tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/south-sudan-conflict-119974/articlesSouth Sudan conflict – The Conversation2023-04-17T16:52:11Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2039492023-04-17T16:52:11Z2023-04-17T16:52:11ZSudan conflict: Hemedti – the warlord who built a paramilitary force more powerful than the state<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521306/original/file-20230417-14-7dwu6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces commander, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti"
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Dozens have been killed in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/16/sudan-conflict-why-is-there-fighting-and-what-is-at-stake-in-the-region">armed clashes</a> in the Sudanese capital Khartoum following months of tension between the military and the powerful paramilitary group <a href="https://acleddata.com/2019/07/02/the-rapid-support-forces-and-the-escalation-of-violence-in-sudan/">Rapid Support Forces (RSF)</a>. Behind the tensions is a disagreement over the integration of the paramilitary group into the armed forces – a key condition of a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-africa-sudan-khartoum-651a0be9bf731d32df41d493a191418e">transition agreement</a> that’s never been signed but has been adhered to by both sides since 2021. </p>
<p>General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, is the leader of the RSF. He is a key mover in the fast-escalating civil war, as he has been in other key moments in Sudan’s recent history. </p>
<p>Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces is led by Darfurian Arabs known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-tracing-the-history-of-sudans-janjaweed-militia-118926">Janjaweed</a>. The term refers to the armed groups of Arabs from Darfur and Kordofan in western Sudan. Drawn from the far west of the country’s periphery, they have – in a mere decade – become the dominant power in Khartoum. And Hemedti has become the face of Sudan’s violent, political marketplace.</p>
<p>I have been a scholar of Sudan for decades. During 2005-06, I was seconded to the African Union mediation team for Darfur and from 2009-11 served as <a href="https://facultyprofiles.tufts.edu/alex-dewaal">senior adviser </a>to the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, in the lead-up to the independence of South Sudan. My most recent <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/event/sudans-unfinished-democracy-w-justin-lynch-and-alex-de-waal/">book</a>, co-authored with Justin Lynch, examines Sudan’s unfinished democracy.</p>
<p>Hemedti’s career is an object lesson in political entrepreneurship by a specialist in violence. His conduct and (as of now) impunity are the surest indicator that politics of the mercenary kind that have long defined the Sudanese periphery, have been brought home to the capital city. </p>
<h2>Coming in from the periphery</h2>
<p>Hemedti is from Sudan’s furthest peripheries, an outsider to the Khartoum political establishment. His grandfather, Dagalo, was leader of a subclan that roamed across the pastures of Chad and Darfur. Young men from these camel-herding, landless and marginalised group became a core element of the Arab militia that led Khartoum’s counterinsurgency in Darfur from <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Sudan/Conflict-with-South-Sudan">2003</a>. </p>
<p>A school dropout turned trader, Hemedti has no formal education. The title ‘General’ was awarded on account of his proficiency as a commander in the Janjaweed brigade in Southern Darfur at the height of the 2003-05 war. A few years later, he <a href="http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-17-Beyond-Janjaweed.pdf">joined a mutiny</a> against the government, negotiated an alliance with the Darfurian rebels, and threatened to storm the the government-held city of Nyala.</p>
<p>Soon Hemedti <a href="https://www.dailymotion.com/video/xtxd8n">cut a deal</a> with the government. Khartoum would settle his troops’ unpaid salaries and compensation for the wounded and killed. He got promotion to general and a handsome cash payment. </p>
<p>After returning to the Khartoum payroll, Hemedti proved his loyalty. President Omar al-Bashir who <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Omar-Hassan-Ahmad-al-Bashir">ruled</a> Sudan from 1993 to April 2019 when he was deposed became fond of him, sometimes appearing to treat him like the son he had never had. </p>
<p>But, in the days after Bashir was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47852496">overthrown</a>, some of the young democracy protesters camped in the streets around the Ministry of Defence embraced him as the army’s new look.</p>
<h2>A country in his pocket</h2>
<p>Back in the fold, Hemedti ably used his commercial acumen and military prowess to build his militia into a force more powerful than the waning Sudanese state. </p>
<p>Al-Bashir constituted the Rapid Support Forces as a separate unit in 2013, initially to fight the rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North in the Nuba Mountains. The new force came off second best. But, with a fleet of new pickup trucks with heavy machine guns, <a href="https://stillsudan.blogspot.com/2015/05/himeidti-and-his-president-war-as.html">it soon became a force to be reckoned with</a>, fighting a key battle against Darfurian rebels in April 2015.</p>
<p>Following the March 2015 Saudi-Emirati military <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis">intervention</a> in Yemen, Sudan cut a deal with Riyadh to deploy Sudanese troops in Yemen. One of the commanders of the operation was General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan who has chaired the Transitional Military Council since 2019. But <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/saudi-arabias-blood-pact-with-a-genocidal-strongman-houthis-bashir-sudan-yemen-uae/">most of the fighters were Hemedti’s RSF</a>. This brought hard cash direct into Hemedti’s pocket.</p>
<p>And in November 2017, Hemedti’s forces took control of the artisanal gold mines in Jebel Amer in Darfur — Sudan’s single <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/sudan-extractive-industries#:%7E:text=Gold%20is%20Sudan's%20most%20valuable,first%20nine%20months%20of%202021.">largest source of export revenues</a>. This followed the defeat and capture of his arch-rival Musa Hilal, who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics-idUSKBN2B32OC">rebelled</a> against Al-Bashir. </p>
<p>Suddenly, Hemedti had his hands on the country’s two most lucrative sources of hard currency.</p>
<p>Hemedti is adopting a model of state mercenarism familiar to those who follow the politics of the Sahara. The late President Idriss Déby of Chad rented out his special forces for counter-insurgencies on the French or U.S. payroll in much the same manner. One can expect to see RSF troops deployed to Libya some day.</p>
