tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/sudan-3007/articlesSudan – The Conversation2024-03-05T12:12:14Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244092024-03-05T12:12:14Z2024-03-05T12:12:14ZCrisis in Abyei: South Sudan must act and stop violence between Dinka groups<p>Abyei – a territory roughly the size of Jamaica – is being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/oct/26/oil-rich-and-extremely-poor-inside-the-forgotten-abyei-box-a-photo-essay">contested</a> by two countries, Sudan and South Sudan. Abyei, which covers just over 10,000km², is under <a href="https://unmis.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/UNMIS/Fact%20Sheets/FS-abyeiprotocol.pdf#page=1">special administrative status</a> following the terms of a 2005 peace agreement between the two countries.</p>
<p>The disagreement has led to increasingly violent inter-communal tensions. Although the roots of these stretch back decades, they present a complex challenge, particularly in a context where the state lacks the capacity to enforce the rule of law impartially. But, in my view, the South Sudanese national government has the tools to help alleviate these tensions in the near term.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://pureportal.coventry.ac.uk/en/persons/jan-pospisil/publications/">researched</a> the political and security situation in Sudan and South Sudan for more than two decades and, as representatives from all sides confirm, the heart of the current conflict lies in overlapping territorial claims. </p>
<h2>Important region</h2>
<p>Abyei is both geographically and culturally significant.</p>
<p>It’s strategically positioned in a resource-rich and fertile area between Sudan and South Sudan that is also important for its transport links. Abyei is a bustling regional trading hub. Although there is only one producing oilfield in Abyei and <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2010/1102/Oil-rich-Abyei-Time-to-update-the-shorthand-for-Sudan-s-flashpoint-border-town">production is declining</a>, the region is thought to have vast untapped resources. </p>
<p>Abyei is deeply embedded in the history of the Ngok Dinka community, who are among the northernmost Dinka populations. The Dinka represent the predominant ethnolinguistic group in South Sudan, a country that emerged as the world’s newest nation in 2011. </p>
<p>Abyei’s ownership is also contested by the Arabic Misseriya from the north, indigenous to the current Sudanese territory.</p>
<p>These contestations have resulted in the region being plagued by <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/clashes-in-disputed-african-region-of-abyei/7460780.html">recurrent conflicts</a>, marking a history of turmoil in Abyei dating back more than a century. </p>
<h2>Efforts at resolution</h2>
<p>In an effort to resolve the dispute over <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_040526_Protocol%20between%20GoS%20and%20SPLM%20on%20the%20Resolution%20of%20Abyei%20Conflict.pdf">Abyei’s sovereignty</a>, negotiations held between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement that began in 2002 proposed a referendum to decide if Abyei should become part of Sudan or South Sudan. Such a referendum would have been held in parallel with the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12317927">South Sudanese independence referendum in 2011</a>. </p>
<p>The referendum on Abyei, however, has yet to happen. This is largely due to <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-referendum-in-abyei-is-an-ongoing-challenge-for-the-african-union">disagreements</a> over voter eligibility. The nomadic lifestyle of the Misseriya groups has also complicated matters.</p>
<p>To address recurrent tensions, the <a href="https://unisfa.unmissions.org/mandate">United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei</a> was established in 2011. It was tasked with maintaining peace in the contested region. Over a decade later, however, little has changed.</p>
<p>Since <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/response-people-impacted-violence-agok-and-aneet-situation-report-no-1-22-april">2022</a>, contestations over Abyei have been complicated by <a href="https://acleddata.com/2024/02/09/acled-brief-violence-rises-across-south-sudans-disputed-abyei-state/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=acled-brief-violence-rises-across-south-sudans-disputed-abyei-state">renewed clashes</a> between the Ngok and another Dinka sub-group, the Twic Dinka, from the south. </p>
<p><strong>Map of Abyei</strong></p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-UD8WK" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/UD8WK/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>The Ngok Dinka assert their rights to the whole territory of what is known as the “Abyei Box”. This is the current internationally recognised form of Abyei, which was established based on the findings of the <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/boundary-demarcation-sudan-comprehensive-peace-agreement">Abyei Boundary Commission</a>. The commission was formed from the North-South peace talks of the mid-2000s. </p>
<p>Conversely, the Twic Dinka argue that their ancestral lands extend further north to the River Kiir, suggesting a natural demarcation line between their territory and that of the Ngok Dinka. The Twic contend that the Ngok Dinka’s presence south of the river had been a result of displacement caused by historic hostilities with the Misseriya during <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05430.6?seq=1">Sudan’s civil war in the 1980s and 1990s</a>.</p>
<h2>The drivers of conflict</h2>
<p>Following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/9/12/south-sudan-president-signs-peace-deal-with-rebel-leader">conclusion of the South Sudanese civil war in 2018</a> and the formation of a power-sharing government, tensions escalated in the Abyei region. This was partly due to grievances from Twic politicians who felt overlooked for significant roles in the national government and also in the state government of Warrap, where Twic county falls. Income from the bustling Aneek market in south Abyei was seen as a potential remedy for these grievances. </p>
<p>However, when the Abyei administration began land demarcation efforts in February 2022, conflict erupted. This resulted in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/response-people-impacted-violence-agok-and-aneet-situation-report-no-1-22-april">several deaths and the destruction of Aneek market</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, the area has remained tense, with outbreaks of violence involving organised assaults or clashes between armed youth factions.</p>
<p>This situation has been further exacerbated by the involvement of Bul Nuer militias. </p>
<p>One faction of militias was displaced from their native Mayom county in Unity State, in South Sudan’s north, by intense flooding. They eventually settled in Twic county, in Warrap state, in areas close to the Abyei border. </p>
<p>Concurrently, political disputes between other factions of Bul Nuer militias with the local government of Mayom county escalated to violent clashes. This forced the militias to flee Unity State. They, too, settled in Twic county.</p>
<p>This complicated an <a href="https://www.sudanspost.com/gai-machiek-i-am-not-a-rebel-and-not-involved-in-abyei-attacks/#google_vignette">already tense situation</a>.</p>
<p>To address the escalating violence in Twic county and Abyei, South Sudan President Salva Kiir <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/kiir-orders-expulsion-of-nuer-spiritual-leader-from-warrap">ordered the expulsion</a> of Bul Nuer militia members from Warrap state, and their resettlement in other states outside Warrap and Abyei. However, the implementation of this decree has faced significant challenges. </p>
<p>Since settling in Twic county in 2022, many Bul Nuer families have formed marital alliances with Twic families, integrating them into the community. This integration led to widespread protests from the Twic against Kiir’s decree. As a result, the Bul Nuer militias have remained in the area. </p>
<p>The presence of these militias has fuelled distrust among the Ngok community. </p>
<p>This tension boiled over in early February 2024 when minor altercations involving Ngok, Twic and Bul Nuer youths escalated into a larger conflict, resulting in the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1146007">loss of more than 50 lives</a>.</p>
<p>Addressing these deep-seated inter-communal tensions, with roots stretching back decades, presents a complex challenge particularly in a context where the state lacks capacity to enforce laws impartially. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Despite these difficulties, the South Sudandese national government has the tools to help alleviate these tensions in the near term. </p>
<p>One significant area of ambiguity that has contributed to ongoing disputes is the undefined border status between Twic and Abyei. </p>
<p>The government’s strategy has been to avoid making definitive statements regarding this border. This is in an effort to prevent alienating any community and to curb conflict escalation. </p>
<p>However, considering the intensification of tensions over the past two years, it may be prudent to reconsider this approach and seek a more definitive resolution to the border issue. Clarifying the border between Twic county and Abyei could significantly undermine the influence of political myths and propaganda used to raise ethnic distrust.</p>
<p>Initiating political dialogue that involves both Ngok and Twic leaders, as well as engaging with the youth who have been both instigators and casualties of the conflict, could facilitate this process of demystification. </p>
<p>While achieving a long-term resolution to the conflict around Abyei amid <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/oct/26/oil-rich-and-extremely-poor-inside-the-forgotten-abyei-box-a-photo-essay">socio-economic challenges</a> remains an elusive goal, adopting pragmatic approaches to manage the current conflict is essential for maintaining peace in the region. Such efforts would help lay the groundwork for long-term stability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224409/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jan Pospisil receives funding from the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, a programme funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. He is Associate Professor at Coventry University's Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations.</span></em></p>Overlapping territorial claims continue to fuel conflict in Abyei, which is claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan.Jan Pospisil, Associate Professor, Research, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2232532024-02-14T14:26:07Z2024-02-14T14:26:07ZWagner Group is now Africa Corps. What this means for Russia’s operations on the continent<p><em>In August 2023, Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin died after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/05/hand-grenade-explosion-caused-plane-crash-that-killed-wagner-boss-says-putin">his private jet crashed</a> about an hour after taking off in Moscow. He had been Russia’s pointman in Africa since the Wagner Group <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">began operating on the continent in 2017</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The group is known for <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-in-africa-russias-presence-on-the-continent-increasingly-relies-on-mercenaries-198600">deploying paramilitary forces, running disinformation campaigns and propping up influential political leaders</a>. It has had a destabilising effect. Prigozhin’s death – and his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/24/timeline-how-wagner-groups-revolt-against-russia-unfolded">aborted mutiny</a> against Russian military commanders two months earlier – has led to a shift in Wagner Group’s activities.</em></p>
<p><em>What does this mean for Africa? <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=fvXhZxQAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">Alessandro Arduino’s research</a> includes mapping the evolution of <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538170311/Money-for-Mayhem-Mercenaries-Private-Military-Companies-Drones-and-the-Future-of-War">mercenaries</a> and private military companies across Africa. He provides some answers.</em></p>
<h2>What is the current status of the Wagner Group?</h2>
<p>Following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death, the Russian ministries of foreign affairs and defence quickly reassured Middle Eastern and African states that it would be <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-wagner-group-evolves-after-the-death-of-prigozhin/">business as usual</a> – meaning unofficial Russian boots on the ground would keep operating in these regions.</p>
<p><a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2024/01/with-new-name-same-russian-mercenaries-plague-africa/">Recent reports</a> on the Wagner Group suggest a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/12/russias-wagner-group-expands-into-africas-sahel-with-a-new-brand.html#:%7E:text=Wagner%20Group%20has%20been%20replaced,its%20new%20leader%20has%20confirmed.">transformation</a> is underway. </p>
<p>The group’s activities in Africa are now under the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-the-fallout-of-russias-wagner-rebellion/">direct supervision</a> of the Russian ministry of defence. </p>
<p>Wagner commands an estimated force of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa#:%7E:text=Rather%20than%20a%20single%20entity%2C%20Wagner%20is%20a,of%20former%20Russian%20soldiers%2C%20convicts%2C%20and%20foreign%20nationals.">5,000 operatives</a> deployed throughout Africa, from Libya to Sudan. As part of the transformation, the defence ministry has renamed it the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa">Africa Corps</a>. </p>
<p>The choice of <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/new-russian-military-unit-recruiting-former-wagner-fighters-ukraine-veterans-2023-12?r=US&IR=T">name</a> could be an attempt to add a layer of obfuscation to cover what has been in plain sight for a long time. That Russian mercenaries in Africa <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-owned-mine-seized-by-russian-mercenaries-in-africa-is-helping/">serve one master</a> – the Kremlin. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the direct link to Russia’s ministry of defence will make it difficult for Russia to argue that a foreign government has requested the services of a Russian private military company without the Kremlin’s involvement. The head of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-asked-private-russian-military-firm-help-against-insurgents-ifx-2021-09-25/">attempted to use this defence in Mali</a>.</p>
<p>The notion of transforming the group into the Africa Corps may have been inspired by World War II German field marshal <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/afrika-korps">Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps</a>. Nazi Germany wove myths around his <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/115/4/1243/35179?redirectedFrom=fulltext">strategic and tactical successes in north Africa</a>.</p>
<p>But will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/wagner-group-africa-where-rubber-meets-road-206202">distinctive modus operandi</a> that propelled it to infamy during Prigozhin’s reign? This included the intertwining of boots on the ground with propaganda and disinformation. It also leveraged technologies and a sophisticated network of financing to enhance combat capabilities.</p>
<h2>What will happen to Wagner’s modus operandi now?</h2>
<p>In my recent book, <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538170311/Money-for-Mayhem-Mercenaries-Private-Military-Companies-Drones-and-the-Future-of-War">Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones and the Future of War</a>, I record Prigozhin’s adept weaving of disinformation and misinformation. </p>
<p>Numerous meticulously orchestrated campaigns flooded Africa’s online social platforms <a href="https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/yevgeniy-prigozhins-africa-wide-disinformation-campaign/">promoting</a> the removal of French and western influence across the Sahel. </p>
<p>Prigozhin oversaw the creation of the Internet Research Agency, which operated as the propaganda arm of the group. It supported Russian disinformation campaigns and was sanctioned in 2018 by the US government for meddling in American elections. Prigozhin <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/14/europe/russia-yevgeny-prigozhin-internet-research-agency-intl/index.html">admitted</a> to founding the so-called troll farm: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I’ve never just been the financier of the Internet Research Agency. I invented it, I created it, I managed it for a long time.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From a financial perspective, Prigozhin’s approach involved establishing a <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1581">convoluted network of lucrative natural resources mining operations</a>. These spanned gold mines in the Central African Republic to diamond mines in Sudan. </p>
<p>This strategy was complemented by significant cash infusions from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/09/how-russia-recruiting-wagner-fighters-continue-war-ukraine">Russian state</a> to support the Wagner Group’s direct involvement in hostilities. This extended from Syria to Ukraine, and across north and west Africa.</p>
<p>My research shows Prigozhin networks are solid enough to last. But only as long as the golden rule of the mercenary remains intact: guns for hire are getting paid.</p>
<p>In Libya and Mali, Russia is unlikely to yield ground due to enduring geopolitical objectives. These include generating revenue from oil fields, securing access to ports for its navy and securing its position as a kingmaker in the region. However, the Central African Republic may see less attention from Moscow. The Wagner Group’s involvement here was <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/">primarily linked</a> to Prigozhin’s personal interests in goldmine revenues.</p>
<p>The Russian ministry of defence will no doubt seek to create a unified and loyal force dedicated to military action. But with the enduring legacy of Soviet-style bureaucracy, marked by excessive paperwork and procrastination in today’s Russian officials, one might surmise that greater allegiance to Moscow will likely come at the cost of reduced flexibility.</p>
<p>History has shown that Africa serves as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-mercenaries-in-africa-why-there-hasnt-been-any-effective-opposition-to-drive-them-out-207318">lucrative arena for mercenaries</a> due to various factors. These include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the prevalence of low-intensity conflicts reduces the risks to mercenaries’ lives compared to full-scale wars like in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/13/russia-ukraine-war-list-of-key-events-day-720">Ukraine</a></p></li>
<li><p>the continent’s abundant natural resources are prone to exploitation</p></li>
<li><p>pervasive instability allows mercenaries to operate with relative impunity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>As it is, countries in Africa once considered allies of the west are looking for alternatives. Russia is increasingly looking like a <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-essential-reads-on-russia-africa-relations-187568">viable candidate</a>. In January 2024, Chad’s junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby, met with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Moscow to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24/">develop bilateral ties</a>”. Chad previously had taken a pro-western policy.</p>
<p>A month earlier, Russia’s deputy defence minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, who’s been tasked with overseeing Wagner’s activities in the Middle East and north Africa, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/04/russian-officials-visit-niger-to-strengthen-military-ties/">visited Niger</a>. The two countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">agreed to strengthen military ties</a>. Niger is currently led by the military after a <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic-comments/2023/the-coup-in-niger/">coup in July 2023</a>.</p>
<h2>Where does it go from here?</h2>
<p>There are a number of paths that the newly named Africa Corps could take.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>It gets deployed by Moscow to fight in conflicts meeting Russia’s geopolitical ends. </p></li>
<li><p>It morphs into paramilitary units under the guise of Russian foreign military intelligence agencies.</p></li>
<li><p>It splinters into factions, acting as heavily armed personal guards for local warlords. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The propaganda machinery built by Prigozhin may falter during the transition. But this won’t signal the immediate disappearance of the Russian disinformation ecosystem. </p>
<p>Russian diplomatic efforts are already mobilising to preserve the status quo. This is clear from Moscows’s <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/brief-russia-deepens-counter-terrorism-ties-to-sahelian-post-coup-regimes/">backing</a> of the recent Alliance of Sahelian States encompassing Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. All three nations are led by military rulers who overthrew civilian governments a recently announced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-say-they-are-leaving-ecowas-regional-block-2024-01-28/">plans to exit</a> from the 15-member Economic Community of West African States.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alessandro Arduino is a member of the International Code of Conduct Advisory Group.</span></em></p>Will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the ruthless modus operandi that propelled it to the spotlight in Africa?Alessandro Arduino, Affiliate Lecturer, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216552024-02-06T14:27:03Z2024-02-06T14:27:03ZMicroplastics found in Nile River’s tilapia fish: new study<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570625/original/file-20240122-15-ncnbn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A fisherman on the River Nile.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Khaled Desouki/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Nile is one of the world’s most famous rivers. It’s also Africa’s most important freshwater system. <a href="https://www.rti.org/impact/nile-river-basin-initiative#:%7E:text=The%20longest%20river%20in%20the,%2C%20Rwanda%2C%20Burundi%2C%20Tanzania%2C">About 300 million people</a> live in the 11 countries it flows through. Many rely on its waters for agriculture and fishing to make a living. </p>
<p>The Nile’s two main tributaries, the Blue Nile and the White Nile, come together in Sudan’s capital city, Khartoum. This industrial hub has <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/khartoum-population">grown rapidly over the past few decades</a>.</p>
<p>The Nile is not immune to the same pollutants that affect rivers all over the world. Plastic debris is of particular concern. Over time plastics break down into smaller pieces known as microplastics. These are tiny plastic particles with a maximum size of five millimetres, all the way down to the nanoscale. <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-40501-9">Recent research</a> found that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>rivers are modelled to export up to 25,000 tons of plastics from their sub-basins to seas annually. Over 80% of this amount is microplastic.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This has huge negative consequences for biodiversity and the climate. As microplastics degrade, scientists have found, they <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2213343722019200">produce greenhouse gases</a>. Airborne microplastics may influence the climate by scattering and absorbing solar and terrestrial radiation, <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/microplastics-may-be-cooling-and-heating-earths-climate/">leading to atmospheric warming or cooling</a> depending on particle size, shape and composition. It also negatively affects <a href="https://www.undp.org/kosovo/blog/microplastics-human-health-how-much-do-they-harm-us">animal and human health</a>. Microplastics <a href="https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/envhealth.3c00052">have been shown</a> in laboratory studies to be toxic to animals and cells. </p>
<p>Much of the research about microplastics in African waters has focused on marine and coastal areas. To address this gap, I <a href="https://www.cell.com/heliyon/pdf/S2405-8440(23)10601-3.pdf">conducted a study</a> to assess the presence of microplastics in the River Nile in Khartoum. My students and I tested for the presence of microplastics in Nile tilapia. This popular African freshwater fish species <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/2/974">forms the basis</a> of commercial fisheries in many African countries, including Sudan.</p>
<p>The results do not make for happy reading. In the 30 freshly caught fish we surveyed, we found a total of 567 microplastic particles. This shows that the River Nile is contaminated with microplastics that can be consumed or absorbed in various ways by the tilapia and other aquatic organisms.</p>
<h2>Our sample</h2>
<p>The fish used in our study were caught just after the meeting point of the two Niles, known in Arabic as Al-Mogran. </p>
<p>We visited the Al-Mawrada fish market in the Omdurman area, which is also alongside the Nile. All 30 specimens we bought were freshly caught. </p>
<p>We dissected the fish to remove their digestive tracts. The individual tracts were treated so they would digest any organic matter they contained without interfering with the analysis of microplastics. The resulting solution was subject to another extraction procedure and we then conducted physical and chemical analyses.</p>
<p>Every specimen had microplastics in its digestive tract.</p>
<p>The number ranged from as few as five to as many as 47 particles per single fish. In total we identified 567 particles. This is high compared to <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0045653520331659">studies</a> that have <a href="https://www.researchsquare.com/article/rs-2430557/v1">reported microplastics</a> in tilapia species in other rivers and lakes. There is, as yet, no global guideline or standard for what might be an “acceptable” number.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fish-in-a-major-south-african-river-are-full-of-microplastics-186017">Fish in a major South African river are full of microplastics</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Shape, size and colour</h2>
<p>We detected different sizes of microplastics (0.04mm to 4.94mm), shapes (fibres, fragments, films, foams and pellets) and colours. The most common were very small (less than 1mm), fibrous – they appear slender and elongated – and coloured (dyed).</p>
<p>These characteristics make sense because of how fish and other aquatic organisms feed. Nile tilapia are versatile feeders: they consume a variety of organisms including phytoplankton, aquatic plants, invertebrates, detritus, bacterial films, as well as other fish and fish eggs. That puts them at a high risk of ingesting microplastics.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lagos-beaches-have-a-microplastic-pollution-problem-128133">Lagos beaches have a microplastic pollution problem</a>
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<p>Nile tilapia are also more likely to consume particles that are within a similar size range as their natural prey, as well as the same shape and colour.</p>
<p>Smaller microplastics are especially good carriers for other pollutants such as heavy metals, resulting in additional health risks. Their small size also makes it easier for them to move into organs like the liver. Studies have found microplastics in the tissues, muscles, livers, blubber and lungs of other <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0025326X15002581">aquatic</a> as well as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026974912301254X">marine mammal species</a>.</p>
<p>Fibres, the most dominant shape found in our specimens, stay in the intestine for longer than other microplastic shapes. This, too, can lead to health problems for the fish. Coloured microplastics contain dyes, many of which <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13762-023-05168-1">contain toxic chemicals</a>. </p>
<p>This all has serious implications for human health, as people catch and eat the fish, which introduces those <a href="https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/86342">microplastics and associated chemicals into their bloodstreams</a>.</p>
<h2>Pollution sources</h2>
<p>Where does all this plastic originate? For starters, 65% of plastic waste in Khartoum is disposed of in <a href="https://www.ijsr.net/archive/v4i3/SUB151879.pdf">open dumps</a>. From there, it contaminates water bodies and other parts of the environment.</p>
<p>The city’s wastewater treatment system is ineffective. The three wastewater treatment plants in Khartoum state, Karary, Wd-Daffiaa and Soba, are outdated and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214785321069704?via%3Dihub">do not meet local and international standards</a>. That means untreated effluent from domestic, industrial and agricultural activities is another probable source of microplastic pollution.</p>
<p>There are also countless recreational sites along the River Nile in Khartoum. The Nile Street is the most popular in the capital city, hosting water sports, restaurants, cafes, clubs, event venues and hotels, as well as the tea ladies (women who serve hot beverages from makeshift mobile cafes along the banks of the river). However, waste disposal and collection practices are sorely lacking, so plastic litter from these leisure activities leaks into the river.</p>
<h2>No easy fix</h2>
<p>Tackling microplastic pollution is not easy. It will require technological advances, as well as the collective efforts of consumers, producers, governments and the scientific community.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/plastic-pollution-in-nigeria-is-poorly-studied-but-enough-is-known-to-urge-action-184591">Plastic pollution in Nigeria is poorly studied but enough is known to urge action</a>
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<p>As consumers, we need to change our behaviour around plastic products, especially single-use plastics. For example, opt for fabric shopping bags instead of plastic bags; use glass and metal containers. Recycling is also important.</p>
<p>Governments must enforce waste management regulations and improve waste management practices, as well as helping to improve public awareness. Strategies and policies must explicitly feature microplastics.</p>
<p>Scientists can not only fill the knowledge gaps around microplastics. Communicating scientific findings is crucial; so too is developing innovations to protect against microplastics and their harmful effects.</p>
