with Africa and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-referred-haiti-african-countries-shithole-nations-n836946">less than flattering comments</a> about African countries. </p>
<p>Blinken’s first trip to Africa in 2021 outlined the US’s need to build a 21st century partnership with the continent. This is key to maintaining the US’s strategic geo-political and economic influence in Africa against the backdrop of increased competition between advanced and emerging countries in an increasingly complex world.</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s re-engagement policy is also informed by other considerations, such as <a href="https://blogs.afdb.org/fr/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/the-expansion-of-chinese-influence-in-africa-opportunities-and-risks-9612">China’s rising influence</a>.</p>
<p>Some media reports have suggested that Blinken’s trip is aimed at countering China and Russia’s footprint in Africa. In particular, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-africa-building-a-21st-century-partnership/">recent visit</a>. </p>
<p>But it is difficult to claim that Blinken’s visit is singularly informed by the Russia - Ukraine conflict. After all, Blinken’s first visit took place before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Blinken is <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/27/how-biden-can-build-u.s.-africa-relations-back-better-pub-84399">launching the US strategy for sub-Saharan Africa</a>. This is anchored on engaging Africa in promoting an open and stable international system in security, exchange and trade. </p>
<p>This will also tackle the effects of climate change, food security, global pandemics and shape technological and economic futures. </p>
<p>In a speech given at the University of Pretoria in South Africa, Blinken reiterated – as he did in Nigeria in November 2021 – that he wanted to treat African countries as <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/south-africa-speech-blinken-details-us-policy-africa-88101187">equal</a> partners. </p>
<h2>Pressing issues</h2>
<p>In Pretoria, Blinken <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/south-africa-speech-blinken-details-us-policy-africa-88101187">focused on four priorities</a> that he believed the US and Africa could tackle together. </p>
<p>The first was “to foster openness”. This would require the free flow of ideas and information, respect for international law, territorial integrity and national sovereignty. And US support for Africa’s quest to choose its own path and not just be instruments of the progress of other nations.</p>
<p>Blinken <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgyKkL6wCjs">said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The United States will not dictate Africa’s choices, neither should anyone else. The right to make those choices belongs to Africans. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The idea of an equal partnership could be pursued through areas of common interest: global health, the climate crisis, inclusive economic growth, democracy and peace and security.</p>
<p>Blinken said that the US strategy was founded on sub-Saharan Africa’s capacity as a geopolitical force. For him the equal partnership is informed by Africa’s diversity, agency and focuses on</p>
<blockquote>
<p>what we will do with African nations and peoples, not for African nations and peoples. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The second priority was partnering with Africa to fulfil the promise of democracy. He referenced <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgyKkL6wCjs">Afro-barometer surveys</a> that show Africans are largely against authoritarianism. </p>
<p>And he acknowledged that delivering on democracy dividends – and the threat to democracy – were not just an African problem, but a global challenge. This included the US where the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-Capitol-attack-of-2021">insurrection at the Capitol</a> revealed fissures in US democracy.</p>
<p>However, the US would work with Africa to promote more inclusive and resilient processes and communities, citizen participation and the peaceful transition of power. These would be subjects of an <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/07/20/biden-to-host-african-leaders-for-december-summit-white-house//">African leaders summit in December 2022</a>. </p>
<p>The third priority is working with Africa to recover from the economic devastation wrought by the Covid-19 pandemic. And laying the foundation for economic opportunities for people. The US position is rooted in the understanding that helping Africa recover is also in the US and the world’s interest.</p>
<p>Blinken spelt out the ways in which the US will “be there for African countries”. These included rallying rich countries and key institutions to support debt relief, supporting the <a href="https://au.int/en/documents/20210715/african-union-green-recovery-action-plan-2021-2027">African Union’s Green Recovery Action Plan</a>, climate finance, humanitarian and food relief, investment in agriculture, vaccine self-sufficiency and sharing vaccine technology.</p>
<p>The US is also supporting African-led initiatives such as the<a href="https://au.int/en/cfta"> African Continental Free Trade Area</a> and the <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">African Union Agenda 2063</a>. The US also pledged to raise over US$200 billion dollars to invest in infrastructure. </p>
<p>Other areas includes intellectual exchanges such as the Young African Leaders Initiative. </p>
<p>The fourth priority area is leading with Africa on clean energy transition, reducing emissions and restoring ecosystems. It would help save the planet, adapt to the effects of climate change and provide power for economic growth. </p>