<p>On the other hand, with the routine deployment of paramilitaries to do the actual fighting in Sudan’s wars at home and abroad, the Sudanese army has become akin to a vanity project. It is the proud owner of extravagant real estate in Khartoum, with impressive tanks, artillery and aircraft. But it has few battle-hardened infantry units. Other forces have stepped into this security arena, including the operational units of the National Intelligence and Security Services, and paramilitaries such as special police units — and the RSF. </p>
<h2>Reaping the whirlwind</h2>
<p>But there’s also a twist to the story. Every ruler in Sudan, with one notable exception, has hailed from the the heartlands of Khartoum and the neighboring towns on the Nile. The exception is the Khalifa Abdullahi “al-Ta’aishi” who was a Darfurian Arab. His armies provided the majority of the force that conquered Khartoum in 1885. The riverian elites remember the Khalifa’s rule (1885-98) as a tyranny. They are terrified it may return. </p>
<p>Hemedti is the face of that nightmare, the first non-establishment ruler in Sudan for 120 years. Despite the grievances against Hemedti’s paramilitaries, he is still recognised as a Darfurian and an outsider to the Sudanese establishment.</p>
<p>When the Sudanese regime sowed the wind of the Janjaweed in Darfur in 2003, they least expected to reap the whirlwind in their own capital city. In fact the seeds had been sown much earlier. Previous governments adopted the war strategy in southern Sudan and southern Kordofan of setting local people against one another. This was preferred to sending units of the regular army -— manned by the sons of the riverain establishment — into peril. </p>
<p>Hemedti is that whirlwind. But his ascendancy is also, indirectly, the revenge of the historically marginalised. The tragedy of the Sudanese marginalised is that the man who is posing as their champion is the ruthless leader of a band of vagabonds, who has been supremely skillful in playing the transnational military marketplace.</p>
<p><em>A version of this article was <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2019/07/01/general-mohamed-hamdan-dagolo-hemedti/">first published</a> by the World Peace Foundation.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203949/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex de Waal is affiliated with the World Peace Foundation.</span></em></p>Hemedti ably used his commercial acumen and military prowess to build his militia into a force more powerful than the waning Sudanese state.Alex De Waal, Research Professor and Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1977252023-02-12T08:36:15Z2023-02-12T08:36:15ZSouth Sudan’s oil and water give it bargaining power – but will it benefit the people?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507896/original/file-20230202-9745-760nn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/oil-field-with-rigs-and-pumps-at-sunset-world-oil-royalty-free-image/1427900101?phrase=Anton%20Petrus&adppopup=true">Anton Petrus/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Sudan has long been one of east Africa’s most unstable states. But surging external interest in its resources and the diplomatic agility of its rulers are again underlining how pivotal the country remains to regional energy and water politics. </p>
<p>Much of Africa has spent 2022 facing <a href="https://oecd-development-matters.org/2022/04/28/collateral-damage-the-russia-ukraine-conflict-and-energy-transitions-in-least-developed-countries/">sharp increases in the costs of energy and food</a> driven by the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the <a href="https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/research/currency-volatility-dollar-strength">strengthening of the US dollar</a>. </p>
<p>For states that have the potential to expand energy and food production – like South Sudan – global shortages and price hikes might offer an <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/africa-and-russia-ukraine-conflict-seizing-opportunity-crisis">opportunity</a>. The country is repositioning itself as a destination for capital flows to boost energy and food supply. </p>
<p>The country’s elites see South Sudan’s energy and water potential as leverage instruments in the region, which is likely to result in the exploitation of these resources in ways that might not benefit most citizens</p>
<p>The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, which has governed since 2011, aims to reconnect with the high hopes that accompanied the country’s independence but that disappeared when civil war erupted in 2013. A <a href="https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/arcss-2015/agreement-summary/130-summary-of-the-revitalized-agreement-on-the-resolution-of-the-conflict-in-the-republic-of-south-sudan-r-arcss-12-september-2018/file">peace deal</a> signed in 2018 is still holding, despite challenges such as its <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129702">slow implementation</a> and <a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-violence-in-upper-nile-and-jonglei-states-south-sudan/">continued fighting in the Upper Nile and Jonglei regions</a>. </p>
<p>Relative national stability and global economic tailwinds have fanned speculation about renewed investment. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/savannah-energy-follows-chad-deal-with-south-sudan-acquisition-2022-12-12/">British firm Savannah Energy’s decision</a> in December 2022 to buy oil fields from Malaysia’s Petronas is the latest example of surging interest in South Sudan’s resources. </p>
<p>Likewise, investors are eagerly awaiting the 2023 <a href="https://energycapitalpower.com/the-energy-minute-south-sudan-oil-power-2023/">South Sudan oil and power conference</a> to see what sort of incentives are on offer. South Sudan has been using the platform to promote investments that help stabilise the national budget. Oil accounts for up to 90% of government revenues. </p>
<p>New investment could affirm South Sudan’s status as east Africa’s largest oil producer. The country is a member of OPEC+, a grouping of oil exporting countries. It currently <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/305-oil-or-nothing-dealing-south-sudans-bleeding-finances">pumps an estimated 150,000 to 170,000 barrels a day</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://sudantribune.com/article267465/">Regular squabbles with Khartoum</a> over diversions of South Sudanese oil and transit fees still occur. But Juba adroitly manages relations with its northern neighbour. It depends on Sudan for transporting its crude to global markets. <a href="https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/feature/the-promise-of-oil-and-gas-in-south-sudan-81521">Petrodollars are forecast to accelerate GDP growth</a> to more than 6% in 2023.</p>
<p>Beyond oil, the country also has huge scope for increased production of food and <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/sr418-south-sudans-renewable-energy-potential-a-building-block-for-peace.pdf">renewable energy</a> like solar, wind and hydro. It has considerable potential to use the Nile for irrigation and electricity production. </p>