<p><em>I would like to thank and acknowledge my student Hadeel Alamin, who conducted this study with me.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221655/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The project was funded by the Royal Society – UK.</span></em></p>The River Nile is contaminated with microplastics.Dalia Saad, Researcher, School of Chemistry, University of the Witwatersrand, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210442024-01-25T12:16:36Z2024-01-25T12:16:36ZThe African Union is working on peace in Sudan: expert explains why it’s in everyone’s interests<p>The African Union has recently <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240117/auc-chairperson-appoints-high-level-panel-resolution-conflict-sudan">named</a> a team to work on a peaceful end to Sudan’s civil war. The team will engage Sudan’s feuding military factions alongside civil society and international players to resolve the conflict that has <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1185th-meeting-of-the-psc-held-at-the-ministerial-level-on-15-november-2023-on-the-situation-in-sudan">been raging</a> since 15 April 2023. </p>
<p>The opponents in the conflict are the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces.</p>
<p>The AU’s High-Level Panel on the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan is made up of Ghanaian diplomat Mohamed Chambas, former Ugandan vice-president Speciosa Wandira-Kazibwe and Mozambican diplomat Francisco Madeira. It has a mandate “to ensure an <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/rest-of-africa/au-appoints-3-prominent-africans-to-sudan-peace-panel-4495772">all-inclusive process</a> towards the swift restoration of peace, constitutional order and stability” in Sudan. </p>
<p>Sudan, under armed forces chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has recently suspended its membership of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The bloc’s eight country <a href="https://igad.int/about/">members</a> are from the Horn of Africa, the Nile Valley and the African Great Lakes. Sudan’s suspension came after leaders from the Horn of Africa <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudans-hemedti-meets-with-kenyan-president">met</a> with Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), the commander of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces. </p>
<p>Hemedti had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-paramilitary-leader-hemedti-meets-civilian-leaders-tour-2024-01-01/">visited</a> Kenya, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/31/head-of-sudans-paramilitary-rsf-visits-djibouti-amid-ceasefire-efforts">Djibouti</a>, Ethiopia, <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-fa-ministry-summons-kenyan-ambassador-hemedti-visits-south-africa">South Africa</a> and Uganda to present what he claimed was his “strategy to cease hostilities and start negotiations for a <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudans-hemedti-meets-with-kenyan-president">comprehensive resolution</a>”. Al-Burhan had undertaken similar visits to Eritrea, Egypt and South Sudan. </p>
<p>I have studied various aspects of Africa’s governance failures for more than 30 years. These include <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0176268095000291">military elites</a> <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45371310">and coups</a>, <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol33/iss4/4/">corruption and state capture</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45371310">political instability</a>, and <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/icpelr2&div=7&id=&page=">constitutional coups</a>.</p>
<p>I see a number of reasons why the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development should take an active role in returning Sudan to democratic governance. </p>
<h2>The ripple effects</h2>
<p>African leaders should understand that if a similar calamity ever befell their own countries, other Africans would help them restore peace and provide humanitarian assistance.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/displaced-sudanese-face-protection-crisis-as-war-drags-on/7306976.html">United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</a> has stated that close to “1.1 million women, children, as well as older persons” have fled Sudan and crossed into <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-conflict-will-have-a-ripple-effect-in-an-unstable-region-and-across-the-world-204858">neighbouring countries</a>. This is creating “economic, social and political ripple effects”. It is in the best interests of neighbouring countries that Sudan returns to its peaceful transition to democracy, in order to arrest what is becoming a serious <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2023-04-28/explainer-what-is-happening-in-sudan-and-how-does-it-affect-global-politics">refugee crisis</a>.</p>
<p>Sudan is geographically important for countries in north and east Africa. For example, <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2023-04-28/explainer-what-is-happening-in-sudan-and-how-does-it-affect-global-politics">Khartoum</a> is where the White and Blue Nile merge to form the Nile River. Prolonged instability in Sudan could create problems for the management of the Nile’s resources, affecting all <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-11-countries-that-rely-on-the-nile-need-to-reach-a-river-deal-soon-75868">11 riparian states</a>. It is in their best interests to help return Sudan to its path of peaceful transition to democratic governance.</p>
<p>Sudan’s location on the Red Sea means that continued political and economic instability in the country could negatively affect trade flows through the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-conflict-will-have-a-ripple-effect-in-an-unstable-region-and-across-the-world-204858">Suez Canal</a>. That would affect most African countries.</p>
<p>Sudan is an important transit country for thousands of Muslims from other parts of Africa who embark every year on the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/hajj">hajj to Mecca</a>. Many pilgrims from Sudan and neighbouring countries usually travel to Port Sudan and then to <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2322071/saudi-arabia">Jeddah Islamic Port</a> by boat. The war is a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/sudanese-hajj-pilgrims-pray-for-god-s-intervention-to-end-war-/7151196.html">threat</a> to the ability of many of the region’s Muslims to complete this important religious ritual. </p>
<p>In addition, many air carriers transit through <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-conflict-will-have-a-ripple-effect-in-an-unstable-region-and-across-the-world-204858">Sudanese airspace</a> on their way to Mecca. The war has already closed Khartoum airport and the country’s <a href="https://safeairspace.net/sudan/">airspace</a> remains closed to civilian flights. This is forcing carriers from other parts of Africa to search for other routes which may be more <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-conflict-will-have-a-ripple-effect-in-an-unstable-region-and-across-the-world-204858">expensive</a>. </p>
<p>Port Sudan is Sudan’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/sudans-red-sea-port-struggles-recover-blockade-turmoil-2021-12-23/">main international trade gateway</a>, a terminal for a regional oil pipeline and a hub that can serve landlocked neighbours. For example, South Sudanese oil, which accounts for 90% of public revenue, must travel through the <a href="https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?Country=Sudan&articleid=1221930106&oid=1421858326&pid=1421858_8">Greater Nile Oil Pipeline</a> via Khartoum to Port Sudan. A peaceful Sudan is critical for economic and social development in South Sudan and the region. </p>
<p>Returning Sudan to its democratic transition can be achieved via a process that uses the offices of regional organisations. These include the AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the East African Community. </p>
<h2>Limitations to the African Union’s solution</h2>
<p>None of the regional organisations can impose a solution to the conflict on the Sudanese people. The AU’s work should be to create an environment within which the people of Sudan can craft a mutually acceptable solution. All the country’s stakeholders must buy into and own the solution for there to be lasting peace. </p>
<p>The two main actors in this civil war – the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces – must be made to understand that a sustainable solution cannot be achieved militarily. Continued fighting will eventually ruin the country’s productive capacity. That includes its scarce human resources, infrastructure, potential for peaceful coexistence, and sustainable economic and human development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221044/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African Union has several reasons to get involved in Sudan’s peace process.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216162024-01-23T13:29:43Z2024-01-23T13:29:43ZEducation has a huge role to play in peace and development: 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570556/original/file-20240122-20-g5icoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children's education is frequently disrupted in conflict-fraught areas.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Beloumou Olomo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nelson Mandela was a famous advocate for the value of education. In 1990, the man who would become South Africa’s first democratically president four years later <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/24/us/the-mandela-visit-education-is-mighty-force-boston-teen-agers-are-told.html">told a high school in Boston</a>: “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.”</p>
<p>The United Nations agrees. In 2018 its General Assembly adopted a resolution that proclaimed 24 January as the <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/days/education">International Day of Education</a>. It’s an annual opportunity to shine a spotlight on the role that education can and should play in promoting peace and development. This year the theme is “learning for lasting peace” – a critical focus in a world that, the UN points out, is “seeing a surge of violent conflicts paralleled by an alarming rise of discrimination, racism, xenophobia, and hate speech”.</p>
<p>To mark the occasion, we’re sharing some of the many articles our authors have contributed since we launched in 2015 that examine the intersection of education and conflict – and how to wield this powerful “weapon” for positive change.</p>
<h2>Education under attack</h2>
<p>Education systems in a number of African countries <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/GCPEA_NSAG_ScopingPaper.pdf">have been identified</a> by international advocacy groups as “very heavily affected” by conflict. These include Sudan, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Central Sahel, which includes Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, is another region of high concern. In 2020 alone (and before COVID lockdowns), 4,000 schools in the Central Sahel <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/Central-Sahel-Paper-English.pdf">closed because of insecurity</a>. </p>
<p>Craig Bailie <a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">explains</a> what drives armed groups to attack schools in the Central Sahel, leaving hundreds of thousands of students high and dry.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">Education is both the victim and the best weapon in Central Sahel conflict</a>
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<h2>Long-term effects</h2>
<p>Education systems, of course, do not exist in a vacuum. Where conflict meets long-term governance failures, poor resourcing and other societal issues, schooling comes under even more pressure. Ethiopia, for instance, has not only had to reckon with <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">internal conflict since 2020</a>; it’s also grappling with deeply rooted systemic crises.</p>
<p>Tebeje Molla and Dawit Tibebu Tiruneh <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">unpack</a> how these crises are colliding to leave Ethiopian children and teenagers floundering.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">Ethiopia’s education system is in crisis – now’s the time to fix it</a>
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<h2>Rebuilding is possible</h2>
<p>That’s not to say education systems can’t bounce back after conflict. During Somalia’s civil war in the late 1980s more than 90% of schools were destroyed. In the wake of the war the north of the country declared itself as the Republic of Somaliland. </p>
<p>Tobias Gandrup and Kristof Titeca <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">examine how</a>, together, the state, NGOs and the diaspora have succeeded in rebuilding the education system.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">How schools are kept afloat in Somaliland</a>
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<h2>Solutions exist</h2>
<p>Researchers also have a role to play in strengthening education systems. All over the continent, projects that aim to keep children learning even amid devastating conflicts are being developed, rolled out and tested.</p>
<p>One example comes from north-eastern Nigeria, which has been beset by Boko Haram attacks. Margee Ensign and Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob <a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">used</a> a combination of radio and tablet computers to improve the literacy and numeracy skills of 22,000 children forced out of school.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">Disasters interrupt schooling regularly in parts of Africa: here's a solution</a>
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<h2>In the classroom</h2>
<p>Conflicts seem inevitable in a world racked by many “wicked problems” like climate change, inequality and poverty. But what’s taught in Africa’s classrooms could play a role in solving them. The ability to think critically, and to engage with facts rather than fiction, is key. </p>
<p>To this end, Ayodeji Olukoju <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">explains</a> why it was so important that Nigeria reintroduced history as a school subject in 2019, a decade after scrapping it from the curriculum. Understanding history, he argues, helps to explode myths and stereotypes, leading to a more cohesive society.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">What studying history at school can do for Nigerians</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221616/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Education can spur peace and development. Here are five essential reads on the topic.Natasha Joseph, Commissioning EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2192962023-12-08T13:36:18Z2023-12-08T13:36:18ZThe landmark Genocide Convention has had mixed results since the UN approved it 75 years ago<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564027/original/file-20231206-17-lncvwh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman prays in front of skulls at a memorial in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, marking the genocide that happened under the Khmer Rouge regime in the 1970s.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-prays-in-front-of-skulls-at-the-choeung-ek-memorial-news-photo/960278782?adppopup=true">Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Seventy-five years ago, in the wake of Nazi atrocities, the world made a vow. </p>
<p>Countries pledged to liberate humanity from the “odious scourge” of genocide when, at the United Nations, they established a new convention on <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">preventing and punishing genocide</a> on Dec. 9, 1948. </p>
<p>Has the international community lived up to this promise? </p>
<p>Amid genocide accusations and mass violence in the Middle East, Ukraine, Sudan, Yemen, Ethiopia, China and elsewhere, the answer would seem to be obvious: “No!” </p>
<p>But the reality is more complicated. It also offers a glimmer of light at a very dark moment. </p>
<p>As someone who has studied genocide for years and <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501765698/anthropological-witness/">testified on the topic</a> at an international tribunal, I view the legacy of the U.N. Genocide Convention – including its effectiveness in preventing genocide and holding perpetrators accountable – as a mixed bag with some good but also some ugly. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black woman wearing a gray outfit that looks like a sari holds her hand to her chest and stands in front of shelves filled with old looking clothing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564029/original/file-20231206-29-j2p3xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A survivor of the Rwandan genocide looks at clothes of genocide victims who were killed by Hutu militants in 1994.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/juliet-mukakabanda-a-survivor-that-will-testify-in-france-news-photo/1240477849?adppopup=true">Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>The story of the Genocide Convention</h2>
<p>It is a minor miracle that there is a U.N. Genocide Convention, a treaty that over 150 countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia and Israel, <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide-convention.shtml">have ratified</a>. </p>
<p>Countries are obsessed with protecting their sovereignty and power. They gave up a bit of both by passing this convention. </p>
<p>The word genocide had been coined only four years earlier by a Polish lawyer, <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/coining-a-word-and-championing-a-cause-the-story-of-raphael-lemkin">Raphael Lemkin</a>. Why, he wondered, was it a crime to kill one person but not an entire group? </p>
<p>In 1946, at the newly formed U.N., Lemkin began lobbying diplomats. Two years of grinding U.N. debate ensued before the convention was finally – and barely – passed. </p>
<p>The convention <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">defines genocide</a> as “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” These acts range from killing to the forced transfer of children from one group to another group. </p>
<p>But the convention’s shortcomings quickly became apparent. </p>
<h2>The bad − a convention rigged for the powerful</h2>
<p>The Genocide Convention was the product of political bargaining, compromise and pressure from some of the world’s great powers. As a result, the convention also has <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/problems-of-genocide/1C48C9BAE4A2CA4EA6727F19771651A6">major weaknesses</a>. </p>
<p>First, it does not protect everyone from genocide. It shields racial, ethnic, national and religious groups, but leaves others, such as <a href="https://www.rutgersuniversitypress.org/bucknell/the-politics-of-genocide/9781978821507/">political groups</a> and economic groups, unprotected. </p>
<p>As a result, the mass targeting of people from particular political groups or economic classes – which has happened in communist <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/cambodia">Cambodia</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/03/giving-historys-greatest-mass-murderer-his-due/">China</a> and the <a href="https://news.stanford.edu/2010/09/23/naimark-stalin-genocide-092310/">former Soviet Union</a> – isn’t technically considered genocide. </p>
<p>This limitation was intentional. The <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/5556.htm">Soviet Union</a>, for example, made sure such groups weren’t included in the convention, since it worried about possible future prosecution. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781351214100-3/historical-perspective-jeffrey-bachman?context=ubx&refId=c6169777-cd53-4e19-bb34-c359a761e515">Cultural genocide</a> was also dropped from the convention’s final draft, since imperial powers like France and the United Kingdom worried about being culpable for acts of cultural destruction in their colonies.</p>
<p>These shortcomings created more problems, including letting culprits off the hook. Perhaps, worst of all, these omissions suggest that enslavement, the use of atomic weapons, apartheid and the targeting of political groups are somehow less serious, since they don’t fall under the convention’s genocide umbrella. </p>
<p>And then there was the problem of enforcement. While the convention was legally binding for those who ratified it, there was no international police force holding people or governments to account for violations – and countries were left to determine whether they wanted to include the convention in their own national laws. </p>
<h2>The ugly − a convention without teeth</h2>
<p>Lacking enforcement powers, the new convention proved largely ineffective during the Cold War that began intensifying in the late 1940s.</p>
<p>This predicament helped lay the ground for a lot of ugly – <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003185291/genocide-adam-jones">tens of millions dead</a> and mass suffering.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/cambodia">Cambodia</a>, for example, the Khmer Rouge enacted policies that resulted in the death of up to 2 million of its 8 million inhabitants. Some groups, including intellectuals and ethnic and religious minorities, were singled out for execution from April 1975 to January 1979.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/blog/new-details-emerge-about-atrocities-in-guatemala">Guatemalan military targeted</a> and killed thousands in indigenous Mayan communities, with the violence peaking in the early 1980s. </p>
<p>Genocidal violence continued after the Cold War ended in the late 1980s.</p>
<p>The 1990s started with extremists from the dominant <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/rwanda">Hutu ethnic group in Rwanda</a> slaughtering about 800,000 Hutu moderates and Tutsi people, an ethnic minority. Ethnic Serbs also killed an <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/bosnia-herzegovina">estimated 100,000 civilians</a> in <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/bosnia-herzegovina">Bosnia</a> as the former Yugoslavia imploded. </p>
<p>The 2000s <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/burma">were riddled</a> with other <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/china">infamous failures</a>, including government-backed militias in Sudan killing 400,000 civilians in <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/darfur">Darfur</a> from 2003 through 2005 and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-darfur-fighting-war-crimes-705bdb1ac90fc7b2903f68e6f666c3ca">again today</a>. </p>
<p>More recently, Russia’s military perpetuated atrocities against Ukrainian civilians during its 2022 invasion and war with <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/ukraine">Ukraine</a> – another instance of likely genocide. And supporters of <a href="https://theconversation.com/both-israel-and-palestinian-supporters-accuse-the-other-side-of-genocide-heres-what-the-term-actually-means-217150">Israel and the Palestinians</a> are now both making accusations of genocide. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three people wearing dark clothing, including one man with an army vest, stand in the snow. The woman and one man cover their mouths and look away, one man looks forward." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564030/original/file-20231206-27-s9b39b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People gather close to a mass grave in Bucha, Ukraine, on April 3, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-react-as-they-gather-close-to-a-mass-grave-in-the-news-photo/1239718685?adppopup=true">Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The good − baby steps and halting successes</h2>
<p>Amid these repeated failures, it may seem difficult to find reasons to mark the convention’s 75th anniversary. </p>
<p>But there are positives. </p>
<p>First, compared with 75 years ago, there is now a <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int">broad network</a> of international <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1502&context=gsp#:%7E:text=National%20Mechanisms%20are%20vehicles%20through,atrocity%20crimes%20as%20parties%20to">and domestic</a> organizations and individuals working to <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/">prevent genocide</a>. </p>
<p>These groups <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/index">conduct investigations</a>, <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org">issue alerts</a> and use <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1093&context=gsp">behind-the-scenes diplomacy</a> to keep peace.</p>
<p>Many governments also are prioritizing prevention. This includes the U.S., which passed the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ441/PLAW-115publ441.pdf">Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act</a> in 2018, formalizing prevention as a U.S. national interest and mandating <a href="https://www.state.gov/atrocity-prevention/">annual reports</a> on U.S. government progress in mainstreaming prevention.</p>
<p>Third, there has been progress in terms of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003185291/genocide-adam-jones">accountability</a>. Different international courts have used the Genocide Convention to convict perpetrators for genocidal acts committed in places such as <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/rwanda-the-first-conviction-for-genocide">Rwanda</a> and <a href="https://www.icty.org/en/press/radislav-krstic-becomes-first-person-be-convicted-genocide-icty-and-sentenced-46-years">Bosnia</a> in the 1990s. </p>
<p>And, critically, there is an International Criminal Court that can hold political leaders accountable for genocide. This <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/ICCAtAGlanceEng.pdf">Netherlands-based court</a>, set up in 2002, has not yet convicted anyone of genocide, though. </p>
<p>Finally, prevention efforts have had full or partial successes. They have curtailed budding genocidal crimes in places like <a href="http://peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/dpe/modern_conflicts/burundi.pdf">Burundi</a>, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2020/10/19/cote-d-ivoire-election-tensions-erupt-in-fatal-ethnic-clashes//">Cote D’Ivoire</a>, <a href="https://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2018/03/21/division-threatens-gambia">Gambia</a> and <a href="https://www.c-r.org/programme/horn-africa/kenya-conflict-">Kenya</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/research/books/responding-to-genocide-the-politics-of-international-action-2013/">Early warnings, diplomacy and political will</a> have often been key to these successes – such as when, with U.N. backing, an Australian-led force brought a stop to escalating violence in <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691150178/if-you-leave-us-here-we-will-die">East Timor</a> in 1999. </p>
<p>It is hard to feel hopeful at this difficult moment as violence in the Middle East and Ukraine rages on. But I think it’s important to recognize the halting progress that has been made during the 75 years since the Genocide Convention was passed – even as much work remains to fulfill the promise that genocide will never again happen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219296/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Hinton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While the Genocide Convention has helped raise awareness and prevent ethnic violence from escalating, it has not stopped many accusations of genocides, including violence in Darfur and in Ukraine.Alexander Hinton, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology; Director, Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights, Rutgers University - NewarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2186282023-12-07T14:15:45Z2023-12-07T14:15:45ZTerror in Uganda: what’s driving the Islamic State-linked rebels<p>The Islamic State Central Africa Province recently <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/suspected-adf-rebels-kill-foreign-tourists-in-western-uganda-4404976">attacked</a> and killed two foreign tourists and a citizen in a Ugandan nature park. Located in the country’s west near the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Queen Elizabeth National Park is about 400km from the Ugandan capital Kampala. </p>
<p>The attack was aimed at Uganda’s most important source of foreign currency, the tourism sector. The sector generated <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/news/uganda-targets-52b-earnings-from-tourism-annu-NV_163086">7.7% of Uganda’s gross national product</a> before a slump linked to the Covid pandemic. </p>
<p>The attack highlights a departure from previous attacks by the armed group towards new targets: western tourists in Uganda. It also highlights how regional rivalries in the border areas of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">Congo-Uganda-Rwanda</a> function as oxygen that has enabled the organisation to survive and grow. </p>
<h2>The evolution</h2>
<p>The group, originally known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), was <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Horn-Sahel-Rift-Fault-lines-African/dp/1849044147">formed and financed</a> by the rulers of the DRC (then Zaire) Mobutu Sese Seko, and Sudan Omar al Bashir to launch insurgent attacks on their common enemy in the mid-1990s – Uganda. The ADF was thus initially used by Mobutu and Bashir as a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Horn-Sahel-Rift-Fault-lines-African/dp/1849044147">weapon</a> in regional rivalries to check Yoweri Museveni’s influence. </p>
<p>At the time of its formation in 1995, ADF was a rather weird merger of <a href="https://theconversation.com/tracking-the-drcs-allied-democratic-forces-and-its-links-to-isis-116439">two vastly different organisations</a>. </p>
<p>The first consisted of former members of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda that had been based around the mainly Christian Bakonjo-Baamba people of the Rwenzori region in western Uganda, and near the border with DRC. </p>
<p>The second part of the organisation consisted of fighters from the Ugandan Islamic Salafi Foundation, an organisation with roots going back to protests against Uganda’s <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/The%20Islamic%20State%20in%20Congo%20English.pdf#page=14">attempts to control</a> its Muslim congregations in the early 1990s. </p>
<p>Uganda forced the new group into the eastern provinces of Congo where it was supported by the Mobutu regime before its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mobutu-Sese-Seko">overthrow in 1997</a>. It survived the fall of Mobutu by withdrawing deep into the forests and mountains in the border areas between Uganda and Congo.</p>
<p>Over time, ADF grew more Islamic, partly due to Ugandan amnesties that convinced several of the more moderate leaders of the ADF to defect. Signs of a more radical organisation emerging could be seen from 2011. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-State-in-Iraq-and-the-Levant">Islamic State</a> accepted the organisation as a province in 2019. When the ADF leader <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/The%20Islamic%20State%20in%20Congo%20English.pdf#page=22">swore allegiance to the Islamic State</a>, there were some defections from the few remaining commanders who had National Army roots. </p>
