tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/south-african-police-16857/articlesSouth African police – The Conversation2022-11-24T10:40:29Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1945422022-11-24T10:40:29Z2022-11-24T10:40:29ZSandton terror alert: time for South Africa to improve its intelligence sharing channels with the US<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497044/original/file-20221123-14-zh8q6q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C19%2C4324%2C2440&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African foreign minister, Naledi Pandor, right, hosts US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, for the SA-US Strategic Dialogue in Pretoria, in August 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jacoline Schoonees/Dirco</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The announcement <a href="https://za.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-possible-attack/">in October 2022</a> by the US embassy in South Africa of a possible terror attack caused a lot of confusion, concern and, in some cases, anger in the country. The alert advised US citizens and personnel to stay away from large gatherings around Sandton, Johannesburg’s financial centre.</p>
<p>Three major events were planned for the weekend of the purported terror attack. These were a major <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sport/soccer/2022-10-27-extra-precautions-bomb-sweep-at-fnb-stadium-for-soweto-derby-after-us-terror-alert/">soccer match in Johannesburg</a>, the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/watch-police-assure-people-that-zulu-kings-coronation-is-safe-to-attend-amid-terror-threat-in-sandton-b6133587-effa-421f-8b7a-110da2e8ad42">coronation</a> ceremony of the Zulu king, Misuzulu kaZwelithini in Durban, and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/29/thousands-attend-south-africa-pride-despite-terror-warning">Pride parade</a> in Sandton. All three events went ahead without any incident, prompting some to say the terror alert might have <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2022/10/31/us-terror-alert-served-its-purpose-as-there-was-no-attack-security-expert">deterred any attack</a>. </p>
<p>Some derided South Africa’s <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2022/11/03/mandy-wiener-our-intelligence-services-shouldn-t-be-the-butt-of-comedians-jokes">intelligence agencies</a> for failure to pick up the terror threat. Others accused the US of <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/opinion/us-terrorism-alert-undermines-solidarity-sas-sovereignty-e5351618-d7e8-4f02-a0a5-7332c04a0e02">undermining South Africa’s sovereignty</a>. While the government recognised that the alert was a <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/government-notes-us-terror-alert">standard communication</a> by the US directed at its citizens, it argued that such information should have been communicated to the local authorities through “normal channels”.</p>
<p>According to Zizi Kodwa, the deputy intelligence minister, the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-10-27-us-was-out-of-line-theres-no-direct-terrorist-threat-to-sa-right-now-says-deputy-state-security-minister-zizi-kodwa/">US ambassador should have informed</a> the local authorities about the potential threat. The onus would then be on them to announce such an alert or take necessary measures. This procedure was not followed.</p>
<p>The South African parliamentary <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/news/south-africa-must-make-firm-response-us-following-terror-attack-announcement">committee</a> responsible for international relations even called for firmer unspecified reaction to the perceived undermining of the country’s sovereignty.</p>
<p>Based on my expertise in defence policy, intelligence and international security strategy and reform, it is my view that the criticism of the US over the terrorism alert was misguided. It ignored a few fundamental facts that are worth noting.</p>
<h2>Duty to protect</h2>
<p>Firstly, the security threat alerts are a common feature of US security practices both at home and abroad.</p>
<p>Since 2020, the <a href="https://za.usembassy.gov/">US embassy</a> in South Africa has issued at least nine security alerts. They have warned of <a href="https://za.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-south-africa-recent-crime-at-numbi-gate/?_ga=2.242772170.914651504.1669013147-250618191.1669013147">criminality</a>, civil <a href="https://za.usembassy.gov/security-alert-the-u-s-mission-to-south-africa-continues-to-closely-monitor-security-developments-in-kwazulu-natal-gauteng-and-across-south-africa/?_ga=2.206129371.914651504.1669013147-250618191.1669013147">unrest</a> and <a href="https://za.usembassy.gov/security-message-for-u-s-citizens-bomb-threat-at-rosebank-mall-in-johannesburg/?_ga=2.252641601.914651504.1669013147-250618191.1669013147">bomb</a> threats.</p>
<p>A security alert was also issued on 23 October in Nigeria about a possible terror attack in <a href="https://www.blueprint.ng/us-terror-alert-nigeria-south-africa-and-conspiracy-theories/">Abuja</a>. </p>
<p>Secondly, every nation has a primary responsibility to protect its citizens, regardless of where they are located. Countries like Britain, Germany, France, and Australia have issued similar alerts for their citizens abroad. <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/breaking-sandton-terror-uk-issues-warning-johannesburg-embassy-thursday-27-october/">They</a> did the same for their citizens in South Africa.</p>
<p>Thirdly, more attention should be paid to the performance and capacity of South Africa’s own intelligence services in sharing intelligence with the embassies it hosts. </p>
<p>South African citizens should be able to expect a similar or comparable alert system from its intelligence or security structures. In the absence of such a system, foreign embassy alerts are the only way for citizens to get terror warnings. </p>
<h2>Fixing South Africa’s intelligence services</h2>
<p>Various reports have recommended fixing South Africa’s intelligence services. They include those by the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">High-level Review Panel on the State Security Agency</a>, the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/site/files/announcements/667/OCR_version_-_State_Capture_Commission_Report_Part_V_Vol_I_-_SSA.pdf">Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture</a> and the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/content/report-expert-panel-july-2021-civil-unrest">Expert Panel into the July 2021 civil unrest</a>. </p>
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<p>While the review panel report highlighted the politicisation of the State Security Agency, the state capture commission revealed large-scale corruption within the agency. The report on the 2021 unrest highlighted the lack of coordination among the nation’s intelligence services. This resulted in poor and late response to the mass looting and destruction in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng provinces.</p>
<p>The combined effect of these reports shows serious governance, operational and structural deficiencies in the intelligence services. These require urgent attention. </p>
<p>The government has since taken some steps which may help restore public confidence in the country’s intelligence services. These include the relocation of <a href="https://mg.co.za/politics/2022-01-17-president-puts-mondli-gungubele-in-charge-of-state-security-agency/">political oversight responsibility for the State Security Agency</a> to the minister in the presidency. Leadership vacancies have also been filled. </p>
<p>The recent appointment of <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/statement-appointment-state-security-agency-director-general">Ambassador Thembisile Majola</a> as the agency’s new director general and <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-appoints-mr-imtiaz-fazel-inspector-general-intelligence">Imtiaz Fazel</a> as the Inspector-General of Intelligence, signals a strong commitment towards ensuring an efficient and effective intelligence capability. Unlike his predecessor, <a href="https://www.saiga.co.za/saiga/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Prof-Dr-Dintwe.pdf">Setlhomamaru Dintwe</a>, who was appointed after the post had been vacant for two years, Fazel was appointed timeously at the expiry of Dintwe’s five-year term.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-provides-fertile-ground-for-funders-of-terrorism-heres-why-194282">South Africa provides fertile ground for funders of terrorism. Here's why</a>
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<p>A stable intelligence service community will ensure that the discovery, monitoring and exposure of people with criminal or terrorist intent is not left to foreign intelligence services. Better still, these can then be identified and brought to justice.</p>
<p>For example, on 7 November 2022 the <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1084">US Treasury</a> announced that it had identified and imposed sanctions on four individuals and their eight companies in South Africa’s port city of Durban. It accused them of providing technical, financial and material support for ISIS operations. There has been no indication that the country’s intelligence services were alert to the individuals’ actions.</p>
<p>The country also runs the real risk of being subjected to additional governance scrutiny by the international Financial Action Task Force (or <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2022-10-02-sa-cannot-escape-greylisting-says-financial-intelligence-centre-chief/">grey-listing</a>) because of failures in its financial system to detect illicit financial transfers, terrorist financing and money laundering.</p>
<h2>United States and South Africa relations</h2>
<p>Tensions between the US and South Africa – this time over the terror alert – are nothing new. Their relations have always had highs and lows since South Africa became a democracy in 1994.</p>
<p>They have tended to converge on socio-economic issues, but diverge on the global political outlook. But the two nations have been consistent in safeguarding their mutual interests.</p>
<p>From an economic perspective, the US is South Africa’s second largest <a href="https://www.worldstopexports.com/top-south-african-import-partners/">trading partner</a>, after China, with a total of US$13.1 billion of exports destined for the US. </p>
<p>On the political front, South Africa has disagreed with a number of US policies. One is Washington’s approach to the Palestine issue. For its part, the US would, for example, have preferred South Africa to take a strong position against Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">in the Ukraine conflict</a>.</p>
<p>But the US will not be reckless by pushing South Africa out of its diplomatic fold. This, in my view, would only benefit countries like Russia and China. As a regional leader, South Africa provides geostrategic and geopolitical value to the US. Washington continues to support Pretoria economically and technically.</p>
<p>That said, South Africa should spare no effort to prevent it from becoming a safe haven for <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-provides-fertile-ground-for-funders-of-terrorism-heres-why-194282">funding terrorism activities</a>. This will also help reduce the possibility of diplomatic misunderstanding between itself and the US on financial security matters.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194542/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Moses B. Khanyile does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tensions between the US and South Africa – this time over the terror alert – are nothing new. Their relations have always had highs and lows since South Africa became a democracy in 1994.Moses B. Khanyile, Director: Centre for Military Studies, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1878892022-08-03T16:03:47Z2022-08-03T16:03:47ZSouth Africa needs stronger security in place to stop the sabotage of its power supply<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477200/original/file-20220802-14-80pssz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African president Cyril Ramaphosa recently <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/address-president-cyril-ramaphosa-actions-address-electricity-crisis%2C-union-buildings%2C-tshwane">outlined</a> plans to solve the country’s devastating electricity supply crisis. But he didn’t mention the country’s ability to protect its energy infrastructure as a prerequisite to any solution.</p>
<p>South Africa has had power cuts <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/1/power-cuts-in-south-africa-what-you-need-to-now">since 2007</a> when Eskom, the power utility, began failing to meet demand. This got worse every year. The power utility is struggling to keep its <a href="https://www.power-technology.com/news/eskom-coal-power/">aged coal-fired power stations</a> running after many years of poor maintenance. It is also <a href="https://www.esi-africa.com/industry-sectors/asset-maintenance/generating-capacity-woes-continues-to-bedevil-eskom/">struggling</a> to get its two new power stations to operate at full capacity.</p>
<p>Explaining some of the recent power cuts, Ramaphosa said that some of the energy infrastructure had been <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/sas-power-stations-ramaphosa-says-theres-deliberate-sabotage">sabotaged</a>. </p>
<p>We flagged this in an earlier <a href="https://theconversation.com/hybrid-warfare-is-on-the-rise-globally-might-south-africas-eskom-be-its-latest-victim-173166">article</a>. We argued that Eskom was the target of hybrid warfare operations aimed at destabilising South Africa’s national power generation capability. </p>
<p>The question is whether the country has the necessary security capabilities to protect its energy infrastructure from such threats and risks. An assessment of the security capabilities also has to include a fit for purpose test of the legislation for the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201911/4286628-11act8of2019criticalinfraprotectact.pdf">protection of critical infrastructure</a>.</p>
<p>Enhanced intelligence capacities are required to detect, deter and neutralise threats such as sabotage, or subversion caused by rioting. More – and appropriately equipped – security forces are also needed to physically secure critical infrastructure. These could be privately or publicly funded.</p>
<p>Our view is that the country does not have what is required where and when it is needed. A comprehensive approach is needed – including managing security threats – to address its energy crisis. This requires collaboration between the state and private sector to implement the president’s long-term energy security vision. </p>
<h2>Hybrid attacks now common</h2>
<p>South Africa is not the only country whose energy infrastructure is facing security threats. There are <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/za/en/insights/industry/public-sector/cyberattack-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity.html">numerous examples</a> of attacks on critical infrastructure. These are typically <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/research-and-innovation/en/horizon-magazine/critical-infrastructures-under-daily-attack-erncip-head-georg-peter">cyber-related</a>. But physical attacks such as <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2021/11/eskom-infrastructure-sabotage-is-consistent-with-the-july-insurrectionists-modus-operandi">sabotage</a> also occur.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/critical-infrastructure-attacks-why-south-africa-should-worry">Institute for Security Studies</a> argues that attacks on the critical infrastructure of developing countries, such as South Africa, could be “<a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/critical-infrastructure-attacks-why-south-africa-should-worry">potentially devastating</a>”. South Africa’s national security vulnerabilities, combined with the security risks to a monolithic state owned entity with no backup, could exacerbate the country’s power supply insecurities. </p>
<p>Cyber attacks on Eskom’s critical infrastructure could lead to severe damage. The result could be corresponding losses of generation capacity and damage to the economy. </p>
<p>National security vulnerabilities can be reduced by state security capabilities that are equal to the task. A <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/content/report-expert-panel-july-2021-civil-unrest">Report of the Expert Panel</a> into <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57818215">civil unrest</a> in the country in July 2021 revealed serious capacity problems within the state security sector. The sector is mandated to forewarn government, and to protect critical infrastructure and the public against <a href="https://journals.sas.ac.uk/amicus/article/view/1671">hybrid threats</a>. These include terrorism, subversion, sabotage, espionage and organised crime. </p>
<p>This weakness was also highlighted in the 2018 <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">High-Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency</a>. It concluded that the country’s <a href="https://nationalgovernment.co.za/units/view/42/state-security-agency-ssa">State Security Agency</a> had been</p>
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<p>The agency is South Africa’s primary authority tasked with protecting the country against such hybrid threats. Yet it is in a state of disrepair. This calls for the country to focus efforts on (at least) the capability to secure Eskom against obvious national security threats. </p>
<h2>The importance of critical infrastructure</h2>
<p>The protection of South Africa’s energy infrastructure falls within the remit of the new <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201911/4286628-11act8of2019criticalinfraprotectact.pdf">Critical Infrastructure Protection Act 8 of 2019</a>. Such infrastructure is crucial for the effective functioning of the economy, <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201911/4286628-11act8of2019criticalinfraprotectact.pdf">national security</a> and public safety. </p>
<p>Critical infrastructure consists of national assets that are viewed as having strategic importance. South Africa has plenty of critical infrastructure spread across its length and breadth – measuring <a href="https://www.worlddata.info/africa/south-africa/index.php#:%7E:text=South%20Africa%20is%20a%20country,25th%20biggest%20in%20the%20world">about 1.219 million km²</a>. These include the Eskom energy grid – <a href="https://www.eskom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/TDP-Report-2019-2029_Final.pdf">including power stations, sub-stations and transmission networks</a> – dams, the banking system and oil storage. The sheer scale requires extensive security capabilities necessary for physical protection and monitoring threats. </p>
<p>Beyond physically securing this infrastructure, the state also needs to have the ability to detect, deter and neutralise threat actors. These are classical counterintelligence prerogatives. Failure on this front makes the country vulnerable to destabilisation. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/download/file/fid/2442">stretched nature</a> of the country’s security agencies was laid bare during the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57818215">violent riots</a> in July 2021. It is thus reasonable to question the capacity of the police, and other security agencies, to secure Eskom’s critical infrastructure and that of private power producers.</p>
<h2>Planning for security</h2>
<p>In our view, all planning to develop and diversify the national power grid and energy supply should include enough resources to protect them. This requires cooperative planning between Eskom and the South African security sector (both state and private).</p>
<p>The exact role of the South African National Defence Force in providing security for critical infrastructure remains unclear. The <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201503/act-102-1980.pdf">National Key Points Act 1980</a>, the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a42-020.pdf">Defence Act 2002</a> and the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201911/4286628-11act8of2019criticalinfraprotectact.pdf">Critical Infrastructure Protection Act 8 of 2019</a> are not explicit on the issue. </p>
<p>The protection of critical infrastructure has been assigned to the South African Police Service, with the defence force <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/170512review.pdf">supporting it</a>. Given that the defence budget has been shrinking annually, the military will probably not be able to sustain this.</p>
<p>With the private sector playing an increased role in the energy sector, South Africa needs to develop dedicated private security capacities to protect its critical infrastructure. At the very least, it should adopt a mixed public-private security model akin to the police service’s <a href="https://cvwa.org.za/community-police-forum/">community policing</a> concept. </p>
<p>The president’s energy vision envisages a much larger private industrial capacity. If left unsecured, such capacity would be just as vulnerable to sabotage as the current Eskom infrastructure is. It is time the country took stock of its security requirements in the same way it has started being serious about its energy vulnerabilities. </p>
<p>There’s also the question of whether the penalties prescribed by law are fit to deter sabotage. </p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>The hybrid nature of <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2021/11/eskom-infrastructure-sabotage-is-consistent-with-the-july-insurrectionists-modus-operandi">threats to the country’s infrastructure</a> can only be solved by an integrated solution. That requires, firstly, clarity about mandates as well as state security capabilities. </p>
<p>Secondly, security sector capacity needs to be developed alongside critical infrastructure. Thirdly, legislation needs to increase existing sanctions in terms of fines and imprisonment.</p>
<p>Lastly, public-private security partnerships must be established to bolster the security of the country’s electricity infrastructure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187889/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann has received funding from the Australian Department of Defence for research regarding grey zone and information operations targeting Australia. Sascha Dov is a Research Fellow with The Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. Sascha would like to thank Dr. Sasha-Lee Afrika for her insightful comments and assistance, particularly regarding the law.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dries Putter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The hybrid nature of threats to South Africa’s energy infrastructure can only be solved by an integrated solution, including severe sanctions that should include fines and imprisonment.Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann, Professor in Law and Co-Convener National Security Hub (University of Canberra) and Research Fellow (adjunct) - The Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University- NATO Fellow Asia-Pacific, University of CanberraDries Putter, Lecturer at the Faculty of Military Science / Affiliate Member, National Security Hub, University of Canberra and Researcher for Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA), Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1871822022-07-18T13:49:33Z2022-07-18T13:49:33ZMass shootings in South Africa are often over group turf: how to stop the cycle of reprisals<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474584/original/file-20220718-72671-c54j9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African police minister, Bheki Cele, centre, at the scene of the tavern shooting that claimed 16 lives in Soweto. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In just two days in early July 2022, 25 people were shot dead in four separate incidents at taverns across South Africa. In one of these shootings, in <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2022-07-13-police-have-footage-of-soweto-tavern-shooting-mazibuko-says/">Soweto</a>, 16 people lost their lives. </p>
<p>The killings made <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/10/africa/soweto-south-africa-shooting-intl/index.html">international headlines</a> and were shocking even in South Africa, a society with one of the highest <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?locations=ZA">murder rates</a> in the world.</p>
<p>There has been intense speculation about the motives behind the killings in the absence of reliable evidence that explains why the multiple murders took place. </p>
<p>To provide some insights into the possible reasons, I reflect on some of the research about mass shootings in South Africa with a view to recommending violence prevention interventions. </p>
<p>South African police <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2022/05/16/wc-has-seen-more-than-400-mass-shootings-between-june-2019-and-december-2021">classify</a> a mass shooting as an incident in which three or more people are shot with a firearm. Available evidence indicates that mass shootings in South Africa are mostly perpetrated by organised criminal groups, such as gangs, with motives often linked to competition over territory and resources. And that shooting incidents have a tendency to result in reprisal attacks.</p>
<p>Based on my insights gained over decades of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Guy-Lamb-3">researching violence in South Africa</a>, my view is that the police will need to prioritise the confiscation of illegal firearms and improve the functioning of crime intelligence to reduce the occurrence of mass shootings.</p>
<h2>Patterns of crime</h2>
<p>Mass shootings have been taking place in South Africa for decades. Incidents were prominent during the 1990s, especially in the province of <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/voting-and-violence-in-kwazulu-natals-no-go-areas/">KwaZulu-Natal</a> as a result of tensions between supporters of the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party. Over the past three decades conflicts between <a href="http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/taxiviolence/fromlowintensity.pdf">minibus taxi associations</a> and between <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/books/organised-crime-a-study-from-the-cape-flats">criminal gangs</a> (especially in the Western Cape province) have frequently been characterised by mass shootings.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/services/crimestats.php">Quarterly crime data</a> indicate that incidents involving multiple murder victims have increased substantially over the past year. </p>
<p>Most murder cases involve the use of a firearm in which a single perpetrator murders a single victim. Nonetheless, multiple murders are perpetrated on a regular basis. For example, the <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/services/april_to_march_2019_20_presentation.pdf">2019/20 crime data</a> indicated that there were 508 murder cases where two or more people were slain simultaneously. A total of 1,133 people died in the incidents. This represented 5% of murders for 2019/20. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/plasma-gangs-how-south-africans-fears-about-crime-created-an-urban-legend-185544">Plasma gangs: how South Africans' fears about crime created an urban legend</a>
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<p>No data for multiple murder cases was provided for 2020/21. But <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/services/crimestats.php">quarterly crime data</a> for 2021/22 showed a significant increase in such murders. For the six-month period between 1 October 2021 and 31 March 2022, there were 416 multiple murder cases involving 953 victims. This equated to 9% of murders for this period.</p>
<p>Historically, most mass shootings in South Africa have been associated with three main things: gang conflicts, rivalries in the minibus taxi sector and factional or inter-group feuds (mainly in KwaZulu-Natal). These forms of collective violence have ultimately emerged from efforts to control certain spaces and resources.</p>
<p>Criminal gangs operate in most major cities in South Africa, especially in Cape Town and Gqeberha, in the Eastern Cape, where much of the <a href="https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Web_SACN-State-of-Urban-Safety-2018-19-1204-1.pdf">violent crime</a> has been attributed to gang activity. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/13/world/africa/cape-town-crime-military.html">Gang conflicts</a> have traditionally revolved around gangs seeking to dominate poorer urban neighbourhoods to facilitate and benefit from the trade in illegal goods, especially drugs. </p>
<p>Violence in the <a href="http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/taxiviolence/fromlowintensity.pdf">minibus taxi industry</a> has often arisen from conflicts between taxi organisations over access to transport routes and taxi ranks. Another driver has been the perceived competition from other public transport service providers, such as <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/amabhungane-taxi-mafia-blamed-for-deadly-attacks-on-long-distance-buses-20220608-2">bus companies</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.newframe.com/going-back-to-the-future-of-kwazulu-natal-politics/">Factional disputes</a>, which have frequently been linked to party politics, have often been related to access to and control over territory.</p>
<p>Mass shootings have at times been the outcome of conflicts between vigilantes and gangsters (or those regarded as criminals by vigilante groups) over control over specific communities. This has been an ongoing problem in Philippi East in the Western Cape. For example in September 2017, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-10-03-patrollers-in-marikana-philippi-east-live-in-fear-after-mass-shooting/">11 people</a> were fatally shot in one evening at the <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/marikana-informal-settlement-erupts-protests/">Marikana informal settlement</a> in fighting between gangsters and other residents. </p>
<p>Vigilantes in <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-28-phoenix-massacre-what-really-happened-in-the-deadly-collision-of-brutalised-communities/">Phoenix</a> were also responsible for mass shootings during the July 2021 unrest in KwaZulu-Natal.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/crime-statistics-show-south-africas-lockdown-crime-holiday-is-over-166785">Crime statistics show South Africa's lockdown 'crime holiday' is over</a>
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<p>Mass shootings have also been associated with the illegal gold mining sector, due to conflicts between <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/5/1/illicit-gold-trade-fuels-conflict-in-south-african-mining-town">competing groups of miners</a> (or “zama zamas”) and between zama zamas and law enforcement or private security personnel. For instance, eight illegal miners died in a shootout with police at a mine in Orkney in <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/six-killed-as-police-exchange-fire-with-zama-zamas-in-north-west-20211007">October 2021</a>. And in <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/01/15/police-suspect-gang-rivalry-after-7-men-found-dead-at-benoni-mine-shaft">January 2018</a>, seven died in a shootout between different groups of miners.</p>