<p>Such projects could, <a href="https://www.academia.edu/840831/Black_Gold_for_Blue_Gold_Sudans_Oil_Ethiopias_Water_and_Regional_Integration">under specific conditions</a>, help remedy deepening regional water and electricity shortages. But plans for reviving canal dredging or dams can also <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/resistance-from-communities-on-dredging-jonglei-3985552">stoke tensions</a> in a region that already has plenty of them.</p>
<h2>Regional diplomacy</h2>
<p>Despite their preoccupation with internal conflicts, South Sudanese elites are far from passive regional actors. They have long considered the country’s resource potential an invaluable diplomatic instrument. </p>
<p>East Africa is at a critical moment. In addition to global pressures on food and energy prices, there are also intractable regional disputes. The most complex dossier remains that of Nile politics, with Ethiopia completing the <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/08/third-filling-nile-dam-heightens-ethiopia-egypt-crisis">third filling</a> of the <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/150/4/159/107371/The-Grand-Ethiopian-Renaissance-Dam-Africa-s-Water">Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam</a> last August. </p>
<p>Egypt and Sudan oppose what they see as the Ethiopian government’s unilateral construction and filling of the dam with Nile water. But the dam’s location makes it cheaper to export power to South Sudan than it is to transport it over the Ethiopian highlands to Addis Ababa. In this context, South Sudan’s diplomatic commitments around energy and water are much sought after.</p>
<p>This gives Juba leverage. The country has been exploiting regional rivalries and fluctuations in global commodity prices. We’ve argued in a <a href="https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/energy-and-water-sovereignty-south-sudan-s-regional-diplomacy-and-geopolitics-nile-basin/">recent paper</a> that the government’s energy diplomacy has allowed the ruling party to tighten its grip on power. It has also bolstered South Sudan’s ability to shape regional developments. </p>
<p>For instance, since independence President Salva Kiir has endorsed the Ethiopian dam and signalled his desire to import electricity from Ethiopia. His cabinet has repeatedly indicated its intention to ratify the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02508060.2013.744273">Cooperation Framework Agreement</a>, which Ethiopian officials see as key to the equitable and stable management of the Nile Basin. </p>
<p>But South Sudan has, at the same time, deepened relations with Ethiopia’s great rival, Egypt. Juba has solidified security ties with Cairo and solicited its assistance for infrastructure projects on the Nile and its tributaries. Such balancing is crucial to Kiir’s ability to extract support from Ethiopia, Egypt and other regional players. But his unwillingness to make hard, durable commitments leaves these powerful neighbours of South Sudan often deeply frustrated. </p>
<h2>Ignoring developmental needs</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, diplomatic agility does little to benefit the people over whom the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement governs. For all South Sudan’s trumpeted potential in water, energy and food, more than 50% of the population <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155997/?iso3=SSD">is facing acute food insecurity</a> and barely <a href="https://www.iea.org/countries/south-sudan">1% has access to electricity</a>. A <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-needs-overview-2022-february-2022">2022 assessment</a> estimates that only 39% of the population has enough water to meet household needs. </p>
<p>Recent initiatives announced by government officials might well make existing problems worse. Resuming construction of the Jonglei canal <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/egypt-secret-nile-deal-divides-juba-3863834">is widely considered detrimental</a> to regional ecosystems, and to local livelihoods already battered by conflict and climate-related uncertainties. Similarly, a project in which <a href="https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/3/105395/Egypt-signs-protocol-for-construction-of-Wau-Dam-in-South">Egypt is to build a dam</a> on a branch of the Jur river has been met with scepticism over how it could contribute to South Sudanese water or food security. </p>
<p>South Sudan is receiving <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/11/21/pr22403-imf-pr-south-sudan-imf-reaches-sla-3rd-rev-smp-rcf-food-shock-window-prgrm-monitor-brd-inv">International Monetary Fund emergency financing</a> to restore some fiscal discipline while it deals with food price shocks. But the notion that such programmes constrain the government and encourage it to prioritise food (or energy) insecurity seems fanciful. </p>
<p>The track record since independence in 2011 is bleak: cereal production in 2021 was barely higher than in 2012, and the same proportion of the population was <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.H2O.BASW.ZS?locations=SS">excluded from access to basic drinking water services</a> as a decade ago (59%). South Sudan remains, by most estimates, the least electrified country on the planet. </p>
<p>Indeed, despite all the buzz about hydro-infrastructure or new oil investments, it is improbable that millions of citizens will get even part of their needs met. If the past is any guide, speculation about foreign investments will likely give the country’s elites the power to once again ignore the population.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197725/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Sudan’s diplomatic support around energy and water is much sought after in Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan.Harry Verhoeven, Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia UniversityFrancois Sennesael, DPhil Candidate, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1907702022-09-26T13:28:10Z2022-09-26T13:28:10ZSouth Sudan should disarm civilians – the evidence shows this improves security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486104/original/file-20220922-33275-qbtdiv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Armed United Nations mission guards secure Malakal airport in in Unity State, South-Sudan, amid conflict between government and rebel troops.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A long-running state of insecurity has recently <a href="https://www.eyeradio.org/council-of-states-violated-the-law-dr-raimondo-says/">intensified</a> in Unity State – one of South Sudan’s 10 states – resulting in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-report-says-173-civilians-killed-four-months-southern-unity-state-amid-continued-fighting">many innocent lives being lost</a>.</p>