<p>He reiterated the US will invest in expanded energy access and meet developmental targets towards a just energy transition; helping communities to choose “conservation over deforestation”.</p>
<p>Blinken rounded off by reiterating that these priorities were first championed by Africa and Africans, and have now become the world’s priorities as well. </p>
<h2>Engaging Africa as equal partners</h2>
<p>Whatever equal partnership means in this case, even if it is spelt mostly in terms of American rather than a (South) African Strategies for partnership, it looks as though the key take-away was a carefully considered business agreement couched as friendship. </p>
<p>In the past, the US’s partnerships with Africa have been informed and characterised by power relations in which the US dictated the terms. </p>
<p>It remains to be seen the extent to which the four areas of cooperation (not too dissimilar to the five points presented in West Africa 2021) will reflect the notion of equal partnership with African countries on the ground.</p>
<p>In our view the significant rise in Beijing’s influence on the continent is a factor in the US redefinition and resetting its relations with Africa. </p>
<p>But Washington still has a long way to go. It must overcome <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/russias-soft-power-sources-in-africa/">growing anti-west sentiment</a> on the continent given the development alternative that China offers.</p>
<p>For instance, while China (and Russia for that matter) does not make upholding democracy and human rights a condition for engaging with African states, the US bases its partnership on advancing these values. This and other factors such as neo-colonialism fuel anti-West sentiment against the US. </p>
<p>It’s re-engagement approach should therefore consider African perspectives on how the issues of diversity, democracy and human rights can be pursued. </p>
<p>Overall, Blinken’s stated commitment to “equal” partnership with Africa, if truly implemented, has the potential to deconstruct these perceptions and the sentiments they produce. The starting point would be to focus on and invest in young people on the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188407/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Washington must overcome growing anti-west sentiment on the continent given the development alternative that China offers.Christopher Isike, Director, African Centre for the Study of the United States, University of PretoriaTinashe Nyamunda, Associate Professor, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1807992022-04-08T11:04:22Z2022-04-08T11:04:22ZAfrican countries showed disunity in UN votes on Russia: South Africa’s role was pivotal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456834/original/file-20220407-22-fnto70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses a Security Council meeting on Russia's invasion via a video link. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Peter Foley</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The preamble of the founding Act of the African Union (AU) <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf#page=3">calls for </a> “collective action in Africa and in our relations with the rest of the world”.</p>
<p>The credibility of this pan-African commitment has been damaged by the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/unga-resolution-against-ukraine-invasion-full-text">unwillingness of African governments to forge a unified position on the Russia-Ukraine war</a>.</p>
<p>They could not agree on the merits of two non-binding resolutions. Half of the AU’s members abstained from the vote demanding that Russia abide by this principle, in the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152">first resolution</a>. And on <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114632">the second resolution</a> three weeks later demanding an end to the humanitarian crisis, the show of African disunity was the same. </p>
<p>Most recently, the General Assembly <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782">voted overwhelmingly to suspend Russia</a> from the UN Human Rights Council. By my count, of the 24 “No” votes, nine were African. South Africa was among the 23 African abstentions, with another 11 not voting, despite human rights being a key objective of the AU and South Africa. </p>
<p>Given this pattern, how will African countries ever agree to act collectively to achieve the ambitious goals on the AU’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33126-doc-01_background_note.pdf">Agenda 2063</a> for Africa’s growth and development?</p>
<p>The issue at stake is not trivial. The core principle of respect for territorial integrity and sovereign equality has been at the heart of postcolonial African international relations since the founding of the Organisation of African Unity <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf">in 1963</a>. As soon as the war began, the AU chair Macky Sall and chairperson of the AU Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat called on Russia to </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220224/african-union-statement-situation-ukraine">respect the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Ukraine. </a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What has been particularly surprising in all three votes is that South Africa, normally a champion of greater African unity and human rights, has chosen either to actively <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202203250047.html">pursue a pro-Russian stance</a>, or to stand on the sidelines.</p>
<p>In my view this will imperil the country’s claim to be a leading human rights advocate, and a leader of an emerging and more potent African voice in world affairs. </p>