<h2>Change in strategy</h2>
<p>Since 2021, the Islamic State Central Africa Province has launched two different types of attacks against Uganda. First, terror attacks and assassinations far from the Congolese border in places like Kampala. Second, heavy, more military-style attacks against civilians in Uganda’s border with the DRC. </p>
<p>It’s increasingly using more <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-threat-to-central-africa-the-2021-transformation-of-the-islamic-states-congolese-branch/">traditional terror tools</a> and has introduced new propaganda material, such as videos with beheadings. Suicide bombings have also become part of its repertoire. The group even <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/uganda-links-islamist-rebels-attempted-murder-minister-2021-07-01/">attempted to assassinate</a> Ugandan government leaders. </p>
<p>From 2022, the group has carried out heavier raids into Uganda, including attacking a school in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65937484">June 2023</a> in a town near the Uganda-Congolese border. It has also launched several attacks against <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/un-adf-backed-by-islamic-state/7143149.html">businesses in the border zone</a>. </p>
<h2>Uganda’s response</h2>
<p>The increase in the Islamic State Central Africa Province attacks led to a Congolese-approved <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/deal-devil-heart-great-lakes">Ugandan intervention in Congo</a> that began in December 2021. The rebel group initially withdrew into the deep forests of the Rwenzori mountains and the Ituri rainforest in the north-eastern parts of Congo. These are close to the DRC’s Virunga National Park, another large area of wilderness and mountains that’s perfect to hide in. </p>
<p>This renewed pressure might have led parts of the rebel group into Ugandan territory in the Rwenzori Mountains National Park. This isn’t too far from Queen Elizabeth National Park where the recent terror attacks occurred. </p>
<p>This latest intervention continues a pattern of Ugandan and Congolese offensives that lead to temporary withdrawals of the rebel group into the forest and mountains around the Uganda-Congo border. These offensives usually end with the rebels returning into towns and cities upon Ugandan and Congolese withdrawals. </p>
<p>Importantly, the current offensive has failed to end terror attacks inside Uganda.</p>
<p>Adding to the complexity of the intervention are ongoing attacks from the largest guerilla group in eastern Congo, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">March 23 Movement</a> (M23). M23 has had <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/14/drc-m23-rebels-recapture-kishishe-where-they-are-accused-of-a-massacre-in-2022/">recent success</a> on the battlefield, recapturing towns from government forces. </p>
<p>The M23 offensive takes place to the south and west of the area where the Islamic State in Central Africa Province is operating, but has repercussions for the group. First, the recent round of warfare in eastern DRC has created a record <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/renewed-fighting-raises-fears-for-peace-in-dr-congo-wider-region/3051713">6.9 million</a> refugees due to escalating violence, creating chaos that the group can take advantage of. </p>
<p>Second, the ongoing fighting has drawn the Congolese army away from its campaign against the Islamic State in Central Africa Province, and hinders Congolese-Rwandese cooperation against it. This is due to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">Rwandan support for the M23</a>, which Kigali officially denies providing. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>The Islamic State in Central Africa Province thrives on <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">Congolese-Rwandese</a> rivalry, as well as regional mistrust dating back decades. Creating real regional cooperation and trust would be the first step toward ensuring that the Islamic State’s local outfit is stopped. It would also help address nearly three decades of fighting in the Congo. </p>
<p>For this to happen, however, African – as well as other international actors – need to stay focused on the conflict in Congo and the unrest in the Uganda-Rwanda-DRC border areas. It’s also important to actively strive for dialogue, especially <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/us-pressure-on-drc-rwanda-paying-off-4445108">between Rwanda and Congo</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I would like to thank journalist Adolph Basengezi for his comments on the situation in Congo's north-east, aiding my analysis on the current conflict.</span></em></p>Regional rivalries have functioned as oxygen, allowing the rebel group to survive and grow.Stig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2164832023-10-27T14:09:00Z2023-10-27T14:09:00ZChad’s first dengue fever outbreak: what you should know<p><em>Chad has <a href="https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/dengue/chad-reports-its-first-dengue-outbreak">reported</a> its first dengue outbreak, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). The country’s health ministry declared an outbreak on 15 August and so far 1,342 suspected cases have been reported, 41 of them confirmed in the laboratory. One death was reported among the patients with lab-confirmed cases. The outbreak started in Ouaddaï province in eastern Chad, currently the outbreak epicentre. Illnesses have also been reported in three other provinces. Godfred Akoto Boafo spoke to medical entomologist Eunice Anyango Owino about the disease.</em></p>
<h2>What causes dengue fever and how does it affect people?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/dengue-and-severe-dengue">Dengue fever</a> is a mosquito-borne viral disease caused by one of the four dengue virus serotypes. It is primarily transmitted by the <em>Aedes aegypti</em> mosquito and to a lesser extent the <em>Aedes albopictus</em> mosquito, mainly in the tropical and sub-tropical areas of the world. </p>
<p>Infection with one serotype provides long-term immunity to that particular serotype, but not the others. That means that, after recovery, a person can still be infected by the other three serotypes. Serotypes are groups within a single species of microorganisms, such as bacteria or viruses, which share distinctive surface structures.</p>
<p>Most infections produce only mild flu-like illness; 80% of cases are asymptomatic. But getting infected with different serotypes one after the other puts a person at a greater risk of severe dengue, also known as dengue hemorrhagic fever. It is characterised by serious internal bleeding and organ damage, and a sudden drop in blood pressure that causes shock which can be fatal. </p>
<h2>How widespread is it in the Sahel? Why is this first outbreak in Chad significant?</h2>
<p>Dengue fever has been <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37473544/">endemic in Sudan</a>, with outbreaks documented in 2010, 2013, 2017 and 2019. Unfortunately, due to years of political and civil conflicts, the control and response capacity of the public health sector in Sudan has been limited. </p>
<p>The risk of spread in the Sahel region, which includes Niger, Mali and Chad, has always been high. This is because these countries all host the suitable mosquito vectors (<em>Aedes</em>). They also share the same tropical climate with seasonal heavy rains and floods. </p>
<p>To add to the problem, countries like Chad are grappling with a massive influx of refugees and returnees from Sudan who might be carrying the disease. The epicentre of the current outbreak, the <a href="https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/chad/chad-humanitarian-update-june-2023#:%7E:text=Following%20the%20escalation%20of%20conflict%20in%20El%20Geneina,Sudanese%20border%20in%20the%20Ouadda%C3%AF%20province%20of%20Chad">province of Ouaddaï</a> at the eastern border with Sudan, hosts more than 400,000 refugees. </p>
<p>The cities at the border with Sudan are densely populated and have poor sanitation. This provides a favourable environment for the vectors to breed. </p>
<p>In addition, Chad lacks effective disease control programmes. This is its first dengue outbreak. It doesn’t have the necessary public health preparedness and response capacities. So the risk posed by this outbreak is high. </p>
<p>The movement of the <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2019-DON207">returning refugees</a> has the potential to spread the outbreak in Chad and even across the border to other countries in the Sahel, the rest of Africa, and the world at large. </p>
<h2>What treatment is available?</h2>
<p>There’s currently no available treatment for dengue in the world. Timely detection and case management, especially treatment of dehydration and plasma leakage by oral or intravenous rehydration, are key in preventing severe illness and death. </p>
<p>There is an approved dengue vaccine (Dengvaxia) for use in people aged 9-45 years. But for it to be effective they must have had one infection of dengue by any of the four serotype viruses, which must be confirmed by a laboratory test. </p>
<p>The vaccine is given in three doses within 12 months and protects against all the four dengue virus serotypes with an efficacy of 80%. However, its availability in developing countries in Africa isn’t assured, although it has been licensed by several national regulatory authorities. </p>
<p>Apart from the vaccine, the only other guard against dengue fever is prevention of mosquito bites and vector control.</p>
<h2>What is the way forward in controlling the disease?</h2>
<p>More investment should be put on expanding clinical and laboratory capabilities to deal with the disease. Given that this is Chad’s first outbreak, it needs to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>put in place standard operating procedures for clinical management of suspected and confirmed dengue cases </p></li>
<li><p>expand the capacity for early detection of cases – this could be done by procurement of rapid diagnostic tests and by alerting communities </p></li>
<li><p>strengthen disease surveillance and coordinate the response by actively finding cases. Cases within the community are likely to be underreported as dengue is unknown to the public. Also, clinicians might not be familiar with the disease presentation. It could be confused with other common fevers. </p></li>
<li><p>put in place effective vector control measures, like draining stagnant water around residential areas, cleaning and replenishing water storage containers on a weekly basis, distributing insecticide-treated nets, spraying indoors and using window and door screens.</p></li>
<li><p>strengthen surveillance to assess the vector breeding potential in containers and to monitor insecticide resistance. This is critical for selecting the most effective insecticides. </p></li>
<li><p>make communities aware of the risks of infection and how to protect themselves. Engaged communities can take ownership of the vector control strategy and adopt healthy behaviours. </p></li>
<li><p>strengthen cross-border collaboration. The current outbreak most likely spread from Sudan. The focus should be on prevention and vector control measures in border areas.</p></li>
<li><p>mobilise resources for a national contingency plan for dengue preparedness and response. And seek help from experienced organisations like the WHO.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eunice Anyango Owino receives funding from National Research Fund, Kenya. </span></em></p>The Sahel region is grappling with an outbreak of the deadly mosquito-borne disease.Eunice Anyango Owino, Medical Entomologist at the School of Biological Sciences, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2129262023-10-10T12:38:06Z2023-10-10T12:38:06ZPeace in Sudan is elusive for any would-be mediators – but a new window of opportunity has opened for outside intervention<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552164/original/file-20231004-15-wakonh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C217%2C5010%2C2017&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Sudanese military has been at war with the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group since April 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sudanese-armed-forces-mark-army-day-in-sudans-eastern-news-photo/1598686946">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than five months have passed since <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/15/africa/sudan-presidential-palace-intl/index.html">intense fighting broke out</a> between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary group also known as the RSF. In that time, <a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/09/08/sudan-situation-update-september-2023-deadly-reciprocal-offensives-for-strategic-locations-in-khartoum-and-darfur/">more than 7,000 people have been killed</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/08/1139352">nearly 4 million others displaced</a>. The conflict is still ongoing, with little evidence of resolution.</p>
<p>The clashes were sparked by a disagreement over how the RSF, led by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, more commonly known as Hemedti, could be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-talks-hit-roadblock-over-security-sector-reform-2023-03-30/">integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces</a>, or SAF, led by Gen. Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan. </p>
<p>Sudan is the <a href="https://fsdafrica.org/countries/sudan">third-largest country</a> by area in Africa. It is also home to the Nile River basin, is mineral rich and is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-conflict-nile-africa-russia-03adebaff0c95992c6f90543dcb2c894">strategically located</a> on the Red Sea, close to the Middle East. So this conflict comes with heavy <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-plunge-into-chaos-has-geopolitical-implications-near-and-far-including-for-us-strategic-goals-204453">security and economic ramifications</a> for the region and beyond.</p>
<p>As a political science professor who <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=3EmhcmoAAAAJ&hl=en">studies civil conflicts</a>, I know that stability in Sudan requires a concerted effort from the international community. So far, a variety of <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/455156-sudan-faces-an-inflection-point-and-needs-us-leadership/">efforts have failed</a>. However, I believe that applying a right mix of international measures at the right time can give Sudan a chance at peace. </p>
<h2>Roots of conflict</h2>
<p>Much like Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/democracy-monitor/sudan/">Sudan is what is known as an “anocracy”</a> – that is, a <a href="https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1008934-the-perils-of-anocracy">political regime in transition</a> from autocracy to democracy.</p>
<p>Anocracies are <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/624156/how-civil-wars-start-by-barbara-f-walter/">prone to armed conflicts</a>. Mainly due to the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717692652">growth of paramilitaries and weak civilian control of the military</a>, they face <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108500319">frequent coups and rebellions</a>. </p>
<p>Sudan experienced a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2023/6/30/between-two-wars-20-years-of-conflict-in-sudans-darfur">major armed conflict</a> in the western region of Darfur from 2003 to 2020, during which former president Omar al-Bashir used RSF paramilitaries to violently suppress rebel groups.</p>
<p>However, as the RSF grew more powerful, <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/03/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-3.php">attempts to integrate it into the Sudanese army</a> failed. And in 2022, a <a href="https://news.umich.edu/u-m-expert-peace-elusive-in-sudan-with-intractable-generals-and-real-risks-of-worsening-conflict/">power struggle</a> between the two groups ensued.</p>
<h2>The limits of mediation</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-turmoil-turkey-erdogan-offers-mediate-conflict">Turkey</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/sudan-crisis-ethiopia-seeks-peace-talks/a-65442664">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/04/18/egypt-president-to-help-mediate-on-crisis-in-neighbouring-sudan/">Egypt</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/israel-proposes-hosting-rivals-sudan-ceasefire-talks-after-mediation-2023-04-24/">Israel</a> have all offered to mediate between the SAF and RSF in Sudan. <a href="https://news.umich.edu/u-m-expert-peace-elusive-in-sudan-with-intractable-generals-and-real-risks-of-worsening-conflict/">So did the African Union</a>, along with the <a href="https://igad.int/">Intergovernmental Authority on Development</a>, an eight-country trade bloc in Africa. They proposed Kenya as the key mediator.</p>
<p>The SAF and RSF have not accepted any of these offers. </p>
<p>Efforts by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have yielded several ceasefires, including a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/17/air-raid-kills-17-in-sudans-capital-khartoum/">72-hour ceasefire</a> from June 18-21, 2023, but no concrete agreements. </p>
<p>Successful mediation requires that the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/International-Mediation-Bias-and-Peacemaking-Taking-Sides-in-Civil-Wars/Svensson/p/book/9781138200739">mediator has leverage</a> to <a href="https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol2/iss1/8/">offer incentives</a> to the warring parties, and also <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/cupapsrev/v_3a103_3ay_3a2009_3ai_3a02_3ap_3a248-263_5f09.htm">maintains impartiality</a> between them.</p>
<p>When it comes to Sudan, no mediator has managed to offer terms acceptable to both warring parties. Furthermore, many of the potential mediators have supported one side or the other. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-general-warns-kenya-against-sending-peacekeepers-2023-07-24/">Kenya</a> and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/28/analysis-uae-egypt-closer-to-different-sides-in-sudan-conflict">United Arab Emirates</a> have been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-general-warns-kenya-against-sending-peacekeepers-2023-07-24/">accused by the Sudanese army</a> of supporting the RSF, which fought in Yemen and Libya <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/12/sudan-conflict-saudi-arabia-uae-gulf-burhan-hemeti-rsf">alongside the UAE</a>. <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sudan/sudan-and-new-age-conflict">Egypt</a>, meanwhile, supports the SAF due to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-burhan-heads-egypt-meet-president-sisi-statement-2023-08-29/">traditional ties with Sudanese generals</a>. </p>
<p>And while the U.S. does not have an official position of support for either side, <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-measures-in-response-to-the-crisis-in-sudan/">partly due to the atrocities committed by both warring parties</a>, its Saudi partners in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/15/sudan-army-returns-for-talks-in-jeddah-as-war-enters-fourth-month">Jeddah talks</a> <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/12/sudan-conflict-saudi-arabia-uae-gulf-burhan-hemeti-rsf">back the SAF</a>. This may stem from their rivalry with the UAE.</p>
<p>But what doomed the Jeddah talks was not this perceived Saudi bias but the lack of political leverage. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia failed to provide clear and concrete terms that could be acceptable to both warring parties. </p>
<h2>Sanctions fall short</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/05/04/executive-order-on-imposing-sanctions-on-certain-persons-destabilizing-sudan-and-undermining-the-goal-of-a-democratic-transition/">U.S. sanctions</a> have targeted specific entities or individuals that disrupt the democratic transition in Sudan. </p>
<p>On June 1, 2023, the Department of the Treasury <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1514">announced sanctions against four companies</a> within the gold mining, vehicle and weapons industries that it accused of funding or arming the warring parties. Two of the companies were affiliated with the SAF, and two were linked to the RSF. Three months later, the department <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1712">also sanctioned Hemedti</a>, the RSF leader.</p>
<p>Usually, the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/power-of-global-performance-indicators/can-blacklisting-reduce-terrorist-attacks/9CE6A7954342868355D1131874672A6D">United Nations coordinates sanctions</a> with the U.S., and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26298448">U.S. allies follow suit</a>. However, this cascade of sanctions has yet to happen. The U.N. Sanctions Committee <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/sanctions-and-other-committees#cat1">has not added any new sanctions</a> on Sudan yet, while the European Union is working on <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-toughen-its-stance-sudan-war-with-sanctions-framework-sources-2023-07-25/">a framework for such sanctions</a>.</p>
<p>While current and future sanctions may hold, targets often find <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318788127">alternative sources of funding</a>. Despite U.S. sanctions targeting Hemedti’s RSF reliance on the gold trade, Russia has stepped in to supply weapons and training to Sudan <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/29/africa/sudan-russia-gold-investigation-cmd-intl/index.html">in exchange for gold</a> to fund its war in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Peacekeeping efforts hold promise</h2>
<p>International peacekeeping can be <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/abs/extraordinary-relationship-between-peacekeeping-and-peace/D2D5D262B60315387B0B23D1D4F79CC9">effective in conflict zones</a>, particularly when the efforts are <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/36691/chapter-abstract/321734745?redirectedFrom=fulltext">properly resourced</a>. Peacekeeping missions in the Ivory Coast from 2004 to 2017 and in Croatia from 1996 to 1998 are often cited as <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/12/1131552">success stories</a>. </p>
<p>The United Nations-African Union Mission, or UNAMIS, was a peacekeeping mission in Darfur from 2007 to 2020 that used both police and troops to provide a buffer zone. The missions had only <a href="https://democracyinafrica.org/the-legacy-of-unamid-and-the-future-of-hybrid-peacekeeping-missions/">partial successes</a>, mainly due to the lack of support from the al-Bashir government. </p>
<p>In 2020, after the UNAMIS ended, the U.N. Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, or UNITAMS, was tasked to assist political transitions in Sudan. However, it lacked police or troops, and its potential efficacy is <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/sb11-ten-challenges-un-2023-2024">heavily disputed</a>. </p>
<h2>An integrated approach</h2>
<p>Observers of Sudanese politics and experts of international relations have suggested many solutions to stabilize Sudan, prevent further atrocities and eventually resolve the conflict.</p>
<p>These include <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/to-stop-the-fighting-in-sudan-take-away-the-generals-money/">stopping Hemedti’s flow of money</a>, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/experts-darfur-peacekeeping-mission-should-be-considered/7124875.html">sending peacekeepers with troops and police</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/7/13/why-is-the-international-criminal-court-so-silent-on-sudan">involving the International Criminal Court</a> to investigate atrocities, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sudan/sudans-descent-chaos">coordinating political dialogue</a> between international actors and warring parties, and <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/magazine/sudan-civil-war-fits-global-pattern-by-comfort-ero-and-richard-atwood-2023-06">restraining outside influences</a> – such as from the UAE or Russia – that weaken the effect of sanctions on Sudan.</p>
<p>One integrated solution is to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343321990076">combine peacekeeping and mediation</a>. This would mean augmenting UNITAMS with police and troops from the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/department-of-peace-operations">U.N. Peacekeeping division</a>, while forging a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sudan/sudans-descent-chaos">united diplomatic front</a> on the international level.</p>
<p>A short-term action for this united front would be to employ the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/mediation-support">U.N. mediation team</a>. With a roster of experienced international mediators, the mediation team can try to provide opportunities for political dialogue. </p>
<p>A long-term solution, and one suggested in the international <a href="https://ifit-transitions.org/peace-treaty-initiative/">Peace Treaty Initiative</a>, is to institutionalize the mediation effort. Once a country accepts the proposed treaty, it can request mediation before or after conflict erupts. This process avoids the difficulty of getting to the mediation table in the first place, while guaranteeing a coordinated and concerted mediation process.</p>
<h2>A window of opportunity</h2>
<p>In April 2023, the warring parties <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230418-sudan-rejects-external-mediation-efforts/">rejected international mediation offers</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/how-sudans-military-factions-set-path-war-mediation-stalled-2023-04-28/">failed to send delegates</a> for internal mediation in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital. Until mid-August, neither side seems had seemed to have reached the stage of a “<a href="https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/9897/chapter/7">hurting stalemate</a>” – which is sorely needed for parties to come to the negotiation table. </p>
<p>However, with the death on Aug. 23, 2023, of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-in-africa-prigozhins-death-exposes-putins-real-motives-on-the-continent-212707">Wagner group in Russia</a>, Hemedti has lost a key Russian ally. This leaves him more vulnerable to U.S. sanctions on the gold trade. In fact, this may have been what prompted him to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/30/political-ploy-activists-experts-rubbish-rsfs-sudan-peace-proposal">suggest a peace proposal</a> on Aug. 27. </p>
<p>As for Burhan of the SAF, he has tried to burnish his image by visiting Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and he gave a <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/09/1141287">speech at the U.N. General Assembly</a> on Sept. 21. This occurred after the SAF had to move to Port Sudan from Khartoum, where the RSF took a stronghold. </p>
<p>Given the weakened positions of both the RSF and SAF, a mediation window may open soon.</p>
<h2>Challenges ahead</h2>
<p>Any effort, however, is not without challenges. </p>
<p>A sufficient supply of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/700203">well-resourced peacekeeping personnel</a> is not guaranteed in this <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/2022-un-peacekeeping-budget-signs-progress-or-fleeting-moment-consensus">age of retrenchment</a>. UNAMID was a <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/interview/2021/5/26/can-a-new-un-mission-help-stabilise-sudan">US$1 billion endeavor</a>, while UNITAMS’ current budget is <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/interview/2021/5/26/can-a-new-un-mission-help-stabilise-sudan">$34 million a year</a>.</p>
<p>Forging a united international front is another challenge, given the <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/magazine/sudan-civil-war-fits-global-pattern-by-comfort-ero-and-richard-atwood-2023-06">various foreign alliances</a> both warring parties have.</p>
<p>Other tools are limited, however. For example, sanctions will not affect Burhan that much, as the SAF still has air power and will be able to sustain its airstrikes. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges ahead, Sudan cannot be ignored. However, a lasting resolution requires multiple measures that can augment each other. The lack of external interference, plus an impartial mediator and U.S. leverage, will be essential ingredients for mediation to move forward. And the mix of measures must be applied with the right timing and with the right actors involved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212926/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hyeran Jo is a member of the expert advisory group of the Peace Initiative, an international legal effort led by the Institute for Integrated Transitions. This article's research was funded by the U.S. National Science Foundation (SES # 2049443).</span></em></p>An expert on civil conflicts explains why the international community has so far failed to create peace in Sudan, and what new opportunities lie ahead.Hyeran Jo, Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127282023-09-18T12:22:09Z2023-09-18T12:22:09ZGenocide fears in Darfur are attracting little attention − have nations abandoned their responsibility to protect civilians?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548147/original/file-20230913-29-frdmf4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=40%2C0%2C4500%2C2930&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A military convoy on the way to Port Sudan on Aug. 30, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/fighters-ride-in-a-vehicle-moving-in-a-military-convoy-news-photo/1633929430?adppopup=true"> Photo by AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mass atrocities are once again plaguing the people of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/08/29/sudan-darfur-genocide/">Darfur, Sudan</a>, with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-war-military-rsf-darfur-6e13139742d52564e47847cb9bd4d2a5">talk of a genocide</a> taking place.</p>
<p>Twenty years after <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/sudan/case-study/violence/enormous-loss-of-civilian-life">genocide</a> began in the region, recent conflict and targeted violence have forced <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/sudan/">over 5 million people</a> to flee their homes across Sudan in just five months. In Darfur, non-Arab unarmed civilians have been <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/16/africa/darfur-sudan-geneina-massacre-account-cmd-intl/index.html">hunted down</a> and massacred, according to eyewitnesses and survivors. Women and girls have been subjected to <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/un-experts-alarmed-reported-widespread-use-rape-and-sexual-violence-against#:%7E:text=Reportedly%2C%20hundreds%20of%20women%20have,been%20particularly%20vulnerable%20to%20violence.">systematic rape, sexual violence</a> <a href="https://sihanet.org/kidnapping-and-slavery-the-rsf-is-committing-more-dangerous-rights-violations-in-this-malign-war-against-civilians-in-sudan/">and trafficking</a>.</p>