<p>The security crisis is being stoked by many factors. One is fighting between sections of the civilian population, caused by <a href="https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2022/02/south-sudan-clashes-leave-at-least-12-people-dead-in-leer-county-unity-state-feb-16-17">cattle raiding</a>, among other things. Another is armed confrontation between government forces and insurgents like the <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/audio-gen-buay-speaks-to-radio-tamazuj-after-mayom-incident">South Sudan People’s Movement/Army</a>. This is a group of disgruntled soldiers who were recently discharged from the military and are agitating for new government roles. </p>
<p>Broadly, the crisis speaks volumes of the fragility of South Sudan as a state. It is the consequence of weak political institutions in the country, not just Unity State. It is my view that the national government of South Sudan and Unity State government should work together to address the crisis in an effective way. </p>
<p>Such a way may involve disarming young people, which has worked elsewhere in the country, for example in the Lakes State. It is the use of arms by civilians to fight each other that has made the situation much worse.</p>
<h2>The role of states</h2>
<p>The roles of states as regional institutions are relevant in the scheme of things. South Sudan is made up of 10 states and three administrative territories. States were created under the country’s <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2011.pdf">transitional constitution in 2011</a>. </p>
<p>Of the three administrative territories, two – Pibor an Ruweng – were created by the national executive government. The third – Abyei, in the north of the country – was created under the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_060000_The%20Comprehensive%20Peace%20Agreement.pdf">2005 comprehensive peace agreement</a> as a disputed territory between South Sudan and Sudan. Abyei’s status remains unresolved.</p>
<p>Each state has a legislative assembly (one chamber of parliament). Its members are drawn from the government and opposition parties as parties to the <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">2018 revitalised peace agreement</a>. This agreement has been incorporated into the transitional constitution.</p>
<p>The responsibilities and functions of state governments include maintaining peace and good order, protecting and promoting human rights and freedoms, and undertaking their own economic and infrastructure development.</p>
<p>States have not been able to achieve these essential goals due to lack of resources. Aside from generating their own revenue, states are supposed to receive a share from the petroleum money – public money – under the <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/vl/item/transitional-constitution-republic-south-sudan-2011">transitional constitution</a>. The constitution is, however, silent on how much money each state should receive. That leaves the national government to decide.</p>
<p>The petroleum producing areas – Upper Nile and Ruweng – are allocated 2% of the net petroleum revenue. But reports suggest they <a href="https://suddinstitute.org/assets/Publications/5b0f78d6b0536_ThePetroleumRevenueSharingArrangementInSouthSudan_Full.pdf">do not receive the amount</a> due to them annually.</p>
<h2>Security problems</h2>
<p>States have been hampered by security problems since at least independence in 2011. Reports have identified <a href="https://acleddata.com/2021/08/19/surface-tension-communal-violence-and-elite-ambitions-in-south-sudan/">communal conflicts </a>as the main cause. These stem from longstanding land disputes and cattle raids. </p>
<p>A proliferation of arms has made the conflicts worse. <a href="https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1179-communities-tackling-small-arms-and-light-weapons-in-south-sudan-lessons-learnt-and-best-practices-">It is estimated </a>that every young person in the villages has a gun. </p>
<p>The Unity State governor has <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/unity-state-governor-blames-arms-proliferation-for-violence-calls-for-disarmament">acknowledged this problem</a>, and urged the national government to lend him support to disarm young people. </p>
<p>These conflicts have deepened divisions in the country, weakening the government’s effort to implement peace. </p>
<h2>State power under the transitional constitution</h2>
<p>Key to understanding the security crisis is perhaps the division of state power under the country’s transitional constitution. </p>
<p>The transitional constitution outlines the powers and functions of government institutions in South Sudan. In particular, it provides for the powers and functions of the two chambers of the national legislature – the national legislative assembly and the council of states. </p>
<p>The national legislature has the overall power to enact laws and to supervise the national executive government. The second chamber – the council of states – has 100 members representing the states.</p>
<p>The council’s role has come under scrutiny recently. This came after its decision to <a href="https://paanluelwel.com/2022/08/26/president-kiir-rejects-the-impeachment-of-governor-joseph-monytuil-by-council-of-state/">impeach</a> the governor of Unity State, Nguen Monytuil, for the crisis.</p>
<p>But President Kiir Mayardit has <a href="https://paanluelwel.com/2022/08/26/president-kiir-rejects-the-impeachment-of-governor-joseph-monytuil-by-council-of-state/">overruled</a> the council’s decision, saying it was unconstitutional. The president has the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2011.pdf">power to sack a state governor</a> if a crisis has occurred in the governor’s state that threatens South Sudan’s territorial integrity.</p>
<p>While the president acted appropriately in this matter, the national government is not doing enough to help Unity State resolve the security crisis. Like the rest of the states, Unity State has limited capacity and resources to deal with matters of security decisively. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>There are obvious measures the government could take. One is total disarmament of young people throughout the country. To make this more effective, parliament should enact a law to make possession of arms by civilians a criminal offence that carries serious penalties.</p>
<p>This approach has been applied in some states in South Sudan, such as Lakes State. And it is working. Lakes State used to be the most violence-stricken place in the country. But its security has improved significantly since its governor, Rin Tueny, started disarmament in 2021.</p>
<p>The same approach is being trialled in Warrap State, another violence-hit territory. It is still too early to tell whether it is working.</p>
<p>Lastly, the power arrangement in the country as set out in the transitional constitution needs to be revised. It’s this arrangement that is partly to blame for the power overreach by the council of states. In one sense, it gives the council a supervisory role over states. This is justifiably what encouraged the council to interfere in the affairs of Unity State government. </p>
<p>This problem will need to be fixed in a new constitution to be drafted for the country. That constitution must be founded on a balance of power between the national and state governments with a focus on allowing state governments to operate independently, politically. </p>