<p>Since 2017, mass shootings, particularly in <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Lifting-the-veil-on-extortion-in-Cape-Town-GITOC.pdf">Khayelitsha</a> in the Western Cape, have increasingly been attributed to extortion efforts by gangs. Acts of mass firearm violence have been used to terrorise township businesses and residents into paying “protection” fees. </p>
<p>Such violent organised criminality appears to have become more prevalent. <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/tavern-shootings-extortion-among-possible-motives-say-experts-20220711">Extortion</a> efforts might be the cause of the recent tavern shootings in Soweto and Pietermaritzburg. </p>
<p>Turf battles between extortion gangs have also tended to result in mass shootings between these groups.</p>
<p>All these forms of collective violence appear to have become self-perpetuating. Mass shootings have tended to ignite <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/bodies-pile-up-as-cape-towns-hard-livings-gang-goes-to-war-in-durban-a97c039f-f0a8-4e60-8364-f266baa0c74e">retaliatory attacks</a>, which in turn have led to further violent reprisals. This has contributed to norms and beliefs that prioritise the use of violence to manage inter-group conflicts becoming more entrenched in crime-affected communities. </p>
<p>On top of this, COVID and the war in Ukraine have had serious implications for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-economy-has-taken-some-heavy-body-blows-can-it-recover-183165">legal economy</a> as well as the illegal economy. Organised criminal groups have been feeling the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-11-03-gugulethu-massacre-gang-sends-out-grim-video-message-warning-of-more-carnage/">economic pinch</a>. Hence <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/extortion-rackets-likely-behind-spate-of-mass-shootings-in-cape-town-20220513">competition</a> between groups, especially between street gangs and groups specialising in extortion, appears to have become more acute and more violent.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>The South African government has two options to reduce mass shootings. Both will require monumental policing efforts. </p>
<p>The first entails the establishment of <a href="https://hub.jhu.edu/2018/01/11/how-to-reduce-gun-violence-in-baltimore-city/">targeted police operations</a> that focus on the confiscation of illegal firearms and ammunition where the risk of mass shootings is the highest, such as Khayelitsha and Delft in the Western Cape and Soweto in Gauteng. This is critically important as the upturn in violent crime appears to be linked to the widespread availability of illegal firearms. These are the <a href="http://www.policesecretariat.gov.za/downloads/reports/CSPS-WSG_Firearms_Report.pdf">most common weapon</a> used to commit murder, attempted murder and robberies with aggravating circumstances in the country.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-turn-the-tide-against-south-africas-crime-wave-131839">How to turn the tide against South Africa's crime wave</a>
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<p>This would need to be linked to a process of tightening the <a href="https://www.saferspaces.org.za/understand/entry/gun-violence">firearm law</a> to reduce the diversion of firearms into criminal hands. More than 5,000 licensed firearms are lost or stolen each year.</p>
<p>The second option necessitates considerable <a href="https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/role-intelligence-combating-organised-crime">intelligence gathering</a>. The police service’s crime intelligence arm needs to be able to identify and monitor the activities of groups responsible for mass shootings to secure arrests and convictions in court.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187182/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Guy Lamb receives funding from the Peace Research Institute, Oslo. He also serves as a Commissioner on South Africa's National Planning Commission where he chairs the Commission's Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Task Team.</span></em></p>Historically, most mass shootings in South Africa have been associated with three main things: gang conflicts, rivalries in the minibus taxi sector and factional or inter-group feuds.Guy Lamb, Criminologist / Lecturer, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1788212022-03-28T15:13:44Z2022-03-28T15:13:44ZSouth Africans have low trust in their police. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454096/original/file-20220324-25-lrsaeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A culture of better service and use of minimal force are key to improving public confidence in the South African Police Service. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The legitimacy of legal authorities is recognised globally as crucial for the state’s ability to function in a justifiable and effective manner. This applies, in particular, to the police. Recently, South Africa’s Defence Minister Thandi Modise lamented the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sas-safety-and-security-machinery-will-be-restored-security-cluster/">low level of public trust</a> in law enforcement agencies in the country.</p>
<p>In particular, the minister, who also heads the country’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/justice-crime-prevention-and-security-cluster">Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster</a>, drew attention to a persisting legitimacy problem in the relationship between the police and the public.</p>
<p>To provide further context to the extent and nature of this challenge, we examine representative survey data on trends in police confidence since the late 1990s. The data shows that public trust in the police has been low throughout most of the democratic period. Between 2020 and 2021, however, there was significant drop in the level of trust ordinary people had in the police. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/media-briefs/dces/changing-patterns-of-trust-in-sa-police">Our research</a> outlines some of the drivers of general attitudes towards the law enforcement. We hope that this work will be used to design interventions to restore the public’s faith in the police. </p>
<h2>Tracking confidence in the police</h2>
<p>Views on crime and policing in the country have been a thematic priority in the <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/departments/sasas">South African Social Attitudes Survey series</a> since its inception in 2003. This series is conducted annually by the <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en">Human Sciences Research Council</a> using face-to-face interviews, and has been designed to be nationally representative of the adult population aged 16 years and above. Each year, between 2500 and 3200 people are interviewed countrywide. The data are weighted using <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/">Statistics South Africa</a>’s most recent mid-year population estimates.</p>
<p>The survey series builds on earlier representative public opinion surveying at the council known as Evaluation of Public Opinion Programme series. On certain topics (such as policing) this allows us to extend the period of analysis back to before the early 2000s.</p>
<p>The pattern of public confidence in the police over the 1998 to 2021 period is presented in Figure 1. Trust levels have remained relatively low over this period. Not once during this 23-year interval did more than half the adult public say that they trusted the police. It would seem that the issue of low trust in the police is not new. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451099/original/file-20220309-27-9zhl8d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451099/original/file-20220309-27-9zhl8d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451099/original/file-20220309-27-9zhl8d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451099/original/file-20220309-27-9zhl8d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451099/original/file-20220309-27-9zhl8d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451099/original/file-20220309-27-9zhl8d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451099/original/file-20220309-27-9zhl8d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1: Confidence in the police, 1998-2021 (% trust/ strongly trust)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">HSRC EPOP 1998-2001; HSRC SASAS 2003-2021</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Between 1998 to 2010, the average level of trust in the police was relatively static. It ranged between 39% and 42% in all but a few years. This was followed by a sharp decline between 2011 and 2013, following the <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2021/08/16/the-marikana-massacre-s-effect-on-the-law-and-sa-s-union-landscape">killing by police of 34 striking miners at Marikana</a>, North West Province, in August 2012. But confidence had almost returned to the 2011 level by 2015. </p>
<p>The 2016 to 2020 period was characterised by modest fluctuation between 31% and 35%. The <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/president-ramaphosa-announces-nationwide-lockdown">hard COVID-19 lockdown</a> imposed by the state <a href="https://www.gov.za/covid-19/about/about-alert-system">in 2020</a> saw <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/pandemic-policing-south-africas-most-vulnerable-face-a-sharp-increase-in-police-related-brutality/">instances</a> of police brutality. However, we did not observe a decline in public confidence in the police during the the 2020 period.</p>
<p>In 2021 public trust in the police dipped to a low 27%. This appears to be linked to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-social-unrest-in-south-africa-and-what-might-be-done-about-it-166130">July 2021 social unrest</a>. Many have <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2022/02/21/in-quotes-cele-explains-how-saps-fell-short-in-responding-to-july-unrest">criticised</a> the police for poor performance of during the unrest. </p>
<p>Substantial provincial variation in trust in the police underlies this national trend (Table 1). Looking at the 2011-2021 period, we find that adults in the Western Cape, Limpopo and Gauteng provinces have consistently reported lower levels of trust in the police than the national average. The country has nine provinces.</p>
<p>The distinct decline in trust observed between 2020 and 2021 was unevenly reflected across provinces. The largest decline was in the Western Cape. It fell more than 20 percentage points, greatly exceeding the national decline of 7 percentage points. This may reflect a failure to rein in <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/we-need-each-other-pleads-western-cape-police-boss-at-emotional-community-meeting-on-crime-20220315">gangsterism</a> in that province. More moderate (but still sizeable) declines were identified in Limpopo, Northern Cape, and Gauteng.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451096/original/file-20220309-20-144x2sw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451096/original/file-20220309-20-144x2sw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451096/original/file-20220309-20-144x2sw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=187&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451096/original/file-20220309-20-144x2sw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=187&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451096/original/file-20220309-20-144x2sw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=187&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451096/original/file-20220309-20-144x2sw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451096/original/file-20220309-20-144x2sw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451096/original/file-20220309-20-144x2sw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Table 1: Provincial trends in police confidence, 2011-2021 (% trust / strongly trust)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">HSRC SASAS 2011-2021</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Factors affecting confidence in the police</h2>
<p>Based on the survey evidence, various factors influence public trust in, and legitimacy of, the police in South Africa. These are briefly summarised below. </p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Experiences of crime:</strong> Those who had been recent victims of crime displayed significantly lower levels of trust in the police. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Fear of crime:</strong> Higher levels of fear are associated with lower trust in the police. This applies to classic measures such as fear of walking alone in one’s area after dark, as well as worrying about home robbery or violent assault. These associations have been found across multiple rounds of surveying. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Experiences of policing:</strong> Negative experiences with police have a bearing on how the public judge police. Those reporting unsatisfactory personal contact with police officers expressed lower trust levels than those reporting satisfactory contact. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Well publicised instances of police abuse or failure</strong>: These can also reduce public confidence in police. Apart from the the <a href="https://theconversation.com/marikana-shining-the-light-on-police-militarisation-and-brutality-in-south-africa-44162">2012 Marikana massacre</a>, another prominent example is the perceived ineffectiveness of the police in responding to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-social-unrest-in-south-africa-and-what-might-be-done-about-it-166130">July 2021 social unrest</a>. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Perceptions of police corruption:</strong> These have a strong, negative effect on confidence in police. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Perceived fairness and effectiveness:</strong> <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12012">Past in-depth research</a> has shown that the South African public strongly emphasises both fairness and effectiveness as important elements in their overall assessments of confidence in police. The more the police are seen to be acting unfairly on the basis of race, class or other attributes, the more people are likely to view them as untrustworthy.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Similarly, perceptions that the police treat people disrespectfully, lack impartiality in their decision making, or transparency in their actions, can also undermine public confidence. If the police are seen as ineffective in preventing, reducing and responding to crime, this will also diminish confidence. </p>
<p>Another factor influencing how the public view the police is the broader evaluation of the government’s democratic performance and trustworthiness. Importantly, public confidence in democratic institutions has shown a strong downward trend over the <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/research-data/view/7843">past 15 years</a>. This has had a bearing on confidence in the police.</p>
<h2>Polishing the tarnished badge</h2>
<p>Low and diminishing confidence in the police, if left unchecked, will continue to undermine police legitimacy in South Africa. Recent recommendations put forward by the <a href="https://issafrica.org/">Institute of Security Studies</a> could improve public attitudes towards the police. </p>
<p>They include dispensing with an excessively hierarchical police culture, promoting <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sa-police-failures-demand-urgent-reform-before-its-too-late">competent and ethical police leadership</a>, as well as strengthening other parts of the overall system of police governance. </p>
<p>Key also is the implementation of a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africas-police-a-rigid-bureaucracy-struggling-to-reform">non-militaristic policing ethos</a>. This should be framed around a service culture and use of minimal force. It also requires police to put more measures in place to monitor and control the use of force, and promote a <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/southern-africa-report/how-to-reduce-police-brutality-in-south-africa">culture of police accountability</a>.</p>
<p>These ideas warrant serious attention. They matter fundamentally for preventing further instances of <a href="https://mg.co.za/politics/2021-04-25-when-violence-is-policy-how-do-we-curb-police-brutality/">police misuse of force</a>, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-03-22-the-collateral-damage-of-south-africas-police-leadership-feud-sees-civilians-vulnerable-while-crime-spirals/">corruption</a> among senior officials, and <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/560270/the-crimes-that-are-getting-worse-in-south-africa/">police ineffectiveness</a> in handling crime. This is crucial for stemming and reversing the eroding confidence in the badge.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178821/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Roberts receives funding from various government and non-government institutions for commissioned research as part of the HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) series. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Gordon is employed at the Human Sciences Research Council. He is affiliated with the University of Johannesburg. </span></em></p>Perceptions that South African police treat people disrespectfully, lack impartiality or transparency, and are prone to brutality
undermine public confidence in them.Benjamin Roberts, Acting Strategic Lead: Developmental, Capable and Ethical State (DCES) research division, and Coordinator of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), Human Sciences Research CouncilSteven Gordon, Senior Research Specialist., Human Sciences Research CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1792462022-03-21T15:17:40Z2022-03-21T15:17:40ZJohannesburg’s first woman mayor speaks on effective coalitions and fighting corruption<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453001/original/file-20220318-21-h2fzmi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mpho Phalatse, mayor of Johannesburg.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo: City of Johannesburg</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa’s nationwide local government elections held on <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-and-results/Municipal-Elections-2021">1 November 2021</a> saw a continuing trend of no outright winners in some key cities, resulting in coalition governments. This is a relatively new phenomenon in South Africa, resulting from the decline in support for the African National Congress, which has dominated politics since democracy in 1994. The coalition governments have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/marriages-of-inconvenience-the-fraught-politics-of-coalitions-in-south-africa-167517">marred by volatility and instability</a>, owing to posturing and power plays. Research specialist Joleen Steyn Kotze talks to <a href="https://www.da.org.za/get-to-know-mpho-phalatse">Mpho Phalatse</a>, from the opposition <a href="https://www.da.org.za/">Democratic Alliance</a>, the first woman to be elected the mayor of the economic powerhouse of Johannnesburg.</em></p>
<h2>Local government councils are often political theatres. How do you manage this?</h2>
<p><strong>Mpho Phalatse:</strong> Multi-party governance requires a high level of political maturity and a full understanding of our role in society. It can be brought into focus through the Kenyan proverb, when two elephants fight it is the grass that suffers. Meaning that our political disagreements leave communities without services such as healthcare, safety, security, housing as well as job opportunities.</p>
<p>While as partners we have agreed on certain principles and values, which are non-negotiables, there are matters that we may not agree on and that require negotiation, which play into processes like budgets. Without the budget there can be no government. Ultimately it is the people that suffer.</p>
<p>So, we cannot be ideologically rigid or stubborn. All parties <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-03-09-da-eff-actionsa-joburg-council-set-for-showdown-over-city-manager-appointment/">must compromise</a>. </p>
<h2>What are the interventions you will advance to ensure meaningful change?</h2>
<p><strong>Mpho Phalatse:</strong> Before we can start hoisting up cranes and rolling out capital projects, we need get the basics right. These are the foundation on which we are going to build the city we desire.</p>
<p>These basics align with our priorities. When we table the <a href="https://www.joburg.org.za/documents_/Documents/2020-21%20Integrated%20Annual%20Report/City%20of%20Johannesburg%20Annual%20Intergrated%20Report_1st_Council%20version.pdf">state of the city address in April</a>, followed by the <a href="https://www.joburg.org.za/documents_/Documents/IDP,%20Budget%20Process%20Plan/IDP,BUDGET%20-PROCESS%20PLAN.pdf">budget in May</a>, these will signal the start of the multi-party government’s full control of the city and its direction.</p>
<p>Some basics include establishing good governance as the gold standard. This means playing by the book, identifying corruption and acting against it. This way, we can stop financial leaks in the system and direct those funds to their intended service delivery programmes.</p>
<p>Through operation <a href="https://www.joburg.org.za/media_/MediaStatements/Pages/2018%20Press%20Releases/National-and-Provincial-Government-embrace-Operation-Buya-Mthetho.aspx">Buya Mthetho</a>, a campaign aimed at restoring rule of law and creating safe communities, as well as a <a href="https://sandtontimes.co.za/operation-buya-mthetho/">revenue collection programme</a> we have identified that our revenue collection is not where it ought to be. So, we have embarked on a campaign to collect as much of the <a href="https://www.joburg.org.za/media_/Pages/Media/Media%20Statements/2022%20Media%20Statements/February/R38-billion-in-unpaid-bills-could-build-a-well-run,-safe,-and-business-friendly-Joburg.aspx">R38-billion</a> owed to the city in outstanding rates, taxes and levies. Those who have the means to pay but simply refuse to, have their service suspended until they pay what is owed. </p>
<p>For those who are unable to pay, we have reopened the <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/debt-rehabilitation-programme-for-citys-customers-to-be-reinstated-johannesburg-mayor/">debt rehabilitation programme</a>. It assists financially distressed ratepayers and defaulting customers to bring their outstanding municipal accounts up to date.</p>
<p>We have also accelerated maintenance projects. Our service delivery teams from City Parks and Zoo, the Johannesburg Roads Agency, Joburg Water and City Power are conducting region-by-region blitzes to fix potholes, clean open spaces and curbs and cut trees, paint lines on the roads, fix traffic signals, repair leaking pipes and taps, and so on. This is part of getting the basics right.</p>
<p>We have deployed an additional <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/city-of-joburg-unleashes-1-800-metro-cops-to-curb-crime-in-the-city-centre-20220119">1,800 city police officers</a> to supplement existing patrols to prevent and fight crime in the Central Business District (CBD) and other business nodes. We will be deploying 150 park rangers to safeguard the city’s open spaces.</p>
<p>The rejuvenation of the CBD is important. We have begun taking back <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/city-of-joburg-target-hijacked-buildings-returns-47-properties-to-lawful-owners-20220210">hijacked buildings</a> – buildings, mostly in the CBD, which were either shuttered or abandoned by their owners and taken over by criminal syndicates who then rented out without paying rates and taxes – and returning them to their owners. If the owners can’t be traced, we will convert the buildings into affordable housing, among other things, to bring more people closer to economic opportunities.</p>
<p>And we recently launched a site and services project in the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dcEWagkt1KI">Zandspruit informal settlement</a> that will bring decent housing to communities that have been left behind. </p>
<h2>Your term will be five years. What legacy would you like to leave?</h2>
<p><strong>Mpho Phalatse</strong>: The administration of the city must work, regardless of who leads it politically. This means having professional, skilled and dedicated staff at all levels who appreciate what it means to work for local government.</p>
<p>One can have the best political and policy intentions but, without a working administration, making ones’ priorities reality becomes difficult. This is why I am obsessed with getting the basics right.</p>
<p>In short, governments come and go, so we must leave the administration stronger than we found it so that there is smooth transition between governments as well as lasting and equitable development.</p>
<h2>How will you ensure balanced consultation in the volatile context of coalitions?</h2>
<p><strong>Mpho Phalatse:</strong> Consultation and implementation are not mutually exclusive. It is understanding what we need to consult on. For example, we consulted extensively ahead of the adjustment budget. We will also consult ahead of the budget in May.</p>
<p>The budget is a key policy and implementation document. Once we pass it, we’ll get on with the job of delivering services.</p>
<p>There was wide consultation on the appointment of board members to serve the municipal entities. Thus, we have highly qualified board members who must now be given the space to do their jobs. Likewise, we will again consult on appointing the right city manager. </p>
<p>All multi-party partners understand what needs to be done. </p>
<h2>What are the lessons from the previous coalition governments?</h2>
<p>In many ways we are writing the multi-party government playbook as we go. But, key to the success of this project is working together, mutual respect and abiding by the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/da-signs-five-year-agreement-with-coalition-partners-dreams-big-for-2024-20211216">coalition agreement</a> all partners have signed.</p>
<p>In a nutshell the rules of engagement must be clear, understood and followed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179246/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joleen Steyn Kotze receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>Parties must forego ideological rigidity and compromise for the common good, says Mpho Phalatse about making coalitions work.Joleen Steyn Kotze, Chief Research Specialist in Democracy and Citizenship at the Human Science Research Council and a Research Fellow Centre for African Studies, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1666682021-08-25T15:11:34Z2021-08-25T15:11:34ZMissteps stand in the way of criminal liability in South African mental health patient deaths<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417609/original/file-20210824-24-2593zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The 144 mental health care users were failed from the get go.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alet Pretorius/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Between March and September 2016, nearly 2000 mental health care users were discharged from a private long term care facility after a South African provincial government organ cancelled a contract. Patients with varying mental health care needs were transferred to unlicensed nongovernmental organisations. It led to 144 deaths. Later, the public would hear details of how patients were deprived of basic provisions such as food, shelter and medication. Five years later no criminal charges have been instituted. On the eve of an <a href="https://section27.org.za/life-esidimeni/">inquest into the deaths</a>, Jo-Mari Visser unpacks how the system has failed to bring justice.</em></p>
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<h2>When did the system first fail those who lost their lives?</h2>
<p>Right at the beginning – the point at which <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-09-04-health-e-news-esidimeni-unnatural-deaths-erased/">various medical officers</a> recorded causes of death on the death certificates.</p>
<p>First some context.</p>
<p>In South Africa, the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/node/9">National Prosecuting Authority (NPA)</a> is the government agency responsible for instituting criminal prosecutions and performing related functions. Included is the duty to help give effect to the provisions of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201505/act-58-1959.pdf">Inquest Act 58 of 1959</a> when a death due to unnatural causes has been reported to the South African Police Service. </p>
<p>The NPA decides whether there is any reason to get more information or to begin criminal proceedings. But this never happened because the deaths were recorded as natural.</p>
<p>Here’s how the process works. When the police investigation into an unnatural death has been completed and all information, post-mortem reports and witness statements have been included in the case file, it is submitted to the public prosecutors at the NPA. The Authority studies the contents of the file and decides whether there are any outstanding investigations still to be concluded. If so, the prosecutor will return the case file to the police with careful instructions about what must be done.</p>
<p>If the prosecutor is convinced that, on the face of it, there is enough potential evidence to secure a successful prosecution and there are no clear reasons not to prosecute, they will institute criminal proceedings against the suspect on behalf of the state. </p>
<p>But if the prosecutor is not convinced of the strength of the case they will submit the case file to the inquest court. This might happen if there’s doubt about the exact cause of death or if there is not a clear link between a known suspect’s actions and the fatal outcome.</p>
<p>The 144 mental health care users were failed from the get-go. Immediate police investigations into these deaths were prevented because the cause of death was indicated as “natural causes” on the death certificates. </p>
<p>Because of this, no postmortem examinations or other forensic investigations were conducted at the time.</p>
<p>This affected every subsequent development.</p>
<h2>How did the tragedy unfold?</h2>
<p>By mid-2016, the Health Department of the Gauteng Province – South Africa’s economic hub – had implemented its decision to cancel its contract with the Life Esidimeni Health Care Centre. This resulted in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329988090_Contribution_of_the_Health_Ombud_to_Accountability_The_Life_Esidimeni_Tragedy_in_South_Africa">more than 1700</a> patients being moved haphazardly to other hospitals and non-governmental organisations. This was despite <a href="http://healthombud.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/FINALREPORT.pdf">warnings</a> that such a move would be detrimental to the patients’ well-being. </p>
<p>Almost immediately reports of abuse, starvation, dehydration and neglect surfaced, and by September 2016, a reported <a href="http://healthombud.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/FINALREPORT.pdf">77 patients had died</a> under suspicious circumstances.</p>
<p>Under public pressure, the Minister of Health instructed the Health Ombud of South Africa to investigate the circumstances surrounding the deaths. In a comprehensive <a href="http://healthombud.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/FINALREPORT.pdf">report</a> published in February 2017, the ombud detailed the unacceptable – and often horrific – conditions in which the patients were moved and cared for after their removal from Life Esidimeni. </p>