<p>With genocide and crimes against humanity once again taking place and so little international attention, one wonders if the international community has completely turned its back on a decades-old commitment to protect civilians from mass atrocities, known as the “<a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml">responsibility to protect</a>.”</p>
<p>I’m an <a href="https://humanrights.uconn.edu/person/mike-brand/">adjunct professor</a> of genocide studies and human rights at the <a href="https://humanrights.uconn.edu/">University of Connecticut</a>, and the question of how the international community should confront genocide is an issue my students and I grapple with every semester.</p>
<p>Before unpacking that question, let’s look at why the expectation of civilian protection even exists. </p>
<h2>An important question</h2>
<p>In 2000, then-United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/413745?ln=en">asked the international community</a>, “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica — to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”</p>
<p>It was an important question. For centuries, the <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803121924198">principle of sovereignty</a> reigned supreme in international relations. It was largely understood that what happens within a country’s borders is that government’s responsibility. Governing authorities were pretty much free to do what they pleased, without fear of meddling from other international actors. </p>
<p>In the post-World War II era, states began to willingly give up some of their sovereignty to join the newly created <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un">United Nations</a> and engage in various agreements outlining common rules they would follow – collectively, these rules are now known as international law. However, even after witnessing the horrors of the Holocaust and pledging “<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2018/09/genocide-never-again-has-become-time-and-again">never again</a>,” the world watched genocide unfold in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">Rwanda in 1994</a> and <a href="https://www.irmct.org/specials/srebrenica/timeline/en/">Srebrenica the following year</a>. Annan’s question needed an answer if the international community were to effectively prevent or intervene to stop another genocide.</p>
<p>In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty sought to answer Annan’s question by presenting a new concept known as the “<a href="https://www.walterdorn.net/pdf/Responsibility-to-Protect_ICISS-Report_Dec2001.pdf">responsibility to protect</a>.” The framework re-imagined state sovereignty and the responsibility of states to protect their people from mass atrocities like genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. In cases when a state was unwilling to live up to its responsibility to protect civilians or was itself the perpetrator of mass atrocities, then the responsibility shifted to the wider international community through the United Nations.</p>
<h2>A revolutionary idea</h2>
<p>The commission outlined three key responsibilities for implementing the responsibility to protect: the responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild. </p>
<p>The responsibility to prevent focuses on addressing the root causes of conflict and preventing mass atrocities before they break out. </p>
<p>The responsibility to react refers to the international community’s response to ongoing mass atrocities through diplomatic interventions, sanctions and sometimes military intervention. </p>
<p>Finally, the responsibility to rebuild includes assisting a country in its recovery from conflict and any damage caused by external interventions in an effort to stabilize a post-conflict country and prevent future atrocities.</p>
<p>Often, it is the responsibility to react, and more specifically military intervention, that people associate with the responsibility to protect. However, the “responsibility to protect” framework clearly states that military intervention is to be used only as a <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/evans-interview-r2p-after-libya/">last resort</a>. As the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/prevention.shtml#:%7E:text=Therefore%2C%20prevention%20not%20only%20contributes,or%20dealing%20with%20their%20aftermath.">has said</a>, “Prevention is much less costly than intervening to halt these crimes, or dealing with their aftermath.” </p>
<p>The concept of the responsibility to protect was in many ways revolutionary. Member states adopted the principle at the U.N.’s <a href="https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/newyork2005">2005 World Summit</a> just four years after the concept was introduced. World leaders pledged in a joint statement: “We are prepared to take collective action … should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”</p>
<p>While it was a major accomplishment to get world leaders to endorse the responsibility to protect, it was not binding international law. There were no requirements that states live up to its provisions, and there were no penalties if states failed to protect populations from mass atrocities.</p>
<h2>The first test</h2>
<p>The urgency for responsibility to protect was evident in the fact that while the principle was being discussed and adopted, <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040909-10.html">genocide was underway in Darfur</a>. Just 10 years after <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">the genocide in Rwanda</a>, which was the impetus for the creation of the responsibility to protect, non-Arab civilian populations in western Sudan were being systematically targeted for destruction.</p>
<p>Some sanctions and strong words from the United Nations and several countries followed. But little direct action was taken for the first few years of the Darfur genocide. It took the United Nations four years to authorize and deploy a hybrid peacekeeping mission in the form of the <a href="https://unamid.unmissions.org/">United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur</a>. Even after this mission was finally deployed, violence continued. In all, between <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-07-24">200,000 and 400,000</a> Darfuris were killed, and millions were displaced. Many fled to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/they-gave-us-two-options-leave-chad-or-be-killed">neighboring Chad</a>, where they remain today. The exact death tolls are disputed because of limited humanitarian presence and a lack of investigative capacity.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A Sudanese mother with scarf on her head is holding her malnourished son in a hospital." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Millions of Darfuris were displaced in the mid-2000s, many to Sudanese refugee camps in neighboring Chad.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ida-ibrahim-holds-her-malnourished-son-ahmad-saleh-13-news-photo/691913736?adppopup=true">Lynsey Addario/via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Several <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Responsibility-to-Protect-in-Darfur-From-Forgotten-Conflict-to-Global/Lanz/p/book/9781032570686">books</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26298897">academic articles</a> analyzed the response – <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4541909">or lack thereof</a> – to genocide in Darfur within the context of responsibility to protect. It has become the quintessential case study.</p>
<p>Yet most view the international community’s response to Darfur in the early 2000s as a <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Unwilling-and-Unable-The-Failed-Response-to-the-Atrocities-in-Darfur.pdf">responsibility-to-protect failure</a>, despite the peacekeeping mission, public attention and diplomatic engagement. Not only was there a failure to protect civilians, there was also a failure to hold perpetrators accountable for their crimes. Many of the <a href="https://medium.com/@atrocitiesprevention/sudan-genocide-warning-letter-ea8e78b671b1">same perpetrators</a> of the genocide in the early 2000s <a href="https://progressive.org/latest/genocide-is-once-again-plaguing-darfur-brand-230710/">are committing atrocities again now</a>, observers say, in a testament to the dangers of impunity. </p>
<h2>Even worse than before</h2>
<p>But there is an important distinction between today and the early 2000s – today there is little appetite among the international community to engage in a meaningful way that would protect civilians and bring an end to the slaughter. <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/tension-between-sudan-kenya-s-ruto-impedes-igad-mediation-effort-in-sudan/7195894.html">Kenyan President William Ruto</a> has called for a new peacekeeping mission to be deployed, but neither the United Nations nor the African Union has supported him. The UN’s former mission in Darfur ended in 2020.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates <a href="https://geneva.usmission.gov/2023/06/19/joint-statement-on-sudan-by-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates-united-kingdom-and-united-states/">publicly called for peace</a> while <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-u-s-ally-promised-to-send-aid-to-sudan-it-sent-weapons-instead-82d396f">privately sending arms</a> to the very militia committing mass atrocities.</p>
<p>The United States has <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases?title=sudan&publication-start-date=&publication-end-date=">sanctioned</a> elements of the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese armed forces and has <a href="https://www.state.gov/statement-on-atrocities-in-darfur-sudan/">repeatedly</a> called for <a href="https://www.state.gov/on-civilian-casualties-in-sudan/">accountability for perpetrators of atrocities</a>. The United States ambassador-at-large for global criminal justice, Beth Van Schaack, has stated that the violence in West Darfur “serves as an ominous reminder of the horrific events that led the United States to determine in 2004 that a genocide was underway in Darfur.” But she stopped short of saying genocide was happening again. Historically, United States genocide determinations have been political decisions that are often <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/22/the-g-word-paradox-genocide-islamic-state-john-kerry/#:%7E:text=When%20used%20correctly%2C%20the%20word,or%20%E2%80%9Ccrimes%E2%80%9D%20ever%20can.">delayed by State Department lawyers</a>. </p>
<p>The question of the viability of the “responsibility to protect” principle goes beyond the crisis in Darfur. Over the past two decades, the international community has failed to protect civilians in <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/1370/2015/en/">Syria</a>, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/south-sudans-civil-war-spirals-genocide-leaving-ghost-towns-wake">South Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">the Democratic Republic of Congo</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">Yemen</a>, <a href="https://www.state.gov/burma-genocide/">Myanmar</a> and <a href="https://www.state.gov/war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/">Ethiopia</a>. The responsibility to protect does not have a great track record. </p>
<p>It would appear that even the secretary-general of the United Nations has lost faith in the doctrine. In António Guterres’ recently released policy paper, <a href="https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-new-agenda-for-peace-en.pdf">New Agenda for Peace</a>, which outlines his vision for creating a more peaceful world, the term “responsibility to protect” does not appear once in the 40-page document.</p>
<p>Perhaps after two decades of limited success, flagrant violations and overall apathy, it is time to retire the responsibility to protect and find a new way to answer Annan’s question.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212728/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mike Brand does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The international community has also failed to protect civilians in Syria, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen, Myanmar and Ethiopia, a genocide expert writes.Mike Brand, Adjunct Professor of Genocide Studies and Human Rights, University of ConnecticutLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122192023-08-24T20:19:37Z2023-08-24T20:19:37ZRegardless of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s fate, Vladimir Putin benefits<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544640/original/file-20230824-18379-6nqbwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C5%2C3936%2C2667&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Face masks depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin displayed at a souvenir shop in St. Petersburg, Russia. Prigozhin reportedly died in a plane crash on Aug. 23.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo, File)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/regardless-of-wagner-group-leader-yevgeny-prigozhins-fate-vladimir-putin-benefits" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>On Aug. 23, Russian media reported that Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/moscow-plane-crash-yevgeny-prigozhin-1.6945096%22">was listed among the passengers of a plane that crashed, leaving no survivors</a>. Speculation has <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/2023/08/24/Prigozhin-death-is-likely-Putin-s-payback-for-mutiny-warning-to-opposition-Analysts">already begun about Putin’s potential involvement in the crash</a>. This speculation is likely to continue unabated well into the future. </p>
<p>Some have even argued that due to <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/business-jet-crash-russia-kills-10-officials-wagner-102499339">many individuals changing their names to Yevgeny Prigozhin in an attempt to thwart surveillance of the Wagner leader</a>, it might not have been him on the flight.</p>
<p>Regardless of whether Putin was responsible or even if Prigozhin is still alive, the latter’s position has been undermined in Russia; Putin will benefit from this development.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="men in uniform stand around the remains of a plane in a field" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian servicemen inspect a part of a crashed private jet that may have been carrying Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Domestic advantages</h2>
<p>Prigozhin’s death will stabilize Putin’s domestic position. Putin has been at his <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-wagner-group-revolt-in-russia-could-mean-for-the-war-in-ukraine-208428">weakest point</a>, politically speaking, since the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wagner-groups-rebellion-putin-unfolded/story?id=100373557">Wagner Group’s insurrection in June</a>.</p>
<p>Not only did domestic elites <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-the-fallout-of-russias-wagner-rebellion/">not immediately support Putin</a>, but the insurrection demonstrated to the Russian people that Putin’s position was not unassailable. Prigozhin’s revolt challenged the Russian political establishment in a way not done since Putin <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vladimir-Putin">assumed power over two decades ago</a>.</p>
<p>Many Russians will see Prigozhin’s death as emanating from the Kremlin. Although some people <a href="https://news.sky.com/video/russians-bring-flowers-to-wagner-hq-for-wagner-leader-yevgeny-prigozhin-12946437">laid flowers</a> outside of Wagner headquarters in honour of Prigozhin, this gesture does not appear to represent the majority. Instead, Prigozhin’s alleged demise will reinforce Putin’s domestic position, whether through his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/may/09/putin-may-have-high-ratings-but-russians-are-terrified-too">genuine popularity or fear of opposing him</a>.</p>
<h2>Russia and sanctions</h2>
<p>The economic sanctions against Russia have been simultaneously controversial and effective. The controversy stems from the fact that the sanctions at their outset had minimal effect on the Russian economy. The Russian economy <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/21/russias-economy-contracted-2-1-in-2022">did not contract to the extent hoped for</a> by those implementing the sanctions. </p>
<p>This development should not have been shocking, as Russia knew sanctions were likely after Western countries made a similar move after its annexation of Crimea. The Russian state, therefore, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/03/world/europe/putin-sanctions-proofing.html">made moves</a> to fortify its economy against the effects of economic sanctions.</p>
<p>Crucial to Russia’s ongoing efforts to avoid the worst effects of the sanctions has been finding non-Western countries with which to conduct trade. Outlets for Russian resources, such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/asia-crude-imports-hit-high-china-india-gorge-russian-oil-russell-2023-08-03/">China and India</a>, have kept the Russian economy functioning, if not in an ideal manner. These markets have helped the Russian economy weather the worst impacts of the sanctions.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-russias-economy-proved-resilient-last-year-now-the-pain-is-setting-in/">collapsing ruble</a> however, suggests that while sanctions were ineffective in the short term, the long-term costs are being felt. </p>
<p>For Russia to surmount this problem, additional markets and means of overcoming the sanctions are needed.</p>
<h2>Wagner operations</h2>
<p>The Wagner Group’s involvement in Ukraine represented an aberration in its standard operations. In Ukraine, the Wagner Group operated as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/bakhmut-is-increasingly-a-quagmire-that-works-to-russias-advantage-203524">direct appendage of the Russian state</a>. This was in contrast to how the group often acted in relationship to the state — it was much more common for Wagner to pursue Russian interests in campaigns where the Russian government <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state">wished to downplay its active involvement</a>.</p>
<p>Syria was a textbook example of how Russia used the Wagner Group to pursue its interests while minimizing its direct involvement. In Syria, Wagner Group soldiers took an <a href="https://apnews.com/general-news-7f9e63cb14a54dfa9148b6430d89e873">active role in not only defending the regime of Bashar al-Assad</a>, but also conducting offensive operations that allowed the Syrian president to retake control of much of the country. </p>
<p>In exchange, the Wagner Group received <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/wagner-group-syria-profiting-failed-states">25 per cent of the gas, oil and phosphate production</a> in the areas it recaptured for the Syrian government.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group’s actions in Africa are even more explicit from an economic standpoint. While the Wagner Group’s operations in Libya were nominally in support of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whos-who-libyas-war">Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army</a>, it simultaneously <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/08/wagner-group-libya-oil-russia-war/">took control of key oil fields and natural gas facilities</a>. </p>
<p>This development has occurred against the backdrop of the European Union looking to <a href="https://globaleurope.eu/globalization/the-eu-and-the-middle-east-exploring-alternatives-to-russian-energy/">Libya and other countries</a> to reduce their reliance on Russian oil and natural gas.</p>
<p>Libya is not alone in this regard. The Wagner Group has been actively involved in supporting numerous governments in Africa. In some countries, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-accuses-russias-wagner-group-mercenaries-fueling-war-sudan-rcna86492">such as Sudan</a>, this involved the Wagner Group establishing companies in order to directly exploit the natural resources of the country.</p>
<p>In other African countries, a Wagner Group presence allows for <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/whats-ahead-for-the-wagner-group-in-africa-and-the-middle-east/">smuggling and money laundering operations</a>. For many governments, such as the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-coup-niger-military-force-e0e1108b58a9e955af465a3efe6605c0">recently established junta in Niger</a>, this is a cost they are willing to pay.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-mercenaries-in-africa-why-there-hasnt-been-any-effective-opposition-to-drive-them-out-207318">Wagner group mercenaries in Africa: why there hasn't been any effective opposition to drive them out</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Wagner’s loyalty</h2>
<p>For Russia, all these activities by the Wagner Group provide a way of overcoming the sanctions regime. The problem Putin faced was that while Wagner Group provided him and the Russian state with vast political and economic resources, Prigozhin’s June revolt made him unreliable. </p>
<p>As the effects of the sanctions become more pronounced, the Russian state is exploring <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/putin-urges-govt-to-propose-reforms-for-overcoming-sanctions/2863665">all avenues available to overcome these economic challenges</a>. Whether Prigozhin truly is dead is irrelevant; Putin, in the underlying confusion, will be able to replace him with individuals <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/putin-is-dismantling-and-rebadging-the-wagner-group-after-prigozhin-plane-crash-experts-say/ar-AA1fJbcY">loyal to him to take charge of Wagner’s vast economic empire</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212219/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russian mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of the Wagner Group, reportedly died when a private jet he was said to be on crashed on Aug. 23, 2023, killing all 10 people on board.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113552023-08-15T14:08:27Z2023-08-15T14:08:27ZSouth Sudan is gearing up for its first election – 3 things it must get right<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542338/original/file-20230811-21-9migfb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Sudan President Salva Kiir (left) and Vice President Riek Machar.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Louis/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The people of South Sudan have not exercised the right to choose their leaders since the referendum that secured <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/new-nation-born">independence from Sudan in 2011</a>. Instead, they have suffered through cycles of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/south-sudans-12-years-of-independence-triumphs-and-challenges/a-66151967">violent conflict</a> that have prevented the democratic transfer of power. </p>
<p>South Sudan descended into violent conflict less than three years after independence. It signed its first <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Agreement%20on%20the%20Resolution%20of%20the%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Republic%20of%20South%20Sudan.pdf">peace agreement in 2015</a>. This collapsed in less than a year and was followed by another wave of violence. The 2015 peace agreement was resuscitated in <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">2018</a> with hope it would lead to a newly elected government in February 2023. </p>
<p>After failing to fully implement the 2018 revitalised peace agreement, the signatories <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15219.doc.htm">extended its term for 24 months</a> to allow for better preparation for elections in December 2024. The elections, however, may be extended again. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Luka-Kuol-2">studied</a> constitution-making, security governance and post-conflict transitions. I also served as a minister in the Government of Southern Sudan and the Sudan National Government of Unity in 2005. In my view, postponing polls has become a currency in South Sudan, making a democratic transition through elections an elusive quest. However, it’s possible to hold elections if there is political will. </p>
<p>A recent public opinion survey showed that the majority of South Sudanese <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/South-Sudan-Policy-Report-Elections.pdf#page=11">are opposed to any further delays</a> to elections. Church leaders and civil society organisations have also <a href="https://cityreviewss.com/no-more-extension-the-church-adds-voice-in-call-for-general-election/">called</a> for elections. These sentiments indicate that the South Sudanese are tired of a status quo where the ruling elite clings to political power through endless power-sharing arrangements rather than through the ballot. </p>
<p>Three key things are needed for a credible poll: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>electoral laws to guide the process</p></li>
<li><p>voter registration and constituency boundaries</p></li>
<li><p>a safe environment to vote in.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Providing what’s needed</h2>
<p>There are <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf">major political and logistical challenges</a> in the way of an election in South Sudan. Resolving them will require hard choices and difficult trade-offs. </p>
<p><strong>Electoral laws:</strong> one of the big issues in the political reforms process is whether the elections will be conducted under a permanent constitution – which is <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudans-constitution-making-process-is-on-shaky-ground-how-to-firm-it-up-177107">still being drafted</a> – or the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2011">current constitution</a>. A permanent constitution is one of the prerequisites for the conduct of election under the 2018 peace deal. However, tying a permanent constitution to the conduct of elections was unrealistic. Permanent constitution-making takes time. It requires the effective participation of citizens, and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their home areas. </p>
<p>Also, the permanent constitution should be ratified by an elected parliament. Not the current handpicked 650 members of the national legislature who are part of South Sudan’s elite power-sharing arrangements. </p>
<p>The amended <a href="https://www.fd.uc.pt/g7+/pdfs/South_Sudan.pdf">2011 transitional constitution</a>, the <a href="https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/SS/south-sudan-the-national-elections-act-no.-39-of/view">2012 elections Act</a> and the <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">2018 revitalised peace agreement</a> can provide the basis for laws to guide the 2024 elections. </p>
<p><strong>Voter registration:</strong> another necessary condition for the conduct of elections is a population census. This is important for voter registration and the drawing of constituency boundaries. However, it would be ideal to conduct such a census when there is relative stability, and displaced persons and refugees can return to their homelands. </p>
<p>A population census will take time, though. So how can South Sudan register voters and draw boundaries without one? Political elites need to make the <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf">strategic decision</a> to either use the 2010 constituency boundaries, population estimates or voter registration data. Given rapid demographic shifts – <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/record-36-million-africans-forcibly-displaced-is-44-percent-of-global-total-refugees-asylum/">40%</a> of the country’s population has been forcefully displaced – projections based on the <a href="http://ssnbs.microdatahub.com/index.php/catalog/6/study-description">2008 census</a> could be used to reflect these changes. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ssnbss.org/">National Bureau of Statistics</a> and other research centres, such as the public policy think-tank <a href="https://www.suddinstitute.org/">Sudd Institute</a>, could objectively make population projections. Combined, these data sets can provide reasonable estimates for voter registration and drawing boundaries for constituencies.</p>
<p><strong>Security, and political and civic space:</strong> violent conflict still plagues South Sudan. Should elections be held when there is greater security? Or be organised under the current conditions in the hope that they will produce a legitimate government that promotes peace? A <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/South-Sudan-Policy-Report-Elections.pdf">public perceptions survey</a> found that despite the fear of violence, the majority of South Sudanese want elections. Creating a minimum safe and secure environment, which includes political and civic space for elections, is within the reach of political elites. Especially with the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/south-sudan-begins-unifying-ex-rebels-and-army-3932544#:%7E:text=South%20Sudan's%20unity%20government%20has,to%20transition%20to%20professional%20soldiers.">unification and deployment of security forces</a>. </p>
<h2>What’s going right</h2>
<p>South Sudan has put in motion two major laws that could help conduct elections.</p>
<p>The first is the progressive <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/elections-act-2012-amendment-bill-tabled-before-parliament">National Elections Bill</a>. It proposes a mixed system that allows geographical representation, as well as special <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf#page=14">parliamentary quota seats</a> for political parties and marginalised groups, such as women, persons with disabilities and the youth. This is aimed at ensuring inclusivity. It also reduces the risk of a single party holding a monopoly of power.</p>
<p>The elections bill has the potential to achieve political stability that rests on the distribution of power and resources to constituencies, as in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-illustrates-both-the-promise-as-well-as-the-pitfalls-of-devolution-96729">case of Kenya</a>. </p>
<p>The second law is the newly amended <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/parliament-passes-political-parties-act-2012-amendment-bill-2022">Political Parties Act</a>. Elections are only as credible as the parties that contest them. The amended law provides mechanisms for regulating political parties. It aims to ensure internal democratic governance and accountability in party constitutions. However, its implementation remains a challenge. For instance, the Political Parties Council hasn’t been formed, affecting the registration of political parties. </p>
<p>Most of South Sudan’s political parties are at the embryonic stage with limited or no political experience and resources. Investing in building their institutional capacities and governance will be as urgent as funding the elections. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>South Sudan is at a crossroad. Its ruling elites have to decide between continuing on the <a href="https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/new-blog-3/2022/12/13/elite-capture-and-popular-participation-in-south-sudans-constitution-making">endless power-sharing path</a> or heed to the demands of the people and embrace elections for state legitimacy and democratic transition.</p>