<p>This is arguably the most effective way to constrain the national government from interfering in the political affairs of states.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190770/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Deng does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A way forward is for the national government of South Sudan and Unity State government to work together to address the crisis.Mark Deng, Postdoctoral Research Fellow and Sessional Law Lecturer, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1865852022-07-08T12:14:03Z2022-07-08T12:14:03ZThree reasons for hope that South Sudan can find peace after 11 years of strife<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473181/original/file-20220708-18-rjavr2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Sudan has struggled to find stability since independence</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Alpeyrie/ullstein bild via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Sudan’s nation building never really started. Two years into its hard-won independence, a civil war broke out in <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/south-sudans-december-2013-conflict/">December 2013</a>. This robbed the country of an opportunity to lay down its foundations.</p>
<p>The country’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/04/01/sudan-election-2015/">first elections</a> were scheduled to be held in 2015 but the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan">war</a> prevented this. A peace deal was struck in 2015, but it collapsed in 2016. So, no elections have been held since independence. </p>
<p>A roadmap for peace and national reconciliation was <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/01/04/comprehensive-peace-agreement-pub-42223">signed</a> in 2018 between the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/kiir-and-machar-insights-into-south-sudans-strongmen-182522">warring protagonists</a>. This raised hopes that South Sudan would achieve peace and stability and hold its first democratic elections. But implementing the agreement has been painfully slow. Since 2018, little has been achieved on critical aspects and it may have to be extended. </p>
<p>Had the timelines provided under the agreement been met, the following would have been achieved by now: </p>
<ul>
<li>adoption of a new constitution </li>
<li>registration of political parties<br></li>
<li>reform of security and legal institutions, including establishing a Constitutional Court </li>
<li>establishment of transitional justice mechanisms<br></li>
<li>unification of armed forces. </li>
</ul>
<p>Despite South Sudan’s chequered history of peacemaking, there’s still room for hope. I <a href="https://suddinstitute.org/publications/show/62381348c74ef">studied</a> the country’s search for a new constitution and found that legislative and institutional reforms can strengthen constitutionalism, rule of law and human rights in South Sudan. </p>
<h2>Local peace initiatives</h2>
<p>There are three reasons to hope that South Sudan will find peace, creating the breathing space the country needs to build a nation and grow its economy.</p>
<p>The first has to do with emerging local peace initiatives in which communities convene to resolve disputes. In addition to these is the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-national-dialogue-initiative-in-south-sudan/">national dialogue initiative</a> where communities freely talk to each other and propose solutions to their problems. Both these local initiatives are driven by respected local leaders, faith-based organisations and civil society with little or no role for political elites. </p>
<p><a href="https://riftvalley.net/news/what-happened-wunlit-reliving-south-sudans-most-successful-peace-conference">Evidence abounds</a> that grassroots initiatives like these are the foundation of lasting peace and security. In South Sudan, such grassroots reconciliation initiatives are known as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/13.htm">“Wunlit people-to-people”</a> – named for the famous location of a peace deal between Nuer and Dinka people in 1991. They are usually led by traditional leaders, sometimes with faith-based organisations. </p>
<p>Their success stands in contrast to the elite-led peace conferences which have failed to end violence in Tonj, the Twic–Abyei communal violence and elsewhere in Jonglei State. Violence in the Tonj, Twic and Abyei areas is between communities of the Jieeng (Dinka) ethnic group who have no history of fighting each other. The Jonglei violence is between Jieeng and Murle ethnic groups who have an intractable history of violence between them. </p>
<p>Local peacebuilding processes and institutions which are championed by local community structures and non-partisan organisations represent hope for South Sudan to heal and reconcile its divided communities and to build back better and from the bottom up. It is to their credit that they have continued to work despite insurmountable challenges of insecurity and breakdown of the rule of law.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kiir-and-machar-insights-into-south-sudans-strongmen-182522">Kiir and Machar: insights into South Sudan's strongmen</a>
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<h2>Reforms to build on</h2>
<p>My second reason for hope is that there have been some gains in the <a href="https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/reports/r-arcss-evaluation-reports/209-progress-report-by-h-e-maj-gen-charles-tai-gituai-rtd-interim-chairperson-of-rjmec-on-two-years-of-the-transitional-period-of-the-r-arcss-covering-the-period-22-february-2020-22-june-2022/file">institutional and legislative reforms</a> being undertaken in terms of the sluggish <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">peace agreement</a>. The country can build on these. </p>
<p>These gains include the fact that the national unity government has managed to review relevant national security laws. Others are:</p>
<ul>
<li>incorporation of the peace agreement into the constitution </li>
<li>reconstitution of the transitional national legislature<br></li>
<li>drafting of the constitution-making process bill </li>
<li>reunification of the security command structure </li>
<li>adoption of a public financial reform strategy.</li>
</ul>
<p>These reforms represent progress. South Sudan and its partners should build upon them to accelerate democratic consolidation and build durable peace. For instance, the reconstitution of the national legislature (Transitional National Legislative Assembly and the Council of States) is an important milestone in establishing oversight public institutions. </p>
<p>The legislature has thus far passed critical laws such as the Political Parties Act and other laws. It will soon pass the Constitution-Making Process Bill to pave the way for the establishment of institutions of constitution-making in South Sudan.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-stands-in-the-way-of-a-new-south-sudan-post-conflict-constitution-171145">What stands in the way of a new South Sudan post-conflict constitution</a>