<p>The report showed that almost all aspects of the move and subsequent care violated the National Health Act and the Mental Health Care Act. It also violated the patients’ and their families’ constitutional rights to, among others, dignity, life, access to quality health care services and environments that are not harmful to their health and well-being. </p>
<p>The report also revealed the entries on the death certificates. But it made clear in its findings that “natural causes” did <em>not</em> reflect the circumstances in which these mental health care patients died. </p>
<p>The entries on the death certificates came under scrutiny again some time later during a dispute resolution process between the families of the deceased patients and the government, a restorative process recommended by the ombud. Former <a href="http://section27.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Life-Esidimeni-arbitration-award-by-retired-Deputy-Chief-Justice-Dikgang-Mosenke.pdf">Deputy Justice Dikgang Moseneke</a> oversaw this arbitration process.</p>
<p>In his arbitration report Moseneke recorded the concessions made by the state that</p>
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<p>the deaths of the concerned mental health care users were not natural deaths but caused by the unlawful and negligent omission or commissions of its employees… </p>
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<p>He attributed blame to the former Gauteng MEC for Health who cancelled the contract with Life Esidimeni, several provincial governmental officials, and the staff of the NGOs who carried the same legislative and constitutional duties of care as the state toward the patients and their families. </p>
<p>But Justice Moseneke stopped short of ordering the police to investigate criminal charges against the mentioned parties. He rightly held that the police must perform their investigative functions as the law commands it, and not at his bidding.</p>
<p>By this time, <a href="https://section27.org.za/">SECTION27</a>, a <a href="https://section27.org.za/life-esidimeni/">public interest law centre</a>, had assisted some families of deceased patients to submit requests with the South African Police Service to launch inquests into these deaths. By the time the arbitration was concluded, all 144 case files had been submitted to the NPA. </p>
<p>Despite the NPA’s <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-09-17-not-enough-evidence-to-prosecute-esidimeni-deaths-npa/">fervent investigations</a> it found that not enough evidence existed to justify the institution of criminal proceedings. Insufficient evidence about the exact cause of death and the connection of specific role-players to these deaths resulted in the NPA submitting the case files for joint inquest in 2021. </p>
<h2>What good will the inquest do?</h2>
<p>An inquest is not a trial. No pronouncements on guilt will be made and no person will be named “accused”. </p>
<p>The purpose is to fill those evidential gaps that preclude the NPA from instituting criminal proceedings. During the inquest, each piece of evidence will be perused, more evidence will be collected and all possible avenues will be scoured to find answers to the questions: how did the patients really die? And who exactly caused their deaths? </p>
<p>It is important to remember that while the health ombud and arbitration assigned blame to certain entities and individuals, criminal proceedings are conducted on a much higher standard of proof. Potential evidence will be subjected to strict rules of admissibility and must carry sufficient probative value to persuade a criminal court of the guilt of specific perpetrators - <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/sites/default/files/resources/justice_system/NPA_eng.pdf">beyond reasonable doubt</a>. </p>
<p>But this reflects the second great failure in the process of pursuing justice for the deceased and their loved ones. The police investigations and forensic examinations of most of the deaths only started during and after the arbitration. It is not known how much time had elapsed between the deaths and the performance of autopsies once it was determined that the deaths were not – as initially indicated – due to natural causes. </p>
<p>Even less is known about any opportunities the South African Police Service and its Forensic Division should have had to collect crucial evidence during the time immediately following the deaths. We will never fully understand how much evidence has been lost due to these failures.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166668/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jo-Marí Visser does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An immediate police investigation into the deaths was prevented because the cause of death was indicated as ‘natural causes’ on their death certificates.Jo-Marí Visser, Senior Lecturer: Department Public Law, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1661942021-08-19T14:34:59Z2021-08-19T14:34:59ZGun control in South Africa: tightening the law, and more<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416575/original/file-20210817-13-1gy04h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African police prepare guns handed in during one of several amnesties for destruction. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Statistics produced by the <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/services/april_to_march_2019_20_presentation.pdf">police</a> and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2636399/">mortuary surveillance systems</a> in South Africa have consistently shown that firearms are the most commonly used weapons to commit murder and other violent crimes, such as carjacking and house robberies. </p>
<p>With this in mind, the <a href="http://www.policesecretariat.gov.za/index.php">Civilian Secretariat for Police Services</a> which serves as the technical advisory agency to the Minister of Police, wants to have the <a href="http://www.policesecretariat.gov.za/downloads/FAC_Bill/FAC_Bill.pdf">Firearms Control Act</a> amended to introduce more stringent firearm licensing measures. The proposed amendments seek to reduce the number of new licensed firearms in circulation. Significantly, if the amendments become law, it will no longer be possible to acquire a firearm licence for self defence purposes.</p>
<p>South Africa already has relatively strict firearms control legislation. The <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/services/flash/firearms/legislation/gov_notice_english.pdf">Firearms Control Act</a>, 2004, replaced the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1968-071.pdf">1968 law</a>, which permitted relatively widespread access to legal firearms. </p>
<p>The current Act requires firearm license applicants to undergo detailed background checks and pass a firearm competency test. In addition, only those 21 years or older can apply for a license. And, applications generally have to be accompanied by compelling motivations. </p>
<p>The proposed amendments have once again stirred public debate, particularly about whether tighter laws do actually reduce firearm violence. The Civilian Secretariat for Police Services has invited public comment on the proposed amendments, and has reportedly received more than <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-07-01-more-than-100000-comments-on-proposed-gun-law--heres-why-sa-is-upset/">100 000 submissions</a>.</p>
<p>Groups lobbying for tighter controls, such as <a href="https://www.gfsa.org.za/">Gun Free South Africa</a> argue that the Firearms Act has been a game-changer for reducing firearm violence in South Africa. They point to the fact that the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf">firearm murder rate</a> declined by 40% between 1998 and 2007. The last amendments were passed midway, in 2004.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/illegal-guns-fuel-violent-crime-wreak-deadly-havoc-in-south-africa-49006">Illegal guns fuel violent crime, wreak deadly havoc in South Africa</a>
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<p>For their part, pro-gun groups claim that the firearm law has had a <a href="https://irr.org.za/reports/submissions-on-proposed-legislation/irr-submission-draft-firearms-control-amendment-bill-of-2021.pdf">negligible impact</a> on crime in South Africa. </p>
<p>Differing views have also been expressed by researchers. Public health studies have suggested that reductions in murders in <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24432917/">urban areas</a>, <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001412">femicides</a> and <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23941753/">gunshot injuries in children</a> can be attributed to the Firearms Control Act. </p>
<p>Conversely, a <a href="http://www.policesecretariat.gov.za/downloads/reports/CSPS-WSG_Firearms_Report.pdf">report</a> by researchers at the Wits University School of Governance “found no evidence for the causal relation between the FCA and reduced crime levels”. </p>
<p>I have more than 20 years of arms control research experience, which included consulting to the United Nations, as well as various policing agencies on various occasions. Drawing from this, it is my view that there are two aspects of firearms control in South Africa that have often been neglected in this debate.</p>
<p>These are essential to understanding the relationship between the Firearms Act, and variations in firearm crime. Firstly, that the Act can only have a direct impact on certain types of firearm violence. Secondly, that changes to the law have been one of a number of interconnected measures that the government has pursued to address gun violence since the late 1990s.</p>
<h2>What’s in place</h2>
<p>The basic premise underlying most restrictions and controls relating to legal gun ownership is that some individuals are more prone to violence than others. Hence, throughout the world, many governments use <a href="https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-03.30-2015EV1.0.pdf">legislation to prohibit</a> those with histories of violence, substance abuse as well as criminal records from acquiring firearm licenses.</p>
<p>Studies published in peer-reviewed journals indicate that the introduction of more stringent firearms controls has the potential to bring about a reduction, or an accelerated reduction in firearm homicides. For example, a <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26905895/">systematic review</a> of 130 studies from ten countries on the public health impact of firearms control legislation found a significant link between the “simultaneous implementation of laws targeting multiple firearms restrictions”, and reductions in firearm deaths.</p>
<p>South Africa, unfortunately, doesn’t have data that definitively determine the impact of the Firearms Control Act on levels of violence. But it’s highly unlikely that the measures contained in the act would not have resulted in some form of a reduction in gun violence.</p>
<p>These include a requirement that the police perform extensive <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/implementing-the-south-african-firearms-control-act-a-complete-failure-or-work-in-progress">background checks</a> on firearm licence applicants. This has resulted in thousands of applications being <a href="https://www.westerncape.gov.za/sites/www.westerncape.gov.za/files/the_effect_of_firearm_legislation_on_crime_western_cape.pdf">rejected</a>.</p>
<p>The Act also makes provision for the invalidation of firearm licenses in circumstances where owners have been convicted of violent crime. And owners are required to store their firearms in a <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/24599gen8581.pdf">safe</a> when they are not carrying them. </p>
<p>But there are caveats. One is illegal firearms, an area in which the Firearms Control Act has serious limitations.</p>
<h2>Licensed versus illegal guns</h2>
<p>Illegal guns have been predominantly used in firearm murders and other types of violent crimes in South Africa. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC-103dc1c7e0">paper</a> written three years ago I examined whether there was a relationship between murder and the policing of illegal firearms by the South African Police Service, particularly in high crime areas. </p>
<p>I found that the vast majority of illegal guns in circulation in South Africa were originally licensed to civilians and private security companies. These ended up in the hands of the criminal sector through <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC-103dc1c7e0">loss and theft</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-soldiers-wont-end-gang-violence-a-co-ordinated-plan-might-120775">South Africa's soldiers won't end gang violence. A co-ordinated plan might</a>
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<p>Although the ambit of the law can’t control these guns once they’re no longer in the regulated frame, there is nevertheless evidence that the Act can help reduce the diversion of legal weapons into the hands of criminals. This is because a correspondence has been shown between substantial reductions in the approval of civilian firearm licenses and a significant decline in the loss or theft of licensed civilian firearms. </p>
<p>This came through clearly in a <a href="https://www.westerncape.gov.za/sites/www.westerncape.gov.za/files/the_effect_of_firearm_legislation_on_crime_western_cape.pdf">report</a> compiled by the Western Cape provincial government based, on data from the police between 2004/04 and 2008/09.</p>
<h2>Beyond controlling guns</h2>
<p>The Firearms Control Act has been one of many firearm violence reduction measures in South Africa.</p>
<p>One has entailed the police prioritising the seizure and destruction of illegal firearms - both within the country and in neighbouring <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP21-Secret-Stockpiles.pdf">Mozambique</a>.</p>
<p>The police have reported that they <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC-103dc1c7e0">destroyed 1,189,884 firearms</a> between 1998/99 and 2013/14. </p>
<p>There have also been large scale police operations in high crime areas, which have involved the deployment of military personnel with the objective of confiscating as many illegal firearms as possible, and arresting those in possession of such weapons. My own <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC-103dc1c7e0">research</a> has shown that these have been particularly effective at reducing levels of firearm violence.</p>
<h2>Firearm violence remains a problem</h2>
<p>Despite these police interventions and the introduction of more stringent firearm licensing controls in 2004, South Africa is still affected by high levels of firearm violence. </p>
<p>The annual number of murders in South Africa has increased by <a href="https://issafrica.org/crimehub/facts-and-figures/national-crime">37%</a> since 2011/12, with <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/services/april_to_march_2019_20_presentation.pdf">firearms</a> featuring prominently in the perpetration of these murders. </p>
<p>It is in the best interests of all people who live in South Africa for the government to pursue more effective ways to reduce firearm crimes. More concerted efforts by the police to seize illegal firearms is essential. Improving firearms control legislation is clearly one such needed intervention to prevent the further diversion of legal guns into the hands of criminals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166194/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Guy Lamb has previously received funding from GIZ, UNICEF, Freedom House, the UKRI-GCRF, the Western Cape Provincial Government and the World Bank. </span></em></p>If proposed amendments to the law are passed, it will no longer be possible to acquire a firearm licence for self-defence in the country. This has sparked heated debate.Guy Lamb, Criminologist / Lecturer, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1647172021-07-26T15:24:04Z2021-07-26T15:24:04ZMilitary not a magic bullet: South Africa needs to do more for long term peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/413119/original/file-20210726-26-vb3azi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African Defence Force troops on patrol in Alexandra, Johannesburg, following recent violence and looting. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a show of force unprecedented since South Africa became a democracy in 1994, the South African National Defence Force has <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/sandf-forces-continue-to-arrive-in-kzn-following-a-week-of-violence-faae84c3-64b0-474b-9716-f5147c86fcb6">commissioned 25,000</a> soldiers for deployment across KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, the two provinces most affected by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/22/south-africa-unrest-death-toll-jumps-to-more-than-300">recent riots and large scale looting</a>. </p>
<p>President Cyril Ramaphosa announced the deployment of the troops to <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/address-president-cyril-ramaphosa-acts-violence-and-destruction-property">support the country’s police</a>, who had been overwhelmed by the scale of the violence.</p>
<p>Governments usually deploy the military as the last line of defence when they face an insurrection or <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/columnists/qaanitah_hunter/qaanitah-hunter-an-insurrection-or-not-why-governments-confusion-doesnt-solve-sas-crises-20210721">revolt</a>. The threat of or use of military force is the ultimate arbiter to quell unrest that threatens state stability or the safety of citizens, as seen in Nigeria, where the deployment of the army on internal security operations <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-use-of-nigerian-soldiers-in-civil-unrest-whats-in-place-and-whats-missing-149283">has increased dramatically since 1999</a>.</p>
<p>In South Africa, the military has recently been deployed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-army-is-being-used-to-fight-cape-towns-gangs-why-its-a-bad-idea-120455">counter gang violence</a> on the Cape Flats and during the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-military-is-not-suited-for-the-fight-against-covid-19-heres-why-138560">COVID-19 pandemic</a>. In all these instances, there are concerns about how effective it is in these roles. </p>
<p>In South Africa, for now, the deployment of the army troops to assist the police has brought about an <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/07/21/explainer-what-caused-south-africa-s-week-of-rioting//">uneasy calm</a>. But what South Africans are seeing is a negative peace – where a degree of normality returns, but in which the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/422690?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents">underlying causes of the conflict remain</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-army-is-being-used-to-fight-cape-towns-gangs-why-its-a-bad-idea-120455">The army is being used to fight Cape Town's gangs. Why it's a bad idea</a>
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<p>The military may help create a more stable and secure environment, curb violence and unrest in the short term, but this is unlikely to result in a <a href="https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/4135/413546002004.pdf">sustainable and lasting peace</a>. The cultural and structural issues underlying the violence need to be <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-15-whats-behind-violence-in-south-africa-a-sociologists-perspective/">addressed</a>. These relate to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/pandemic-underscores-gross-inequalities-in-south-africa-and-the-need-to-fix-them-135070">inequalities</a> and injustices embedded in the structure of society. </p>
<p>The military is no magic bullet.</p>
<h2>Concerns about army deployment</h2>
<p>There are many concerns around the use of the military internally in domestic operations within the borders of one’s own country.</p>
<p>The first concerns the government’s use of the military <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2019.1650787">against its own citizens</a>. As seen in both Nigeria and South Africa, the military is typically not trained or equipped to deal with civil unrest and has limited experience in riot control.</p>
<p>One risk is that communities might deliberately act out in ways that <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/news/general/SANDF-covid-19">provoke the soldiers</a>, which could result in excessive use of force. This can affect trust in the military, affecting the legitimacy of the state. The South African government has already faced criticism for its heavy handed and highly militarised approach during the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/un-human-rights-office-highlights-toxic-lockdown-culture-in-sa-20200428">early phase of lockdown in 2020</a>. However, in general the population has a far higher level of trust in the military <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno90_south_africa_trust_in_officials.pdf">than in other state institutions</a>.</p>
<p>The second risk pertains to prominence given to the military when faced with situations of civil unrest. Giving the military a prominent role in political decision-making in dealing with civil unrest can <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-army-is-being-used-to-fight-cape-towns-gangs-why-its-a-bad-idea-120455">lead to a culture of militarism and militarisation</a>. This results in the increased political reliance and economic investment in the military to assist with solving societal problems.</p>
<p>This can undermine attempts at finding more constructive approaches at conflict resolution. </p>
<h2>Achilles’ heel</h2>
<p>The army will inevitably be called in again to support the police. Whether the soldiers can provide this support given their <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-south-africas-neglected-military-faces-mission-impossible-133250">limited capacity</a> is the big question. Those deployed are predominantly from the infantry, of which there are only 14 battalions, not all of which can deploy internally. Then there are the commitments to peacekeeping operations and the border, and now to Mozambique. </p>
<p>In its present form, the military cannot adequately respond to the threats facing the country internally and externally, due to the way it is <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-mulls-future-of-its-military-to-make-it-fit-for-purpose-146423">structured, funded and trained</a>. The military is structured for <a href="https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-sociology/chapter/war-and-terrorism/">conventional warfare</a>. This requires expensive equipment and training and does not allow sufficient flexibility to perform the functions it actually does.</p>
<p>South Africa needs a military that is more capable of responding to all the challenges facing the country. These include <a href="https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_15_Gendarmeries%20and%20constabulary-type%20police_0.pdf">a mix of military and policing functions</a>. This would mean restructuring the military to be able to put more boots on the ground. What is needed is more infantry troops, trained and equipped for the tasks they are required to do. This is less costly than preparing for conventional warfare, and using the army in collateral roles as it does now.</p>
<p>These changes would ensure that it could meet roles like peacekeeping, border control, support for the police and countering terrorism more effectively. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-mulls-future-of-its-military-to-make-it-fit-for-purpose-146423">South Africa mulls future of its military to make it fit-for-purpose</a>
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<p>Beyond this is the need to address the current <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-14-south-africas-tipping-point-how-the-intelligence-community-failed-the-country/">inefficiencies in the state security cluster</a>. Clearly there is a lack of visionary leadership, accountability and oversight, to enable these sectors to function more effectively.</p>
<p>The lack of <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/unrestsa-ministers-cele-and-dlodlo-at-odds-over-intelligence-report-20210720">effective intelligence</a> has meant that both the military and police were unable to put preemptive defensive measures in place to tackle the recent violence and looting, which has left <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/22/south-africa-unrest-death-toll-jumps-to-more-than-300">more than 330 people dead</a>.</p>
<h2>Comprehensive approach</h2>
<p>A more comprehensive approach to security is required. As indicated by soldier-scholar Laetitia Olivier in relation to gang violence, what is needed is a coordinated and comprehensive plan to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-soldiers-wont-end-gang-violence-a-co-ordinated-plan-might-120775">address the twin challenges of security and economic development</a>. </p>
<p>Security and economic development are intertwined; the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/%EF%BF%BCthe-security-development-nexus-and-the-imperative-of-peacebuilding-with-special-reference-to-the-african-context/">one cannot be achieved without the other</a>. To date, the government has failed on both accounts, which has led to the current crisis.</p>
<p>What is needed is a clear national security framework to repurpose the military in terms of its most likely <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africas-security-sector-is-in-crisis-reform-must-start-now">future roles, missions and goals</a>. These are the roles which the military is currently performing, but it doesn’t have the force design and structure best suited for the tasks.</p>
<p>Tough decisions have to be made in terms of personnel, rejuvenation and equipping the military for its future roles and functions, given the current security threats facing the citizens of South Africa. This does not imply more investment in defence, but better use of the resources available.</p>
<p>More than ever before, decisive leadership is needed from politicians, military leadership and civil society to march the South African National Defence Force in the right direction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lindy Heinecken does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The army may help create a more stable and secure environment in the short term, but this is unlikely to result in sustainable and lasting peace.Lindy Heinecken, Chair of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1644992021-07-14T12:17:07Z2021-07-14T12:17:07ZUnrest is being used to subvert South Africa’s democracy: giving in is not an option<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411208/original/file-20210714-21-11w1gzb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Looters grab items from a vandalised mall in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Marco Longari/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/looting-violence-grips-south-africa-after-zuma-court-hearing-2021-07-13/">mayhem</a> of the last few days is a reminder of the danger that South Africa continues to live with, as well as an indication of the disfigurement of its law enforcement institutions. </p>
<p>The danger stems from the deferral of a “<a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-ancs-1994-election-manifesto">better life for all</a>” which the governing African National Congress promised when apartheid ended, while the crisis in law enforcement institutions is born of a sinister motive to evade accountability. The poor will emerge worse off, and the bandits are hoping for state institutions too weakened to dispossess them of their bounty and throw them into prison.</p>
<p>Failure to stop former president Jacob Zuma’s incarceration has led to where the country is. This is not an unavoidable result, but the fruition of a calculated strategy – call it “Plan B”. Zuma zealots had hoped their <a href="https://www.news24.com/witness/politics/mkmva-stands-firm-on-civil-unrest-threats-if-zuma-is-arrested-20210706">threats of a violent breakout</a> would scare off the police from arresting him, thereby forcing the authorities to hatch some arrangement that would keep him out of prison.</p>
<p>Once the threats proved hollow, which led to Zuma being jailed, the plan morphed to inciting <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57797007">lawlessness</a>. The intention is to inflict sufficient harm on property and sources of livelihood and instil fear of widespread loss of life to a point where the authorities regret the decision to proceed with Zuma’s incarceration.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/historic-moment-as-constitutional-court-finds-zuma-guilty-and-sentences-him-to-jail-163612">Historic moment as Constitutional Court finds Zuma guilty and sentences him to jail</a>
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<p>For their destructive plans, Zuma’s fanatics found willing accomplices among the hungry, the underworld and petty thieves looking to feed a drug habit. And criminality is <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-turn-the-tide-against-south-africas-crime-wave-131839">not unusual in South Africa</a>. It makes <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/13/world/africa/cape-town-crime-military.html">global headlines</a>, now and then. </p>
<h2>Not unexpected</h2>
<p>The looting and violence is not unexpected for a country with the kind of social ills South Africa faces. For instance, of those who’re able to work, between the ages 15 and 65 years, <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14415">43% can’t find jobs</a>. About two-thirds of the unemployed are youthful, below the age of 34. Most may never find jobs in their lifetime. They are school dropouts without <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-has-worsened-south-africas-system-of-developing-the-skills-of-young-people-162528">any skills to sell in the labour market</a>.</p>
<p>Faced with dim prospects of finding jobs and without much to do, these unemployable youngsters have taken to drugs to soothe their misery and to criminality as a source of livelihood. Drug abuse has emerged recently as the most worrying problem among <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/research-outputs/view/5058">the country’s youth</a>. It has predisposed them even more to criminality. </p>
<p>What’s happening now also can’t possibly come as a surprise because of poor police visibility. Police absence has emboldened some. These are the hungry in South African society, but they have remained obedient and fearful of imprisonment. Given the unlikeliness of arrest in this climate, the usually timid have decided to join the looting frenzy. And, though it may not be their first choice, they all possibly feel entitled to steal to assuage hunger.</p>
<p>That is the social deprivation that Zuma’s devotees are successfully exploiting. One can’t rule out the possibility that these marauding mobs have been initially encouraged, or bussed, to loot. It’s not unusual for leaders of the governing African National Congress to enlist the help of the underworld, including for <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-fails-to-get-to-the-bottom-of-killings-in-kwazulu-natal-128167">murder of their own comrades</a>. </p>
<p>Once orchestrated, the looting and destruction frenzy took on a life of its own. But the aim of those involved is not just wanton destruction and to raise the spectre of mob attacks. Zuma devotees remained focused on freeing their cult-figure. They’re blaming the judiciary for the chaos, saying the jurists have taken an irresponsible decision. Their goal is to discredit the judiciary to justify making a deal that would <a href="https://www.news24.com/witness/news/pietermaritzburg/we-are-mobilising-to-get-zuma-released-20210709">free Zuma from punishment</a>.</p>