<p>The latter provides citizens with hope of a better South Sudan governed by elected leaders. Yet, political elites are <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf#page=23">becoming increasingly calculating and transactional</a> in meeting the minimum conditions for holding elections. </p>
<p>Providing funding for the elections, and related institutions and activities will test political commitment to the poll. The <a href="https://mofp.gov.ss/doc/MinisterofFinancandPlanning-BudgetSpeechFY2023_2024.pdf">2023-2024 budget</a> – expected to be an elections budget – failed to allocate resources for the poll. </p>
<p>The challenges facing the 2024 elections can be surmounted by collective political will. This is currently in short supply.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211355/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luka Kuol is affiliated with the Abyei Community Action for Development and the Rift Vally Institute.</span></em></p>The political elite have held on to power through power-sharing arrangements rather than the ballot. How will that change?Luka Kuol, Adjunct Professor, University of JubaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2107282023-08-13T09:13:34Z2023-08-13T09:13:34ZHow to grow rhinos in a lab: the science that could save an endangered species<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540701/original/file-20230802-27-i9629h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Najin, one of two northern white rhinos left in the world, grazes in a paddock in Kenya. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There are several parallel projects running across the world to save the northern white rhinoceros (<em>Ceratotherium simum simum</em>), one of Africa’s captivating and iconic wildlife species. With the death of last male in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43468066">2018</a> and with only two females alive, the species is functionally extinct.</p>
<p>The most famous of these projects is an international research consortium called <a href="https://biorescue.org/en/home-0">BioRescue</a>. It was founded in 2019 by a team of scientists and conservationists under the leadership of the <a href="https://www.izw-berlin.de/en/mission-vision.html">Leibniz Institute for Zoo & Wildlife Research</a> in Berlin, Germany.</p>
<p>In one of its research lines, the BioRescue team collects mature eggs – scientifically called oocytes – from one of the only two northern white females. They reside in Kenya’s <a href="https://www.olpejetaconservancy.org/">Ol Pejeta Conservancy</a>, a privately run wildlife sanctuary. These eggs will be fertilised with frozen sperm that were collected from several northern white male rhinos before their death. </p>
<p>The two remaining females, Najin and Fatu, are not capable of delivering offspring anymore. Najin’s back legs are too weak to carry a pregnancy and Fatu has problems with her uterus. Therefore, the resulting embryos from the fertilised eggs will be transferred into surrogate mothers. </p>
<p>The most suitable surrogate mother would be a southern white rhino as it is the closest related species. But, placing a northern white rhino embryo in a southern white female rhino isn’t an easy task. However, there was <a href="https://phys.org/news/2023-07-embryos-surrogate-mothers-added-northern.html">promising news</a> in May 2023. Next to the addition of five more northern white embryos – which brings the total to 29 – two wild southern white rhinos were identified as suitable surrogates, as they can still get pregnant and are able to carry the pregnancy through. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-case-for-introducing-rhinos-to-australia-99585">The case for introducing rhinos to Australia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The goal of producing a new northern white rhino calf now seems more realistic than ever before. </p>
<p>Sometimes people <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-northern-white-rhino-should-not-be-brought-back-to-life-94153">question the funding and effort</a> spent on one species, but the science behind the rhinoceros story is much bigger. Any species going extinct has huge consequences on the ecosystem, and people’s survival depends on resources provided by this same ecosystem. As a recognisable, impressive and majestic animal, rhinos certainly have a role as a flagship of conservation efforts. </p>
<p>Further, joint efforts on one species can provide scientific knowledge that allows for a multi-species conservation approach. These techniques would not only save the northern white rhinoceros, but also other rhino species, related species with a common ancestor, and all other creatures in need.</p>
<h2>Different approaches</h2>
<p>Despite the great scientific strides made in efforts to save the northern white rhino, the success rate of embryo transplantation followed by pregnancy to term is <a href="https://raf.bioscientifica.com/view/journals/raf/4/3/RAF-23-0020.xml">extremely low</a>. Parallel initiatives focusing on different conservation approaches are indispensable to ensure the future of this species. </p>
<p>While BioRescue is collecting matured eggs after hormonal stimulation, the <a href="https://www.wrh.ox.ac.uk/research/rhino-fertility-project-1#:%7E:text=Prof%20Suzannah%20Williams%20and%20her,eggs%20in%20a%20laboratory%20setting.">Rhino Fertility Project</a> at the University of Oxford in the UK is focusing on growing follicles, which are structures found in the ovary containing an immature egg surrounded by a few layers of supporting cells. These supporting cells provide signals and components essential for the development of the eggs. The idea is to make use of the much greater potential of the ovary by collecting the very small follicles and growing them all in a petridish in the lab. </p>
<p>This would bypass atresia, which is the degradation of follicles that occurs during a natural hormonal cycle. As member of this project, one of us, Ruth Appeltant, was <a href="https://theconversation.com/only-two-northern-white-rhinos-remain-and-theyre-both-female-heres-how-we-could-make-more-147608">hopeful</a> that this method had the potential to quickly provide a vast number of in vitro-grown oocytes, or mature eggs. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, it became clear that the ovarian tissue of older rhinoceroses contained extremely few to no oocytes. These eggs were needed as the starting material for the project. Without eggs, there is nothing to grow. Ongoing efforts are now looking to establish ways to localise and process the few remaining follicles in old ovarian tissue.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An overview of the focus of different initiatives around the world to save the northern white rhino.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ruth Appeltant</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This bottleneck led us to the area of <a href="https://blog.uantwerpen.be/fbd/meet-our-researchers-prof-ruth-appeltant/">stem cell technologies</a>. At the <a href="https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/research-groups/veterinary-physiology-biochemistry/research-mission-and-members/research-mission/">Gamete Research Centre</a> of the University of Antwerp in Belgium, our group is aiming to produce eggs outside the body from stem cells. These could be used to conserve endangered species like the rhinoceros.</p>
<p>The BioRescue project and a <a href="https://science.sandiegozoo.org/species/white-rhino">research group at the San Diego Zoo</a> in the US are also aiming to produce artificial eggs from body cells present in tissues. </p>
<p>The common thread is turning cells into <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/induced-pluripotent-stem-cell">induced pluripotent stem cells</a>, which are immature cells generated from mature cells, and that can in turn differentiate into eggs. In fact, this process can transform a skin cell into an egg. The procedure has so far been <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature20104">completed successfully</a> in mice and could already provide a kind of precursor to oocytes in the northern white rhino. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/even-if-you-were-the-last-rhino-on-earth-why-populations-cant-be-saved-by-a-single-breeding-pair-93733">Even if you were the last rhino on Earth... why populations can't be saved by a single breeding pair</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The collection of oocytes is a really tricky process due to the technical difficulties in reaching the site of the ovaries in living animals. Advanced artificial reproductive techniques using body cells, such as skin cells, introduce a spectrum of new possibilities. Most biological samples stored to date consist of small skin samples, but not of oocytes. </p>
<p>A downside to this approach is the fact that scientists first need to succeed in producing stem cells in the species of interest. </p>
<p>At the University of Antwerp’s <a href="https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/research-groups/veterinary-physiology-biochemistry/research-mission-and-members/research-mission/">Gamete Research Centre</a>, we’re not only interested in developing stem cell technologies based on induced pluripotent stem cells, but are currently establishing the in vitro gametogenesis – or “in vitro oocyte-creation” technique – based on stem cells present in the ovary. Due to a scarcity of tissues from endangered species, we are using the pig as a large animal model. This will give us more in-depth knowledge on how to approach egg creation from stem cells already present in the animal, termed endogenous stem cells. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>When we do not have eggs, let’s create them. When we have stem cells, let’s use them. Researchers now know that samples of the northern white rhino individuals currently stored in biobanks have enough genetic variability to establish a viable and sustainable population. </p>
<p>A decade ago, we would have never imagined eggs could be produced from other cells. This is becoming a reality that gives us hope, motivation and energy to save the northern white rhino.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210728/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ruth Appeltant receives funding from the University of Antwerp.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rita L. Sousa receives funding from the University of Antwerp.</span></em></p>Efforts to save one species can provide scientific knowledge that enables us to save other creatures in need.Ruth Appeltant, Assistant research professor, University of AntwerpRita L. Sousa, PhD Candidate, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113532023-08-11T15:39:27Z2023-08-11T15:39:27ZMilitary coups in Africa: here’s what determines a return to civilian rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542141/original/file-20230810-25-hyb3hk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Niger's July 2023 coup celebrate in the capital, Niamey. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Balima Boureima/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Slightly more than two years after Niger’s first peaceful handover of power from one civilian president to another, the military seized power in July 2023. The coup – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13943662">the fourth in Nigerien history</a> – follows on the heels of recent military interventions in Africa. Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), Chad (April 2021), Guinea (September 2021), Sudan (October 2021) and Burkina Faso (January and September 2022). </p>
<p>Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the number of military coups has <a href="https://arresteddictatorship.com/coups/">declined sharply</a>. However, francophone west Africa now accounts for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">approximately two-thirds of all military coups</a> that have occurred since then. </p>
<p>As a political scientist analysing African politics, I have <a href="https://people.clas.ufl.edu/selischer/">studied</a> military coups and their outcomes for the last decade and a half. In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">recent article</a>, Justin Hoyle, a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Florida, and I demonstrate that since 1989, military coups across the world have resulted in two outcomes. </p>
<p>First is the withdrawal of the junta from executive power. This means the junta doesn’t participate or interfere in post-coup elections. While it is necessary for the transition to democracy, it isn’t sufficient in itself. This scenario played out in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/110/439/295/164122">Nigerien coup of 2010</a> and the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00472330701651929">Thailand coup of 2006</a>. </p>
<p>Second is electoral rigging by the junta in favour of its own candidate. This scenario establishes a regime in which coup leaders entrench themselves in executive power.</p>
<p>Examining how military coups unfold is crucial to understanding a country’s path back to democracy. It also provides insights into the effect of coups on the <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691217000/shock-to-the-system">quality of democracy</a>.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>We <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">studied</a> five countries and 12 post-coup transitions: Egypt (coups in 2011 and 2013), Mauritania (coups in 2005 and 2008), Niger (1996, 1999 and 2010), Fiji (2000 and 2006) and Thailand (1991, 2006 and 2014). </p>
<p>Overall, we examined slightly more than a third of all military coups between 1989 and 2017.</p>
<p>Out of a total of 32 post-coup environments, we found that in half of all cases, juntas withdrew from executive power in the coup’s aftermath.</p>
<p>However, even with the military’s withdrawal from power, the transition period to civilian rule was highly volatile. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, counter-coup attempts by a rival faction within the armed forces intending to remain in power occurred rather frequently. This was the case most recently in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2015/09/17/441222504/presidential-guard-announces-takeover-of-burkina-faso">Burkina Faso in 2015</a>. </p>
<p>Although many coups result in the withdrawal of juntas from executive power, many of the cases from our study were near-misses – the country could’ve ended up under <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/military-coups-are-key-to-understanding-contemporary-autocracies/">military authoritarian rule</a>.</p>
<p>We examined four key variables and their influence on coup outcomes. These are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the internal coherence of the armed forces</p></li>
<li><p>the ability of civil society organisations and political parties to mobilise against the junta</p></li>
<li><p>the deployment of donor leverage </p></li>
<li><p>trade dependency on regional and western partners. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Of these, we argue that the two that matter the most are: the internal cohesion of the military and the vibrancy of civil society groups. </p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>In our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">analysis</a>, we found that the single most important variable that accounts for different coup outcomes is the internal coherence of the military.</p>
<p>When there’s internal coherence, militaries generally feel <a href="https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article-abstract/12/2/192/2367607">inclined</a> to <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691217000/shock-to-the-system">withdraw</a> from executive power. This is because holding on to power <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-213418">challenges</a> their internal cohesion.</p>
<p>Internal cohesion <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">is based on</a> the factors that triggered the coup. If a coup occurs in response to threats to the country’s territorial integrity, to the preservation of public order, or to the military’s material or reputational benefits, the junta will have the backing of the military at large. This is because the benefits of seeking power outweigh the risks of not being in power. </p>
<p>If a coup occurs for reasons outside these, the junta either won’t seek power or will face resistance from within the military and withdraw. We found this confirmed in all the coups that we analysed.</p>
<p>Another relevant yet less significant variable is the positioning of civil society toward the junta. </p>
<p>Where civil society groups manage to rally the population to demand a return to democratic civilian rule, juntas depart from power. The most prominent example of this was in <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=de&lr=&id=xSZwAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=egypt+2011+nepsted&ots=r-G56kRRmg&sig=YmiQioJNNM-ECTabvUcrsIT2w_c#v=onepage&q=egypt%202011%20nepsted&f=false">Egypt after the 2011 coup</a>. </p>
<p>Interestingly, we didn’t find that aid dependency or membership in an international organisation with anti-coup rules exerted any discernible influence on juntas. This means that domestic variables – and in particular the drivers of the coup – influence political aftermaths.</p>
<h2>What it all means</h2>
<p>For the current transitions in parts of Africa, these findings are troubling. </p>
<p>In Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad, militaries overthrew their governments because of threats to their countries’ territorial integrity or to the military’s material benefits. The juntas in these countries can rely on the backing of the military at large. This decreases the likelihood of a return to civilian rule. </p>
<p>The implications of our findings for Niger and Guinea are less straightforward, however. Here, coups were staged by a sub-section of the military, even though such a move wasn’t in line with the interests of the armed forces at large. Our research findings suggest a more volatile dynamic for these two post-coup states.</p>
<p>At this stage, no one can predict how the motives of Niger’s presidential guard will shape future action. Much will depend on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115">coup leader Abdourahmane Tchiani’s</a> ability to convince the military that a coup was the right thing to do politically. </p>
<p>Generally, military coups bode ill for democratic processes. In instances where juntas withdraw from power, democracies don’t emerge. When juntas rig post-coup elections, they <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/military-coups-are-key-to-understanding-contemporary-autocracies/">become entrenched in power</a> in the medium to long-term. This has devastating consequences for the political and civil rights of their populations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211353/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sebastian Elischer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Examining how military coups unfold is crucial to understanding a country’s path back to democracy.Sebastian Elischer, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2102932023-08-01T14:46:56Z2023-08-01T14:46:56ZSudan needs to accept its cultural diversity: urban planning can help rebuild the country and prevent future conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539757/original/file-20230727-17-efhzbn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Smoke rises above buildings in Sudan's capital Khartoum in June 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sudan is rich in cultural, ethnic and racial diversity. The country’s <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/SD">48 million people</a> come from <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698280500423908">56 ethnic groups, with over 595 sub-ethnic groups, speaking more than 115 languages</a>. </p>
<p>This plurality has shaped urban development patterns and the country’s socio-political landscape. </p>
<p>Take, for instance, <a href="https://theconversation.com/khartoum-the-creation-and-the-destruction-of-a-modern-african-city-205705">Khartoum</a>. The Sudanese capital <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2005-4-page-302.htm">historically</a> drew traders from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Each placed a <a href="https://jur.journals.ekb.eg/article_88400.html">distinctive stamp</a> on the cityscape. </p>
<p>These range from Ottoman-style Islamic architecture to the narrow alleys, small windows and colourful clothes peculiar to African ethnic groups. The city symbolises Sudan’s cultural mosaic in architecture and urban planning.</p>
<p>However, Khartoum is also a domain of <a href="https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/2020/12/02/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8E%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%8A/">ethnic and cultural division</a>.</p>
<p>This dates back to the period of the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/mahdist-state-mahdiyya">Mahdist state (Mahdiyya)</a>, which ruled Sudan from 1881 to 1898 and challenged the colonial ambitions of Britain and Egypt. The Mahdist state made <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Omdurman">Omdurman (Umm Durman)</a> its new capital on the western side of the River Nile, and developed the city around the <a href="https://archive.org/details/isbn_9781782821151">ethnic structure of its army</a>. </p>
<p>A colonial plan for <a href="https://repozytorium.biblos.pk.edu.pl/redo/resources/28522/file/suwFiles/HassanS_UrbanPlanning.pdf#page=3">Khartoum followed in 1910</a>, triggered by the governor-general of Sudan, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Horatio-Herbert-Kitchener-1st-Earl-Kitchener">Horatio Kitchener</a>. It had <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268280184_alywm_alalmy_ltkhtyt_almdn_althdyat_w_almalat_fy_almdn_alswdanyt">three segregated zones</a> to accommodate Europeans, elites and ordinary locals. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/khartoum-the-creation-and-the-destruction-of-a-modern-african-city-205705">Khartoum: the creation and the destruction of a modern African city</a>
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<p>These decades of interplay between diversity and urban planning in Sudan fostered vibrant cityscapes. But spatial segregation has continued, creating <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">socio-cultural divisions and uneven urban growth</a>. </p>
<p>Drawing on my experiences as an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ibrahim-Bahreldin">educator, researcher and practitioner in urbanism in Sudan</a>, I argue that failure to use urban planning to manage diversity has worsened ethnic and racial divisions. It has fanned <a href="https://theconversation.com/darfur-how-historical-patterns-of-conflict-are-haunting-current-violence-144423">conflict and discontent</a> in Sudanese society.</p>
<h2>Embracing diversity</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268280184_alywm_alalmy_ltkhtyt_almdn_althdyat_w_almalat_fy_almdn_alswdanyt">Urban planning</a> is supposed to improve residents’ quality of life. It strategically organises physical spaces and land use. It optimises resources and livelihoods, and promotes social equity. </p>
<p>It holds immense potential to manage diversity and reconstruct a resilient and prosperous Sudan. </p>
<p>This isn’t to say urban planning can single-handedly resolve <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">Sudan’s conflict</a>. Peace requires a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-makes-peace-talks-successful-the-4-factors-that-matter-206299">shared commitment</a> to silence the guns and build political stability and security. </p>
<p>Yet the way diversity is managed makes it either a virtue or a <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">curse</a>. </p>
<p>In my view, there are three avenues through which urban planning can positively manage diversity to help prevent conflict: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>by celebrating multiculturalism.</p></li>
<li><p>by boosting regional integration and resource management.</p></li>
<li><p>by ensuring effective governance and public participation in urban spaces.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What Sudan got wrong</h2>
<p>Colonial and post-independence planning practices in Sudan attempted to forge a <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/AHRLJ/2013/17.html">national identity</a>. However, this was done by <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">suppressing ethnic diversity</a>, and disintegrating cultural values and their spatial footprints. </p>
<p>After independence from Egypt and Britain in 1956, Sudan’s ruling elites rejected the demand from southern Sudan for <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/federalism">a federal system</a>. This would have created a united Sudan but allowed different regions to maintain their integrity, culture and traditions. The ruling elite instead adopted an “Arab Islamic” identity to create a <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">homogeneous society</a>. </p>
<p>This was among the reasons for the eruption of the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/sudanese-civil-wars">first civil war in southern Sudan in 1955</a>.</p>
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<p>And in Darfur, infringements of communal land ownership rights <a href="https://metropolitics.org/Land-Insecurity-in-Khartoum-When-Land-Titles-Fail-to-Protect-Against-Public.html">fuelled violent conflict</a>. This extended to <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">southern Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287221183_Urban_agriculture_facing_land_pressure_in_Greater_Khartoum_The_case_of_new_real_estate_projects_in_Tuti_and_Abu_Se'id">Khartoum</a>. </p>
<p>The Khartoum <a href="https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Sudan_Khartoum1998.pdf">Public Order Act</a> of 1996 (<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50596805">repealed in 2019</a>) was another misjudgement. It <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/12/5194">discriminated against citizens</a> based on their cultural and gender identities. The public order rules were <a href="https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/report-Final.pdf#page=5">vague and open-ended</a>, leaving them open to exploitation for social control.</p>
<h2>Rebuilding a post-war Sudan</h2>
<p>Urban planning should follow the principles of economic, social and physical integration. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Economic integration ensures equal access to employment, education and resources. </p></li>
<li><p>Social integration provides affordable housing, diverse neighbourhoods and accessible social infrastructure. </p></li>
<li><p>Physical integration encourages social interaction and breaks down barriers. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These principles help create vibrant, harmonious cities that cater to the needs of diverse populations and future generations. They can be put into practice through three avenues.</p>
<p><strong>1. Celebrating multiculturalism and diversity</strong> </p>
<p>This requires <a href="https://www.cgscholar.com/bookstore/works/the-power-of-diversity?category_id=cgrn&path=cgrn%2F209%2F215">rethinking urban spaces to embrace inclusivity</a>, particularly where ethnocultural ties transcend national boundaries. Inclusive neighbourhoods, mixed-use developments and accessible public spaces promote interaction and foster belonging. Such developments help build understanding, empathy and trust among different communities, preventing community fracturing that <a href="https://theconversation.com/darfur-tracing-the-origins-of-the-regions-strife-and-suffering-131931">leads to unrest</a>. </p>
<p><strong>2. Regional integration and resource management</strong></p>
<p>Sudan has experienced <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269336771_Khartoum_2030_Towards_An_Environmentally-Sensitive_Vision_for_the_Development_of_Greater_Khartoum_Sudan">unequal urban growth and the depopulation of rural areas</a>. To address this, the country’s long-term development visions and plans should aim for equitable development. These plans should take into account marginalised regions which may have ethnic populations that extend beyond national borders. A planning vision that transcends the scope of a single nation and seeks a regional approach is indispensable. Regional integration can restructure urban spaces, mobility systems and production patterns. This would foster self-sufficiency and integration. </p>
<p>Urban planning can also address resource management concerns – such as land ownership and economic opportunities – that trigger tension and conflict. Transparent mechanisms for resource allocation can help mitigate conflict arising from scarce resources. In Sudan, this would have helped improve regional employment prospects, reducing a <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-created-a-paramilitary-force-to-destroy-government-threats-but-it-became-a-major-threat-itself-203974">reliance on paramilitary activities</a> for income.</p>
<p><strong>3. Effective governance and public participation</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261996322_A_Critical_Evaluation_of_Public_Participation_in_the_Sudanese_Planning_Mandates">Participatory urban planning</a> improves governance. It empowers historically marginalised groups like young people, women, rural communities, informal settlers and minorities through public engagement. This enables them to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262008475_Evaluation_of_Two_Types_of_Community_Participation_In_Development_Projects_A_Case_Study_of_The_Sudanese_Neighbourhood_of_Al-Shigla">address their grievances and secure opportunities for meaningful dialogue</a>. The process generates enthusiasm for shaping, financing and managing urban spaces. </p>
<p>Public engagement harnesses local knowledge and culture. It advocates for policy transformation to address systematic inequalities and safeguard rights. Transparent and accountable governance complements these arrangements, promoting equality and preventing tension.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210293/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ibrahim Bahreldin is a member of the Sudanese Institute of Architects and the City Planning Institute of Japan, and is registered as a professional architect and urban planner with the Sudanese Engineering Council and the Saudi Council of Engineers. He is also affiliated with the University of Khartoum in Sudan. Ibrahim does not work for, consult, own shares in, or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article.</span></em></p>The interplay between diversity and urban planning in Sudan has created vibrant cityscapes, but also led to segregation and division.Ibrahim Z. Bahreldin, Associate Professor of Urban & Environmental Design, King Abdulaziz University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2102552023-07-26T14:54:19Z2023-07-26T14:54:19ZEgypt and Ethiopia are finally working on a water deal – what that means for other Nile River states<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539011/original/file-20230724-25-5rnfy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam began generating electricity in 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Minasse Hailu/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Egypt and Ethiopia have waged a diplomatic war of words over Ethiopia’s massive new dam – the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – on the Blue Nile, which started filling up in July 2020. The political row has threatened to get out of hand on occasion but now the two countries have <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/rest-of-africa/egypt-ethiopia-agree-to-reach-deal-on-dam-in-4-months-4303192">finally agreed</a> to conclude “a mutually acceptable agreement” within four months. We asked John Mukum Mbaku, the author of a <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/856122/pdf">recent article</a> on the Ethiopian dam and a co-author of a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/books/governing-the-nile-river-basin/">book</a> on the Nile River’s changing legal regime, to answer four key questions.</em></p>