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<h2>National dialogue</h2>
<p>The third source of hope for South Sudan relates to the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-national-dialogue-initiative-in-south-sudan/">National Dialogue Initiative</a> forums to document citizens’ aspirations. These were launched by President Salva Kiir Mayardit in recognition of the inadequacies of the peace agreement the government signed with belligerents. While the citizens’ recommendations are yet to be implemented, the mechanism remains a model for keeping the country together through dialogue and engagement. </p>
<p>Furthermore, the national dialogue defines the country’s prioritises for nation building. These include fixing security, peacebuilding, economy and governance issues. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudans-constitution-making-process-is-on-shaky-ground-how-to-firm-it-up-177107">South Sudan's constitution-making process is on shaky ground: how to firm it up</a>
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<h2>Light at the end of the tunnel</h2>
<p>South Sudanese and the international community are losing hope due to endless conflicts, humanitarian crises and governance challenges. There is, however, light at the end of the tunnel. This calls for scaling up citizen dialogue and involvement, local peace-building processes and relentlessly pursuing necessary reforms.</p>
<p>It also calls for building on the gains already made and embracing a multiplicity of ideas that work – even those outside the peace agreement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186585/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr J Geng Akech does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Local institutions and systems of governance and peace-building are working despite insurmountable challenges.Dr J Geng Akech, Adjunct Assistant Professor, University of JubaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1825222022-05-10T13:55:38Z2022-05-10T13:55:38ZKiir and Machar: insights into South Sudan’s strongmen<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461556/original/file-20220505-19-ego7xx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Sudan's President Salva Kiir (right) and his deputy Riek Machar shake hands in Addis Ababa to signify a peace deal in September, 2018.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Salva Kiir and Riek Machar loom large over South Sudan’s recent history. And they will keep holding the future of the young nation in their hands to a large extent.</p>
<p>So who are they? And what are the roots of their rivalry?</p>
<p>Kiir is the 70-year-old president of South Sudan, a nation of 11 million. Machar, a year younger, is his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/18/south-sudan-opposition-leader-riek-machar-drc-democratic-republic-congo">on-and-off vice-president</a>. The two men have been pivotal figures in negotiating and agreeing, disagreeing and breaking peace agreements over most of South Sudan’s first decade as an independent nation. </p>
<p>Their attitudes, behaviour and actions have shaped the country’s unwieldy road towards and away from democracy, peace and development, and national unity. To understand South Sudan’s contemporary and future political development, security and national unity, it’s important to take a closer look at these two towering political leaders.</p>
<h2>From rebel fighters to political kingpins</h2>
<p>Both Kiir and and Machar spent their formative years in the first and second South Sudanese civil war between South Sudanese rebel movements and the Sudanese armed forces and pro-government militias. These wars were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23017651?seq=1">fought between 1955 and 1972</a>, and <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/sudan-2nd-civil-war-darfur/">1983 and 2005</a>.</p>
<p>Kiir belongs to the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/s-c-acaps_country_profile_southsudan_august2015.pdf">Dinka</a>, the largest ethnic group in South Sudan. He was an officer and second in charge in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the main rebel movement and army in South Sudan. He led several successful military offensives against the Sudanese government, for instance capturing large parts of Western Equatoria from Sudanese control. </p>
<p>His military leadership made him popular within the military wings of the movement and he held a strong vision of an independent South Sudan. His vision, however, was in stark contrast to the late John Garang de Mabior, the charismatic SPLM leader who <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article23287/">envisioned a united Sudan</a> where South Sudanese had equal political and economic rights along North Sudanese. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8306.doc.htm">peace agreement</a> between the government of Sudan and the SPLM was eventually signed in 2005, paving the way to South Sudan’s independence. Garang became Vice-President of Sudan and president of the transitional government of South Sudan. </p>
<p>Tragically, Garang <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/8/1/sudans-garang-dies-in-copter-crash">died in a helicopter crash due to a pilot error</a> in 2005. Kiir took over the SPLM leadership as well as Garang’s position as Vice-President of Sudan, and became the president of South Sudan. After a landslide referendum in 2011, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449057.2011.593364?scroll=top&needAccess=true">South Sudanese were granted independence</a>.</p>
<p>Kiir is generally known for his calm, mild tempered, and rather emotionless public appearances. But even during his years as subordinate to Garang he had a thirst for formal authority and power which he has expanded with stamina within the SPLM and South Sudanese state institutions over the past decades.</p>
<p>Machar belongs to the second-largest ethnic group in South Sudan, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/s-c-acaps_country_profile_southsudan_august2015.pdf">Nuer</a>. He was a regional commander under Garang’s leadership in the SPLM during the 1980s. Like Kiir, he disagreed with Garang’s objectives, preferring an independent South Sudan. He also complained about <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/08/south-sudan-child-soldiers-riek-machar/">Garang’s authoritarian leadership</a>. After the 2005 peace agreement and Garang’s death, Machar became the Vice-President of South Sudan. </p>
<h2>The genesis of violent rivalry</h2>
<p>Frustrated with and opposed to Garang’s leadership of the South Sudanese resistance, Machar and members of other tribes formed an opposition rebel movement to the main rebel group SPLM in 1991. This they called the SPLM-Nasir faction. </p>