<h2>The question of a political pardon</h2>
<p>A political pardon, especially under these circumstances, would set this country down a potentially irreversible path. It would mean that all the guilty need to do to avoid accountability is to threaten violence. That would mean Zuma would never be punished for accumulated <a href="https://theconversation.com/president-zuma-loses-bid-to-dodge-criminal-charges-but-will-he-have-the-last-laugh-85703">allegations of corruption</a>. </p>
<p>If he managed to force a pardon now, who says he wouldn’t employ violence the next time he faced jail time? There’s a real possibility that Zuma will go back to prison. He’s currently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/17/new-delay-in-south-africa-ex-president-jacob-zuma-corruption-trial">going through a trial</a>, and evidence of his impropriety is piling up at the Zondo commission probing allegations of <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">state capture and corruption</a>. </p>
<p>If the state pardons Zuma now, it’s effectively saying he enjoys indemnity from prosecution, regardless of how severe his improprieties are. Once that happens, South Africa will lose any claim to being a country governed by the rule of law. It would pave the way for the proliferation of militia forces and mobs organised by strong-men to threaten law enforcement agencies.</p>
<p>Countries don’t renounce the rule of law on account of a mere refusal to comply. The idea is to enforce the law. That is why the police and prosecutors are called <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-sa/police-and-defence">law enforcement agencies</a>. </p>
<p>But South Africa is faced with a dreadful failure of law enforcement, resulting from sheer failure to detect the likelihood of the current mayhem. Imprisonment of any heroic figure, especially one who encourages his zealots to break the law, is likely to incite chaos. The likelihood of that happening is even greater in a country with deep grievances like South Africa. </p>
<p>How the country’s <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-14-south-africas-tipping-point-how-the-intelligence-community-failed-the-country/">intelligence could not have foreseen</a> this is inexplicable. Either they’re hopelessly inept, or they have simply deserted their posts and left the country exposed to internal threats.</p>
<h2>Major setback</h2>
<p>The current chaos has set the country back. More people have possibly been infected by COVID-19 due to failure to observe preventative measures. Even more deaths are likely to follow because of the <a href="https://sacoronavirus.co.za/2021/07/13/media-release-impact-of-violent-protests-on-health-services/">disruption of the vaccination programme</a> and lack of staff at hospitals for fear of violent attacks by the mob.</p>
<p>This will add to the already high number of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235941788_Child-headed_households_in_South_Africa_The_legal_and_ethical_implications_when_children_are_the_primary_caregivers_in_a_therapeutic_relationship">child-headed households in the country</a>. Destruction of businesses will lead to a multiplication of unemployment, which is unlikely to decrease any time soon as business people remain uncertain about the return of law and order. This means criminality is likely to rise even more.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jacob-zuma-isnt-a-man-with-a-cause-just-a-wily-politician-trying-to-evade-the-law-163660">Jacob Zuma isn't a man with a cause. Just a wily politician trying to evade the law</a>
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<p>South Africa can’t possibly remain the same country in the aftermath of this mayhem. There are just too many storms ahead to simply continue unchanged. State institutions need to rid themselves of people who are not proving their worth. Their retention is truly reckless.</p>
<p>The “<a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2021-05-21-inequality-in-south-africa-is-a-ticking-timebomb">ticking bomb</a>” in South Africa does actually have the potential to explode. Mere promises of a better life are not enough to disarm the bomb. Malfeasant elements within the governing party are determined to take the entire country down with them. South Africans can’t say they have not been warned.</p>
<p><em>Mcebisi Ndletyana is the author of Anatomy of the ANC in Power: Insights from Port Elizabeth, 1990 - 2019 (HSRC Press, 2020)</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164499/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mcebisi Ndletyana receives funding from the National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences.</span></em></p>South Africa can’t possibly remain the same country in the aftermath of this mayhem. There are just too many storms ahead to simply continue unchanged.Mcebisi Ndletyana, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1569662021-03-11T16:28:03Z2021-03-11T16:28:03ZA close look at how the net has tightened on the right to protest in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389051/original/file-20210311-22-1rh4exy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters clash with police in February in Cape Town over student funding.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brenton Geach/Gallo Images via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s public order policing is as ill as it ever was. This has been illustrated in recent <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-11/protests-spur-south-africa-to-bolster-university-student-funding">student protests</a> spreading across the country’s campuses. In Johannesburg <a href="https://mg.co.za/education/2021-03-10-why-am-i-being-shot-witnesses-describe-last-moments-of-man-shot-during-wits-protests/">police shot dead</a> a pedestrian at a protest outside the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. </p>
<p>In March 2020 the government imposed a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2021-01-19-south-africas-new-lockdown-regulations-explicitly-ban-all-political-gatherings/">ban</a> on political gatherings as part of a host of interventions aimed at managing the COVID-19 pandemic. The move was <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/government-using-lockdown-decide-who-may-or-may-no-protest/">unprecedented</a> in the country’s post-apartheid history. </p>
<p>Since then there has been a distressing level of uneven and inconsistent policing of gatherings. The message this has sent is that the police were going easy on some gatherings, while taking <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/continued-prohibition-political-gatherings-irrational/">tough action</a> on others to suppress dissent. </p>
<p>As a scholar of the <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/323143697/Introductin-to-Protest-Nation-The-Right-to-Protest-in-South-Africa#from_embed">right to protest</a> I have not been surprised by the heavy handed action. In my view the state has merely been reproducing behaviour patterns entrenched over the past two decades.</p>
<p><a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.2989/CCR.2020.0009">Research I conducted</a> prior to the lockdown pointed to anti-democratic patterns of behaviour towards protesters. This is despite a 2018 Constitutional Court <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2018/45.html">judgment</a> in South Africa that affirmed people’s right to protest. </p>
<p>I concluded from my findings that much more needs to be done at municipal level to ensure that the judgment changes how the state regulates and polices protests. South Africa’s Regulation of Gatherings <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/regulation-gatherings-act">Act</a> requires a convener to give notice of their intention to hold a gathering to their local authority, in most cases their municipality.</p>
<h2>Understanding local practices</h2>
<p>The Constitutional Court <a href="https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/mlungwana-v-the-state/">found</a> in the <em>Mlungwana and Others v S and Another</em> judgment that a convener’s mere failure to give notice of an intention to hold a gathering should not be criminalised. </p>
<p>The court argued that criminalisation was an unjustifiable limitation on freedom of assembly. It argued that less restrictive means could be used to encourage notification, which it recognised served important public purposes.</p>
<p>The ruling covered all gatherings. But it was particularly significant for the right to protest. This is because protests are more susceptible to government repression than ordinary gatherings.</p>
<p>Using notification as a lens through which to view the state’s treatment of protests, I explored whether actual municipal practices on the ground were opening or closing spaces for protests, and what impact <em>Mlungwana</em> was likely to have on these practices.</p>
<p>I drew on two datasets, which provided rich detail about actual municipal practices over the past decade. The first was collected from 12 municipalities between 2012 and 2013 around the country by a team of researchers under my direction. The second was sourced from the <a href="https://www.saha.org.za">South African History Archives</a>. It had assisted a public interest law clinic to send access to information requests to all municipalities in the country where an information officer’s contact details could be found. Many municipalities simply ignored their requests.</p>
<p>The documents they obtained covered the period 2015 onwards. </p>
<p>I supplemented these datasets with interviews with municipalities, activists and lawyers.</p>
<p>The research results did not paint a flattering picture of municipal practices. Municipalities used pre-emptive restrictions on gatherings, and especially protests, as a matter of course. </p>
<p>For example, municipalities impose onerous conditions that are not required by, or even supported by, the Act. Some require conveners to pay fees to hold a gathering. </p>
<p>In addition, the Act should regulate gatherings in a content-neutral manner with the narrowest prohibitions possible on harmful forms of expression. Yet, there was evidence of municipalities interfering in the lawful expressive content of protests.</p>
<p>In one municipality conveners had to provide information about whether placards would be displayed in gatherings, the names and copies of the identity documents of people who were going to give speeches at the gathering, as well as the duration of the speeches.</p>
<p>Another required conveners to provide details of whether speeches would be made at gatherings, and if so, by whom. In two others they required conveners to give descriptions of the placards and slogans to be displayed.</p>
<p>These requirements risk chilling freedom of expression in gatherings as speakers may be unwilling to be identified in advance out of fear that their speeches may make them targets for harassment or intimidation.</p>
<p>The datasets revealed that municipalities held preparatory meetings for most gatherings they’d received notices about. This is in spite of the fact that in terms of the Act, meetings are needed only if the responsible officer has concerns about the gathering.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-student-protests-in-south-africa-have-turned-violent-66288">Why student protests in South Africa have turned violent</a>
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<p>My research showed that outright prohibitions or refusals of requests for gatherings were a rarity. However, municipalities have also been known to impose blanket prohibitions on gatherings during special events – such as around the time of the 2010 football World Cup and, more recently, the 2016 local government elections – effectively suspending the right to gather in public spaces outside of a State of Emergency.</p>
<h2>A shift</h2>
<p>Municipal over-regulation of protests, coupled with over-policing, suggests a doctrinal shift in how they are viewed by the government. Instead of recognising protests as a democratic right and legitimate form of expression, increasingly protests have been framed as threats to domestic stability and, consequently, national security.</p>
<p>For example, I found no evidence from my research that the national government stepped in to curb abuses.</p>
<p>This shift is not confined to South Africa. It reflects a more conflictual global social order, declining respect for democracy as a political form, and consequently increasingly common framings of protests as riots and protesters as mobs. </p>
<p>State conduct during the lockdown has been yet another sign of this doctrinal decline.</p>
<p><em>Mlungwana</em> was an important step towards reforming the problematic notification process. But, unless the judgment is followed by a deeper and more consistent ideological and doctrinal commitment to respecting the right to protest and ensuring a more genuine incorporation of the majority of South Africans into the political system, then the changes are likely to be limited.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Duncan receives funding from the Open Society Foundation for South Africa and Luminate.</span></em></p>Instead of being a democratic right and legitimate form of expression, protests have increasingly been framed as threats to national security.Jane Duncan, Professor, Department of Journalism, Film and Television, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1508892020-11-30T13:17:58Z2020-11-30T13:17:58ZWhat history teaches us about shaping South Africa’s new cannabis laws<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371735/original/file-20201127-23-1oosep4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A T-shirt worn by a cannabis advocate during a court hearing on the legality of the plant in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">RODGER BOSCH/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African <a href="https://www.news24.com/health24/Lifestyle/Street-drugs/Plants/Dagga-20120721">cannabis</a> policy is currently at a crossroads. In 2018, the Constitutional Court <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-court-frees-cannabis-from-colonial-and-apartheid-past-103644">effectively decriminalised</a> private cannabis use. Since then, the government has continued to grapple with how to regulate this plant and its products, locally called ‘<a href="https://www.etymonline.com/word/dagga">dagga</a>’. </p>
<p>A cannabis <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/2020-CannabisBill.pdf">bill</a> to clarify legal reforms was recently presented in parliament. Yet, medical and civil rights groups who advocate rights-based approaches <a href="https://www.medicalbrief.co.za/archives/sa-drug-policy-initiative-proposed-cannabis-bill-does-not-reflect-the-spirit-of-2018-concourt-ruling/">remain wary</a> of the ongoing potential for discrimination. They argue it will benefit the affluent and <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/rastas-march-against-new-cannabis-bill/">impact negatively</a> on vulnerable communities, who may not have space at home to cultivate the crop and will be criminally penalised for smoking cannabis outside the home.</p>
<p>With a cannabis industry estimated at <a href="https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/04/18/1806583/0/en/New-Study-Estimates-the-Global-Cannabis-Market-at-Over-340-Billion-USD.html">over $300-billion</a> worldwide, much is at stake. Already, South African boutique producers are navigating <a href="https://iono.fm/e/916260">legal loopholes</a> to deliver cannabis products to young, urban middle-class consumers. Some government officials see dagga as a ticket to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2020-02-25-medicinal-and-skincare-benefits-of-cannabis-in-david-makhuras-sights/">economic growth</a>. This is through agriculture and medicinal products that can be marketed for pain alleviation, sleep and skin care. </p>
<p>But, would further liberalisation invite <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/">“corporate capture”</a> as some development practitioners fear?
If so, what will happen to people in rural communities who, for decades, have eked out risky livelihoods by illegally cultivating dagga? History provides crucial insights into the questions of social justice at stake in current policy debates. </p>
<p>Our <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2020000100005&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en">recent study</a> using police statistics from the mid 1900s uncovers trends in cannabis arrests and seizures, by geographical area. It shows the South Africa apartheid state to have been a pioneer in supply-side drug control strategies, targeting rural cannabis farmers in the most impoverished parts of the country. </p>
<p>Listening to the lessons of history means protecting and promoting the interests of those people who nonetheless developed a thriving national cannabis economy through indigenous knowledge, entrepreneurship and toil.</p>
<h2>What police records reveal</h2>
<p>From early in the 20th century, state approaches to dagga control were deeply entangled in racist colonial and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> policies. These maintained spatial divisions based on race and ethnic classifications. But segregation created conditions that allowed illicit commercial cannabis farming and trade to develop and thrive. </p>
<p>“Tribal” reserve areas were long the protected or undetected spaces for dagga production. These “homelands” were mostly rural territories that were put aside for majority black South Africans to live in under various chieftainships. </p>
<p>Officials informally tolerated dagga in “tribal” areas, even after its prohibition in 1922. For over two decades, policing was overwhelmingly focused on keeping cannabis and cannabis smoking out of the white-managed towns and cities. </p>
<p>This changed under a new political regime. In 1948, the National Party was <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/chapter-1-victory-nationalist-party-1948">elected</a> by white voters. Even before it passed its first apartheid law, the new cabinet commissioned a formal, nation-wide investigation into “dagga abuse”.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/cannabis-in-south-africa-the-duplicity-of-colonial-authorities-129915">Cannabis in South Africa: the duplicity of colonial authorities</a>
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<p>There had been calls for such an investigation since the 1930s, when more people of colour moved into the cities. Liberal activists and welfare officials considered dagga smoking a barrier to progressive reforms, urban security and class respectability. In the late 1940s, even before the National Party victory, government was increasing police capacity. </p>
<p>Under <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/book-4-industrialisation-rural-change-and-nationalism-chapter-3-afrikaner-nationalism-1930s">Afrikaner nationalism</a>, however, a push for order – both moral and political – was supercharged. Authoritarian tactics backed an agenda pinned on Calvinist principles, modernist ambitions and a white supremacist vision. The political will and means to stamp out dagga increased.</p>
<p>In 1952, the Interdepartmental Committee on the Abuse of Dagga published its <a href="https://fieldsofgreenforall.org.za/report-of-the-interdepartmental-committee-on-the-abuse-of-dagga-1951/">report</a>. It recommended curtailing cannabis trade and consumption. Most consequentially, it advocated for a focus on the sources of cannabis supply for the urban market.</p>
<p>Squads of police were now routinely deployed to destroy cannabis crops. Much of this was grown within or around impoverished “tribal” territories, by poor families and especially women.</p>
<p>Two decades before US President Richard Nixon popularised the phrase “<a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2011/jul/22/drugs-trade-richard-nixon">war on drugs</a>”, South Africa had adopted a systematic supply-side approach to cannabis law enforcement, targeting growers.</p>
<h2>A drug war</h2>
<p>Numbers of arrests and amounts of cannabis seized by police rose dramatically from the mid-century. The vast majority of arrests continued to be for charges of possession. But police raids in rural locations accounted for enormous quantities of dagga being confiscated in the decades that followed. </p>
<p>In addition to the numerical evidence, other historical documents indicate further extreme consequences of the target on cannabis production. In 1956, a police raid near Bergville, in the eastern part of the country, revealed the growing violence in these encounters between the police and communities defending their precarious livelihoods. Five policemen were brutally killed by community members. In retaliation, 22 people were convicted and hanged by the state.</p>
<p>The relative scale of the cannabis economy in South Africa is a notable element in this story. In 1953, <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2020000100005&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en">United Nations records</a> comparing six years of cannabis seizures for 46 countries showed South Africa accounted for a mind-blowing 50% to 76% of the world’s reported total.</p>
<h2>What this teaches us</h2>
<p>The take-away here is twofold. It’s not just a story of victimisation but also of resilience. On the one hand, the notorious nature of colonial and apartheid policing was a visible demonstration of white minority state power. Yet, at the same time, the statistics show both the endurance of indigenous dagga practices as well as the steady growth of a national cannabis agribusiness. This was developed through the entrepreneurship of marginalised people in socially oppressive and criminalised conditions.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-court-frees-cannabis-from-colonial-and-apartheid-past-103644">South African court frees cannabis from colonial and apartheid past</a>
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<p>Policymakers need to listen to the voices of people <a href="https://www.soas.ac.uk/news/newsitem148724.html">most affected</a> by state drug control. This means also looking for voices silenced by history. </p>
<p>In the South African story of cannabis, the mid-century shift in policing strategy is a <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2020000100005&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en">critical</a> episode.</p>
<p>Additionally, it reveals South Africa as a precocious case in the broader and global ‘war on drugs’ chronology. Together with other research, a historical picture adds to a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/blog-feed/rethinking-war-drugs">growing body</a> of international evidence that shows state drug wars as an ineffectual and socially devastating response to the realities of substance use.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150889/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thembisa Waetjen has received NRF funding as a rated researcher.</span></em></p>Policy makers need to protect and promote the interests of people whose indigenous knowledge and toil developed a thriving national cannabis economy - in the face of harsh police crackdowns.Thembisa Waetjen, Associate Professor of History, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1381712020-05-13T13:40:27Z2020-05-13T13:40:27ZWhat South Africa needs to forge a resilient social compact for Covid-19<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/334400/original/file-20200512-82397-mqplfk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Abuses by police and the army point to the need for citizens to be involved in security and other crisis response measures </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/full-speech-cobid-19-crisis-will-not-last-forever-but-impact-needs-extraordinary-budget-ramaphosa-20200421">called for</a> “a new social compact among all role players – business, labour, community and government – to restructure the economy and achieve inclusive growth”.</p>
<p>In South Africa, ‘social compact’ has often been used narrowly to describe pacts between stakeholders on specific sectoral issues. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17502977.2019.1682925">A resilient social compact,</a> as we use the concept, requires a dynamic agreement between the state and society on how to live together, and how to address issues of power and resources. </p>
<p>For such an agreement to contribute to peace and societal well-being, it must be reflected in the mechanisms, policies and responses that uphold the agreement. This needs to be done in a way that’s flexible and responsive, especially in times of crisis.</p>
<p>This approach recasts the concept of social compact (or social contract) as a tool for addressing issues of conflict, crisis and transition. <a href="http://www.socialcontractsforpeace.org/publications/#FindingsDocuments">Research across nine countries</a>, including in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17502977.2019.1706436">South Africa</a>, found that social cohesion is a key driver. <a href="http://www.socialcontractsforpeace.org/research/concepts/">Social cohesion</a> builds on the concept of social solidarity, which lies in areas of trust and respect, belonging and identity, and participation. </p>
<p>Its achievement also rests on progress by other drivers. These are inclusive political settlements addressing core issues dividing people, and institutions delivering fairly and effectively. </p>
<p>To move in the direction of a resilient social compact, Ramaphosa’s call will fall on deaf ears unless there are some fundamental changes to the way in which the pandemic is being managed.</p>
<h2>Solidarity and cohesion</h2>
<p>The first is that there needs to be a critical focus on how vulnerable groups are affected differently.</p>
<p>South Africa’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/pandemic-underscores-gross-inequalities-in-south-africa-and-the-need-to-fix-them-135070">stark socio-economic inequalities</a> – within and across racial groups – are core issues that continue to divide people. This is true economically as well as spatially, psychologically, socially and politically. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lockdown-is-riling-black-and-white-south-africans-could-this-be-a-reset-moment-138044">Lockdown is riling black and white South Africans: could this be a reset moment?</a>
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<p>Lockdown restrictions, therefore, affect people differently. In <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/publication/the-economics-of-south-african-townships-special-focus-on-diepsloot">townships</a> – apartheid-era residential areas that are predominantly black – loss of work means loss of livelihoods with <a href="https://socialjustice.sun.ac.za/blog/2020/04/statement-policy-brief-coronavirus-covid19/">grave challenges</a> accessing food, health and education. Suburbanites – who are mostly white – on the other hand, have tended to be more preoccupied by loss of freedoms related to jogging, dog-walking, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/lockdown-is-riling-black-and-white-south-africans-could-this-be-a-reset-moment-138044">accessing liquor and cigarettes</a>.</p>
<p>These differences demand, secondly, that greater attention be given to how policies are being implemented. </p>
<p>Addressing these issues could ensure that social cohesion and social solidarity are nurtured through this crisis. </p>
<p>People need to feel included and that they belong – and that policies and practices deliver on expectations and agreements. When this fails, and human rights are violated in the process, these bonds and relationships suffer. Trust in the state, its institutions and associated legitimacy needed for their functioning, falters.</p>
<p>Human rights abuses by the security forces in the wake of the lockdown have included shootings, baton and gun beatings, teargassing, humiliation, abusive language, water bombing, invasion of private backyards, and <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/da-calls-for-military-ombudsman-to-investigate-abuse-by-sandf-members-during-lockdown-45758138">even death</a>. This has occurred especially in townships.</p>
<p>The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights recently identified South Africa as among <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/raises-alarm-police-brutality-covid-19-lockdowns-200428070216771.html">15 countries</a> where human rights violations associated with COVID-19 restrictions were <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25828&LangID=E">most troubling</a>.</p>
<h2>What’s missing</h2>
<p>In the current COVID-19 context we are seeing fissures that dangerously undermine the bonds and relationships between the state and citizens. These are common in fragile and transitional contexts.</p>
<p>Many security forces members are following on the path Ramaphosa set with his peaceful <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-03-27-in-quotes--ramaphosa-on-police--army-as-a-force-of-kindness-chancers-and-saving-lives/">messaging</a> to guide them in defending citizens against the pandemic.</p>
<p>But, some are <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/da-calls-for-military-ombudsman-to-investigate-abuse-by-sandf-members-during-lockdown-45758138">abusing their power</a>. </p>
<p>These abuses echo the experiences of black South Africans under apartheid when obedience was secured with authoritarian rule and aggression. </p>
<p>In addition, developing a national COVID-19 response has brought glaring inequalities to the fore – and the country’s persistent <a href="https://journals.co.za/content/journal/10520/EJC-19f475f86a">racial geographies</a>.</p>
<p>These too challenge the goal of achieving a resilient social compact.</p>
<p>Resentment among some township residents has grown, and various forms of civil disobedience have resulted. Vuyo Zungula, leader of the African Transformation Movement, one of the smaller parties represented in parliament, observed on his Twitter page:</p>
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<p>Until I see Whites, Indians getting the same treatment for breaking the Lockdown rules I will view the SANDF and SAPS as the enemy of the people.</p>
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<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>If the lockdown is enforced through coercion rather than consent, and the dignity of citizens is not respected, a resilient social compact won’t ever be viewed as anything more than rhetoric. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-raised-social-grants-why-this-shouldnt-be-a-stop-gap-measure-138023">South Africa has raised social grants: why this shouldn't be a stop-gap measure</a>
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<p>COVID-19 presents profound challenges for citizens and the state. Building trust and cooperation, between state and society, and between social and stakeholder groups in society, is paramount.</p>
<p>What then is needed?</p>
<p>First, there needs to be vigilant government commitment against coercion. Swift action must be taken against abuses by the security sector. And there needs to be effective communication with those affected by the abuse. This should accompany strong assurances of accountability and justice, and upscaled training of the military and the police in crisis response functions.</p>
<p>Second, <a href="https://socialjustice.sun.ac.za/downloads/posts/2020-04-ml-csj-statemement-on-policy-responses-to-coronavirus-covid19.pdf">two-way communication channels</a> that offer the means to build trust and legitimacy of government actions need to be established. These should focus on fostering <a href="https://www.sfcg.org/our-media/">innovative ways</a> for citizens to access information and participate in crisis response strategies. This can occur through surveys, via radio and mobile applications, or radio call-in shows. </p>