<h2>What is the context of the current tussle?</h2>
<p>Ethiopia, whose highlands provide more than 85% of the water that flows into the Nile, has long argued that it has the right under international law to manage resources within its own borders for its national development. It sees the “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/12/ethiopia-says-completes-third-filling-of-mega-dam-reservoir">Nile as a gift of God</a>” given to Ethiopians to use for their development. </p>
<p>Egypt, which depends on the Nile for more than 90% of its fresh water, has argued that the Ethiopian dam represents a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/6/30/egypt-warns-of-existential-threat-from-ethiopia-dam">threat</a> to its water security and its very existence as a people.</p>
<p>The decision by Addis Ababa to begin construction of the dam on the Blue Nile in 2011 exacerbated an already deteriorating relationship between Ethiopia and its two downstream neighbours, Egypt and Sudan, over access to Nile waters. After Egypt’s diplomatic efforts failed to stop construction, Cairo redirected its energies to securing a legally binding agreement for filling and operating the dam. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://enterprise.press/stories/2018/04/10/egypt-sudan-ethiopia-fail-to-reach-agreement-in-gerd-talks/">no mutually</a> acceptable <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/5/egypt-ethiopia-sudan-fail-to-succeed-in-disputed-dam-talks">agreement</a> for filling and operating the dam was ever reached.</p>
<p>In August <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/20/ethiopia-electricity-production-gerd-blue-nile-mega-dam#:%7E:text=The%20process%20of%20filling%20the,was%20to%20add%2013.5%20billion.">2020</a>, Addis Ababa began to fill the dam’s reservoir. That process was repeated in <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/second-filling-gerd-reservoir">2021</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/12/ethiopia-says-completes-third-filling-of-mega-dam-reservoir">2022</a>. </p>
<p>In 2023, Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed announced that the country would delay the fourth filling until September “to alleviate the <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/ethiopia-delays-filling-of-flagship-dam-vows-to-heed-downstream-nations-concerns/2940475">concerns of neighbouring people</a>”. </p>
<p>The dam’s reservoir filling in particular, and its operation in general, are issues that the three countries must resolve, most likely through a legally binding agreement or treaty. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/egypt-reacts-ethiopia-switches-first-nile-dam-turbine">February 2022</a>, the Ethiopian dam started producing electricity. Egyptians claimed that Addis Ababa was “violating its obligations under the 2015 Declaration of Principles” and endangering Egyptian “<a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/egypt-reacts-ethiopia-switches-first-nile-dam-turbine">water interests</a>”.</p>
<h2>What are the main sticking points going into the talks?</h2>
<p>An agreement would have to explicitly deal with issues that are important to Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. The most important are Egypt’s and Sudan’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/">historically acquired rights</a> to Nile waters. The rights were granted by the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan (1959 Nile Treaty). </p>
<p>After estimating the average annual flow of the Nile River as measured at Aswan to be 84 billion cubic metres, the two treaties granted <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">66%</a> of Nile waters to Egypt, 22% to Sudan and 12% to account for <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/">seepage and evaporation</a>. These allocations exhausted all the Nile’s average annual flow of water. Egypt was also granted veto power over all construction projects on the Nile and its tributaries. </p>
<p>These rights came to be known as Egypt’s and Sudan’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-limits-of-the-new-nile-agreement/">acquired rights</a>. They have been the main <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">sticking point</a> in efforts to conclude a treaty between all <a href="https://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/media-center/maps#:%7E:text=The%20Nile%20River%20flows%20through,%2C%20Tanzania%2C%20and%20Uganda">11 Nile riparian states</a> for the allocation of the waters of the Nile, as well as between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the Ethiopian dam. </p>
<p>While Ethiopia and other upstream riparian states see these two treaties as colonial anachronisms that have no relevance to modern Nile governance, Egypt and Sudan insist that they are <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">binding</a>.</p>
<h2>What impact would a breakthrough have on other Nile Basin agreements?</h2>
<p>The impact will depend on what type of agreement is reached. Assume that both Egypt and Sudan agree to abandon the rights granted by the 1929 and 1959 treaties. They could then enter into negotiation with Ethiopia to produce a new treaty that creates rights for all three states. </p>
<p>Such a treaty could provide the impetus for all 11 Nile Basin states to return to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">Cooperative Framework Agreement</a>, which was expected to provide a legal framework for governing the Nile based on equitable and reasonable water use. The framework agreement has been in limbo since Egypt and Sudan <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article60989/">rejected</a> it. </p>
<p>The other Nile Basin states see these colonial-era treaties as a violation of <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article60989/">international law principles</a>, and a breach of the vision of the Nile Basin Initiative.</p>
<h2>What other claims threaten the status quo?</h2>
<p>Egypt fears that if Addis Ababa is allowed to fill the reservoir without a legally binding agreement, other Nile Basin states might also take unilateral actions. This could harm Egypt’s water security and ability to control projects on the Nile River and its tributaries. </p>
<p>Then, there is the matter of how to manage issues related to climate change, such as droughts and floods. The existence of the dam means Addis Ababa’s cooperation will be required. In times of drought, for example, the Ethiopian dam will be expected to release some water to help Egypt and Sudan. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s right to water for agriculture and household consumption is an issue that has not yet been agreed upon by all three countries.</p>
<p>Egypt and Sudan are worried about the <a href="https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/491429.aspx">harm</a> that could come to them from activities upstream. Egypt remains adamant that the dam will hurt its <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-gerd-dam-a-potential-boon-for-all-experts-say/a-65254058">water supply</a> and threaten domestic development. </p>
<p>But Sudanese officials appear to have changed their assessment of the impact of the dam. They now see it as a potential regulator of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-gerd-dam-a-potential-boon-for-all-experts-say/a-65254058">seasonal floods</a> and provider of clean energy. </p>
<p>These issues should be examined thoroughly during the negotiations. The three countries should adopt a treaty or agreement that is mutually acceptable and beneficial. </p>
<p>Over the years, the three countries have struggled to bring meaning to terms like “significant harm” and “equitable and reasonable utilisation”. The final treaty should define these terms. It should also create a mediation mechanism, which can include referring certain specified matters to the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/how-the-court-works">International Court of Justice</a> for resolution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210255/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Nile Basin states are keen to see what kind of deal Ethiopia reaches with Egypt and Sudan.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2084082023-07-06T14:50:21Z2023-07-06T14:50:21ZRising sexual violence in Sudan conflict reflects entrenched patriarchy – but women and girls are fighting back<p>Watching and hearing the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-violence-between-army-and-militia-is-a-symptom-of-an-old-disease-that-is-destroying-africa-204288">horrifying reports of violence</a> and savagery in Sudan, those of us working to end violence against women and girls immediately become concerned about how it will inevitably spill over into sexual violence. As recently as July 5, a <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/07/1138392">report from the UN</a> highlighted the “conflict-related sexual violence against internally displaced and refugee women and girls forced to flee for their lives”.</p>
<p>Since fighting broke out in Khartoum and spread across the country in April, the reports emerging from Sudan have been shocking. In mid-June, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/crisis-continues-gbv-sub-sector-sudan-situation-brief-update-16-june-2023">Reliefweb reported</a>: “Since April 15, the number of people in need of gender-based violence services in Sudan has increased by over 1 million to 4.2 million people.” </p>
<p>As noted in the UN report, those most vulnerable are the internally displaced moving to try and cross borders. Humanitarian agencies are struggling to respond. </p>
<p>On June 9 alone <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/en/news-stories/feature-story/2023/06/in-sudan-womens-organizations-fight-back-against-sexual-violence-in-conflict#:%7E:text=As%20of%209%20June%2C%20the,the%20severity%20of%20the%20situation">the UN reported</a> 12 verifiable instants of sexual violence affecting 37 women. Three of these cases involved young girls.</p>
<p>The full picture of this current surge in extreme violence against women and girls is likely to be even more horrific. <a href="https://africa.unwomen.org/en/where-we-are/eastern-and-southern-africa/sudan/un-women-representative-in-sudan">Adjaratou Ndiaye</a>, the UN Women representative in Sudan, has reported that in Darfur, western Sudan – where the Janjaweed militia that was to become the Rapid Support Force (RSF) involved in the current conflict developed – mass rapes are once again <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/no-woman-feels-safe-sexual-violence-rampant-in-sudan-war-/7127981.html">being committed</a>. </p>
<p>And <a href="https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/press-release/un-special-representative-of-the-secretary-general-on-sexual-violence-in-conflict-expresses-grave-concern-over-alleged-acts-of-sexual-violence-in-sudan-during-the-ongoing-violence/">both sides</a> – the government-backed Sudan Armed Forces and the RSF – are involved in these atrocities against women. </p>
<h2>Gendered identity</h2>
<p>This violence against women in war is in some ways an extension of Sudan’s patriarchal social structure. It’s vital to understand the gendered dimension of Sudan’s social and political structures, which leave women and girls largely powerless outside the home and subservient within it. </p>
<p>Sudanese national identity is highly gendered, shaped by a discourse that draws heavily on an ideal of women as exemplars of culture and morality.</p>
<p>Symbols of women as mothers and nurturers are central to the moral fabric of Sudanese society and indeed to its stability. Strict gender codes exist to ensure women conform to this role and violence is thereby <a href="https://www.gicj.org/topics/countries/208-sudan/3132-sudan%E2%80%99s-systematic-cycles-of-violence-against-women">seen as legitimate</a>. </p>
<p>Until the regime of Omar al-Bashir was overturned in 2019, Sudanese women were subject to <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/sudan-repeals-law-that-restricted-womens-dress-and-behaviour-11873354">strict codes of conduct and dress</a>. The Public Order Act of 1996 imposed conservative Islamic social codes which restricted women’s movement, work and study. Women could be imprisoned or flogged for seemingly trivial transgressions – such as wearing western-style jeans. </p>
<h2>Women building power</h2>
<p>Despite this history of gender inequality in Sudan, there is a rich history of women’s activism and a network of women’s organisations who work at a grass-roots level to empower women and girls. This often undocumented dimension to Sudanese society needs to be recognised internationally and supported as a critical mechanism in countering the rising levels of violence against women and girls. </p>
<p>Change to the underpinning norms that sanction and excuse violence against women can only effectively be challenged by women themselves. Women and girls need to be supported as change agents and not reduced to passive victims. The <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/5084-the-history-of-the-womens-movement-in-sudan">growing women’s movement in Sudan</a> is important in this process.</p>
<p>The iconic image that emerged from the 2019 revolution that toppled al-Bashir was of Alaa Salah, a 22-year-old student, who became known as Sudan’s <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tamerragriffin/sudan-protests-woman-car-iconic-photo-alaa-salah">statue of liberty</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1115529965783719936"}"></div></p>
<p>But groups of women meeting in each others homes had been at the forefront of the movement that toppled al-Bashir. Sudanese Women in Civic and Political Groups – or Mansam as they became known – gave a voice and image to the many women who wanted to challenge the entrenched patriarchy in Sudan.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, a growing network of young female Sudanese writers is challenging gender stereotypes for a growing audience, both inside and outside the country. But they too have to combat the patriarchal attitudes that pervade the country’s publishing industry and many choose to publish their books abroad initially.</p>
<p>“There is a patriarchal mentality that prevails throughout Sudanese society, and an extremely high sensitivity toward what female authors are writing about, especially when it seemingly contradicts societal values,” Ann el-Safi – who lives and writes between the UAE and Canada – told <a href="https://wordswithoutborders.org/read/article/2020-12/december-2020-sudanese-women-writers-aperture-sudanese-female-novelists-com/">Words Without Borders</a> in 2020. </p>
<p>Her sentiments were echoed by veteran novelist and cultural critic <a href="https://wordswithoutborders.org/contributors/view/zeinab-belail/">Zeinab Belail</a> who said: “Writing about sex or religion is still forbidden for women. There are red lines that as a female writer you’re not even meant to approach. To do so brands you a heretic, a rogue, someone who has no appreciation for literature.”</p>
<h2>Tragedy at Ahfad</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://talloiresnetwork.tufts.edu/ahfad-university-for-women-sudan/">Ahfad University for Women</a> – a private, non-sectarian university in Omdurnam, close to the capital Khartoum – was founded in 1966, with the aim of raising generations of women to assume social leadership. </p>
<p>The university has more than 5,000 students and offers a wide range of undergraduate and postgraduate degrees to PhD level. <a href="https://talloiresnetwork.tufts.edu/ahfad-university-for-women-sudan/">As its website states</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The university’s philosophy is to prepare women to assume greater roles in their families and communities, and in the nation as a whole. To that end, the university enrols women from all over Sudan and prepares them to be proactive change agents and leaders.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But there were recent reports not of the <a href="https://www.al-fanarmedia.org/2023/06/sudans-war-disrupts-universities-leaving-more-students-in-limbo/">destruction of the campus during the violence</a>, accompanied by the <a href="https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20230522081037286">rapes of young female students</a> as they hid, terrified in their dormitories. This was depressingly predictable. </p>
<p>The Ahfad University campus has been destroyed by militia groups. The lack of respect afforded to women and their human rights in general is yet again reflected in the brutal realities of conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208408/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tamsin Bradley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sudan is riven by conflict and once again, women are the targets of the sexual violence that is rooted in the patriarchal nature of Sudanese society.Tamsin Bradley, Professor of International Development Studies, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2086052023-06-28T08:36:25Z2023-06-28T08:36:25ZWagner debacle in Russia raises red flags for African states and how they manage their security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534398/original/file-20230627-15-qy37yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">10 tons of ammunition previously laid in civilian settlements by Libyan militia and Wagner group mercenaries . </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hazem Turkia/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The brief rebellion led against the Kremlin by the head of the Wagner mercenary forces in Russia last week sent <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/short-lived-wagner-mutiny-will-undermine-russias-ukraine-invasion/">shock waves</a> across the world. </p>
<p>This was no less true in Africa, where <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">some countries</a> have, over the last decade, turned to the Wagner group for security support.</p>
<p>Many states in Africa are contending with <a href="https://www.usip.org/events/security-challenges-africa-2021-and-beyond">multidimensional insecurity</a>. This includes violent extremism, terrorism, insurgency, banditry, communal clashes, sea piracy, separatist violence, kidnapping and oil theft. Non-state actors have entered the scene as security providers. </p>
<p>As a coordinator of observations of organised crime in central Africa at the Institute for Security Studies based in Dakar, Senegal, I believe the recent events in Russia could have three implications for African countries that depend on non-state armed groups for security. These are: rebellion, increased human rights abuses and insubordination to state military authorities. </p>
<p>African countries engaged with Wagner, and with Russia, should take heed. The aborted Wagner rebellion offers distinct lessons for African countries that have invited mercenary troops onto their soil.</p>
<p>Private armies might sometimes prove effective in the battlefield. And militias might be useful in intelligence gathering. But the inability of state authorities to bring them under control casts serious doubt on their overall usefulness. </p>
<p>African states should rather take full responsibility for their security sector reform. This must include repositioning their military and law enforcement agencies to respond effectively to internal and external security challenges.</p>
<h2>Non-state actors</h2>
<p>African countries have come to depend on non-state actors like Wagner for security in three ways:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>co-option of militia groups by the state</p></li>
<li><p>the voluntary incursion of vigilante groups into the security space as service providers </p></li>
<li><p>state partnership with private military mercenaries.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>As security nosedives, some governments have co-opted militia groups to strengthen the state security architecture. </p>
<p>There are a number of examples.</p>
<p>In 2015 the Nigerian government <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/179208-we-got-new-pipelines-protection-contract-two-weeks-ago-opc-leader.html">awarded</a> a multi-million naira contract to Oodua Peoples Congress, an ethnic militia, to secure oil pipelines. </p>
<p>Seven years later the Nigerian Senate lent legislative support to the <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/11/23/senate-backs-n48bn-pipeline-surveillance-contract-awarded-to-tompolos-company">N48 billion</a> pipeline surveillance contract awarded to Global West Vessel Specialist Limited. This is a private maritime security firm founded and owned by <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/opinion/555830-government-ekpemupolo-the-only-government-that-works-in-nigeria-by-osmund-agbo.html">Government Ekpemupolo</a>. He was the former commander of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, popularly known as Tompolo. </p>
<p>These contracts were akin to handing over national assets to armed gangs for protection. They were an affront to the Nigerian constitution, which empowers the law enforcement and security agencies as ultimate providers of security. </p>
<p>Voluntary policing to fill the vacuum left by the state is another example. A <a href="https://theconversation.com/many-kenyans-have-embraced-vigilante-cops-an-ineffective-police-force-is-to-blame-196449">recent study</a> showed that where people feel insecure and unprotected, they find innovative ways of responding to crime. Some rely on private security and others, especially the poor, rely on community vigilantism. Kenya is an example. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/23311886.2023.2174486?needAccess=true&role=button">My recent study</a> showed that vigilantes performed strategic duties in Nigeria’s north-west. They repelled attacks from bandits, rescued kidnap victims and arrested criminals. They also sometimes participated in joint security operations with the police and army. </p>
<p>Borno state has used the Civilian Joint Task Force and hunters to complement military efforts in counter-terrorism operations. They are on <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/zulum-pays-salary-bonus-to-12735-borno-civilian-jtf-members-others/">government’s monthly payroll</a>.</p>
<p>Wagner’s involvement fits into the third category: state partnership with private military mercenaries.</p>
<p>Wagner has been operating in over a <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/world/africa/russias-wagner-groups-presence-in-africa-goes-beyond-libya">dozen countries</a> in Africa.</p>
<p>In Mali, the state opted to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali">partner</a> with it for security provision. This was prompted by <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15253.doc.htm">heightened insecurity</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220720-%F0%9F%94%B4-mali-expels-spokesperson-of-un-peacekeeping-mission-minusma">diplomatic rows</a> with the peace-keeping mission and the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-partners-troop-withdrawal-mali/">ejection</a> of foreign counter-insurgency forces.</p>
<p>In the Central African Republic (CAR), the mercenaries <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/#s4">reportedly</a> started operating in 2018. This was after the government and Moscow <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/05/wagner-groups-car-mining-operations-help-russia-evade-sanctions/">agreed</a> to exchange Russian military support and weapons for mining concessions. </p>
<p>In late 2020, CAR’s security situation deteriorated ahead of general elections. Wagner’s role switched from support and training to combat. </p>
<p>In 2019 Wagner fighters <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa#:%7E:text=Similarly%2C%20Wagner%20Group%20forces%20deployed,area%20after%20a%20few%20months.">were deployed</a> to Mozambique to help contain Islamist militants operating in the northern Cabo Delgado province.</p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>The Wagner rebellion in Russia has three possible implications for African countries.</p>
<p><strong>Rebellion:</strong> States in which the Wagner group is operating could witness armed rebellion. In some, the military and police have already ceded critical security operations to the group. For instance, in the CAR, Wagner mercenaries <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/05/wagner-groups-car-mining-operations-help-russia-evade-sanctions/">permeate all levels</a> of the country. </p>
<p><strong>Increased human rights abuses:</strong> There’s the potential for an increase in human rights abuses and impunity. In countries with Wagner footprints, relevant agencies <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/download/IF/IF12389/IF12389.pdf/">are increasingly impeded</a> from monitoring and reporting on abuses in areas of Wagner’s operations. </p>
<p>A human rights investigative mission conducted by the UN in Mali has provided strong evidence that more than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/russian-mercenaries-behind-slaughter-in-mali-village-un-report-finds">500 villagers</a> were killed by Malian troops and Wagner mercenary fighters.</p>
<p>In the CAR the <a href="https://acleddata.com/">Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project</a> has recorded <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/#s4">180 civilian targeting events</a> involving Wagner mercenaries since December 2020. </p>
<p><strong>Insubordination to military authorities:</strong> The Wagner rebellion unfolded in Russia <a href="https://lieber.westpoint.edu/contracts-wagner-group-russias-defense-ministry-international-law-implications/">partly</a> to resist an attempt by the Russian defence ministry to bring the group under state control. </p>
<p>This bodes ill for most African states in which Wagner operates. In most, the country’s army is subordinate to the mercenary group. The rebellion by Wagner against the Kremlin shows the group can support discordant elements in weaker African states to subvert democracy. </p>
<p>In addition, non-state armed groups could draw their cue from the Wagner group and become unaccountable to the military. </p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>African countries that have invited the mercenary troops in should review their security architecture. This must begin with a decoupling of their security policies and operations from mercenaries and non-state security service providers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oluwole Ojewale does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Wagner rebellion in Russia has implications for African countries that depend on mercenaries and non-state armed groups for security.Oluwole Ojewale, Regional Coordinator, Institute for Security StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2070342023-06-28T07:50:53Z2023-06-28T07:50:53ZEvery 2 seconds in the world a baby is born prematurely – report identifies biggest challenges for their survival<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531103/original/file-20230609-25-ucxday.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A premature infant receives care at Koidu Government Hospital in Kono, Sierra Leone. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Melina Mara/The Washington Post via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Globally, about <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(18)30451-0/fulltext">one baby in 10</a> is born too soon – that’s around one baby
every two seconds. A full term pregnancy is around nine months or 37 weeks. Babies born before this mark are considered premature. Preterm birth is a significant global health issue. It can cause serious short term consequences, such as respiratory and cardiac problems. In the long term, babies born prematurely may face motor, neurosensory, cognitive and behavioural deficits. </p>
<p>A decade ago in 2012, a global coalition of stakeholders launched <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241503433">Born Too Soon: The Global Action Report on Preterm Birth</a>. The report made a case for global action to mitigate the problems of preterm birth. </p>
<p>Since then, many countries have adopted plans and resolutions on newborn health. Global guidelines now include life-saving interventions, such as the use of antenatal corticosteroids and kangaroo mother care (skin-to-skin contact). There’s also been growth in community activism on preterm birth and stillbirth prevention, driven by networks of parents, health professionals, academia and civil society. </p>
<p>Despite these interventions, the last decade has seen no measurable change in global preterm birth rates in any region of the world. For example, in southern Asia 13.3% of babies in 2010 were born premature; this figure was 13.2% in 2020. In sub-Saharan Africa 10.1% of babies in both 2010 and 2020 were premature. A group of over 140 individuals from more than 70 organisations contributed to a new report, <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240073890">Born Too Soon: decade of action on preterm birth</a>, to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the first report.</p>
<p>The latest report shows that the overall progress in improving the wellbeing of babies born prematurely, and that of their families, has not gone fast enough or far enough. Where babies are born often dictates whether they will survive. Inequalities related to race, ethnicity, socioeconomic and educational status, and access to quality healthcare services determine the likelihood of death and disability. For example, one in 10 extremely preterm babies (born before 28 weeks or seven months) survive in low-income countries. In high-income countries more than nine in 10 of these babies survive. </p>
<p>Strategies to reduce preterm birth include: pre-conception care such as access to family planning; sexual health programmes aimed at prevention and treatment of infections prior to and during pregnancy; and assessment and treatment of low nutritional status before conception. </p>
<p>The report is a wake-up call. The problem of preterm birth needs concerted efforts from governments and donors. Families, communities, healthcare providers and the civil society must also be actively involved in the solutions. </p>
<h2>Key findings</h2>
<p>In addition to established global issues, the report highlights new and intensified challenges which have affected efforts to improve preterm birth outcomes. We call these the “four Cs”:</p>