<p>Machar and his Nasir faction fought for South Sudanese independence. But at the same time they received financial and military support from the military government in Khartoum, the main opposition of the SPLM. Relying on a <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847011510/the-root-causes-of-sudans-civil-wars/">divide-and-conquer strategy</a>, Khartoum used Machar and his troops to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/16/south-sudan-ethnic-targeting-widespread-killings">turn against the SPLM rebels</a> including Garang and Kiir. </p>
<p>During one known <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/4/23/south-sudans-massacre-among-many">massacre</a> in the town of Bor, Nasir troops killed thousands of civilians belonging to the ethnic Dinka, Kiir’s tribe. The result were reprisal attacks. Divisions within South Sudan became not only increasingly violent but were also increasingly ethnic in character. </p>
<p>The legacy of this ethnic violence remains largely unresolved and unaddressed. It continues to be a source of latent distrust and suspicion that’s exploited by political rhetoric and manipulation.</p>
<p>Since 2013 South Sudan has been embroiled in a civil war that is essentially a conflict between Kiir’s Dinka-dominated troops and Machar’s Nuer-dominated troops. Both Kiir and Machar are concerned about their own political future, their own security and that of their families and allies and ethnic kin. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://unmiss.unmissions.org/">United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)</a> has the mandate to support the implementation of several peace agreements as well as to protect civilians. It has a large presence: more than 14,000 military personnel, 1,500 police and at least 2,000 civilian staff. Nevertheless, it has often been <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/12/impact-un-mission-south-sudan-complicated-by-dilemmas-of-protection/">perceived</a> as doing too little too late to protect civilians. </p>
<h2>The Dinka and the Nuer</h2>
<p>Ideologically, Kiir and Machar do not seem to be that far apart. They have both always seen South Sudan’s future as that of an independent nation. The difficulty lies in agreeing on how to organise, distribute and cooperate within a nation that consists of dozens of ethnic groups and sub-tribes, different livelihoods, and cultural links across neighbouring countries. </p>
<p>It is clear, although they would never admit it, that the two men see themselves and their ethnic communities as the main heirs of the nation, and that they each hold a legitimate claim to leadership. These claims are nurtured through the relative population share of both groups and their role in the war with Sudan, largely due to their settlement areas along the South Sudan-Sudan border.</p>
<p>The Dinka are the largest ethnic group in South Sudan, representing around 35% of the population. The Nuer are the second largest with around 16%. Other groups represent much <a href="https://reliefweb.int/map/sudan/distribution-ethnic-groups-southern-sudan-24-dec-2009">smaller shares</a>.</p>
<h2>What legacy?</h2>
<p>In recent years, foreign aid has been cut back to humanitarian assistance, foreign investment has stalled due to insecurity, prices for everyday goods have skyrocketed due to reduced agricultural activities and increased import reliance. </p>
<p>These are just some of the things that make life for ordinary citizens in South Sudan harder than it already has been for most of their lives. At the end of the day, the question for Kiir and Machar is what legacy both want to be remembered for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182522/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlo Koos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kiir and Machar have been pivotal figures in most of South Sudan’s short history as an independent nation.Carlo Koos, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of BergenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1815472022-04-26T13:01:20Z2022-04-26T13:01:20ZPeace in South Sudan hinges on forging a unified military force: but it’s proving hard<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458879/original/file-20220420-13-o6fq13.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Sudanese president Salva Kiir (right) and first vice president Riek Machar.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Alex McBride/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Implementation of the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/reviving-peace-in-south-sudan-through-the-revitalised-peace-agreement/">2018 peace agreement</a> in South Sudan lags significantly behind its mandated schedule. One of the reasons for this slow progress is establishing a unified military command structure. This was to be done within the first eight months of signing the pact.</p>
<p>The 2018 peace deal was established to bring an end to South Sudan’s five-year civil war. Under it, a unity government was created by President Salva Kiir and his former deputy Riek Machar. A fallout between the two leaders in <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2013/0724/Why-did-South-Sudan-s-president-dissolve-his-government">2013</a> sparked the country’s descent into <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/23/south-sudan-state-that-fell-apart-in-a-week">war</a>. Under the terms of the agreement, Machar was sworn in as first vice president. </p>
<p>The peace deal’s transitional period started with the establishment of the unity government and was to last 36 months. The <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/south-sudan-ends-6-year-war-with-formation-of-coalition-government/a-52481823">government</a> was formed in February 2020 after the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) – aligned to Machar – and other opposition groups joined it. </p>
<p>The peace agreement also mandated a unified command of the country’s armed forces. Kiir and Machar <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-sudan-president-integrates-rivals-officers-into-army-2022-04-12/">recently</a> agreed to a 60-40 split of leadership positions – in favour of the president – in national security institutions. </p>
<p>But this unifying process has been slow and not without its difficulties. Examples from countries like <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13287216">Cote d'Ivoire</a> show that it can be a fraught process that, if not handled well, can undo efforts at consolidating a comprehensive peace agreement like the one signed in South Sudan.</p>
<h2>Rocky road</h2>
<p>Recent events put a nervous tremor through South Sudan’s peace efforts.</p>
<p>On March 23, 2022, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition decided to <a href="https://www.eyeradio.org/r-jmec-worried-over-splm-io-withdrawal-from-security-mechanisms/">withdraw</a> from the security mechanisms set up as part of the 2018 peace deal. </p>