<p>Township and suburban residents must take part in the security and other crisis response measures. Widely accessible and consistent messaging is needed, such as the township education undertaken by the <a href="https://c19peoplescoalition.org.za/">C-19 People’s Coalition</a>. The alliance brings together social movements, trade unions, and community organisations working to provide an effective, just and equitable response to the pandemic.</p>
<p>Its members distribute leaflets in Gauteng townships in local languages, as they demonstrate social distancing and the wearing of masks while they mobilise and strengthen networks of food production, distribution and consumption. These may well have benefits beyond the COVID-19 crisis. </p>
<p>Finally, social solidarity is forged when each segment of society works together for the greater social good. Such efforts are widespread in <a href="https://www.solidarityfund.co.za/">South Africa</a> and <a href="https://thedetail.tv/articles/activist-response-to-covid-19">around the world</a>. These stories need to be shared with a view to strengthening longer-term transformation efforts in the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138171/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ramaphosa’s call for a new social compact will fall on deaf ears unless there are some fundamental changes to the way in which the pandemic is being managed.Erin McCandless, Associate Professor, School of governance, University of the WitwatersrandDarlene Ajeet Miller, Senior Lecturer, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1362672020-04-14T15:15:07Z2020-04-14T15:15:07ZUnravelling why some democracies – but not all – are better at fighting pandemics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/327724/original/file-20200414-117562-c4nhp5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Korea has been the quickest to bring the pandemic under control. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jung Yeon-je/AFP/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of democracy’s strengths is that it allows its critics to complain about it loudly.</p>
<p>The current complaint in South Africa from some commentators and many voices on social media claims that the coronavirus pandemic shows that democracy does not protect people from pandemics. </p>
<p>China, we are told, has beaten the disease. Western Europe and North America have not. Perhaps because they are preoccupied with their own disaster, the rich countries of the North no longer lead efforts to help others fight the virus: that role has shifted to non-democracies or countries whose democratic credentials are questioned such as <a href="https://www.thestar.com.my/news/regional/2020/03/05/china-steps-in-to-help-the-world-beat-covid-19-outbreak">China</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/04/03/world/europe/ap-cb-virus-outbreak-cuban-doctors.html">Cuba </a> and <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/turkey-sends-aid-to-countries-around-world-in-fight-against-covid-19-35290">Turkey</a>.</p>
<p>The obvious conclusion is that South Africa (and, presumably, other African countries), would do well to ditch democracy.</p>
<p>But the evidence thus far might point in the opposite direction: that countries with stronger democracies do best at dealing with the pandemic.</p>
<p>The most obvious problem with claims that some countries – or political systems – are better at fighting the virus is that it will be quite a while before we know who did well and who did not. Because the pandemic is nowhere near over, we have no idea how many people in each country will contract COVID-19 or how many lives it will claim. </p>
<p>We don’t even know yet whether <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/02/18/diseases-like-covid-19-are-deadlier-in-non-democracies">China has beaten it</a>: <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2020/4/13/headlines/china_reports_spike_in_new_imported_covid_19_cases">new infections</a> are being reported and there are fears of another outbreak. </p>
<p>When the disease is contained and we have final figures, research may show that some countries did better than others for reasons which have nothing to do with how they fought the pandemic. </p>
<p>But, even if we base our judgements on the evidence we have now, and concentrate only on countries which are agreed to be democratic or non-democracies, the claim that democracy has been found wanting does not stand up.</p>
<h2>Measuring performance</h2>
<p>At this stage, China is the only non-democracy which has some claim to have beaten back the pandemic. It is too early to tell whether others, such as Cuba, will do this. </p>
<p>But precisely because it is not a democracy, China <a href="https://sciencebusiness.net/international-news/china-was-slammed-initial-covid-19-secrecy-its-scientists-led-way-tackling-virus">first covered up the virus outbreak</a>, which helped it to spread. </p>
<p>The accolade for handling the epidemic the best must go to South Korea: in Daegu, the epicentre of the virus, on April 10, for the first time since the virus appeared, <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/south-korean-daegu-china-coronavirus-covid19-cases-virus/">no new cases were reported</a>. But its greatest success so far is that, at the time of writing, <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/south-korea-daegu-coronavirus-covid-19-cases-zero-12630006">just over 200 people have died of the disease</a>, a spectacular achievement compared with most other countries. And South Korea is, of course, a democracy.</p>
<p>South Korea is not the only democracy to have made headway against it. Portugal has lost <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/countries-confirmed-cases-coronavirus-200125070959786.html">only 535 people</a> in a population of 10 million at the time of writing.</p>
<p>New Zealand, whose prime minister, Jacinda Ardern, is seen by many as a democratic role model, has <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/09/asia/new-zealand-lessons-intl-hnk/index.html">lost one person</a> out of a population of almost 5 million. Mexico may be next to the US geographically, but is nowhere near it in COVID-19 deaths: <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/countries-confirmed-cases-coronavirus-200125070959786.html">only 332 </a> in a population of 129 million. In Greece, only 99 people out of 10 million have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/14/how-greece-is-beating-coronavirus-despite-a-decade-of-debt">lost their lives</a>.</p>
<p>These examples show that democracies can – and do – cope with the virus. There are far more democratic than non-democratic success stories.</p>
<p>But not all democracies are doing well. So, why are some doing better than others?</p>
<h2>Right-wing nationalism</h2>
<p>A clear reason is that some countries are run by right-wing nationalists to whom protecting people does not come naturally. A clear lesson we can draw already is that the nationalist right is terrible at dealing with pandemics.</p>
<p>The stand-out is Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, who is exhorting people to ignore the health measures introduced by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/01/brazil-bolsonaro-ignored-by-state-governors-amid-anger-at-handling-of-covid-19-crisis">provincial governors</a>. US president <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-donald-trumps-funding-cuts-to-who-mean-for-the-world-136384">Donald Trump</a> has done far more to hinder than help the fight against COVID-19: Brazilians and Americans have probably been saved from a far worse fate by the fact that the federal system <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/04/politics/republican-governors-stay-at-home-orders-coronavirus/index.html">allows governors to protect their populations</a> when the president won’t.</p>
<p>Britain is battling because its government embraced a bizarre theory which suggested that the best way to fight the virus was to allow up to 80% of the population to <a href="https://fortune.com/2020/03/14/coronavirus-uk-cases-herd-immunity-covid-19/">become infected</a>. India’s Narendra Modi initiated a hasty and <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.in/entry/coronavirus-lockdown-police-action_in_5e8c231cc5b62459a92e52ae">punitive lockdown </a> which has done more damage than the virus.</p>
<p>None of them may pay a political price for their folly. But the myth that the nationalist right cares about “the people” has been shattered.</p>
<p>A more complicated reason may be that the democracies that do better are those in which citizens have reason to feel they are part of the political system. In South Korea, only two years ago, citizens achieved the removal of a president accused of corruption. </p>
<p>In New Zealand, Portugal and Mexico, the current governments are seen by many citizens as a sign that the system can produce change. Greece’s government is newly elected and has handed over the fight against the virus to a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/05/world/europe/scientists-coronavirus-heroes.html">medical specialist</a> who has won huge support by seeming to speak for people rather than at them. </p>
<p>So, it may well be that the democracies which do best against COVID-19 are those whose citizens feel part of the system.</p>
<p>South Africa seems to illustrate this strongly.</p>
<h2>Insiders and outsiders</h2>
<p>South Africa is divided sharply between insiders, who benefit from the formal economy and live mainly in the suburbs of large cities, and outsiders who are excluded from the economy’s benefits and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-portrayal-of-protest-in-south-africa-denigrates-poor-people-115595">live in poor townships and shack settlements</a>. </p>
<p>So far, its response to the virus has seemed to work well among the insiders who have, in the main, rallied around a national effort to beat back the disease. </p>
<p>It has done less well among the outsiders <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/news/covid-19-national-lockdown-hardest-for-poor-sa-families-45821923">whose circumstances</a> make it very difficult to comply with restrictions and have been on the wrong end of sometimes <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/police-kill-three-people-three-days-lockdown-normal-south-africa-data-reveals/">heavy-handed police attempts to enforce them</a>. Some have been <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/court-rules-against-city-of-joburg-evictions-during-covid-19-lockdown-46615118">victims of evictions</a>, implausibly styled as attempts to fight COVID-19.</p>
<p>Insiders may often complain about the government but they trust the political system and participate in it enthusiastically. Outsiders live at its fringes, often connected to the system only when they vote.</p>
<p>The message seems clear. It is not all democracies which struggle to deal with the virus; it is those in which the people do not feel that the system works for them.</p>
<p>In South Africa, as elsewhere on the continent, the lesson is surely clear. Governments need to develop far deeper roots into their societies if they are to meet citizens’ needs. This will be true long after the virus has been contained.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136267/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It is not all democracies that struggle to deal with the coronavirus; it is those in which the people do not feel the system works for them.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1318392020-02-21T09:41:34Z2020-02-21T09:41:34ZHow to turn the tide against South Africa’s crime wave<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316414/original/file-20200220-92541-1mjunm0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Johannesburg Metropolitan Police raid a building highjacked by a criminal syndicate. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In February last year South African President Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/2SONA2019">announced</a> that his government would pursue five fundamental goals over the next decade. One of these was particularly bold, namely that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>violent crime would be halved, if not eliminated.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This, according to Ramaphosa, would be achieved through improved policing, especially at the local level, and through addressing gender-based violence. </p>
<p>His emphasis on the issues was well placed. Three months later the South African Police Service released its <a href="http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/190919saps.pdf">crime statistics</a> for 2018/19. They confirmed why it was imperative that the government prioritised crime reduction. Most categories of violent crimes had risen dramatically over the past eight years.</p>
<p>Between 2011/12 and 2018/19 there had been a 35% increase in murder cases, a 29% surge in attempted murders, and robberies with aggravating circumstances had risen by 39%. Robberies in homes had increased by 34% homes, and the number of violent protests had almost tripled from 1226 incidents in 2011/12 to 4277 in 2018/19.</p>
<p>South Africa has, for many years, experienced considerably higher levels of violent crime compared to many other countries. The 2019 United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet2.pdf">Global Study on Homicide</a> shows that South Africa has more than 20,000 homicides a year. This is close to the number of homicides for all of Europe, and a quarter of all homicides in Asia.</p>
<p>Recently, Ramaphosa re-emphasised the government’s commitment to <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/2SONA2019">tackling violent crime</a>. The focus on improved policing and gender-based violence has been retained. He has pinned his hopes on increased police visibility – especially better resourced anti-gang units, improved crime detection and investigation, and better cooperation between the police and the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/">National Prosecuting Authority</a>. Another idea is to roll out a <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-gender-based-violence-and-femicide-strategic-plan-draft-12-aug-2019-0000">national gender-based violence and femicide strategic plan</a>.</p>
<p>These interventions, if effectively implemented, have the potential to reduce violent crimes. But, if there is to be a substantial drop, then the determinants of violence perpetration, especially among young men, and the <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12620">low levels of trust in the police</a> need to be adequately addressed.</p>
<h2>Anti-gang units</h2>
<p>The anti-gang units are based on <a href="https://cap-press.com/books/isbn/9781611635706/Policing-the-World-Second-Edition">evidence-based practice</a>, and as emphasised by prominent policing scholars such as John Casey, Michael Jenkins and Harry Dammer,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>certain crimes, especially organised crimes and gang violence, cannot be dealt with by routine policing responses and require specialised expertise </p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022427815576576">International studies</a> indicate that introducing non-aggressive specialised units can reduce violent crime. But, their practices need to be carefully attuned to the environments in which they operate. And, they must act in ways that do not undermine public trust in the police. </p>
<p>There is, nonetheless, a darker side to the work of specialised police units. The work of the renowned sociologist <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10439463.1997.9964775">Martha Huggins</a> and others have shown that in Latin American, some specialised units have been used as a mechanism for social cleansing. Drug dealers, street children and suspected robbers have been killed by these units. </p>
<p>South Africa’s police minister Bheki Cele and senior police officials have regularly <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-05-04-government-is-winning-the-war-against-gangsterism-on-the-cape-flats-says-ramaphosa/">sung the praises of the country’s anti-gang units</a>. They tout their arrest records and the seizures of large quantities of illegal goods, especially firearms. But, complete information relating to successful convictions has not been forthcoming. </p>
<p>There have also been reports of <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-06-26-cop-vs-cop-rival-western-cape-police-units-at-each-others-throats/">institutional rivalries</a> between the units and other specialised police bodies.</p>
<p>Operational missteps have also been reported, for instance the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/just-in-6-saps-anti-gang-unit-members-shot-in-cape-town-20190612">fiasco at the Samora Machel</a> informal settlement in Cape Town, whereby six policemen from the anti-gang unit were shot by criminals during one operation. </p>
<p>If the anti-gang units are going to be at the forefront of the police response to violent crime, their activities should be subjected to considerably more scrutiny by parliament and civil society. This is essential to ensure they operate within the confines of a constitutional democracy.</p>
<h2>Improved crime detection</h2>
<p>Improved crime detection, combined with better cooperation between the police, prosecutors and the courts, could potentially improve the conviction rates for violent crime, which are <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/rising-crime-low-prosecution-rates-how-law-enforcement-in-sa-has-all-but-collapsed-20191021">shockingly low</a>. For instance, only 4.6% of home robberies and 2.3% of carjackings result in convictions.</p>
<p>But, as <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/protector-or-predator-tackling-police-corruption-in-south-africa">studies on police corruption</a> and the <a href="https://khayelitshacommission.org.za/images/towards_khaye_docs/Khayelitsha_Commission_Report_WEB_FULL_TEXT_C.pdf">report of a commission of inquiry</a> show, numerous cases have been dismissed by the courts due to shoddy police work. And, crime dockets often go missing due to bribery and corruption.</p>
<p>The creation of a crime detection “university” mentioned in President Ramaphosa’s speech may lead to more convictions. But, <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/the-terrible-consequences-of-police-corruption/">police corruption</a> needs to be systematically addressed in order for such training to yield meaningful results. </p>
<p>And, the National Prosecuting Authority’s <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-02-08-selective-prosecutions-for-npa-some-cases-are-more-equal-than-others/">cherry-picking</a> of cases in which it stands reasonable prospects of securing a prosecution needs to stop. </p>
<p>But, convictions are difficult to secure in many cases involving gang violence. Witnesses are often unwilling to testify. Those that do testify put their personal safety and that of their families <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-03-27-cape-flats-murder-witness-puts-her-life-in-danger-for-the-blood-of-innocents-shed-on-the-streets/">at risk</a>.</p>
<h2>Gender-based violence</h2>
<p>The gender-based violence and femicide plan addresses an urgent need by providing better support for the victims, especially women and <a href="https://www.yourtango.com/2015282102/lgbt-terminology-101">LGBTIQA+</a> individuals. This plan also seeks to address the key determinants of such violence and recommends a wide range of interventions to enhance prevention efforts. </p>
<p>But, most interpersonal violent crime in South Africa is <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19709732">perpetrated by men against other men</a>, yet there is no specific plan to deal with this. Also, the government does not have a good record of implementing existing <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2018.1503831">crime prevention plans</a>, as has been the case with its 1996 <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-crime-prevention-strategy-summary">national crime prevention strategy</a>. The same goes for its 2011 <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/integrated-social-crime-prevention-strategy">integrated social crime prevention strategy</a>.</p>
<h2>Turning the tide</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa’s speech emphasised that a ‘whole-of-society’ approach was crucial to remedying South Africa’s violent crime epidemic. Nevertheless, government has typically confined such collaborations to <em>indabas</em> (conferences), community consultations and awareness-raising.</p>
<p>But, for South Africa to stand a chance of turning the tide against its crime wave, then, as has been shown by various <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00038-016-0909-6">studies</a>, meaningful partnerships with ordinary South Africans, businesses and crime prevention specialists are essential.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131839/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Guy Lamb does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Ramaphosa’s emphasis on fighting crime is well placed. Most categories of violent crimes have risen dramatically over the past eight years.Guy Lamb, Director, Safety and Violence Initiaitive, University of Cape Town, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1281672020-01-21T14:14:40Z2020-01-21T14:14:40ZSouth Africa fails to get to the bottom of killings in KwaZulu-Natal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310477/original/file-20200116-181603-hq7rke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African police minister Bheki Cele (left) claims success in the investigation of political killings in KwaZulu-Natal. With him is the head of the police, Khehla Sithole.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The assassination of political figures in South Africa has a long and horrible history. That the practice has continued since the country became a democracy is deeply disturbing.</p>
<p><a href="https://globalinitiative.net/the-rule-of-the-gun-hits-and-assassinations-in-south-africa-2000-2017/">Research</a> by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime between 2000 and 2017 ranked one province in South Africa – KwaZulu-Natal – well ahead of the other eight provinces in killings of people in the political sphere and the taxi industry. </p>
<p>I have conducted <a href="https://www.violencemonitor.com">anthropological research</a> on political violence in the province since 1983. My work has been of a qualitative nature, using information obtained from my own research networks, interventionist work with the police, and media reports. </p>
<p>My work, among other things, confirms the close links between political and taxi violence in the province, with taxi hitmen often deployed in political attacks. It is a cause for great concern that despite the availability of information about such activities, little progress has been made in bringing perpetrators to justice.</p>
<p>In May 2018 President Cyril Ramaphosa formed a national <a href="http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/ministerial-committee-to-look-into-kzn-political-killings/">inter-ministerial investigative team</a> drawn from different parts of the country to investigate the killings. Its work has stirred controversy, amid allegations it has been <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-03-28-cele-defends-political-killings-probe/">selective</a> when making arrests. Questions have been raised about <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/task-team-probing-political-killings-in-kzn-slammed-as-incompetent=34518425">the quality of its investigations</a>, which have had little impact on exposing those behind the violence. </p>
<h2>The nature of political killings</h2>
<p>According to my statistics, around 90 people with some official standing have been killed in KwaZulu-Natal since 2015. They were either municipal councillors, political party officials or, in a few cases, senior municipal officials. Most of the deceased were affiliated to the African National Congress (ANC), the party that governs both the province and the country. </p>
<p>This figure is bound to be an under representation of the situation as not all such deaths are reported. Also, the figure does not include over 100 murders in Durban’s Glebelands hostel, which was built during the apartheid era to house male migrant workers, but is now home to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-07-23-glebelands-part-one-durbans-hostel-dwellers-the-collateral-damage-as-public-protector-fights-battles-on-all-fronts/">22,000 people</a>, including families.</p>
<p>Prominent municipal employees are included in the deaths because of links between corruption and killings confirmed by a <a href="http://www.kznonline.gov.za/images/Downloads/Publications/MOERANE%20COMMISSION%20OF%20INQUIRY%20REPORT.pdf">commission</a> set up in 2016 to investigate political violence in KwaZulu-Natal.</p>
<p>Many of the deaths have been linked to intra-ANC politics. But the motive may not necessarily be political. For example, a death could be linked to the taxi business, known for its high levels of <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/news/taxi-violence-on-the-up-in-kzn-north-coast-after-murders-33637750">violence and assassinations</a>. The violence, as my own research confirms, is usually linked to fierce competition over routes. </p>
<p>What’s common to all the deaths is that the violence is motivated by a battle over scarce resources. For example, prior to elections, competition over candidature might have been a motive, as seen in the spike in killings <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/sacq/n57/06.pdf">ahead of the 2016 local government elections</a>. Becoming a councillor guarantees a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-governing-party-celebrates-with-eye-on-tough-year-ahead-52989">lucrative salary in all working class wards</a>. </p>
<h2>No transparency</h2>
<p>The inter-ministerial task team investigating the political killings started work on over 100 dockets in mid-2018. Over a year later, the only known high profile conviction for any of the 90 murders I documented was secured by KwaZulu-Natal detectives in March 2019 for a 2016 murder. </p>
<p>There may well have been convictions for the murders of less well known victims in regional courts which have not been reported. But none have been reported for the many prominent victims during this period. </p>
<p>This hasn’t stopped the police minister, Bheki Cele, from <a href="https://www.politicalanalysis.co.za/cele-says-the-imc-has-made-progress-in-addressing-political-violence/">claiming</a> that the task team has had many successes and secured several life sentences. He has failed to provide full details of these convictions. </p>
<p>From my personal experience, it has become increasingly difficult to obtain information from the South African Police Service about progress in criminal investigations.</p>
<p>I have also experienced a lack of transparency relating to the structure of the task team itself, including who commands it. </p>
<p>I have been able to establish that many people have been arrested. Some have been released without being charged while others have had charges withdrawn after appearing in court. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305647/original/file-20191206-90588-10i9unp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305647/original/file-20191206-90588-10i9unp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305647/original/file-20191206-90588-10i9unp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305647/original/file-20191206-90588-10i9unp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305647/original/file-20191206-90588-10i9unp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305647/original/file-20191206-90588-10i9unp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305647/original/file-20191206-90588-10i9unp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sindiso Magaqa, a municipal councillor in Umzimkhulu, KwaZulu-Natal, paid the price for opposing tender fraud.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">African News Agency Archive.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A number of examples of high profile cases – some of which were included in the dockets taken by the task team – show how the justice system is failing to conclude cases. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The assassination in May 2018 of prominent ANC activist Musawenkosi “Maqatha” Mchunu <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/the-witness/20191008/281539407705788">in Pietermaritzburg</a>. Six people were arrested for the crime, including Gift Zungu and Nkosinathi Gambu, the son and the nephew of the former deputy mayor of the district municipality under which the city falls. Almost a year after their arrests, murder charges were withdrawn against all the accused. Zungu and Gambu still face lesser charges.</p></li>
<li><p>Earlier last year the mayor of the KwaZulu-Natal town of Newcastle, Dr Ntuthuko Mahlaba, was arrested and charged for the 2016 murder of local ANC Youth League leader Wandile Ngubeni. Five months later <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-08-15-murder-charges-dropped-against-kzn-mayor-as-witnesses-wont-testify/">charges were withdrawn</a>. In May a local ANC activist, Martin Sithole, who was believed to be a witness in the Ngubeni matter, <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-05-13-witness-in-kzn-political-murder-gunned-down-in-apparent-hit/">was gunned down</a>. He was with a friend who was also killed.</p></li>
<li><p>Three ANC councillors from the town of Umzimkhulu were shot and badly injured in July 2017. One of them, Sindiso Magaqa, died in hospital months later. He had been working to expose corruption in the award of tenders for <a href="https://www.violencemonitor.com/2018/08/19/why-the-callous-disregard-for-the-safety-of-corruption-busters/">repairs to a hall in the area</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>In March 2019 the task team arrested the mayor of the district municipality, Mluleki Ndobe, a very senior ANC politician, together with the local municipality manager and three other men. Charges against Ndobe and the municipal manager were withdrawn 10 days later, but murder charges against the other three accused, including two former policemen, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-03-25-charges-provisionally-withdrawn-against-ndobe/">remain</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Evaluating task team performance</h2>
<p>These high profile arrests, followed by subsequent withdrawal of charges, have led to charges by the provincial ANC and the South African Communist Party of political partisanship and <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/task-team-probing-political-killings-in-kzn-slammed-as-incompetent-34518425">shoddy work by the task team</a>. </p>
<p>In the absence of empirical evidence to substantiate claims by the minister of police about convictions secured by this team, the inevitable conclusion is that their deployment is a waste of scarce criminal justice resources.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128167/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Natal Monitor Research Project Mary de Haas was part of at the University of Natal received funding from Norwegian People’s Aid between 1995 and 2005. She is affiliated with MeRAN, a small self-funded voluntary non-profit organisation of bioethicists working on medical rights.