<h2>The South African factor</h2>
<p>This article does not address the pros and cons of maintaining friendly relations with Russia. </p>
<p>It poses a different question: Could African states that abstained on the two UN resolutions have voted with the majority, thus preserving a semblance of African unity, without jeopardising the interests they stated to justify abstaining?</p>
<p>And what about defending core AU values, such as <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">human rights</a>?</p>
<p>I draw primarily from the rationale for abstentions offered by South Africa for three reasons: Firstly, it is among Africa’s most prominent and influential countries. Secondly, since the end of apartheid, it has been an <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2020-africa-day-25-may-2020-0000">outspoken proponent of African unity </a> and the catalyst for several practical initiatives to advance collective self-reliance. Lastly, I live amid South Africa’s public debates about these issues.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-war-decoding-how-african-countries-voted-at-the-un-178663">Russia-Ukraine war: decoding how African countries voted at the UN</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>I assume that had South Africa chosen to make defending the principle of territorial integrity and sovereign equality a priority, and lobbied other African governments to support it, there would have been a much better show of African solidarity in voting for the resolution. </p>
<p>Consider three prominent and broad reasons that South Africans offer to justify abstaining: The war is foremost a proxy struggle between Russia and the US; For South Africa to play a mediating role it should not take sides; and, The need for continued Russian trade and security assistance.</p>
<h2>Unpacking South Africa’s reasoning</h2>
<p>Consider the proxy war between Russia and US argument. In a recent <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ojA1u430eEg">University of the Witwatersrand webinar</a> a senior government official described the war as a proxy one, between Russia and the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). He said it was not in South Africa’s interest, which is primarily the cause of peace, to choose sides. He went on to accuse the US of similar aggression in <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/sas-opposition-to-the-us-invasion-of-iraq-ten-year">the 2003 invasion of Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>In response, <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/gilbert-m-khadiagala-173180">Gilbert Khadiagala</a>, a Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States, noted that “two wrongs don’t make a right”. He also recalled that South Africa immediately criticised the US invasion and <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2003-03-20-south-africa-reacts-to-war-in-iraq/">its specious justification</a>. That criticism did not seriously affect South Africa-United States cooperation when in the best interests of both. And, if even-handedness is a valid concern, then voting and pressing for African unity in support of respect for core UN/AU principles should not affect South Africa-Russia relations, or perceptions of Pretoria’s SA non-alignment.</p>
<p>Now to the role of mediator. There were expectations in some quarters that there might be a useful role for South Africa in actively supporting a peaceful end to the current war. This was because of the country’s relatively peaceful transition to full democracy in the early 1990s, a process in which President Cyril Ramaphosa’s played a critical role. And his contribution to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ringside-seat-at-irish-theater-of-war-ira-sinn-fein-irish-politics/">a negotiated end to the war in Northern Ireland</a> between 2000-05.</p>
<p>But to be acceptable as mediator in any conflict, one has to be acceptable to both sides. This is not the case. The only current host acceptable to both sides is Turkey. The country has maintained good relations with Moscow, despite being a NATO member and reportedly selling Ukraine dozens of deadly drones since 2019. It also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/11/turkey-drones-use-ukraine">voted for both UN resolutions</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-with-ukraine-five-reasons-why-many-african-countries-choose-to-be-neutral-180135">Russia’s war with Ukraine: Five reasons why many African countries choose to be ‘neutral’</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In addition, South Africa, presumably, is far away from the conflict. Nor does it have sufficient influence to act alone. Prospects for leveraging its membership of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/brics-brazil-russia-india-china-south-africa-1">Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) bloc</a> have dimmed. </p>
<p>Had South Africa led an effort to forge a united African position on the UN resolutions, I believe, this would have had no bearing on its prospects for helping mediate an end to the war.</p>
<p>Lastly, the trade imperative. It is true that there is <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-ukraine-conflict-could-influence-africas-food-supplies-177843">significant agricultural trade between countries on the continent and Russia and Ukraine</a>. Major importing countries are Egypt, which accounted for nearly half, followed by Sudan, Nigeria, Tanzania, Algeria, Kenya and South Africa.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-ukraine-conflict-could-influence-africas-food-supplies-177843">How Russia-Ukraine conflict could influence Africa's food supplies</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Sanctions against Russia will also <a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-russia-will-affect-arms-sales-to-africa-the-risks-and-opportunities-180038">affect arms sales</a>. Africa needs military hardware, especially in the Sahel region, and pays for private military <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">assistance from Russians employed by the Wagner Group</a>, regardless of politics.</p>