<p>The decision raised fears that efforts towards a unified security forces could be derailed. To avoid large-scale violence, the international and donor community <a href="https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/media-center/news/item/617-aumiss-unmiss-igad-and-rjmec-issue-joint-press-statement-on-security-and-political-situation-in-south-sudan">immediately</a> responded, <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/us-uk-norway-condemn-ssudan-govt-for-attacks-on-opposition">condemning the attacks</a> and calling the movement to <a href="https://www.sudanspost.com/splm-io-urged-to-rejoin-security-mechanisms/">rejoin</a> the security mechanisms.</p>
<p>This they did within a couple of weeks. </p>
<p>With the reinstating of security mechanisms and the resumed talks between Kiir and Machar, South Sudan seems to be back on track to implementing the 2018 peace agreement. </p>
<p>However, this mending may not guarantee a smooth pathway for peace and stability, as the process is moving ahead very slowly, with some viewing the three-and-a-half-years since the deal was signed as a <a href="https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/media-center/news/item/604-with-two-years-of-transitional-period-gone-much-in-the-r-arcss-remain-to-be-done">stalemate</a>.</p>
<p>The process, which is only now getting under way, is expected to be completed within the transition phase, which ends in February 2023. </p>
<p>Yet, many hurdles remain. </p>
<p>For instance, about 78,500 <a href="https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/reports/r-arcss-evaluation-reports/202-progress-report-by-he-maj-gen-charles-tai-gituai-rtd-cbs-interim-chairperson-of-rjmec-on-two-years-of-the-transitional-period-of-the-r-arcss-covering-the-period-22nd-february-2020-to-22nd-february-2022/file">registered combatants</a> of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition are still in military camps and training sites that lack food, medicine, shelter and equipment. </p>
<p>This has had both military and political ramifications for the movement, and has weakened Machar politically. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-root-causes-of-ongoing-conflict-remain-untouched-133542">South Sudan: root causes of ongoing conflict remain untouched</a>
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<p>Militarily, more commanders of the opposition movement have joined the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces. Politically, the movement was split into two with the creation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition <a href="https://smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/HSBA-MAAPSS-Update7-September2021-SPLA-IO-Split.pdf">[Kitgwang]</a>. This has resulted in continued fighting between the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/clashes-kill-least-30-south-sudanese-soldiers-says-vp-spokesman-2021-08-07/">two groups</a>. </p>
<h2>Unifying armed forces</h2>
<p>It is important to be cautious of the lofty timeline given for unifying the country’s command structure. Creating unified armed forces took four years in <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/interim-constitution-accord">South Africa</a>, over five years in <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/general-peace-agreement-for-mozambique">Mozambique</a> and seven in <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/lome-peace-agreement">Sierra Leone</a>.</p>
<p>The creation of a professional armed force can continue after first-accord elections, as was observed in South Africa, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. However, armed forces that are not fully professionalised can easily interfere with the electoral process. </p>
<p>In Cote d'Ivoire, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11913832">elections</a> in 2010 took place in parallel with the military reform process. When the election outcome became disputed, the country returned to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/31/ivory-coast-brink-civil-war">full-scale violence</a>, with forces loyal to the various presidential candidates taking sides. </p>
<p>The current situation in South Sudan is very similar to the situation in the Cote d'Ivoire in terms of establishing professional armed forces.</p>
<h2>The place of trust</h2>
<p>Machar is militarily weak and politically marginalised. This could be seen as a good thing for Kiir and the ethnic group he represents, the Dinka. But it will not necessarily lead to peace and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25427965">stability</a>. </p>
<p>The implementation of the 2018 peace agreement has gone through uncertainties. Nevertheless, Kiir and Machar have managed to save the process by recommitting to <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/04/03/South-Sudan-rivals-sign-pact-on-key-military-provision-of-peace-accord-">its implementation</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, they have a very short window of time to implement critical provisions in the agreement and rebuild trust to solidify the success of this process.</p>
<p>One of the barriers to a successful peace process is the lack of trust that the signatories have in each other and their mutual commitment to implementing an agreement. Yet, trust-building is not instantaneous. It is done by enacting a series of reforms that respond to the needs of the respective constituencies the leaders represent. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/building-trust-must-take-precedence-in-south-sudan-peace-process-127849">Building trust must take precedence in South Sudan peace process</a>
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<p>Due to the back-and-forth nature of these reforms, implementing peace is often not popular with the group that traditionally tends to benefit from the status quo. However, the trust built through this process contributes to stable peace, as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/implementing-the-peace-the-aggregate-implementation-of-comprehensive-peace-agreements-and-peace-duration-after-intrastate-armed-conflict/E5CCABC853015434FDAEACA40266C393">my research</a> has shown. </p>
<p>This stability, however, can be threatened by <a href="https://stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.774/">stalled implementation processes</a>, which generate mistrust and beget violence. </p>
<p>South Sudan’s peace and stability depends on Kiir and Machar stopping the politics of brinkmanship. They <a href="https://iwpr.net/global-voices/can-kiir-cut-it-president-new-state">worked together</a> for an independent country for the South Sudanese in 2011. It is time for these two leaders to show that they can also work together for peace and the functioning state that all South Sudanese deserve.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181547/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Madhav Joshi receives funding from the USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) to conduct an impact evaluation of
the multi-year emergency program in South Sudan. The grant is not related to this article.</span></em></p>South Sudan wants to create a professional army from rival forces in under 12 months. It’s a lofty timeline that faces many challenges.Madhav Joshi, Research Professor & Associate Director, Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.