<p><strong>Conflict:</strong> By the end of 2022, over 100 million people were driven from their homes by war, violence or human rights abuses, particularly in countries such as Ukraine, Afghanistan, Sudan and Mozambique. Worldwide, 61% of maternal deaths, 51% of stillbirths and 50% of newborn deaths occurred in countries that required UN humanitarian aid in 2023. Surviving newborns from conflict zones are particularly vulnerable to lifelong risks as a result of poor healthcare services.</p>
<p><strong>COVID-19:</strong> The pandemic destabilised health services for women and newborns. Separation of newborns from caregivers threatened high-impact practices like kangaroo mother care and exclusive breastfeeding (giving no other food or drink – not even water – except breast milk). A recent <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7955179/">study</a> found that if universal coverage of kangaroo mother care were achieved, more than 125,000 newborn lives around the world could have been saved. The number of newborn deaths from COVID-19 could have been lower than 2,000. </p>
<p><strong>Climate change:</strong> Climate change (including extreme heat) and natural disasters are displacing millions of people. The health impacts are wide-ranging. In 2020, <a href="https://www.stateofglobalair.org/health/newborns#fragile-stage">20%</a> of newborn deaths were attributed to air pollution, mostly because of preterm birth. Toxic chemicals in maternal blood <a href="https://www.stateofglobalair.org/health/newborns#risk-home">results</a> in immune system stress and placental dysfunction.</p>
<p><strong>Cost of living crisis:</strong> Disruptions to supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the climate crisis have dramatically increased the cost of living. Global <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO#:%7E:text=Global%20inflation%20is%20forecast%20to,to%204.1%20percent%20by%202024.">inflation</a> rose from 4.7% in 2021 to 8.8% in 2022, creating a global cost of living health crisis. There are <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpub/article/PIIS2468-2667(22)00120-7/fulltext#:%7E:text=Good%20nutrition%2C%20shelter%2C%20and%20the,health%20timebomb%20for%20the%20future.">reports</a> of babies dying in low- and middle-income countries following discharge to families who cannot afford heating and oxygen at home, further compromising maternal and newborn health outcomes.</p>
<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240073890">new report</a> sets an ambitious agenda to reduce the burden of preterm birth by addressing contributory factors both within and outside the health system. Its recommendations have crucial contextual relevance to Africa, where preterm birth is the <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/levels-and-trends-in-child-mortality-report-2021#:%7E:text=Sub%2DSaharan%20Africa%20has%20the,36%25%20of%20global%20newborn%20deaths.">leading cause of deaths</a> in babies under a month old. </p>
<p>In summary, the report recommends:</p>
<p><strong>1. Counting and accounting for preterm births</strong></p>
<p>Data availability and quality must improve. This can be done by counting every baby everywhere, including those stillborn, and accurately recording gestational age and birth weight. </p>
<p><strong>2. Rights and respect</strong> </p>
<p>Women and their families should be empowered and cared for with respect. This will take more healthcare providers and stronger accountability.</p>
<p><strong>3. Women’s and maternal health services</strong></p>
<p>Women’s access to high-quality, respectful sexual, reproductive and maternal health services is fundamental. All women and adolescent girls should be able to determine the number and spacing of their children. </p>
<p><strong>4. Care for small and sick newborns</strong></p>
<p>Most of the major causes of neonatal death can be prevented by caring for the small or sick newborn. This requires commitment, resources and joined-up systems. </p>
<p><strong>5. Intersectoral action</strong> </p>
<p>There is a need to invest in policies that prioritise equitable and inclusive education, including sexuality education, and innovative financing schemes that support families with preterm babies. Countries also need emergency response plans to avoid service interruptions in times of crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The last decade has seen no measurable change in global preterm birth rates in any region of the world.Priya Soma-Pillay, Chair: School of Medicine and Head of Department: Obstetrics and Gynaecology, University of PretoriaDilly OC Anumba, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2075532023-06-25T11:08:20Z2023-06-25T11:08:20Z920 million people could face conflict over the world’s rivers by 2050: what our study found in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533686/original/file-20230623-21-q74dgb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Blue Nile river passes through the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/nile-basin-at-a-turning-point-as-ethiopian-dam-starts-operations-178267">Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project</a> on the Nile River started operating in February 2022. It reinforced tensions between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. The three countries rely most heavily on the Nile’s water. Sudan and Egypt consider the US$4.6 billion dam a threat to vital water supplies. Ethiopia sees it as essential for its development.</p>
<p>This is just one example of how conflicts can arise between states that share river basins. And there’s a real risk that such conflicts will become more common as <a href="https://theconversation.com/global-warming-to-bring-record-hot-year-by-2028-probably-our-first-above-1-5-c-limit-205758">global temperatures rise</a>.</p>
<p>Hundreds of rivers are shared between two or more countries. Sharing waters can be a source of cooperation or conflict. This depends on economic, cultural and institutional conditions. It also depends on <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-imperialist-past-that-started-dam-politics-between-egypt-sudan-and-ethiopia-156760">historical relations</a> between countries. </p>
<p>Although <a href="https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2023/03/tracking-conflict-cooperation-worlds-international-freshwater-resources/">cooperation historically prevails over conflict</a> and large-scale violent international conflicts haven’t happened so far, tensions over water have long existed. They are also <a href="https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/water-conflict-and-cooperation-between-india-and-pakistan">rising</a> in <a href="https://www.international-alert.org/stories/climate-change-trigger-conflicts-border-rivers-central-asia/">several river basins</a>. </p>
<p>Africa has <a href="https://tfddmgmt.github.io/tfdd/map.html">66</a> transboundary river basins. These include the Nile basin, and the Juba–Shebelle and Lake Turkana basins in the Horn of Africa. Conflict risk can rise as populations grow, water use intensifies and the climate changes. </p>
<p>There’s no consensus on the precise mechanisms that fuel conflict in such basins. It is, however, possible to identify basins where risks are projected to compound. This can be done by combining data on conflict risk conditions identified in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S095937801730537X?via%3Dihub">existing literature</a>. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07900627.2023.2184650?scroll=top&needAccess=true&role=tab&aria-labelledby=full-article">a recent study</a> I conducted with three water system researchers from IHE Delft, Utrecht University and Wageningen University & Research, we came up with three possible futures regarding conflict risk in global transboundary river basins. </p>
<p>Our study projects that if nothing substantially changes in how transboundary river basins are managed and with climate change worsening, 920 million people will live in very high to high conflict-risk basins by 2050. </p>
<p>If nations improve water use, strengthen cooperation and do more to prevent or mitigate conflict, this number drops to 536 million. </p>
<p>Water treaties and strong river basin organisations increase the likelihood of long-term, stable cooperation between states. </p>
<h2>Our research</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07900627.2023.2184650?scroll=top&needAccess=true&role=tab&aria-labelledby=full-article">Our study</a> combined projections on the construction of mega-dams and institutional resilience. It looked at hydroclimatic, governance and socio-economic risk factors. Combining these factors provided an idea of the overall conflict risk per transboundary river basin. </p>
<p>We used a broad interpretation of conflict over transboundary water resources. This ranged from accusations and diplomatic tensions to economic sanctions and violent disputes. </p>
<p>A lack of cooperation between countries can lead to a loss of benefits that could arise from joint activities. These include adapting to climate change, protecting the environment and developing socio-economically. Tensions between states over such issues can also spill over into other sectors, compromising regional political or economic relations.</p>
<h2>Our findings</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07900627.2023.2184650?src=recsys">Our results</a> show that under a business-as-usual scenario – where no major changes are made – 920 million people out of the <a href="https://tfddmgmt.github.io/tfdd/map.html">4.4 billion people living in transboundary river basins</a> will live in very high to high conflict-risk basins by 2050. In Africa, this number includes people living in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger. It also includes those in Mozambique, Malawi, Benin and Togo.</p>
<p>In the high ambition scenario – which implies improved water use practices and rising institutional resilience – this number decreases to 536 million. The low-ambition scenario implies some improvement in water use efficiency, institutional capacity and governance quality. Under this scenario, 724 million people would be living in very high to high conflict-risk basins by 2050.</p>
<p>Basins in Africa and Asia especially are projected to face high overall risks, since several risks collide here. In Africa, several basins face extra risks like high variability of water flows and limited water availability. There is also a dependence of downstream countries on upstream ones. </p>
<p>The current tensions in the Nile over <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-dam-dispute-five-key-reads-about-how-it-started-and-how-it-could-end-187644">Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam</a>, for instance, could escalate when Ethiopia decides to develop several new mega-hydropower dams. Egypt and to a lesser extent Sudan are highly dependent on basin-related water resources. </p>
<h2>What it means</h2>
<p>Our study shows that potentially, 11 more large hydropower dams could be built in the Nile basin. This is based on physical feasibility, energy yield and construction costs. The projection takes into account some restrictions, such as protected natural reserves. </p>
<p>Seven of these dams would be in Ethiopia, and the other four would be in South Sudan. The construction of these dams would be happening alongside rising water shortages, high water dependencies and limited economic resources to deal with water-related risks.</p>
<p>These new dams could worsen regional climate change impacts and water demands, especially when the population and economy are both growing. Although scholars cannot predict when this will occur, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-19089-x">a multi-year drought in the Nile basin is inevitable</a>. This would have severe impacts on water allocation. </p>
<p>The prospect of a multi-year drought in parts of the Nile basin requires preparations today. And even if the impact of new dams will be moderate, the perception of risk could affect how Egypt, for instance, makes decisions over shared river cooperation.</p>
<p>Two other large basins – the Juba–Shebelle in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, and the Lake Turkana basin in Kenya and Ethiopia – are projected to face high conflict risk levels. In these two basins, <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/emergency-response-appeal-greater-horn-of-africa">multiple issues</a>, such as local conflict, low human development and limited water availability already collide today. </p>
<p>This may be worsened without additional efforts towards 2050 due to relatively high population growth and climate change impacts – without sufficient resources to adapt. </p>
<p>Even in our high ambition scenario – which implies substantial improvements in water management, overall domestic governance and institutional resilience – the Juba–Shebelle and Lake Turkana basins still face high risks. </p>
<p>The challenges and risks these basins face must be explicitly included in wider plans. For example, when large hydropower dams are built, their operation must not hinder the climate adaptation goals of the wider region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207553/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie de Bruin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hundreds of rivers are shared between two or more countries – this could be a source of cooperation or conflict.Sophie de Bruin, Researcher in Environmental Change, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2073542023-06-14T13:34:39Z2023-06-14T13:34:39ZNigeria’s response to the Sudan crisis is lacking – it could play a leading role in bringing peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531660/original/file-20230613-29-m9x1lj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People fleeing war-torn Sudan on 13 May 2023.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Khaled Desouki/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hostilities between rival military parties in Sudan had claimed more than <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/death-toll-from-sudan-war-rises-to-more-than-600/7086508.html">600 lives</a> by May 2023. </p>
<p>The infighting has mostly been between the Sudanese Armed Forces loyal to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/who-is-al-burhan-sudans-military-de-facto-head-of-state">Abdel Fattah al-Burhan</a>, Sudan’s current military ruler, and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/sudan-unrest-what-is-the-rapid-support-forces">Rapid Support Forces</a>, a paramilitary force led by his deputy <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, “Hemedti”</a>. </p>
<p>Sudan and Nigeria have regional and geographical connections, especially through Chad, which is a neighbour to both. </p>
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<p>As I have <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/01/sudan-war-chad-sahel-small-arms-car-iswap/">previously noted</a>, the fallout of the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin region, of which Nigeria is a core member, directly affects the country’s peace and security. </p>
<p>Nigeria is duty bound to respond to the unfolding situation, considering the 5,500 Nigerian nationals and the over <a href="https://dailytrust.com/we-have-over-5-million-sudanese-of-nigerian-origin-in-our-country/">5 million</a> Sudanese of Nigerian origin in Sudan. </p>
<p>Aside from helping the Nigerians trapped in Sudan, Nigeria needs to offer relief and assistance because a spiralling Sudan will have an impact on Nigeria’s own peace.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/author/folahanmi-aina/#:%7E:text=Folahanmi%20Aina%20is%20an%20associate,Basin%2C%20and%20the%20Sahel%20region">international security expert</a> with a regional focus on west Africa, I argue that without Nigeria’s input, the prospects of lasting peace in Sudan remain elusive, as no other country in Africa has what it takes to fill this role. </p>
<p>Sudan could experience a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65409730">prolonged conflict</a> that the sub-region cannot afford to manage. The situation in Sudan offers Nigeria an opportunity to reassert a leadership role. Nigeria also has the legitimacy and recognition to take the lead on providing an African solution to an African problem. </p>
<h2>Nigeria’s regional role</h2>
<p>Nigeria dominates the west African sub-region. It has the largest population in Africa at over <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=NG">213 million people</a>, and the largest economy by gross domestic product at <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=NG">US$440.8 billion</a> as of 2021. </p>
<p>With an estimated total military personnel of <a href="https://punchng.com/nigeria-maintains-35th-position-in-global-military-ranking/">215,000, of which 135,000 are active</a>, Nigeria has the most formidable military force in west Africa. </p>
<p>A recurring argument is that given Nigeria’s current economic woes, which include a <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-news/578847-nigerias-public-debt-rose-to-n44-06trn-in-q3-2022.html">rising debt profile</a>, it may not be able to take the leadership role. If it doesn’t, who will, and what would the implications be? </p>
<h2>A history of interventions</h2>
<p>Nigeria has a record of intervening to achieve stability in west Africa. It did this during <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/nigeria-spent-13bn-on-liberation-of-sierra-leone-liberia-says-envoy">the first (1989-1996) and second (1999-2003) Liberian civil wars, and Sierra Leone’s civil war (1991-2002)</a>. In both cases, Nigeria played a leading role in restoring peace and security. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s decision at the time reflected a willingness to avert a regional humanitarian crisis and the potential spillover effects of armed conflicts. </p>
<p>Nigeria has also helped to sustain democratic rule in west Africa. A case in point was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-ecowas-ivorycoast-20110323-idAFJOE72M0NU20110323">Cote d’Ivoire</a>, where after a disputed election, Laurent Gbagbo refused to hand over power to Alassane Ouattara. </p>
<p>In 2016, following Yahyah Jammeh’s refusal to relinquish political power in The Gambia, Nigeria <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/foreign/west-africa-foreign/255739-gambias-president-reveals-buharis-statement-helped-sack-jammeh.html?tztc=1">mobilised</a> regional support. This regional intervention <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-politics-idUSKBN15305Q">led to the emergence of Adama Barrow</a> as president. Nigeria also contributed to the 4,000 troops who remained in The Gambia. </p>
<p>In July 2022, Nigeria <a href="https://punchng.com/fg-wades-in-mali-cote-divoire-row-over-detained-soldiers/">waded</a> in on the crisis between Mali and Cote d’Ivoire over detained soldiers.</p>
<h2>Sudan’s impact on Nigeria</h2>
<p>The situation in Sudan has already led to a worsening humanitarian crisis in the region. The UN refugee agency recently noted that <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/number-of-refugees-who-fled-sudan-for-chad-double-in-week-/7095241.html">55,000</a> people have fled from Sudan to Chad. </p>
<p>With a 1,300km border between Sudan and Chad, the unfolding situation could lead to an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/01/sudan-war-chad-sahel-small-arms-car-iswap/">influx</a> of small and light arms and displaced people, which could worsen the situation in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel regions. </p>
<p>For Nigeria, this would mean increased pressure on infrastructural facilities arising from the arrival of refugees. </p>
<p>There is also the possibility of an upswing in violence if foreign terrorist fighters from across the Sahel region seek new recruits and safe havens. </p>
<p>For Nigeria, this would be one trouble too many. The country’s security forces have been stretched responding to multiple security threats at home. </p>
<h2>What Nigeria should do</h2>
<p><strong>Mediation:</strong> the United States is <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/307029/sudan-whats-wrong-with-the-us-saudi-mediated-talks-in-jeddah/">attempting</a> to play the role of a mediator but the chances of it brokering a peace deal are slim. </p>
<p>Citizens in west African states like Mali and Burkina Faso see the west, including France, as part of the problem rather than the solution. </p>
<p>A state-led mediation effort from an African regional power like Nigeria offers a better chance at acceptability and recognition. It avoids the suspicion that comes with the involvement of western powers. </p>
<p>Nigeria should send a special envoy to Sudan and rally continental efforts through the African Union. </p>
<p><strong>Effective manning of entry points:</strong> Nigeria needs to guard potential illegal entry points and use aerial surveillance.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s Immigration Service and its National Identity Management Centre must also be ready for rapid documentation of foreign nationals finding their way into the country. </p>
<p><strong>Refugee management:</strong> emergency refugee camps will be needed to accommodate refugees from the war in Sudan.</p>
<p><strong>Provision of relief materials:</strong> the Nigerian Air Force should be willing to airlift medical and relief materials into Sudan. Nigeria’s vast experience in this regard would make a difference on the ground. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>As a regional leader, Nigeria must not sit by at a time of turbulence such as this. </p>
<p>Doing so widens the existing “policing gap” across the region, especially since <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/16/last-french-troops-leave-mali-ending-nine-year-deployment">France’s exit</a> from Mali. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s foreign policy actions and inaction will be closely watched. The unfolding situation in Sudan reinforces the need for Nigeria to come up with an articulate <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/240218/why-nigeria-needs-a-grand-strategy/">grand strategy</a> that reflects its position and national interests in a complex and fast-changing region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207354/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A spiralling Sudan will affect peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin region, of which Nigeria is a member.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2070622023-06-08T14:08:49Z2023-06-08T14:08:49ZChad on the brink: how the war in Sudan hurts its fragile neighbour<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530631/original/file-20230607-17-bbcsrb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A 2014 view of Gaoui refugee camp in N'Djamena, Chad. Pressure on refugee camps in Chad has increased due to latest fighting in Sudan.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sebnem Coskun/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the 15 April <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">outbreak of hostilities</a> in Sudan, the civilian population has been bearing the brunt. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/sudan-unrest-what-is-the-rapid-support-forces">Rapid Support Forces</a>, led by <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (called Hemeti</a>), are in conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/who-is-al-burhan-sudans-military-de-facto-head-of-state">General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan</a>, Sudan’s de facto head of state.</p>
<p>Nearly <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/sudan/">1.4 million</a> people have been displaced. Of these, 330,000 have crossed into neighbouring countries. </p>
<p>Chad – already a fragile country itself – is one. Around <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/sudanese-refugees-fleeing-violence-flock-chad">90,000</a> Sudanese refugees have entered Chad since the conflict began. The new arrivals have added to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/over-60000-have-fled-chad-sudan-since-conflict-started-unhcr-2023-05-22/#:%7E:text=The%20new%20arrivals%20have%20added,for%20displaced%20people%20from%20Sudan.">600,000</a> mostly Sudanese refugees already in Chad after fleeing previous conflicts, especially in the Darfur region. </p>
<p>Despite its oil wealth, Chad is one of the <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/chad">poorest countries</a> in the world. Chad and Sudan share a common border of 1,400 kilometres. They also share the same ethnic groups living on both sides of their borders. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/helga-dickow-1209876">political scientist and expert in ethnic and religious conflict</a> with a focus on Chad, I outline how the ongoing armed conflict in Sudan poses security, humanitarian, political and economic challenges for Chad. </p>
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<h2>Fragile security</h2>
<p>In the past, relations between Chad and Sudan have been characterised by <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-WP-12-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War.pdf">conflicts, proxy wars and fragile peace agreements</a>. </p>
<p>The Darfur region plays a crucial role. It has at different times been a shelter for rebel groups of both countries.</p>
<p>Before he took power in Chad through a coup in December 1990, <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">Idriss Déby Itno</a>, an ethnic Zaghawa, and his militia had their rear base in Darfur. Members of Darfurian Zaghawa belonged to the inner circle of his rule. </p>
<p>After his <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">death in 2021</a>, a military council led by his son Mahamat took power in Chad.</p>
<p>Sudan’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/17/mohamed-hamdan-dagalo-the-feared-ex-warlord-taking-on-sudan-army-hemedti">Hemedti</a> is well connected within Chadian politics and military. He is of Chadian Arab descent and has his stronghold in the Darfur region. His family lives on both sides of the border. </p>
<p>Hemedti’s cousin, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/13366/Death_on_the_front_line%2c_a_coup%2c_and_then_an_about_turn">General Bichara Issa Djadalla</a>, is the personal chief of staff to Mahamat Déby. Hemedti’s victory or defeat in Sudan could be a huge risk for the transitional president Déby in Chad.</p>
<p>In the case of his victory, Chadian Arabs could feel encouraged to try to take power in Chad as well. Many Chadians want an end to the Zaghawa rule, which has lasted for more than 30 years. Chadian Arab forces could be a real threat for Mahamat Déby.</p>
<p>In case of defeat, Hemeti would not give up his stronghold, Darfur. The gold of Darfur is the reason for his wealth and military strength. Hemedti is known for his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/who-is-hemedti-the-puppeteer-behind-sudans-feared-rsf-fighters">cruelty and ruthlessness</a>. The Zaghawa of Darfur could become the victims, as it was during the <a href="https://origins.osu.edu/article/worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-understanding-darfur-conflict?language_content_entity=en">Darfur crisis in 2003</a>. If Mahamat Déby did not intervene, other sons of Déby and Zaghawa members of the army could quickly get rid of him.</p>
<h2>Humanitarian crisis</h2>
<p>The consequences of the outbreak of fighting in Khartoum were immediately felt in eastern Chad. </p>
<p>About <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/05/23/more-than-90000-sudanese-take-refuge-in-chad-to-flee-the-fighting/">90,000 refugees</a> have fled from Sudan to Chad so far. Among them are about <a href="https://storyteller.iom.int/stories/plight-homecoming-chadians-fleeing-violence-sudan">12,500 Chadian returnees</a> who have been living in Sudan for decades. </p>
<p>Most refugees arrived in eastern Chad with only what they could carry. Here they met a poor but traditionally hospitable population, including earlier refugees. The arrival of more refugees risks worsening a precarious situation.</p>
<p>International aid is desperately needed. The people lack water, food, medical care and all other necessities of life. According to UNHCR, only <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/chad-funding-2023">17%</a> of the funds needed to meet the most urgent needs of refugees in Chad have been received from donors. </p>
<p>During her recent visit, USAID administrator Samantha Power pledged <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/readout/may-20-2023-administrator-samantha-power-travels-chad-visits-refugee-camp-support-humanitarian-response-crisis-sudan">$17 million</a> in humanitarian aid to the Chadian government for new and long-time refugees in the east of the country. </p>
<p>UNHCR’s deputy high commissioner for refugees, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/23/1177626408/unexpectedly-high-number-of-refugees-cross-into-chad-to-flee-fighting-in-sudan">Raouf Mazou</a>, also promised help for refugees and Chadians during his audience with Mahamat Déby on 22 May 2023.</p>
<p>In spite of these promises, there’s a risk that if any group feels neglected in the allocation of support, tensions between the local population and the newcomers could increase. </p>
<p>With the rainy season approaching, the situation threatens to deteriorate further. Access to the refugee camps becomes almost impossible due to poor or non-existent roads. This will make it even more difficult for aid organisations to distribute relief supplies and to move the refugees away from the border region. A humanitarian disaster in eastern Chad is a possibility. </p>
<h2>Economic crisis</h2>
<p>Landlocked Chad is heavily dependent on imports of most goods – industrial products, raw materials and food. The two main ports that supply Chad are Douala in Cameroon and Bur Sudan in Sudan.</p>
<p>The closure of the borders has had an immediate impact on Chadian consumers. Prices of goods and services have risen by up to <a href="https://nairametrics.com/2023/05/18/nigeria-increases-trade-with-chad-on-war-in-sudan/">70%</a>, according to the Observatory for Economic Complexity. </p>
<p>The few Chadian exports have come to a standstill. Cotton, gum arabic and livestock are Chad’s <a href="https://www.export.gov/article?series=a0pt00000000GtoAAE&type=Country_Commercial__kav">main non-oil exports</a>. </p>
<p>The war in Sudan might bring the already weak Chadian economy to a standstill. To make matters worse, there is currently a <a href="https://apanews.net/2023/03/06/chad-reels-from-fuel-shortage/">shortage of fuel</a> in Chad. The shortage led to an increase in fuel prices of up to 300% - in a country where private households and manufacturers rely almost entirely on their own generators. </p>
<h2>Political implications</h2>
<p>Chad’s transitional president Mahamat Déby was surprised by the fighting in Sudan while on a pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. It took him almost a week to find a safe way to fly back home to N'Djamena. </p>
<p>However, he announced on his <a href="https://www.facebook.com/presidencetd">Facebook account</a> that he had been in telephone contact with the two warring parties, trying to convince them to stop the fighting. </p>
<p>He wanted to present himself as a mediator to the international public. By talking to the two generals, he avoided choosing sides. He cannot afford to get caught on either side of the conflict between al-Burhan and Hemeti. </p>
<p>Since the death of his father, Mahamat Déby has tried to keep a firm grip on power despite national and international criticism. The transitional authorities suppress <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/26/chad-scores-protesters-shot-dead-wounded">opposition</a> to the Déby dynasty. </p>