</span></em></p>The task team established to investigate political killings in KwaZulu-Natal has had little impact on exposing those behind the violence.Mary de Haas, Honorary Research Associate in the School of Law, University of KwaZulu-NatalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1230532019-09-10T08:40:39Z2019-09-10T08:40:39ZXenophobia: time for cool heads to prevail in Nigeria and South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291544/original/file-20190909-109943-1h6fkvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C152%2C1628%2C1044&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, left, with his Nigerian counterpart Muhammadu Buhari in late August in Japan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/governmentza/48663894001/in/photolist-2h9eocY-2h9gXVu-2h9eobW-2h9gbpo-2h9gXSZ-2h9eo89-2h9gbmT-2h9eo7s-2h9gXNk-2h9eo4w-2h9gbgc-2h9enLn-2hc93x8">GCIS/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The latest <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/live-peace-migrants-fearful-sa-attacks-190904051255164.html">xenophobic attacks</a> in South Africa have ignited the long-standing tensions between the country and Nigeria. These are captured in the retaliatory attacks on <a href="https://www.biznews.com/global-investing/2019/09/05/xenophobia-mtn-shoprite-nigeria-ramaphosa-tweets">South African businesses in Nigeria</a> and the diplomatic outrage by Nigerian authorities.</p>
<p>Nigeria also boycotted the recent World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/350546-breaking-nigeria-recalls-ambassador-to-south-africa.html">in Cape Town</a>. More critical was the temporary closure of South African missions in <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/videos/xenophobia-nigeria-shoprite-attacks-video/;https://www.voanews.com/africa/nigerians-attack-south-african-businesses-retaliation">Abuja and Lagos</a> and Nigeria’s decision to <a href="https://punchng.com/breaking-xenophobia-nigeria-recalls-ambassador-to-south-africa-shuns-wes/">recall its ambassador</a>. </p>
<p>But in the larger scheme of things, xenophobia is a distraction from the leadership role that Nigeria and South Africa should play on the continent on fundamental issues of immigration and economic integration.</p>
<h2>A constant irritant</h2>
<p>Accurate figures are hard to get. But Statistics South Africa put the number of Nigerian migrants at <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201908150322.html">about 30,000</a> in 2016, far below Zimbabweans and Mozambicans.</p>
<p>Xenophobia has remained a constant irritant in Nigeria-South Africa relations since the major attacks on African migrants in poor neighbourhoods in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/20/world/africa/20safrica.html">in 2008</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/report-blames-media-xenophobic-panic-africa-160406102827284.html">2015</a>. But, contrary to popular perception, xenophobic attacks do not disproportionately target Nigerians. Nigerians often exaggerate the effect of violence on their citizens. That is probably because Nigeria has a better organised, savvy, and loud <a href="https://punchng.com/killing-of-nigerians-in-south-africa-will-no-longer-be-tolerated-fg-warns-sa/">diaspora constituency</a> in South Africa.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the loudness of the Nigerian diaspora transforms victimhood into foreign policy, generating the reactions that have been witnessed recently. It also plays into the naïve narrative of the <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/south-africa-should-be-eternally-grateful-to-nigeria-for-defeating-apartheid">“liberation dividend”</a>. This entails Nigerians seeking to be treated uniquely because of their contribution to the struggle for majority rule in South Africa. There were no such expectations from the other countries that supported South Africa’s liberation struggle.</p>
<p>This narrative has taken on an equally economic tinge. South African companies are heavily invested in Nigeria. So, they often become targets of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190905-nigeria-south-africa-businesses-attacks-xenophobic-violence">Nigerian ire</a> in times of xenophobia. </p>
<p>The accurate picture is that <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/09/south-africa-years-of-impunity-for-xenophobic-crimes-driving-the-latest-attacks/">xenophobia affects all African migrants</a>. These are mostly migrants from Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and, increasingly Ethiopians, Kenyans and Somalis. Nigerians are affected. But they’re not on top of the list.</p>
<p>The Nigerian responses are understandable in light of the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/enough-is-enough-says-nigerian-govt-over-violent-attacks-in-south-africa-20190903">frequency of these attacks</a>. But, it is important to <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-research-reveals-about-drivers-of-anti-immigrant-hate-crime-in-south-africa-123097">probe the drivers of xenophobia</a> to understand it more deeply.</p>
<h2>What drives xenophobia?</h2>
<p>First, some <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12288405">studies reveal</a> that the intrusion of foreign migrants into vulnerable communities beset by joblessness and despair inevitability produces <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/unemployment-and-immigration-in-south-africa-2013-05-24">a tinderbox</a> that <a href="https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/handle/10413/3186">sparks violence </a>. </p>
<p>Migrants are easy targets. That’s because they are seen as being better off by the locals. They therefore become targets of people who feel their circumstances have not been addressed by government. It is no surprise that xenophobic attacks have typically occurred in poor <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-soar-amid-unmet-expectations-in-south-africa-42013">neighbourhoods that have been affected</a> by service delivery protests since the mid-2000s.</p>
<p>Second, xenophobia thrives on ineffective policing in South Africa. Barely two days after the Johannesburg attacks started, the national police spokesman admitted that the police were running out of resources to manage the violence. This prompted the Premier of Gauteng, the country’s economic hub, to threaten to also <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/riots-in-gauteng-draining-police-resources-20190903">deploy the army</a> if the violence continued.</p>
<p>Examples of the police’s inability to maintain order and respond to threats to property and livelihoods are <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/xenophobia-police-have-no-plan-as-crime-intelligence-is-caught-napping-20190909">legion</a>. This, in part, forces people to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africa-can-turn-the-rising-tide-against-vigilantism-72986">take the law into their own hands</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africa-can-turn-the-rising-tide-against-vigilantism-72986">How South Africa can turn the rising tide against vigilantism</a>
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<p>But the police are sometimes complicit in stoking anti-foreign sentiments. The July 2019 raids on foreign-owned businesses in Johannesburg in apparent efforts to <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/08/08/gauteng-top-cop-vows-to-remove-counterfeit-good-from-joburg-cbd">stamp out illicit goods</a> added to the current climate of xenophobia. When some business owners retaliated against the police, some local leaders appropriated the language of “threats on South Africa’s sovereignty” to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/police-union-condemns-mob-attack-on-police-in-johannesburg-30264628">justify the police response</a>. </p>
<p>Reforms are urgently needed to create a competent, less corrupt, better-resourced, and civic-minded police service. </p>
<p>Xenophobia is also an outcome of a rickety migration and border control regime. Efficient border controls are one of the hallmarks of sovereignty and the first line of defence against xenophobia. Broken borders breed criminality. These include <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/308313/human-trafficking-rife-in-south-africa-with-more-women-lured-into-dens">human</a> and <a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2017-05-16-migration-of-the-nigerian-mafia">drug</a> trafficking. Human and drug trafficking feature prominently in the discourse on xenophobia in South Africa.</p>
<p>How, then, does xenophobia distract South Africa and Nigeria from what should be their leadership on core African issues?</p>
<h2>Overreaction</h2>
<p>The weighty issues of creating a humane and just society for South Africans and migrants alike will ultimately be led by the South African government. Outsiders can make some diplomatic noises and occasionally boycott South Africa. But these actions are unlikely to drive vital change. </p>
<p>In fact, the <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/09/03/zambia-cancels-bafana-friendly-due-to-attacks-on-foreign-nationals">overreactions</a> by Nigeria and other African countries simply undercut the South African constituencies that have a crucial stake in wide-ranging reforms that address the multiplicity of problems around xenophobia.</p>
<p>In the previous instances of xenophobic violence, Nigeria urged the African Union (AU) to force South Africa to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/nigerians-africa-living-fear-attacks-170221155456218.html">take action</a>. But such unhelpful statements only inflame passions and prevent civil diplomatic discourse.</p>
<p>Instead, the best policy would be for Nigeria to engage South Africa through their existing <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/abuja/bilateral.html">binational commission</a>. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari is scheduled to visit South Africa next month.</p>
<h2>Taking the lead</h2>
<p>Rather than the perennial relapse into shouting matches and hardening of rhetoric, it is essential for Pretoria and Abuja to take decisive leadership at the continental level. The two nations must articulate immigration policies. </p>
<p>The newly-inaugurated AU <a href="https://www.ilo.org/africa/areas-of-work/labour-migration/policy-frameworks/WCMS_671953/lang--en/index.htm">Free Movement of Persons Protocol</a> will not be implemented if South Africa and Nigeria do not join hands to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/belt-and-road/tito-mboweni-has-called-for-the-free-movement-of-africans-within-the-continent-31930766">make it a reality</a>. More ominously, migration to South Africa as the premier African economy will only get worse in the coming years. This, as Europe and the United States tighten their borders <a href="https://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/financial/2019/05/23/op-ed-the-future-of-africas-diaspora-is-in-africa/">against African migrants</a>.</p>
<p>Also, without the leadership of its two major economies, Africa is not going to make any traction on the new treaty establishing the African Continental <a href="https://theconversation.com/more-work-lies-ahead-to-make-africas-new-free-trade-area-succeed-118135">Free Trade Agreement</a>. Ironically, the WEF meeting in Cape Town addressed ways to boost intra-African trade. Nigeria should not have boycotted it because of xenophobia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123053/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilbert M. Khadiagala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa and Nigeria need to lead policy debates on long term measures to address migration in Africa.Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States (ACSUS), University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1207752019-07-23T07:34:16Z2019-07-23T07:34:16ZSouth Africa’s soldiers won’t end gang violence. A co-ordinated plan might<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285298/original/file-20190723-110187-10dh1k1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Deploying the army in the Cape Flats constitutes nothing more than simply sticking band aid on a festering wound.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ground Up - Ashraf Hendricks</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African government has taken a decision to <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/sandf-deployed-cape-town-townships">deploy</a> members of the South African National Defence Force to areas that have been ravaged by gang violence. </p>
<p>At least the deployment of the army shows some commitment by government to address the dire security problems these communities face. But it’s too little too late. It constitutes nothing more than simply sticking band aid on a festering wound. </p>
<p>The arrival of the soldiers has made headlines in the country. But will they make any difference? </p>
<p>In the short term they are likely to silence some of the guns. But they are unlikely to net any of the important kingpins behind the violence. Firstly, many of them don’t live in the neighbourhoods in which they conduct their business. Secondly, those who were living there would have decamped long before the soldiers arrived.</p>
<p>Lasting solutions to gangsterism and organised crime on the Cape Flats require a much more comprehensive approach than has been put into action. It requires a plan that pulls together various government agencies as well as different departments. The country in fact <a href="https://nationalgovernment.co.za/department_annual/128/2016-department:-defence-annual-report.pdf">has a framework</a> for joint action. Outlined in the Department of Defence’s review in 2015, it lists how the approach should be implemented. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, four years on, no progress has been made to structure this kind of approach. This pertains not only to issues of future force design and command-and-control, but to the need for better coordination in the sharing, storing and analysis of information and intelligence among all the departments involved. </p>
<p>This coordination is not happening. Soldiers, for instance, collect and process data into actionable intelligence to inform when and where to launch attacks. For their part, the South African Police Service, the Department of Correctional Services and the judiciary collect data and information to translate it into evidence that could be presented in courts of law. These diverse organisational end states limit the chances for lasting success. Unless all the efforts are focused, continually managed and controlled to achieve mutual support, none of the institutions can act effectively.</p>
<p>This won’t be easy. I know this from firsthand experience. As a serving South African Army officer who was deployed with members of the police in cordon and search operations during the 1990s, I can attest to the difficulties experienced in coordinating activities among state departments and agencies. </p>
<h2>A joint approach tested, then abandoned</h2>
<p>In the 1990s joint, interdepartmental and inter-agency structures were established from local, to provincial to national level. These bespoke structures were tailored to serve the operations and intelligence communities from tactical, to provincial to national levels that played a vital role in the collection, processing and dissemination of the intelligence collected. </p>
<p>Intelligence officers were also deployed in specific areas for extended periods of time which provided them with opportunities to gain detail intelligence of their areas of operations, as well as to register sources who provided them with information.</p>
<p>After 1994, a decision was made to disband these networks. The tactical intelligence structures of the Air Force, Navy and South African Medical Health Services were shut down. The South African Army was the only service that retained its tactical intelligence capability, albeit with an extremely limited mandate, namely that of overt collection only. For example, its intelligence corps was not permitted to conduct the processing and dissemination of intelligence anymore. These activities were centralised at Defence Intelligence Headquarters in Pretoria from about 1997. </p>
<p>The implications of these changes for the current deployments is that the South African Army members deployed on the Cape Flats will be depended on information and intelligence that will be mostly re-active and historical. And, although it could be used to provide context to their deployments, it would not necessarily be of any use as actionable intelligence.</p>
<h2>Defence in democracy</h2>
<p>The debates on the topic of the internal deployment of members of the South African National Defence Force has again highlighted the need for South Africans to debate what “Defence in Democracy” actually means. The result is that the military is expected to perform tasks for which it is not trained, funded or structured. The deployment of the army to the Cape Flats can therefore, at least, serve as a reason for debates on the topic of the role and future functions of the army and how it could be restructured.</p>
<p>In the interim, the successes to be achieved by the South African National Defence Force and the South African Police Services on the Cape Flats will be directly linked to the levels of cooperation established on an ad hoc basis by the role-players on a personal, individual level, rather than as a result of the integrated efforts of all the role-players. </p>
<p>There is a need for comprehensive <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/CTBSP-Exports/Capability-Development-in-Support-of-Comprehensive-Approaches.pdf?ver=2017-06-16-110221-453">approaches</a> that should include all the relevant government departments, as well as all organisations in society that can play a role in fighting the crime and violence which has become endemic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120775/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laetitia Olivier does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Successes by the army and police on the Cape Flats will depend entirely on levels of cooperation established on an ad hoc basis.Laetitia Olivier, Lecturer at the Department of Strategic Studies, Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy), Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1204552019-07-17T13:45:49Z2019-07-17T13:45:49ZThe army is being used to fight Cape Town’s gangs. Why it’s a bad idea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284493/original/file-20190717-147275-f0gknx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Shaldene Prins is supported by a policewoman at the funeral of her husband who was killed during gang violence. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Barry Christianson/ New Frame</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Following the latest <a href="http://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/354084/philippi-cape-town-13-people-killed-in-48-hours">spate of murders</a> on the notorious <a href="http://capeflats.org.za/modules/home/townships.php">Cape Flats</a> in the Cape Town, the South African government has decided to send in the army. </p>
<p>The move has been welcomed by many who want to see an end to the rampant violence, crime and <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/western-cape-government-relieved-by-presence-of-sandf/">gangsterism in the province</a>. Cape Town is ranked among the most violent cities <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/230123/cape-town-is-one-of-the-most-violent-cities-in-the-world/">in the world</a>.</p>
<p>But, the use of the military to perform law and order functions raises several problems, many of which have long-term implications. The biggest problem is that armies are not trained for law enforcement. They’re trained for warfare and to use maximum force. </p>
<p>This is very different from the law and order duties of the police. The principle of minimum force is alien to a soldier. As the chief of South African National Defence Force General Solly Shoke, recently stated, the army is trained to “skiet and donner” (“shoot and beat up”), <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4WZmodrMzFI">not for crime prevention</a>.</p>
<p>The South African government appears to have had little choice but to use the military as the country’s police have been unable to protect citizens against violent crime. A staggering 43 people were killed in Cape Town <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/43-killed-in-another-bloody-weekend-in-cape-town-20190715">this past weekend alone</a>.</p>
<p>Deploying soldiers may be effective in suppressing violence. Nevertheless, studies show that using the military in an internal role can exacerbate conflict, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-using-the-military-in-nigeria-is-causing-not-solving-problems-116676">rather than resolve it</a>. </p>
<h2>Soldiers are trained to kill</h2>
<p>Military training and culture instils in soldiers a particular disposition which shapes and guides their actions and behaviour. Aggressiveness and an <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438799800556">emotional distancing from the “enemy”</a> enables soldiers to deal with life-or death situations and perform acts that are otherwise considered abhorrent in civilian society. </p>
<p>Nor can the military identity of a soldier – who carries a machine gun rather than a pistol – be switched off by merely placing them in policing roles, without some degree of re-socialisation and training. The <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-07-15-as-army-deployment-is-delayed-43-murdered-over-bloody-cape-town-weekend/">delay</a> in the deployment of the military, announced by Police Minister Bheki Cele last Thursday, <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/sandf-says-cele-gave-too-much-away-report-20190713">relates to this</a>.</p>
<p>The soldiers need to receive proper training on police rules and conduct before they can be deployed. Without this they wouldn’t know how to react when confronted with heavily armed gang members. </p>
<p>The soldiers will be under <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/watch-troops-undergo-mission-ready-training-ahead-of-cape-flats-deployment-20190715">the command of the police</a> in the crime fighting operation. But differences in organisational cultures, procedure and equipment, could prove to be highly problematic. In addition, unlike the police, the military is typically unfamiliar with the terrain, street conditions, public attitudes and reactions of civilians.</p>
<p>Whether or not the deployment succeeds will depend on the conduct of the military, their methods of coercion and whether they act in an impartial and professional manner. The rules of engagement need to be very clear to ensure that they do not use excessive force, or violate the human rights of citizens. </p>
<p>Parameters must be set to ensure that the use of force is proportional to the threat posed to contain a situation. Force should only be used when all other means have failed, and where there is evidence of hostile intent. And, such use of force should be of limited duration, and only employed as a protective measure. </p>
<h2>Threat of militarisation</h2>
<p>The last thing the country can afford is a return to what happened during the apartheid era, when citizens were at the mercy of the state security forces, with hardly any <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0021909614541086?icid=int.sj-abstract.similar-articles.1">civilian oversight and accountability</a>.</p>
<p>There are also wider social ramifications. On the one hand, failure to intervene by the state may result in citizens forming their own armed groups that offer them <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070500370589">security and protection</a>. Any increase in vigilantism has the potential to further escalate violence, as citizens come to <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-mob-violence-out-of-control-in-south-africa">take the law into their own hands</a>.</p>
<p>On the other hand, further calls to deploy the military throughout the country could foster a culture of militarism. This, in turn, could be linked to broader social processes of militarisation within society at the economic, <a href="http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/transformation/tran010/tran010010.pdf">political and ideological levels</a>. </p>
<p>On the economic level, militarisation is associated with the increased spending on defence. At the political level, the involvement of the army in law and order duties can result in them being afforded <a href="https://www.csvr.org.za/index.php/component/content/article/1442-vigilantes-a-contemporary-form-of-repression.html">extra-ordinary powers</a> to institute <a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-one/wp43-rethinking-militarism-in-post-apartheid-south-africa.pdf">violence and repression </a>.</p>
<p>Ideologically, this can <a href="https://www.csvr.org.za/publications/1573-political-pawns-or-social-agents-a-look-at-militarised-youth-in-south-africa">perpetuate</a> an already established culture of violence as an effective means of achieving objectives.</p>
<p>Where there is a culture of resorting to the use of force to restore peace and security, it undermines the need to seek other alternatives. Nor does it address the underlying causes of conflict, which ultimately results in the military being deployed for prolonged periods, or even permanently, to prevent the return to violence. </p>
<h2>A constabulary force</h2>
<p>There are no simple solutions. But perhaps it is time to consider whether South Africa needs a constabulary force, or gendarmerie. These are hybrid police-military forces more suited for the maintenance of public order functions, rather than the military.