<p>In my view, however, none of this justifies South Africa’s chosen path.</p>
<h2>Imperatives for collective action</h2>
<p>Looking ahead, the failure to forge common cause in mostly symbolic UN votes on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will fade amid Africa’s real hardships resulting from that war. Already, spikes in the costs of food are having dire consequences <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/conflict-humanitarian-crisis-ukraine-threatening-future-global-food-security-prices">on many poor African families</a>.</p>
<p>Issues vital to human security for Africa are certain to accelerate as with the imperatives for African unity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180799/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The unwillingness of African governments to forge a unified position on the Russian invasion has damaged the credibility of their pan-African commitments.John J Stremlau, Honorary Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1736382021-12-12T14:26:13Z2021-12-12T14:26:13ZLindiwe Mabuza: feminist icon who used art to fight for democracy in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437018/original/file-20211211-19-1rwamnh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lindiwe Mabuza (right) with President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Katlholo Maifadi/GCIS</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the tributes continued to <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23LindiweMabuza&src=typed_query&f=top">pour in</a> for South Africa’s <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/lindiwe-mabuza">Lindiwe Mabuza</a>, who <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/struggle-icon-and-poet-lindiwe-mabuza-dies-20211207">passed away</a> on 6 December 2021, it was clear that she will be remembered for the <a href="https://sala.org.za/lindiwe-mabuza/">many different roles</a> she occupied during her lifetime. She was called ambassador, diplomat, feminist, poet, writer, freedom fighter, leader and educator, amongst others. </p>
<p>Born in 1938 in Newcastle, South Africa, she was undoubtedly an advocate for women’s rights, and she foregrounded women’s concerns at a time when the struggle against <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> surpassed the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-womens-struggle-south-africa">rights of women</a>. </p>
<p>Lindiwe skillfully linked her love for the creative arts with teaching moments. Close to her heart were innovative ways of teaching children to write about their experiences. She traveled across Scandinavia teaching children about the evils of apartheid – an ideology of racial segregation entrenched by white minority rule in South Africa. </p>
<p>Long before the demise of apartheid, from 1979 already, she was representing the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-national-congress-anc">African National Congress</a> (ANC) in the Nordic countries and the US and is well recognised for her role in solidifying the international movement against apartheid. After democracy in 1994 she would become an ambassador, eventually serving as South Africa’s High Commissioner to the United Kingdom from 2001.</p>
<h2>Intellectual cultural activism</h2>
<p>For Lindiwe, art was an <a href="https://creativefeel.co.za/2017/11/lindiwe-mabuza-a-life-of-cultural-activism/">essential component</a> of the apartheid struggle: “We used it as a weapon, an extra weapon of the struggle.” </p>
<p>It was the combination of the art of storytelling as teaching methodology, as a way of raising awareness, as a tool to network, that contributed to her leadership style. Examples of these are her <a href="https://www.thediplomaticsociety.co.za/3599-tribute-to-lindiwe-mabuza-diplomat-poet-and-cultural-activist">networks</a> and friendships with prominent African American artists such as <a href="https://www.quincyjones.com">Quincy Jones</a>, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Danny-Glover">Danny Glover</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Harry-Belafonte">Harry Belafonte</a> as well as Black leaders like the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jesse-Jackson">Reverend Jesse Jackson</a>, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Randall-Robinson">Randal Robinson</a> and <a href="https://lee.house.gov/about/biography">Barbara Lee</a>, to name a few.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437024/original/file-20211211-17-1rld9eu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover in beige and white with an illustration of a black woman holding a gun and a baby." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437024/original/file-20211211-17-1rld9eu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437024/original/file-20211211-17-1rld9eu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437024/original/file-20211211-17-1rld9eu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437024/original/file-20211211-17-1rld9eu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437024/original/file-20211211-17-1rld9eu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1065&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437024/original/file-20211211-17-1rld9eu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1065&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437024/original/file-20211211-17-1rld9eu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1065&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mabuza used the name Sono Molefe for the book of struggle poetry.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">uHlanga poetry press</span></span>
