tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/tom-moyane-53868/articlesTom Moyane – The Conversation2018-11-08T10:37:00Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1065582018-11-08T10:37:00Z2018-11-08T10:37:00ZSouth Africa’s commissions of inquiry: what good can they do?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244524/original/file-20181108-74772-5karpy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former South African Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas gave damning evidence at the State capture commission.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sunday Times/Alan Skuy</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africans might be forgiven for expecting two key commissions of inquiry currently underway to change the country. Some of these expectations, however, are unrealistic, as a look at the commissions’ functions and powers show. </p>
<p>Some expectations might be met, but only if the commissions achieve public buy-in and generate enough pressure for change. </p>
<p>Whether they can do that depends not only on their powers but also on how they are run.</p>
<p>The probe into tax administration and governance at the <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-ramaphosa-establishes-commission-inquiry-tax-administration-and">South African Revenue Service</a> – headed by Judge R Nugent – and has already led to the axing of Tom Moyane as head of the tax collection agency. The other inquiry – headed by Deputy Chief Justice Zondo – is looking into allegations that the South African state has been <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">captured</a> by private business interests allied to former President Jacob Zuma. It’s expected to run for two years.</p>
<p>Unrealistic expectations about what commissions can achieve come from the fact that they’re often confused with courts of law. This isn’t surprising given that they seem to function like courts. For example, they’re often chaired by judges, affected parties are often represented by lawyers and witnesses take oaths to tell the truth. </p>
<p>But they aren’t courts. And it’s important to understand the difference between the two when it comes to their functions, powers, and procedures.</p>
<h2>The differences</h2>
<p>A court judgment is binding and has direct legal effect on the parties involved. The court will determine that the accused goes to prison, for example, or that the defendant pays damages. The only way affected parties can escape the court order is by getting it overturned on appeal or review by a higher court. </p>
<p>Commissions of inquiry, on the other hand, make non-binding recommendations to the person who set them up. (In the case of these two commissions, that’s President Cyril Ramaphosa.) Technically, all commissions do is offer the person who set them up advice. And they’re required to stick to the issues on which advice was requested. These are set out in the terms of reference which establish what questions the commission must answer, who will head it up and what its powers are. </p>
<p>Commissions of inquiry are completely different from courts when it comes to procedures too. </p>
<p>South Africans courts are adversarial. The judge sits as an outside observer while the two teams before her attempt to establish their version of events. Commissions of inquiry, on the other hand, are inquisitorial. This makes the commission the driver of the investigation itself. It seeks out the facts rather than waiting for two opposing parties to choose and present their evidence. In an inquisitorial process, the witnesses and their lawyers are <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/moyane-vs-sars-inquiry-judge-nugents-ruling">merely assisting</a> the commission’s investigation.</p>
<p>An important consequence of the inquisitorial process is that a commission is not bound by the same rules of evidence as in a court. Thus evidence will never be “inadmissible”, as the commission enjoys discretion to consider all evidence that it finds relevant to its inquiry. </p>
<h2>Why the confusion</h2>
<p>With these important distinctions in mind, why have some commissions become “judicialised” and lawyer-driven? Why was the first day of the Zondo Commission taken <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-08-21-zondo-turns-the-first-day-of-state-capture-inquiry-into-a-massive-yawn-fest/">up with technicalities</a>? Why have postponements been built into the process so that “implicated parties” can study the allegations made against them?</p>
<p>It’s not just to stave off the threat of a court challenge to any findings. Such a threat is, in fact, not much of a threat at all. Commissions of inquiry will not be subject to the (higher) standards of so-called “administrative” review unless their findings have a direct effect on the persons who might want to challenge them. But the direct effect would arise only when the president acts on the findings. </p>
<p>The president wouldn’t be subject to administrative review in many of these cases either. Instead, the president and the commission will be subject to review for “rationality”. A rationality review asks only whether there is a rational connection between the conduct challenged before the court and a legitimate governmental objective. </p>
<p>But commissions have another, equally crucial function – to educate the public and ensuring its buy-in for important processes of change and renewal.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244356/original/file-20181107-74769-14otren.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244356/original/file-20181107-74769-14otren.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244356/original/file-20181107-74769-14otren.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244356/original/file-20181107-74769-14otren.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244356/original/file-20181107-74769-14otren.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244356/original/file-20181107-74769-14otren.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244356/original/file-20181107-74769-14otren.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Tom Moyane has been fired as South Africa’s tax boss.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sunday Times/Masi Losi</span></span>