Countries that have established constabularies, or gendarme, include <a href="https://mns.gov.jm/content/jamaica-constabulary-force">Jamaica</a>, Spain (<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Civil-Guard">Guardia Civil</a>), France (<a href="http://www.nspcoe.org/welcome/french-gendarmerie-nationale">Gendarmerie</a>) and Italy (<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28254297">Carabinieri</a>). Countries like Canada’s <a href="http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en">Royal Canadian Mounted Police</a> and the US’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/18/what-is-national-guard-ferguson-missouri">National Guard</a> have been set up on a similar basis. </p>
<p>There has been an increase in the use of these forces due to the reluctance to deploy the military to combat internal threats. They are widely used in internal security and peacekeeping operations due to their ability to deal with threats posed by armed groups and other forms of violence that the police are <a href="https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/14295/163648/SSR_Paper_7%20(1).pdf">unable to deal with</a>. </p>
<p><em>Lindy Heinecken is the author of a forthcoming book, “South Africa’s post-apartheid military: Lost in Transition and Transformation”, to be published shortly by UCT/Juta and Springer Press.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120455/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lindy Heinecken does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The biggest problem with using the military to fight rime is that soldiers are not trained for law enforcement, but warfare, using maximum force.Lindy Heinecken, Chair of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1115682019-02-19T14:35:52Z2019-02-19T14:35:52ZWhy a law designed to fight gang violence in South Africa can’t do the job<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259278/original/file-20190215-56204-1w8mi6d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa at the launch of a national anti-gang unit in Cape Town. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/services/crimestats.php">Crime statistics</a> from the
South African Police Service show that gang related murders are increasing sharply, particularly in the suburbs that make up the <a href="http://capeflats.org.za/modules/home/townships.php">Cape Flats</a> in the Western Cape. The area is the <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Book2006OC_CapeFlats.PDF">epicentre</a> of gang activity in the country. One in every five of the 3 729 people murdered in the province between April 2017 and March 2018 were the victims of gangs.</p>
<p>Los Angeles in the US has a comparable gang problem. But even it has had a lower rate of gang related murders in the <a href="http://www.lapdonline.org/get_informed/content_basic_view/1396">past three years</a>.</p>
<p>Last year I concluded the first comprehensive analysis of the main law designed to deal with gang related crimes. I specifically looked at Chapter 4 of the <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1998-121.pdf">Prevention of Organised Crime Act</a> to investigate the shortcomings of the legislation in combating gang related crimes. </p>
<p>My analysis uncovered several shortcomings – including issues such as sentencing and the fact that the law falls short of being specific on gang related crimes – that frustrate the prosecution and conviction of gangs. </p>
<h2>Research findings</h2>
<p>I <a href="http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/105032">found</a> that the state’s failure to protect the inhabitants of the Cape Flats can in great part be attributed to the failure of Chapter 4 of the law, which was enacted in 1999 to combat organised crime. That includes gang related crime. </p>
<p>One of the biggest problems is that the law doesn’t have the power to disrupt gangs’ structures and capabilities. This is partly due to weak sentences for gang related crimes. They range between three and six years, mostly with the option of a fine. The sentences are ineffectual in deterring gang members and are also too short to disrupt the organisational structure of the gangs.</p>
<p>My research also highlighted the fact that low sentences were often given to high-ranking gang members or bosses, on whose orders the offences such as drug dealing, assault, robbery or murder are often committed. </p>
<p>This issue is worsened because the Prevention of Organised Crime Act doesn’t contain any offence that is specifically aimed at gang leaders. The closest it comes to targeting them is through the provision for the crime of inducing another to commit gang activities. This carries a maximum sentence of three years, or an unspecified fine. </p>
<p>This is in stark contrast to crimes pertaining to managing criminal racketeering enterprises. These offences carry a <a href="http://justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1998-121.pdf">R100 million fine</a> or life imprisonment. </p>
<p>A further issue is that proving crimes were committed on the instruction of gang leaders is extremely difficult. That’s because gang leaders are mostly far removed from the actual crimes, which are executed by their subordinates. There’s often no evidence linking the leaders to the actual crimes, making it practically impossible for the state to prove their involvement beyond a reasonable doubt in trials.</p>
<p>Prosecutions based on the act are often derailed due to a lack of evidence, also because of the complex nature of the crimes.</p>
<h2>Ineffective policing</h2>
<p>The Western Cape government has been very vocal in claiming successes in its fight against gangs. For example, it claimed last August that its <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/police-claim-successes-operation-thunder/">anti-crime operation</a> had made over “11,000 arrests including high-ranking gang members on the Cape Flats”. This seems exorbitant, considering that the total number of people awaiting trial in the entire country during 2016 and 2017 was <a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-the-state-of-south-africas-prisons/">about 43 799</a>.</p>
<p>But the public should be weary of this misleading language. Arrests don’t translate into prosecutions; and prosecutions don’t translate into convictions. In fact, Helen Zille, the Premier of the Western Cape, <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/where-did-zille-get-stats-for-gang-convictions-2031652">criticised</a> the low 0,7% gang conviction rate two years ago. </p>
<p>The gang crisis is aggravated by the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/crime-stats-call-for-more-police-for-the-poor-as-murder-rate-climbs-20180911">shortage of police officers</a> in the country. In 2015 it was reported that about 85% of South African police stations were understaffed. </p>
<p>Another problem is the unfair allocation of police resources. In December 2018, the Equality Court <a href="http://sjc.org.za/campaigns/police-resources">found</a> that the allocation of police resources unfairly discriminated “against black and poor people on the basis of race and poverty”. Many of those under-served areas are rife with gang activity.</p>
<h2>What can be done?</h2>
<p>The law needs to change to provide for crimes that are simpler to prove, and include provisions that specifically target gang leaders. This should be coupled with harsher sentences.</p>
<p>Ensuring that gang leaders are directly accountable for the crimes committed by their subordinates would solve the problem in providing evidence in court that the crimes were committed on the bosses’ instructions. Proof that the boss controls the gang, for instance, would be enough to secure a conviction. Such models are recognised under <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf">international criminal law</a>. </p>
<p>A controversial option, akin to Australia’s <a href="https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/act/2012/9/full">New South Wales</a> model, would be to outlaw the formation of gangs and membership. This might, however, lead to the infringement of the constitutional right to freedom of association.</p>
<p>None of the necessary changes will happen without real political will. The establishment of the <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/cape-flats-gang-unit-national-government/">Anti-Gang Unit</a> in the Western Cape in late 2018 was a step in the right direction. But its true value will be reflected in actual convictions for gang-related crimes. </p>
<p><em>This was updated in the light of new developments.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111568/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delano Cole van der Linde does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The law aimed at fighting gangs lacks the power to disrupt their activities.Delano Cole van der Linde, Lecturer in the Faculty of Law, North-West University, North-West UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1054602018-10-31T13:56:02Z2018-10-31T13:56:02ZSouth African voters are moving beyond party loyalty: they want delivery<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/242019/original/file-20181024-48724-c9n1mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Voters line up in South Africa's last election. Their concerns are shifting.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The attention of South Africans has recently been firmly fixed on issues of good governance – or more specifically on its failures. This is due partly to several exposés of scandals involving former President Jacob Zuma and the <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/rise-and-fall-gupta-empire">Gupta family</a>. The allegations are that members of the family and a network of individuals close to Zuma were involved in <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture">corruption and efforts to weaken key state institutions</a>.</p>
<p>But does the public outcry reflect actual changes in the hearts, minds, and loyalty of the nation’s voters? And what does this mean for the incumbent government, led by the African National Congress (ANC), when the people return to the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/iec-on-track-for-2019-elections-not-planning-for-rumoured-early-vote-20180529">polls in 2019</a>?</p>
<p>New <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Voter%20Preference%20Report%20A4%2002.10.%202018%20PDF.pdf">research</a> suggests that major shifts are beginning to happen in the country. For example, in past elections, loyalty to the ANC – the party that led the struggle for freedom and democracy – mattered more than government performance and trust in government institutions. This is no longer the case. The research shows that the performance of institutions such as parliament, the Courts, the South African Police Services, the South African Social Security Agency, the Department of Social Development and the media are now as important a predictor of voters’ preferences. </p>
<p>In fact, issues of good governance – reflected in trust in institutions, the implementation of the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution and perceptions of corruption – matter significantly.</p>
<p>This is clear from the two major findings of the study. The first is that the number of people supporting the ANC is down significantly. The survey found that 53% of those interviewed said that they would vote for the ANC in 2019. The percentage may be slightly higher as 11% of respondents said they wouldn’t vote and the remainder refused to answer the question. This is significantly lower than the 70% the ANC got in 2004 and marginally lower than the 54% in the 2016 local government elections. </p>
<p>Secondly, perceptions of good governance are becoming more important for the average voter, and that party loyalty – while still significant – is on the decline.</p>
<p>These first findings are part of a three-part national study into the drivers of voting preference and influence. </p>
<h2>What matters</h2>
<p>Perceptions of who and how decisions are made, how resources are managed and implemented, and the extent to which public institutions meet the needs of the population (rather than a select group of people) appears to be holding sway among potential voters. This is pertinent given the prevalence of <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-paying-a-heavy-price-for-dysfunctional-local-government-102295">service delivery protests</a>, increasing concerns <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-wont-become-less-violent-until-its-more-equal-103116">about safety </a> and the daily exposure by various <a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-will-go-to-the-polls-with-only-one-major-asset-its-president-ramaphosa-105433">commissions of enquiry</a> of the magnitude of corruption.</p>
<p>The study clearly shows that perceptions of good governance, corruption as well as social and economic well-being are the key factors likely to influence how people vote in the 2019 national general elections. </p>
<p>We also found that:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>75% of the respondents believed that corruption had increased in the country.</p></li>
<li><p>Voting for the party of “liberation” was still the most important reason for 35% of all respondents. But this was not a key driver of voting behaviour in our statistical model. This is a clear shift from the past two decades.</p></li>
<li><p>Many respondents expressed fairly high levels of trust in institutions (such as the courts, media, South African Social Security Agency, and the Department of Social Development). But, former President Jacob Zuma fared poorly: only 26% of potential voters expressed trust in him. </p></li>
<li><p>Voters who expressed strong trust in institutions were nearly four times likelier to vote ANC than those who had strong distrust in institutions.</p></li>
<li><p>Voters who believed that corruption had increased since 2014 were half as likely to vote for the ANC than those who thought that corruption had decreased.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Contradictions</h2>
<p>The research revealed that while potential voters in the poor and middle-income brackets are not oblivious to how public institutions conduct their affairs, just over half of the respondents were likely or extremely likely to trust the South African Social Security Agency and the Department of Social Development. These two departments are directly engaged in poverty reduction through the payment of social grants to almost 17 million beneficiaries and the delivery of welfare services to vulnerable individuals and families. </p>
<p><strong>Figure 1: How likely are you to trust in the following institutions?</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, the survey found lower levels of trust in the South African Police Service (44%). This comes as no surprise in view of <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/crime-stats-south-africa-murder-rate-2018/">high rates of crime and violence in the country</a>. </p>
<p>Trust in Parliament was 45%, indicating less favourable public opinion about the failure of parliament to hold political office bearers to account. Similarly, corruption is highly likely to be the reason for the low levels of trust expressed in former President Zuma (26%). </p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>These findings, when read along with concerns about corruption and service delivery failures, suggest that good governance matters significantly to voters. These perceptions and the extent to which public institutions meet the needs of the population appear to be holding sway among potential voters. </p>
<p>This is pertinent given the persistence of service delivery protests in communities all over the country and the exposure to corruption on a daily basis.</p>
<p>Whether the recent changes in ANC leadership, which saw Cyril Ramaphosa become party president and leader of the country, will once again shift voter perceptions is a question that we hope to answer when the results of the 2018 study are released. </p>
<p><em>This first set of data was collected through a nationally representative survey, at the height of the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-dlamini-zuma-in-a-tightrace-20171104">contestation for leadership</a> in the governing party in 2017. It’s the first set of findings released in a three-year study. The next findings – to be released in the first quarter of 2019 – will help to show patterns over time, particularly where voters hold contradictory views.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105460/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leila Patel receives funding from the National Research Foundation for her Research Chair in Welfare and Social Development, from the University of Johannesburg's Research Committee and the Faculty of Humanities Research Committee at UJ </span></em></p>South African voters are worried about how their country is being run. Most still support the ANC but in far fewer numbers.Leila Patel, Professor of Social Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1044442018-10-05T14:20:40Z2018-10-05T14:20:40ZSocial media is making it harder to protect the identities of suspects<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239508/original/file-20181005-72133-i0j15o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man accused of raping a seven-year old child at a restaurant in South Africa makes his first court appearance.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eyewitness News/Christa Eybers</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>A controversy is <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/dros-rape-media-must-strive-to-minimise-harm-20181001">raging</a> in South Africa over the naming of a man accused of <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/drosrape-he-ruined-things-for-us-says-dros-waitress-17346838">raping a seven-year old child</a> at a restaurant in Pretoria, the capital city, before he had appeared in court. His name and photograph were widely circulated on social media. At <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/your-sunday-headlines-in-city-press-20180930">least two</a> major Sunday newspapers identified him. The Conversation Africa asked Jameelah Omar, a criminal procedure expert, to explain what is and isn’t allowed.</em> </p>
<p><strong>What does the law say?</strong></p>
<p>The country’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/Act%2051%20of%201977s.pdf">Criminal Procedure Act of 1977</a> prohibits the publication of the identity of the accused before they appear in court and plead. This is to prevent undue prejudice to a person before the prosecuting authority decides to prosecute. </p>
<p>Some information can be reported before the accused appears in court and pleads. But this is limited to information about an alleged crime, such as where it allegedly took place. </p>
<p>The act also stipulates that the identity of the complainant in a sexual matter must always be confidential. </p>
<p>Generally, criminal trials are public. In some cases, however, a court can direct that a criminal matter be heard behind closed doors (in camera), and that any person whose presence is not necessary will be barred from attending the trial. This is common practice in sexual offence cases given the sensitivity of the subject and the vulnerability of the complainant.</p>
<p>Even if a case is heard in camera, the name and personal particulars of the accused, the charge against him, the plea, the verdict and the sentence (unless the court directs otherwise) can all be reported. </p>
<p>Another law that sets down conditions for what can and can’t be reported is the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/Act68of1995.pdf">South African Police Service Act</a>. This prohibits the publishing of pictures (photos or sketches) of someone who is in custody on suspicion of having committed an offence before a decision to prosecute has been made or criminal proceedings have started. But, in particular circumstances, permission can be sought from the national or provincial commissioner of police to authorise publication.</p>
<p>In the latest furore, both sets of laws were broken because people on social media circulated the name of the alleged rapist, as well as his photo before he pleaded in court. At least <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/your-sunday-headlines-in-city-press-20180930">two major newspapers</a> also broke the law by doing this.</p>
<p><strong>Why is identifying suspects before they have pleaded a problem?</strong></p>
<p>The rationale behind about banning the publication of details, particularly when it comes to sexual offences, is threefold.</p>
<p>Firstly, to (always) protect the complainant, secondly, to protect minors, and finally, to protect the accused (or any witnesses) if there is a likelihood that they may be harmed. </p>
<p>The prohibition of the accused’s identity before they plead has a slightly different rationale. </p>
<p>The logic here is that the prosecuting authority must be able to apply its mind as to whether there is, at face value, enough evidence. If there is sufficient evidence a prosecution should proceed. But this should happen without the pressure of a public outcry.</p>
<p>Should the prosecuting authority opt not to prosecute, the matter doesn’t go to trial? If the alleged perpetrator had already been named they would suffer reputational harm.</p>
<p>It’s of course frustrating if someone who people believe has committed a crime doesn’t get charged. But, the thing to bear in mind is that the law has to apply consistently for everyone. None of us would want our name to be spread through the media before we’ve appeared in court. </p>
<p><strong>What about public figures and public interest?</strong></p>
<p>The prohibition against identifying alleged perpetrators before they have actually appeared in court, and pleaded, doesn’t depend on who the person is. As soon as the accused has pleaded, their identity can be disclosed, regardless of the person’s public profile.</p>
<p>The prohibition applies to any person publishing details of a criminal allegation, not only the media. But media houses are more likely to be cautious about sticking to the law compared with ordinary people. </p>
<p>The rise of social media has brought about a whole new set of challenges. For example, it would be ridiculous to envisage charging every person who has shared the identity of an alleged perpetrator on Twitter or Facebook. Individuals are not bound by the same restrictions of ethical reporting guidelines as media companies are. Individuals could also possibly claim ignorance of the law as a defence, something media companies can’t do.</p>
<p>Having said that, I always make a point of warning my students to be cautious when they share information on social media, as we should all abide by an ethic of care when we communicate publicly.</p>
<p><strong>What is the penalty for breaching the law or rules?</strong></p>
<p>Contravening the Criminal Procedure Act by identifying alleged perpetrators before they have pleaded is a criminal offence. Those found guilty can be either fined, or jailed for up to three years. If the person who has been wrongfully identified is under 18-years-old, the imprisonment could be five years.</p>
<p>Violations of the South African Police Act involving the publication of a picture of someone in custody before criminal proceedings start carries a possible sentence of either a fine or a year in jail.</p>
<p>These laws have been applied in South Africa. But making them stick in the era of social platforms like Twitter and Facebook presents a whole new set of challenges.