<p>At its last meeting, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/communique-1152nd-meeting-peace-and-security-council-african-union-report-panel-wise-its-mission-republic-chad-held-11-may-2023">African Union Security Council</a> reiterated the ineligibility of the transitional government, including its president. </p>
<p>The war in Sudan and its outcome could destabilise Chad even further and lead it away from any path to peace and democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207062/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helga Dickow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ongoing war in Sudan poses security, humanitarian, political and economic challenges for Chad.Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2059472023-06-08T11:44:42Z2023-06-08T11:44:42ZSudan conflict: how China and Russia are involved and the differences between them<p>As clashes <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-refugee-crisis-aid-agencies-face-huge-challenges-as-hundreds-of-thousands-flee-violence-205217">continue</a> between the Sudanese military and rapid support forces, the current and historic role of <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/04/meet-sudans-web-warlords-foreign-backers-and-their-tangled-alignments">foreign</a> governments in Sudanese affairs is under close examination. </p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, the Sudan conflict has amplified <a href="https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/great-power-competition-implications-in-africa-the-chinese-communist-party/">concerns</a> from the US and other countries about the roles <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-conflict-sudan-affect-russia-and-wagner-group">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bda84300-5f77-4b69-9540-7c6f1f28c8ee">China</a> are playing in Sudan specifically, and in Africa. </p>
<p>Researchers had been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19480881.2023.2195280">concerned</a> that Beijing’s loans for infrastructure and development to countries including Sudan might be “debt-trap diplomacy”, a predatory attempt to acquire key foreign infrastructure such as ports. </p>
<p>Analysts had previously suggested the implications of China’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13567888.2018.1436801">growing</a> military engagement with Africa including establishing naval bases and its use of <a href="https://greydynamics.com/the-rise-of-chinese-military-contractors-in-africa/">security contractors</a> are examples of Beijing wanting to expand its military power and political influence abroad. </p>
<p>Others have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1693105">suggested</a> that Russian activity in Africa could be a return to Soviet-era levels of influence through arms sales, joint military exercises, and installing their own set of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2136236?src=recsys">security contractors</a> to train the Sudanese military.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group, a high profile group of Russian mercenaries, has denied any <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-violence-between-army-and-militia-is-a-symptom-of-an-old-disease-that-is-destroying-africa-204288">involvement in events in Sudan</a>, saying in a post on Telegram: “Due to the large number of inquiries from various foreign media about Sudan, most of which are provocative, we consider it necessary to inform everyone that Wagner staff have not been in Sudan for more than two years.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-violence-between-army-and-militia-is-a-symptom-of-an-old-disease-that-is-destroying-africa-204288">Sudan: violence between army and militia is a symptom of an old disease that is destroying Africa</a>
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<h2>China favours stability</h2>
<p>Our work for <a href="https://peacerep.org/research/geopolitical-transitions/">PeaceRep</a>, an international research consortium led by Edinburgh law school, suggests that the US and Europe should be cautious about lumping Russia and China’s goals in Africa together. It found that Beijing and Moscow are taking different approaches. China has its own set of interests, but its approach appears to fundamentally favour stability. </p>
<p>As a result, China is <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/State-of-the-Art-Report-Digital-1.pdf">keener</a> to work with the broader international community on issues such as peacekeeping and <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Third-Party-Mediation-in-Sudan-and-South-Sudan-Digital.pdf">mediation of conflicts</a>. Conversely, Russia pursues its interests in Africa without as much cooperation with international institutions. </p>
<p>Our new <a href="https://peacerep.org/publication/china-russia-sudan-economic-military-engagement/">report</a> looks at the available data for pre-war Sudan to see how well claims from scholars and commentators match Russia and China’s behaviour. </p>
<p>We consolidated data from the United Nations, <a href="https://www.sipri.org/">Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</a>, the <a href="https://www.aiddata.org/">AidData</a> research lab on Chinese and Russian engagement with Sudan, as well as news reports to examine how well the arguments from scholars and policymakers hold up. </p>
<p>We found that China cooperated with the international community on issues such as peacekeeping and pursued deep economic engagement. In contrast, Russia prioritised arms sales over issues such as trade, aid, or peacekeeping.</p>
<p>Sudan shows how Russia and China’s approaches to Africa differ. Sudan received <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/sudan-china-loan-idUSL6N0AM9UY20130117">billions</a> in loans and investment from China to facilitate oil production and economic development throughout the 2000s. Russia is a longstanding security partner of Sudan, and is keen to set up a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-sudan-government-moscow-803738fba4d8f91455f0121067c118dd">naval base</a> in Port Sudan. Both countries sell arms and sent peacekeepers to at least one UN mission.</p>
<h2>China’s investment</h2>
<p>According to the UN <a href="https://comtrade.un.org/">Comtrade</a> database, China’s economic investment is higher than Russia’s. China’s imports from Sudan took a big hit when South Sudan became independent due to South Sudan having the lion’s share of the oil reserves. </p>
<p>China’s imports peaked at nearly £6.2 billion worth of goods in 2011. Ten years later, annual imports hadn’t recovered. Meanwhile, Chinese exports to Sudan grew steadily. In 2021, China exported £1.3 billion worth of goods to Sudan, even amid the disruptions caused by COVID-19. </p>
<p>China is also a major lender. As AidData’s <a href="https://www.aiddata.org/data/aiddatas-global-chinese-development-finance-dataset-version-2-0">Chinese development finance</a> data shows, China has pledged billions of dollars in loans since 2000. Contrary to <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-01">claims</a> that Chinese loans are part of “debt-trap diplomacy,” China often provided debt relief to Sudan. </p>
<p>The findings match recent research that China is <a href="https://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS124_China_as_an_International_Lender_of_Last_Resort.pdf">working</a> to ensure countries they lend to can service their debts.</p>
<p>By comparison, Russia’s economic engagement in Sudan is meagre. As a major oil producer, Russia did not need to purchase Sudanese petroleum products. Annual <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/rus/partner/sdn">trade</a> with Sudan is significantly lower than China’s, and Russia offered little in the way of bilateral aid or loans.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530612/original/file-20230607-19-itsgr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chart showing exports from Russia to Sudan." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530612/original/file-20230607-19-itsgr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530612/original/file-20230607-19-itsgr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530612/original/file-20230607-19-itsgr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530612/original/file-20230607-19-itsgr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530612/original/file-20230607-19-itsgr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530612/original/file-20230607-19-itsgr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530612/original/file-20230607-19-itsgr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/rus/partner/sdn">OEC</a></span>
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<h2>Supplying arms</h2>
<p>Contrary to some <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/12/how-china-is-building-influence-through-arms-sales.html">concerns</a> about Chinese arms sales, <a href="https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php">data</a> shows that Russia sold more “major weapons” by value in the post-cold War era than China, especially high-ticket items such as <a href="https://www.military.africa/2023/05/sudans-rsf-shoots-down-russian-made-mig-29-fighter-jet-over-khartoum-a-stalemate-emerges-in-the-ongoing-conflict/">fighter jets</a>. </p>
<p>Globally, China has been far more involved in multilateral efforts than Russia. Of all the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, <a href="https://mwi.usma.edu/beijings-blue-helmets-what-to-make-of-chinas-role-in-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/">China has become</a> the biggest UN peacekeeping contributor. </p>
<p>In Sudan, Russia created a small peacekeeping contingent for the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unmis/">United Nations Mission in Sudan</a> (UNMIS). China contributed a larger force to UNMIS and an <a href="https://unamid.unmissions.org/unamid-welcomes-chinese-engineers-build-camps">engineering</a> unit to the concurrent UN-African Union Mission in Darfur, nearly 800 peacekeepers at the peak of both missions.</p>
<p>Russian and Chinese security contractors are both under <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/stealth-industry-quiet-expansion-chinese-private-security-companies">scrutiny</a>, but we found no reliable quantitative data on the number of Russian or Chinese contractors in Sudan. <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2217673/chinas-private-military-and-security-companies-chinese-muscle-and-the-reasons-f/">Other</a> work suggests that their roles in Africa and Sudan are different. </p>
<p>Chinese security contractors seem to be focused on protecting Chinese businesses oversees and Russian contractors such as the Wagner Group are alleged to be involved in <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/29/africa/sudan-russia-gold-investigation-cmd-intl/index.html">criminal activity</a> in addition to their formal missions. The <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/russias-private-wagner-group-denies-operating-sudan">Wagner Group said reports</a> of it having any staff in Sudan were false.</p>
<p>Overall, the conflict in Sudan shows the differences between Russia and China’s approaches. Russian pre-war activity in Sudan has had more negative effects than China’s in the current conflict. Russian-made aircraft are currently being used to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/27/more-air-strikes-in-sudan-as-ceasefire-expiry-looms">strike</a> Sudanese cities. </p>
<p>China, on the other hand, faced similar challenges to western states in trying to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3218722/sudan-evacuation-based-chinas-years-african-conflict-experience">evacuate its citizens</a>, but also helped get citizens of other countries <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/30/world/sudan-crisis-china-uk-uae-evacuations-fighting-unrest-looting-intl-hnk/index.html">out of Sudan</a> as well. </p>
<p>Any international engagement with China and Russia to help find longer-term responses to the crisis in Sudan needs to be well informed about these different approaches.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205947/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mateja Peter is a Principal Investigator on the PeaceRep Global Fragmentation project, which receives funding from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. She serves on the Management Committee of the Scottish Council on Global Affairs. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marcel Plichta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s involvement in Sudan is more financial than military, and favours stability.Marcel Plichta, PhD Candidate , University of St AndrewsMateja Peter, Lecturer in International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2020702023-05-30T11:27:50Z2023-05-30T11:27:50ZSome refugee girls are forced into early marriage for safety – here’s why<p>Rates of child marriage increase in communities <a href="https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/learning-resources/resource-centre/child-marriage-in-humanitarian-contexts/#resource-downloads">displaced by conflict</a> as well as communities affected by natural and environmental disasters. </p>
<p>The current crisis in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-65284948">Sudan</a> is just one place where this could be an issue. The recent earthquakes in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/major-earthquake-strikes-turkey-syria-about-200-dead-many-trapped-2023-02-06/">Turkey</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-64544478">Syria</a> are also typical situations where we are likely to see young girls pushed into marrying before they are ready. At these times of extreme fragility, there are fewer protections for young women than would normally be the case.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/15540/805_Child_Early_and_Forced_Marriage_in_FCAS.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">report</a> published in 2020, from the Institute of Development Studies, a research organisation affiliated with the University of Sussex, shows that crises exacerbate and complicate existing causes of child marriage, such as poverty and gender inequality. There are also additional crisis-specific causes. These include food insecurity; the breakdown of legal mechanisms that protect girls, such as minimum age of marriage laws; and an absence of rights and protections, such as the right to work or a guaranteed minimum household income.</p>
<p>Marriage can be considered <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1363/42e0416?seq=2">a form of protection against sexual violence</a>, which often increases in conflict. During times of crisis, stress, insecurity and instability increase, while protective family and community structures are weakened. This reduces the support that members of extended families can provide to each other. There are also examples of forced marriages. For instance, reports from Damascus in Syria suggest that families were forced to <a href="https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/documents/959/Child-marriage-in-humanitarian-contexts_August-2020.pdf">allow the marriage</a> of girls to members of armed groups. During the civil war <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/11/10/living-fear/child-soldiers-and-tamil-tigers-sri-lanka">in Sri Lanka</a>, some parents married their girls earlier in the hope of protecting them from being recruited into militias.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/documents/959/Child-marriage-in-humanitarian-contexts_August-2020.pdf">Twelve of the 20 countries</a> with the highest prevalence of child marriage experience the most extreme humanitarian crises. Child marriage is often considered as one of the few viable survival strategies for girls in these difficult moments. Child marriage may also be considered more socially acceptable during a crisis. In many societies, women are expected to marry and have children eventually, so marriage occurring earlier than planned is not ideal but is also not necessarily <a href="https://www.tdh.ch/en/media-library/documents/research-child-marriage-syrian-refugees">considered harmful or a problem</a>. <a href="https://data.unicef.org/resources/towards-ending-child-marriage/">Global data</a> from Unicef showing the decline of child marriage hides this increase in communities affected by crises.</p>
<p>The marriage of a girl before she is 18 has life-long <a href="https://aps.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1026">negative consequences</a>, such as pregnancy-related health problems and low educational attainment. But finding effective solutions to prevent it during emergencies is difficult.</p>
<h2>What can help?</h2>
<p>Several actions are <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33446401/">recommended to prevent child marriage</a> around the globe, including in these crisis and conflict zones. Keeping girls in education is considered important, as school girls are less likely to marry. </p>
<p>Economic incentives can be provided to households when their daughters attend school rather than marry. In Bangladesh, the female secondary school assistance programme has <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Long-term-impacts-of-the-free-tuition-and-female-on-Hong-Sarr/1deea1497f45db6ed049e05a2b3f2abde313d6e8">increased the age</a> at which recipients marry by between 1.4 and 2.3 years. The payment of school fees and provision of uniforms and books is also common, and this has been effective in <a href="https://knowledgecommons.popcouncil.org/departments_sbsr-pgy/537/">Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Tanzania</a>, <a href="https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/learning-resources/resource-centre/the-ishraq-program-for-out-of-school-girls-from-pilot-to-scale-up/">Egypt</a> and <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/694930">Bangladesh </a>. </p>
<p>Other strategies target community expectations that limit girls’ aspirations to being a passive wife and mother only. Talking with community leaders is usually complemented by direct investment in girls. Girls are offered informal education or life skills training to enhance access to employment or enhance sexual and reproductive health knowledge, for example, often delivered by peers from their community. </p>
<p>Finally, the creation and implementation of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lasr.12033">minimum age of marriage laws</a>, and other complementing social policies, are also considered critical. While most actions are targeted at preventing child marriage, meeting the needs of married girls is also important.</p>
<p>One problem we have, however, is that most of the research done to understand child marriage and identify ways to prevent it, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1054139X21004791">has not been done with crisis-affected communities</a>. We still do not know whether these actions work effectively for girls affected by crises. </p>
<p>Recent research on preventing violence against refugee adolescent girls argues that our responses to child marriage need to be better <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/3/5/e000825">adapted for humanitarian situations</a>. Keeping girls in schools during a humanitarian crisis is harder, for example, as is building relationships with community leaders in fast-changing community contexts. </p>
<p>Parents are also more reluctant to let their daughters access any training or events away from the family space because of worries about their security in dangerous and uncertain environments.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/child-marriages-in-indonesia-increase-womens-depression-research-shows-198777">Child marriages in Indonesia increase women's depression, research shows</a>
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<p>While we wait for more evidence on whether action to prevent child marriage in troubled times is working, there is more that can be done. Development professionals such as social workers, educators and health practitioners can work more closely with humanitarian organisations, <a href="https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Collaboration-Across-Humanitarian-Sectors-and-Across-the-Humanitarian-Development-Peace-Nexus-for-Preventing-Child-Marriage-and-Supporting-Married-Girls-brief.pdf">to share knowledge, resources and capacities</a>. </p>
<p>Development organisations, particularly those at local levels, have a deep understanding of the communities affected, their history, their needs and values. Meanwhile, the international humanitarian community, led by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, have expertise in providing short-term care to those affected by severe or sudden crisis. </p>
<p>Crisis usually occurs in countries where social and economic development initiatives are already present. This provides opportunities for local knowledge and leadership to guide and shape fast-paced and complex humanitarian action. </p>
<p>Closer work by these organisations and practitioners could help to prevent child marriage when communities are affected by crisis. Providing girls and their families with the resources and support to help negotiate the many challenges they face during times of crisis is the only way we can improve this situation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aisha Hutchinson has received funding in the past from The British Academy, The Economic and Social Research Council and from the Women's Refugee Commission.</span></em></p>Research shows that young girls can be pushed into marriage in refugee camps or during national disasters.Aisha Hutchinson, Lecturer in Social Sciences, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2062992023-05-28T08:25:08Z2023-05-28T08:25:08ZWhat makes peace talks successful? The 4 factors that matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528036/original/file-20230524-15-o7zx4n.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Slim/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Peace talks that seek to end armed conflicts are underway in several African countries. Because very few conflicts are resolved on the battlefield, negotiations are fundamental. But they often fail. And even when an agreement is concluded, it doesn’t always last. </p>
<p>So what are the factors that lead to successful peace talks? </p>
<p>To start, negotiating peace is complex. If it wasn’t, conflicts would be resolved more quickly and peace would last longer. Recognising this complexity is essential. </p>
<p>Significant expertise has been developed in the field of peace mediation over the past decades. The <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/107-au-mediation-support-unit">African Union</a> and the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/mediation-support">United Nations</a> have set up mediation teams. Several specialised non-governmental organisations have been created, like the South Africa-based organisation <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/work/peacemaking/">Accord</a> and the Switzerland-based <a href="https://hdcentre.org/about/">Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>These actors, along with regional powers and other states, often roll out several peace initiatives simultaneously. This can be helpful to deal with the complexity of armed conflicts. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://research-repository.uwa.edu.au/en/persons/philipp-kastner/publications/">international law and peace scholar</a>, I have analysed many different peace negotiations and agreements. There have been some great successes in Africa, such as the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MZ_921004_MozambiqueGeneralPeaceAgreement.pdf">1992 peace agreement</a> that ended the 16-year long civil war in Mozambique. </p>
<p>But there have also been spectacular failures, like in Sierra Leone, where fighting flared up just after the conclusion of a <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_990707_LomePeaceAgreement.pdf">comprehensive agreement in 1999</a>. And there are several ongoing conflicts that urgently require a peaceful resolution, for example in <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/jeddah-agreement-welcomed-but-also-met-with-scepticism-in-sudan">Sudan</a>, the <a href="https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/HRC/51/59&Lang=E">Central African Republic</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>. </p>
<p>Based on my research, I would argue that there are four key factors that make (or break) mediation efforts. These include a sustained commitment from several actors to building peace; serious efforts to develop trust and listen to grievances; an attunement to timing; and an acceptance of peace as a process. </p>
<h2>Building peace</h2>
<p>First, peace has a better chance when war is attacked from several sides. Multiple mediation processes can facilitate the inclusion of different stakeholders, such as civil society actors. This is crucial, precisely because more inclusive processes <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781786610256/Conflict-Intervention-and-Transformation-Theory-and-Practice">increase the chances</a> of durable peace. </p>
<p>At the same time, however, it can be problematic when too many actors are involved. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">Sudan’s ongoing conflict</a>, this has led to a <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Third-Party-Mediation-in-Sudan-and-South-Sudan-Digital.pdf">piecemeal approach</a> and to <a href="https://peacerep.org/publication/third-party-mediation-in-sudan-and-south-sudan-longer-term-trends/">unhelpful competition</a> between different regional and international actors who often pursue their own interests. </p>
<p>Second, the organisation or the specific mediator in question must be trusted by the parties. A good example of this is the Catholic Community of Sant-Egidio, which facilitated the <a href="https://www.santegidio.org/pageID/34180/langID/en/Dossier-Mozambique-and-the-Community-of-Sant-Egidio.html">conclusion of the peace agreement</a> in Mozambique. </p>
<p>Building trust and listening to grievances is important. This helps find creative solutions that give guarantees to all the parties and allow them to imagine a common future.</p>
<p>But contrary to ordinary understandings of mediation, peace mediators don’t have to be perfectly neutral and unbiased. Blaise Compaoré, the former president of Burkina Faso, mediated the 2007 negotiations between the government of Côte d’Ivoire and the rebellious Forces Nouvelles, which Compaoré had <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2003-1-page-71.htm">overtly supported</a>. In the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CI_070304_Accord%20Politique%20de%20Ouagadougou%20%28French%29.pdf">agreement</a> that followed, the parties made Compaoré an arbitrator in the implementation phase. In other words, a mediator can be an insider who has close relationships with one of the parties.</p>
<p>A third factor for successful peace talks is timing. Since negotiations typically take place in the shadow of military gains and losses, it’s often assumed that it only makes sense to start negotiations when both sides believe that they can gain more from negotiating than from fighting. </p>
<p>But waiting for the “ripe moment” to start high-level negotiations is problematic. It can prolong a conflict unnecessarily and lead to extreme suffering. In Sudan – where the national army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces have been fighting each other since mid-April 2023 – more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/more-than-1-mln-people-displaced-by-sudan-crisis-un-refugee-agency-2023-05-19/">one million people</a> have already been displaced. And in the Ethiopian region of Tigray, a <a href="https://addisstandard.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/AU-led-Ethiopia-Peace-Agreement.pdf">ceasefire agreement</a> was concluded in November 2022, but only after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jan/11/joy-and-grief-as-tigray-reconnects-to-the-world">hundreds of thousands of people</a> had been killed over two years of conflict.</p>
<p>Therefore, peace actors should constantly search for entry points to create opportunities for building peace instead of waiting for the perfect conditions. They can convince the conflict parties that negotiations are not zero-sum games and don’t automatically lead to painful compromises. </p>
<p>Fourth, how “peace” is understood plays a major role. It’s often thought that no fighting means peace, and that an agreement will end violence and suffering almost instantly. This is rarely true. An agreement is only one small step in an often long process.</p>
<p>Moreover, while a ceasefire is always desirable because it means less violence and less suffering, it’s not absolutely necessary to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/peace-talks-ukraine-russias-red-lines-unchanged-2022-03-30/">negotiate substantive issues</a>. Many negotiations, from <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-War">Bosnia</a> to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20319583">Colombia</a>, have been held while fighting continued, and yet a substantive peace agreement was eventually concluded. </p>
<p>And it can be alright to agree to disagree: not everything can or needs to be resolved in the same deal. Some root causes of conflict, like the historical marginalisation of minority groups or of certain regions, can be difficult to tackle. But it’s possible to put in place measures and mechanisms to envisage improvements. </p>
<p>Partial agreements can be a good option, even if this approach obviously takes time. In Senegal, for example, it’s only earlier this year, after decades of conflict and many years of mediation, that one of the factions of the rebellious Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance <a href="https://hdcentre.org/news/une-faction-du-mfdc-signe-la-cessation-des-hostilites-avec-le-gouvernement-du-senegal-et-depose-definitivement-les-armes/">agreed to lay down its weapons</a>. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>It’s vital to do more to prevent armed conflicts in the first place. Continuously <a href="https://www.sipri.org/news/2023/world-military-expenditure-reaches-new-record-high-european-spending-surges-0">rising military expenditures</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/arms-control/">few restrictions</a> on weapons sales mean that weapons are easily available in many places. The international community should, therefore, urgently make more efforts to halt the massive production and circulation of weapons. </p>
<p>And although every conflict has its own dynamics, poverty, global inequalities and exploitation are always significant factors. Tackling these issues isn’t straightforward, but it would help prevent and resolve armed conflicts, and would pay off in the long run. </p>
<p>Peace is a process, and it requires significant commitment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206299/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philipp Kastner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An agreement to end conflict is only one small step in an often long process.Philipp Kastner, Senior Lecturer in International Law, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.