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<p>In 2017 she deservedly <a href="https://act.org.za/2017/10/get-to-know-the-act-lifetime-achievement-award-winners/">received</a> the Arts and Culture Trust Lifetime Achievement Award for Arts Advocacy. The award <a href="https://creativefeel.co.za/2017/11/lindiwe-mabuza-a-life-of-cultural-activism/">traced</a> her involvement in becoming the editor of the ANC <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/anc-womens-league-struggle-womens-rights-south-africa-meghan-knapp">Women’s League</a> publication Voice of Women in 1977, where she provided the platform for women to express themselves. She also used her position as broadcaster in the ANC’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/radio-freedom-history-south-african-underground-radio-chris-smith">Radio Freedom</a> to highlight women’s plight. And she was responsible for promoting the <a href="http://uhlangapress.co.za/malibongwe-poems-from-the-struggle-by-anc-women-ed-sono-molefe">Malibongwe book project</a>. For this she invited women teachers, freedom fighters, nurses and students who were in the trenches of Tanzania, Angola, and Mozambique to submit in their own words their experiences as black women in the struggle. She edited the book – which was banned but appeared in Europe in 1980 – under the name Sono Molefe. </p>
<p>Lindiwe believed that it was important for women to tell their own stories because they too played an important part in the history against oppression. She was indeed a feminist when the concept was not yet as popular as now.</p>
<p>Her love for storytelling is evident in her various poetry anthologies. She herself <a href="https://murderinparis.com/assets/images/Resources-page/Newsletters/May_2021.pdf">said</a>: </p>
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<p>Poetry is part of the struggle. You use the armed struggle; you use political methods … You recite a poem. It’s better than a three-hour speech. It gets to the heart of the matter. It moves people.</p>
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<p>This is so reminiscent of the struggle poetry and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/art/African-theatre-art/Southern-and-South-Africa">theatre</a> that have such an integral part of the apartheid struggle era.</p>
<p>She published <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Voices_that_Lead.html?id=XMR7NAAACAAJ&redir_esc=y">Voices that Lead: Poems 1976-1996</a> (1998); <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Letter_to_Letta.html?id=bRNtQgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y">Letter to Letta</a> (1991); <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Footprints_and_Fingerprints.html?id=UxsgAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">Footprints and Fingerprints</a> (2008); <a href="http://uhlangapress.co.za/malibongwe-poems-from-the-struggle-by-anc-women-ed-sono-molefe">Malibongwe, One Never Knows</a> – poetry and short stories by African Congress Women; From ANC to Sweden; and <a href="https://www.amazon.de/-/en/Lindiwe-Mabuza/dp/3872948075">Africa to Me: Gedichte Englisch/Deutsch</a> (1999).</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Mabuza discussing her O.R. Tambo book project.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Lindiwe never forgot the children and in 2007 she published a children’s book <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/South_African_Animals.html?id=NLivGQAACAAJ&redir_esc=y">South African Animals</a>. In the same pedagogical tradition, she edited a book by 30 contributors titled <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/conversations-with-uncle-or---lindiwe-mazibuko-2018-08-13">Conversations with Uncle O.R.</a> – Childhood Memoirs in Exile in which the contributors reflect on their experiences born, raised and educated in foreign countries. </p>
<p>It was important for her to give space and voice to the children whose experiences are often marginalised and even erased in the broader struggle for freedom and democracy.</p>
<h2>Lifelong educator</h2>
<p>Her life is a kaleidoscope of a lifelong educator and artistic creator intersecting with age, nationalities and gender. She used every opportunity to build movements with a consciousness and understood it is imperative that you archive these experiences in writing. She leaves behind a legacy of collaboration and networking. </p>
<p>Lindiwe was especially interested in marginalised children and women and had the ability to draw on her skills as educator and provide the platforms where they too could give expression in this masculine and patriarchal world.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/black-feminist-writers-in-south-africa-raise-their-voices-in-a-new-book-161445">Black feminist writers in South Africa raise their voices in a new book</a>
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<p>Lindiwe Mabuza’s life did not have an easy beginning, but she was able to use those disadvantages as a challenge and in the process, she did not leave others behind but continued to create opportunities and platforms for others. Her cultural and political work will continue to live in her publications.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173638/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mary Hames does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For her, art was a weapon in the struggle and a tool for education. She used every opportunity to build movements and to archive experiences in writing.Mary Hames, Researcher and Gender Equity Officer, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.