m</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104444/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jameelah Omar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Social media presents new challenges in sensitive cases but media houses must stick to the law.Jameelah Omar, Lecturer in Criminal Justice, Department of Public Law, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1036482018-10-02T13:55:25Z2018-10-02T13:55:25ZVictim surveys show that crime in South Africa may be dropping, yet fear is rising<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238981/original/file-20181002-85617-1bwhagw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There’s been a decline in many crimes in South Africa but the murder rate has increased for the sixth year. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/KIM LUDBROOK</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africans <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20of%20results/saf-r6-sor.pdf">consistently rank</a> crime among their top concerns, second only to unemployment. Between 2003 and 2015, <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/research-outputs/ktree-doc/17276">79% of people</a> surveyed annually by the country’s Human Sciences Research Council were dissatisfied with the government’s efforts to reduce crime. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-wont-become-less-violent-until-its-more-equal-103116">latest crime statistics </a>released by the South African Police Service provide reason for both optimism and concern. They show year-on-year declines in many crimes, including aggravated robbery, burglary, and vehicle theft. If these reflect real declines, that may be because of more intelligent policing – and developments in anti-theft technology and residential fortification, among other factors.</p>
<p>But murder rates increased for the sixth consecutive year. The recent rise includes a 14% increase in the murder of women and children. Given that murder rates more than halved between 1994 and 2011, these increases are worrying.</p>
<p>Amid the focus on crime statistics, another set of data is often ignored. South Africa is fortunate to have <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0341/P03412016.pdf">victim</a> and <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20of%20results/saf-r6-sor.pdf">perception</a> survey data.</p>
<p>This is valuable because police data alone offer only a partial picture. It also tells us almost nothing about public experiences and perceptions, including how many crimes aren’t reported, whether people trust police, or if they feel safe.</p>
<p>Where trends in police data match trends in victim survey data, they are more likely to be accurate – particularly for certain crime types. Perceptions, on the other hand, are subjective. It can take years for an actual crime decline to result in improved feelings of safety. Where violent crime declines but remains common, or where stories of violence saturate daily media, feelings of safety may not improve, despite real crime declines. </p>
<p>It’s important that governments take these perceptions seriously. Improved feelings of safety and confidence in police should be central to how government evaluates itself.</p>
<h2>Police data</h2>
<p>Fewer crimes were reported to police in 2017/18 than in the preceding year. Although <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0341/P03412016.pdf">most victims</a> don’t report crime, some crimes are more likely to be reported than others. These include residential burglary, vehicle theft, carjacking as well as home and business robbery. These all showed a decline. Other violent crimes that are most likely to be reported, including murder, bank robbery and cash in transit robbery, increased. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238325/original/file-20180927-48659-2336hy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238325/original/file-20180927-48659-2336hy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238325/original/file-20180927-48659-2336hy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238325/original/file-20180927-48659-2336hy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238325/original/file-20180927-48659-2336hy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238325/original/file-20180927-48659-2336hy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238325/original/file-20180927-48659-2336hy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://issafrica.org/crimehub">ISS Crime Hub</a></span>
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<p>Common assault and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm also declined. This is perplexing. </p>
<p>With attempted murder remaining flat and murder increasing, it would be surprising if assault had declined. Police analysis suggests that many murders begin with an assault.</p>
<p>However, considering that 41% of murders involved firearms and another 31% knives, it’s possible that most lethal violence takes place under different conditions, or between different people, to that classified as assault. For example, more murders are likely to occur during robberies today than they did in the past. </p>
<p>But, it is at least as likely that the decline in reported assaults is a result of police dissuading victims from opening cases, including domestic and child violence cases, or victims simply not reporting. </p>
<h2>Victim surveys</h2>
<p>National victim surveys are conducted among representative samples of households. Victim surveys explore experiences and perceptions of crime, regardless of whether respondents experienced crime or victims reported crimes to police. They are not perfect, but offer a means to gauge crime trends, reporting rates, and public perceptions. </p>
<p>The 2017/18 police data should be compared with the 2017/18 national victim survey, but this has not yet been released. The 2015/16 and 2016/17 surveys indicate a slight, general decline in reporting in recent years. </p>
<p>Victim surveys estimate the distribution of crime experienced by victims. The <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0341/P03412016.pdf">latest data</a> suggests that most victims in 2016/17 experienced burglary (53%) and theft outside the home (42%). But, only 10% of crimes reported to police in 2017/18 were classified as burglary, and 14% as other theft. This suggests irregular victim engagement with police. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238625/original/file-20181001-195266-1xtxr85.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238625/original/file-20181001-195266-1xtxr85.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238625/original/file-20181001-195266-1xtxr85.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238625/original/file-20181001-195266-1xtxr85.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238625/original/file-20181001-195266-1xtxr85.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238625/original/file-20181001-195266-1xtxr85.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238625/original/file-20181001-195266-1xtxr85.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied by author</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Fewer crime victims</h2>
<p>Like police statistics, household victim surveys suggest that increasingly fewer people are falling victim to crime. In 1998, 25% of households reported experiencing a “household” crime (for example burglary, home robbery, car theft) while in 2016/17 just 7% did. </p>
<p>Similarly, 4.7% reported being victims of “individual” crimes (for example theft of personal property, robbery, assault) in 2013/14 compared to 3.5% in 2016/17. This suggests that despite widespread feelings of insecurity, fewer people may be victims of crime each year than is commonly thought. </p>
<p>For example, if burglary is the most common crime and half of burglaries aren’t reported to police, this still means that fewer than 1% of individuals or roughly 3% of households experienced burglary in 2017/18. </p>
<p>Despite what appears from both police and victim survey data to be a decline in general crime, in 2016/17 more people believed crime had increased in their area of residence than those who believed it had decreased or stayed the same. In contrast, in 2011 and 2012 more people believed crime had decreased. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, recent perceptions are better than they were in 2003 and 2007, when most people believed crime was increasing. People are also <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/about">more positive</a> when asked to reflect on long term trends. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238626/original/file-20181001-195263-z8xeqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238626/original/file-20181001-195263-z8xeqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238626/original/file-20181001-195263-z8xeqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238626/original/file-20181001-195263-z8xeqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238626/original/file-20181001-195263-z8xeqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238626/original/file-20181001-195263-z8xeqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238626/original/file-20181001-195263-z8xeqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied by author</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>How do these beliefs shape lives? </p>
<h2>Fear of crime</h2>
<p>In 2016/17, up to 32% of people reported being unable to carry out basic tasks for fear of crime. Although most people report feeling safe walking in their area of residence during the day, just 29% feel the same at night. This figure has increased consistently since 2011, suggesting that although general crime may be declining, public fear is increasing. </p>
<p>While national victims surveys give some cause for optimism, youth victim surveys – which can register harms not captured by national surveys – offer reason for serious concern. They show that <a href="http://www.cjcp.org.za/uploads/2/7/8/4/27845461/08_cjcp_report_2016_d.pdf">26-35%</a> of young South Africans have experienced sexual abuse; <a href="http://www.cjcp.org.za/uploads/2/7/8/4/27845461/cjcp_ubs_web.pdf">34% have been</a> hit, beaten, kicked or physically hurt by an adult. Children exposed to violence are <a href="http://www.samj.org.za/index.php/samj/article/view/12218">more likely</a> to perpetrate and be victims of violence as adults.</p>
<p>South Africans should be very concerned about this. Without addressing violence against children – which is often coupled with violence against women – the country will struggle to reduce the violent crime that keeps so many gripped by fear.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103648/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Faull receives funding from the Hanns Seidel Foundation. </span></em></p>Data from victim and crime perception surveys help make sense of South Africa’s crime statistics.Andrew Faull, Research Associate at UCT's Centre of Criminology, Consultant at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1031162018-09-12T15:26:23Z2018-09-12T15:26:23ZSouth Africa won’t become less violent until it’s more equal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236031/original/file-20180912-133904-1sl8biq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African police on patrol in Hout Bay, Cape Town, following requests for more intervention by locals.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The release of crime statistics in South Africa always triggers great angst among ordinary citizens, and obfuscation on the part of the South African authorities. This year was no exception. </p>
<p>In their latest release of <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/services/crimestats.php">crime statistics</a>, the South African Police Service seem to have tried to downplay crime rate increases (and exaggerate crime rate decreases), by using the <a href="https://africacheck.org/2018/09/12/analysis-crime-rates-worse-than-south-african-police-calculated/">wrong population estimates</a>. The police <a href="https://africacheck.org/2018/09/12/analysis-crime-rates-worse-than-south-african-police-calculated/">incorrectly</a> used the June 2018 population estimates in their analysis of the 2017/18 crime rates. This is not the first time they have made this kind of <a href="https://oldsite.issafrica.org/uploads/ISS-Statement-20Sept-2013.pdf">bungle</a>. </p>
<p>But their motivation is clear. Applying the correct population estimates suggests that the country saw the biggest per capita annual murder rate increase since 1994. Last year’s figures suggested that the murder rate had <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-crime-stats-show-police-struggling-to-close-cases-86429">stabilised</a>. But these were unfounded, as the murder rate has now risen to 36 per 100,000. The last time it was this high was in 2009. The increase is cause for serious concern.</p>
<p>Even the new minister of police Bheki Cele <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/2007430/57-south-africans-murdered-a-day-crime-statistics/">expressed shock</a> at the numbers, describing South Africa as being close to a “war zone”. He admitted that the country’s police force “dropped the ball”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236017/original/file-20180912-133898-qt13kc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236017/original/file-20180912-133898-qt13kc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236017/original/file-20180912-133898-qt13kc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236017/original/file-20180912-133898-qt13kc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236017/original/file-20180912-133898-qt13kc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236017/original/file-20180912-133898-qt13kc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236017/original/file-20180912-133898-qt13kc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South Africa’s annual murder rate per 100,000.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A logical response might be that there is a need for more policing. <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-09-11-dire-crime-statistics-are-nothing-to-write-home-about-bheki-cele-says/">According</a> to Cele:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have lost the UN norm of policing which says one policeman to 220 citizens. One police officer is now looking at almost double that.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But this isn’t the answer. A sensible response to South Africa’s rising crime rates would be twofold: a problem-solving approach that would require a close analysis of what’s causing crime to rise in a given area. Then they’d need to devise a plan that takes into account all the contributory factors – and involves everyone affected in addressing it.</p>
<p>And, secondly, the country’s leaders must address inequality. South Africa is a highly unequal society. It has one of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-a-fresh-approach-to-its-stubbornly-high-levels-of-inequality-87215">highest gini-co-efficients</a> (a measure of inequality) in the world. Research shows that inequality and crime go <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/Crime%26Inequality.pdf">hand in hand</a>.</p>
<h2>The question of police numbers</h2>
<p>Police leaders <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-09-11-crime-stats-from-hell-brought-to-you-by-years-of-instability-political-pliancy-and-the-sapss-internecine-battles/">reported</a> that their staff numbers have gone down by 10,000 since 2010. They argued that they had 62,000 fewer police than were needed. </p>
<p>Police agencies all over the world often claim that, to reduce crime, they need bigger budgets and more officers. But the evidence that these two things automatically lead to more effective crime prevention is far from clear. </p>
<p>Take the issue of police numbers. Short-term and extreme spikes in police numbers (such as in response to <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/426877">terrorist</a> threats) do seem to reduce crime. But <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0032258X15612702">a review of a number of studies</a> on the relationship between policing levels and crime rates suggested that the impact of more police is generally small. The paper also noted that part of the problem was that there have been few rigorous <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2011.00240.x">experiments</a> on, for example, extra police resources being allocated randomly.</p>
<p>Bigger budgets also have mixed outcomes. This is because, very often, a significant proportion of spending on police is ineffectual. Police resources often aren’t targeted, even though there’s evidence that <a href="https://theconversation.com/police-strategy-to-reduce-violent-crime-in-south-africa-could-work-heres-how-98497">doing so</a> produces <a href="http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/media/k2/attachments/Braga_Hot_Spots_Policing_Review.pdf">good results</a>. </p>
<p>This isn’t hard to do: crime is highly <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/580e/0a9a216444faf0db9592df45076fac297d50.pdf">concentrated</a> in hot spots that are often surprisingly small and quite <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2004.tb00521.x">stable</a> over time. With the right focus, resources could be directed to these areas. But mostly <a href="https://theconversation.com/police-strategy-to-reduce-violent-crime-in-south-africa-could-work-heres-how-98497">they aren’t</a>.</p>
<h2>Targeted approach</h2>
<p>What works best is a <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0002716203262548">problem-solving approach</a>. This involves focusing narrowly on understanding specific crime problems in specific places, and using not only police but drawing on the knowledge and resources of all parties, including other government departments and local communities. </p>
<p>For example, particular factors might be contributing to a spike in robberies in a particular area. These could include a large cohort of bored young people in the community, paths that are fertile ground for attacks because they are dark and overgrown, or unlit parks near a derelict building. </p>
<p>More police patrols wouldn’t necessarily be the best solution. The underlying problems would need to be addressed. This might include creating a partnership between property owners, the agencies in charge of parks and lighting administration, schools and parents, and the communities that use the spaces. </p>
<p>One concern with a targeted approach is that crime is simply pushed elsewhere. But evidence suggests that the displacement effect is usually limited and that, in fact, nearby areas often enjoy a <a href="https://campbellcollaboration.org/library/geographically-focused-policing.html">diffusion of benefits</a>. </p>
<h2>Inequality</h2>
<p>There’s a more fundamental problem that needs to be solved on a national scale before South Africa’s crime levels can be reduced: inequality. </p>
<p>Research shows that inequality is arguably the single best <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15817728">predictor</a> of whether a country will experience high or low levels of crime and violence. Inequality</p>
<ul>
<li><p>makes property crime more attractive and profitable;</p></li>
<li><p>drives frustration, hostility and hopelessness; and,</p></li>
<li><p>undermines trust, community engagement and the functioning of social and institutional structures. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/530481521735906534/Overcoming-Poverty-and-Inequality-in-South-Africa-An-Assessment-of-Drivers-Constraints-and-Opportunities">world</a>. </p>
<h2>Where to from here</h2>
<p>Murder levels nationally have been at about this level or higher (above 30 per 100,000, which is considered <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/GSH2013/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf#page=24">very high</a> by global standards) since at least the <a href="https://theconversation.com/facts-show-south-africa-has-not-become-more-violent-since-democracy-62444">1970s</a>. High levels of violence are not a matter of police resources. They are a structural feature of this society. </p>
<p>This is not to say that the police are blameless. Among <a href="https://theconversation.com/police-strategy-to-reduce-violent-crime-in-south-africa-could-work-heres-how-98497">other things</a> they should be doing more to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-crime-stats-show-police-struggling-to-close-cases-86429">solve cases</a>. But addressing the key drivers of crime and violence requires that South Africa builds a much larger social partnership. It has no hope of becoming a fundamentally less violent country until it becomes a more equal one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103116/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anine Kriegler previously received funding from the National Research Foundation and the David and Elaine Potter Foundation.</span></em></p>Increasing police patrols won’t solve South Africa’s high rates of violent crime. Underlying problems need to be addressed.Anine Kriegler, Researcher and Doctoral Candidate in Criminology, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1017532018-08-21T13:44:22Z2018-08-21T13:44:22ZSouth Africa’s criminal justice system is on the mend. But it’s just the beginning<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232693/original/file-20180820-30578-ocyzr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former South African President Jacob Zuma has lost his grip on the country's criminal justice system. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2018/23.html">judgment</a> by South Africa’s Constitutional Court that ended the reign of the country’s national prosecutions boss marked the end of former president Jacob Zuma’s hold on the country’s criminal justice system.</p>
<p>The court found that Zuma had appointed Shaun Abrahams unlawfully to the powerful position, and ordered him removed. President Cyril Ramaphosa has since <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/breaking-silas-ramaite-appointed-as-acting-npa-head-20180814">replaced him with Silas Ramaite</a> in an acting position.</p>
<p>Abrahams was the last remaining Zuma acolyte in the country’s criminal justice system. Finally, Zuma has lost the iron grip he once held on crucial state institutions.</p>
<p>Abrahams’ departure follows sweeping changes to other key positions in the government’s criminal justice and security cluster. The highly compromised <a href="http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/arthur-frasers-redeployment-causes-controversy/">Arthur Fraser</a> has been moved from the State Security Agency while the priority crimes investigating unit, the Hawks, has a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/godfrey-lebeya-appointed-as-new-hawks-boss-20180524">new head</a>.</p>
<p>There are still two relatively new Zuma appointments in position: the national police commissioner <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2017/11/22/general-khehla-sithole-appointed-new-national-police-commissioner">Khehla Sitole</a>, and the Inspector General of Intelligence <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-appoints-inspector-general-of-intelligence-20170313">Isaac Dintwe</a>. Both of them have received Parliament’s endorsement at a time when it was already increasingly critical of Zuma. Dintwe, for example, was directly responsible for <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/inspector-general-of-intelligence-claims-ssa-head-arthur-fraser-is-intimidating-him-20180411">Fraser’s demise</a>. They are, therefore, not Zuma functionaries. </p>
<p>The fact that the final step against Abrahams was taken by the Constitutional Court, and wasn’t a political decision, adds legitimacy to his departure. The clarity of the judgment on the constitutional and legal aspects of the position of the country’s prosecutions’ boss, and independence of the prosecutions authority, deepens the democratic character of criminal justice. </p>
<h2>Court’s role in deepening democracy</h2>
<p>The court’s ruling on Abrahams follows a trend of taking decisions that have promoted democracy in a tangible way. A few examples illustrate the point.</p>
<p>In 2016 the Court reaffirmed that remedial decisions taken by the Public Protector <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/full-text-constitutional-court-rules-on-nkandla-public-protector-20160331">were binding on all public officials and representatives of the country</a>. </p>
<p>The court also ruled that the appointments of two previous <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-12-06-government-finally-drops-menzi-simelane-for-good/">prosecutions bosses</a> were invalid. </p>
<p>Another example was the court’s interpretation of the parliamentary Speaker’s powers on <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-06-22-read-in-full-concourt-ruling-on-secret-ballot/">no confidence motions</a>. This entrenched the principle that the speaker can decide when voting would be by secret ballot or by public electronic voting.</p>
<p>The court also set aside a decision by the former National Director of Public Prosecutions, Mokotedi Mpshe, to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/concourt-refuses-to-hear-npa-appeal-on-zuma-corruption-charges-da-20161007">withdraw corruption charges</a> against Zuma. </p>
<p>In another key judgment, the court ruled that political parties should <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-06-21-the-constitutional-court-rules-voters-should-know-who-funds-political-parties/">disclose</a> the sources of their private funding.</p>
<h2>Public expectation</h2>
<p>Abrahams’ demise has created the public expectation that stronger action can now be taken against corruption. The ongoing revelations of <a href="http://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/sym2017papers.pdf">state capture</a> excesses have left the National Prosecuting Authority with no room to sidestep prosecutions. </p>
<p>If there’s no action it will be difficult for Ramaphosa to refute the claim that those accused of corruption continue to enjoy political protection on his watch. His promise of a new era of <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-promises-corruption-crackdown-at-maiden-sona-20180216">clean governance</a> and efficient government is unquestionably bound to visible prosecutions without fear or favour. Urgent progress with prosecutions is just as important as his economic renewal agenda.</p>
<p>But progress in the fight against corruption doesn’t only depend on the National Prosecuting Authority. The police – and special investigative units in particular, such as the Hawks who are responsible for criminal investigations – would have to be seen to be doing their jobs. Their efficiency and effectiveness in investigations are crucial to the success of prosecutions. Serious reform of the police services is therefore equally important for effective prosecutions.</p>
<h2>Public perception</h2>
<p>Arguably, one of the most serious challenges facing the prosecutions authority is how to address the public perception that it’s <a href="http://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/268246/npa-hawks-delay-on-guptaleaks-shows-they-are-compromised-says-foundation">politically compromised</a>. A range of factors account for this. </p>
<p>Firstly, there’s the high turnover of national directors which in turn is a symptom of political pressure. The incumbent’s term of office is <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1998-032.pdf">ten years</a>, in line with fixed, non-renewable terms for the Public Protector and judges. But since 1998 the five permanent and two acting national directors have all, on average, lasted only three years. On top of this, two previous commissions of inquiry against national directors – the <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/commissions/comm_hefer/2004%2001%2020_hefer_report.pdf">Hefer</a> and <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/commissions/2008_ginwala.pdf">Ginwala</a> inquiries – happened within a politicised environment. </p>
<p>There have been a number of cases that have pointed directly to political manipulation of the National Prosecutions Authority. These include the abuse of the Hawks’ and the prosecutions authority’s <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/pravin-gordhan-back-in-hawks-crosshairs-20180312">investigations</a> against former national tax commissioner Pravin Gordhan and other tax officials to protect Zuma’s interests. So was Mpshe’s decision to <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-10-13-sca-rejects-zumas-spy-tapes-appeal">rescind corruption charges</a> against Zuma.</p>
<p>An immediate priority for prosecuting authority is to change this legacy of political abuse, and to cultivate credibility. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa’s campaign of renewal will initially require many more <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/the-state-capture-inquiry-what-you-need-to-know-20180819">investigations</a> of politicians to combat corruption in the public sector. That entails potentially more political complications for him and the risk of creating more political enemies. It will also threaten deeply entrenched patronage networks in the governing ANC. </p>
<p>For the National Prosecuting Authority, only after it has shown visible success in significantly reducing corruption in the public sector can its political exposure be reduced. The most critical factor in changing its negative legacy is for the prosecutions authority to safeguard its independence. </p>
<p>The latest Court <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2018/23.html">judgment</a> has made an important contribution to this. It has provided clarity on the prosecutions boss’s tenure of office. It also instructed the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-prosecuting-authority-act">National Prosecuting Authority Act</a> to be changed to curtail the president’s powers to appoint and dismiss the national head of prosecutions. </p>
<p>Independence in terms of decision making is equally important, but does not form part of the court judgment. This will require consistency and a show of high levels of integrity and competence by the National Prosecuting Authority. </p>
<p>To promote its independence, it would help if its leading figures are career professionals with no public political profiles. The <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/breaking-silas-ramaite-appointed-as-acting-npa-head-20180814">appointment of Silas Ramaite</a> as the acting National Director of Public Prosecutions, is a good beginning.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101753/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The axing of the prosecutions head follows sweeping changes to other king positions in the security cluster by President Cyril Ramaphosa.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/984972018-06-20T13:10:35Z2018-06-20T13:10:35ZPolice strategy to reduce violent crime in South Africa could work. Here’s how<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223802/original/file-20180619-126543-1fgagsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's police commissioner, Khehla Sitole, and police minister, Bheki Cele, unveil a new plan to combat violent crimes.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bongani Shilubane/African News Agency </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s Police Minister Bheki Cele and National Commissioner Khehla Sitole recently announced a new <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/newsroom/msspeechdetail.php?nid=16018">“high density stabilisation intervention”</a> to tackle crime. The strategy focuses on cash-in-transit heists, car hijackings, murder, house robberies, and gang and taxi violence. </p>
<p>It includes the deployment of desk-based police officials to the streets, particularly in “identified hotspots”, while dedicated detectives track and arrest suspects wanted for both organised and repeat violent crimes. </p>
<p>The strategy comes on the back of a multi-year rise in aggravated robbery, and a recent spike in robberies targeting <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44328938">cash-carrying armoured vans</a>. It has already resulted in <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-06-07-police-arrest-14-cash-in-transit-suspects-in-24-hours/">key arrests</a>, and should thus be celebrated. </p>
<p>But, more than 90% of violent crimes recorded each year fall outside the categories named in the strategy. </p>
<p>To significantly reduce violence and harm in South Africa, the police should expand the strategy in three ways: (1) focus on murder hot spots, (2) tackle domestic violence effectively, and (3) implement targeted and evidence-based interventions.</p>
<h2>Tackling murder</h2>
<p>First, for the police service to improve public safety most effectively, it should focus a significant amount of its resources on reducing murder. Murder is the most reliable crime statistic and the best proxy for violence more broadly. Where murder is common, so is other violence. Murder and associated types of violence <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief106.pdf">affect far more people</a>, and cause far more harm than car hijackings, house robberies or cash-in-transit heists.</p>
<p>A significant amount of murders in South Africa is predictable, so police should be able to reduce it. For example, in 2015/16, <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23194/">78% of murders</a> occurred in just four provinces - KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, Eastern Cape and Western Cape. In the <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/services/crimestats.php">most recent</a> crime statistics, 2% of police stations recorded 20% of all murders in the country, and 13% recorded 50% of murders. </p>
<p>Within these precincts it’s almost certain that violence and murder are clustered in hot spots known to local police. Targeting these could significantly reduce murder and other violence.</p>
<p>Many murders are also committed during predictable time periods, specifically over weekends. In 2017 the SAPS reported that most murders (66%) in the Western Cape province occurred from Friday to Sunday, with 56% occurring between 6pm and 3am. Similarly, in 2016 half of murders nationwide occurred on Saturday and Sunday, with 70% taking place between 6pm and 8am.</p>
<p>Murder and violence are also often linked to alcohol. A <a href="https://www.saferspaces.org.za/resources/entry/annual-crime-report-2015-2016-addendum-to-the-saps-annual-report">2016 analysis</a> of murder dockets found that in up to 48% of murders, the victim or perpetrator was intoxicated.</p>
<p>Based on this information, one can estimate that around a third of all murders in South Africa occur over weekends, in predictable hotspots, in roughly 100 police precincts, in four provinces. If focused police and socio-economic interventions could halve weekend murders in these areas, the national murder count could be reduced by as much as 15% in just a few years and by far more in a decade.</p>
<p>Instead, murder has increased by 22% since 2012. What’s more, by focusing on murder, police will almost certainly reduce other violent crime in the same targeted areas, significantly reducing overall harm.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223600/original/file-20180618-85863-17y58s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223600/original/file-20180618-85863-17y58s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223600/original/file-20180618-85863-17y58s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223600/original/file-20180618-85863-17y58s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223600/original/file-20180618-85863-17y58s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223600/original/file-20180618-85863-17y58s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223600/original/file-20180618-85863-17y58s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Police officials console family members of slain officers at a police National Day of Commemoration ceremony.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>The World Health Organisation and numerous violence experts believe the global <a href="https://www.vrc.crim.cam.ac.uk/VRCconferences/conference/violencereductionreport">murder rate can be halved in 30 years</a> in part by adopting just these kinds of targeted interventions. South African police can and must be part of this, and wherever possible, should do so in parallel with complimentary interventions by other government departments, business and civil society stakeholders.</p>
<h2>Combating domestic violence</h2>
<p>The second adjustment to the strategy should be a focus on domestic violence. Although most violence is perpetrated by men <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-05-10-analysis-how-south-africas-violent-notion-of-masculinity-harms-us-all/#.WygSPKczbIU">against men</a>, addressing violence in the home (and in schools), particularly against women and children, is key to breaking its cycle. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="http://apps.who.int/violence-info/">World Health Organisation</a>, witnessing violence in childhood makes one 3.8 times more likely to be a victim of domestic violence later in life, while living in a high crime neighbourhood makes one 5.6 times more likely of the same.</p>
<p>Policing domestic violence is not easy. It occurs behind walls and closed doors, and often requires vulnerable victims to risk additional abuse by seeking police help. Nor is there <a href="http://whatworks.college.police.uk/toolkit/Pages/Intervention.aspx?InterventionID=27">significant evidence</a> that policing alone effectively reduces domestic violence. </p>
<p>But hundreds if not thousands of people call on the country’s police service for such intervention each month, giving the government important opportunities to signal to the public that violence is not tolerated and victims will be supported. To do so, police must appreciate the <a href="http://apps.who.int/violence-info/">link between</a> domestic violence and societal violence.</p>
<p>Dedicated police officials should promptly investigate domestic violence reports, especially in murder hot spots, and work with social workers to fast-track interventions, mediations and, if necessary, prosecutions. They must also respond rapidly to any breaches in negotiated agreements or court orders by abusers.</p>
<h2>Targeted interventions</h2>
<p>The third adjustment pertains to visible policing. The idea that general “visible policing” will make South Africa safe is appealing but <a href="http://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/what-works-in-policing/research-evidence-review/standard-model-policing-tactics/">not supported</a> by evidence. Rather, policing is most effective <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/USAID-2016-What-Works-in-Reducing-Community-Violence-Final-Report.pdf">when directed</a> at specific places (hotspots), people (gang members, for example), and crimes (cash in transit heists, street robbery, murder). This is true of both police patrols and investigations.</p>
<p>It’s, therefore, promising that the new police strategy focuses on crime hot spots and crime types amenable to police intervention, such as aggravated robbery perpetrated by organised groups. It is important that the police not try to increase visible police in general, or to target general crime equally, everywhere.</p>
<p>Rather, targeted medium and long-term interventions are key. These should be planned and guided by best practice and crime data, and be implemented in a manner that allows rapid adaption and learning based on contextual dynamics. Participating police must work within the rule of law and treat all those they encounter, including suspects, fairly.</p>
<h2>Cause for optimism</h2>
<p>The police’s new strategy is cause for optimism. Its focus on organised and violent crime is rational and necessary but should be fine tuned and expanded. By treating murder and domestic violence as proxies for broader violence, and by deploying resources and focusing efforts to address them using data-guided methods, police could significantly reduce overall violence and harm in South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98497/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Faull's work is supported by the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF). </span></em></p>More than 90% of violent crimes in South Africa fall outside the categories named in the police’s new anti-crime strategy.Andrew Faull, Research Associate at UCT's Centre of Criminology, Institute for Security Studies Consultant, and Independent Researcher/Criminologist, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.