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<p>South Africans are already incensed at the loss of public funds to corruption, the devastation of public institutions at the hands of those who sought to profit by it, the damage this has caused to the country’s economy and the suffering it has inflicted on the poorest in society. </p>
<p>But all South Africans have to be on board with the solution to the problem. This sort of buy-in is possible only if the facts are widely known, the relevant law is clear, and the commission investigating the problem is accessible to the public and is seen as legitimate.</p>
<p>A commission can achieve this by having open hearings, broadcast publicly, public access (such as a <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">website</a> and an enquiry desk) and a strong, independent commissioner. </p>
<p>This is where the judicial procedure comes in. Although it can render the body <a href="http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/views-expressed/2014/10/national-inquiry-mmiw-yes-do-it-right">less accessible</a>, it does have the strong advantage of satisfying people’s innate sense of natural justice.</p>
<p>And the decisions of the commissions will only have legitimacy in the eyes of the public if they are seen to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-11-02-with-moyanes-dismissal-ramaphosas-slo-mo-revolution-claims-a-crucial-scalp/">treat people fairly</a>. That is one of the reasons why implicated people need enough time to respond to the allegations against them.</p>
<h2>The value of the commissions</h2>
<p>The Nugent Commission is due to report soon while the Zondo Commission may take two years. </p>
<p>The long delay between the advent of a crisis and a commission’s report is often used as an argument that they’re being used to put matters <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/feb/03/law.politics">“on hold”</a>. </p>
<p>However, commissions of inquiry don’t remove an issue from the public eye if they’re run openly and transparently. Instead, they draw the public in to the issue, educating and inviting engagement. The most important work of the Zondo and Nugent Commissions might be done before their formal function – the submission of their reports – is completed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106558/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cathleen Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Unrealistic expectations about what commissions can achieve comes from the fact that they’re often confused with courts of law.Cathleen Powell, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/977892018-06-12T14:24:21Z2018-06-12T14:24:21ZRamaphoria in South Africa: just a honeymoon, or the start of true love?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222198/original/file-20180607-137312-22d1j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The public liking towards South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has benefited the ANC.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As 2017 drew to a close South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), had reached <a href="http://citizensurveys.net/sa-citizens-survey/">the nadir</a> of its popularity with voters. The decline was driven by public hostility towards <a href="https://theconversation.com/survey-shows-zuma-and-ancs-mutual-dance-to-the-bottom-92126">Jacob Zuma</a>, then president of both the party and the country.</p>
<p>The good ship ANC wasn’t quite sinking, but it was seriously listing. Then Cyril Ramaphosa became the party and the state’s new leader – and attention turned to whether he could steer the ANC into calmer waters.</p>
<p>The results of our new <a href="http://citizensurveys.net/sa-citizens-survey/">South African Citizens Survey fieldwork</a> – conducted in March 2018 – suggest Ramaphosa has done well so far. Compared to the 23% of all citizens aged 18 and over who said they approved of Zuma’s performance in January and February, almost two-thirds (68%) approved of Ramaphosa’s performance.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222546/original/file-20180611-191962-1j03q8y.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222546/original/file-20180611-191962-1j03q8y.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222546/original/file-20180611-191962-1j03q8y.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222546/original/file-20180611-191962-1j03q8y.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222546/original/file-20180611-191962-1j03q8y.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222546/original/file-20180611-191962-1j03q8y.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222546/original/file-20180611-191962-1j03q8y.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>Ramaphosa’s rise in popularity has also helped the ANC. The proportion of people who held a positive image of the party rose from 42% (in November 2017) to 68%. </p>
<p>Such a sharp reversal might simply be chalked up to the usual <a href="https://presidential-power.com/?p=7692">“honeymoon phenomenon</a> historically observed by public opinion polls around the world with new presidents. Even if he’d done nothing at all, Ramaphosa stood to benefit from any comparison with his deeply unpopular predecessor.</p>
<p>But, far from doing nothing, Ramaphosa has acted swiftly in several areas since he took the oath of office <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-02-15-the-oath-is-sealed-ramaphosa-is-officially-the-president-of-south-africa/">on February 15</a>. These surely account for a large part of the the good feelings in which he now basks. </p>
<h2>Ramaphoria at work</h2>
<p>The population’s elation about Ramaphosa, tagged as <a href="https://www.fanews.co.za/article/investments/8/economy/1021/south-africa-ramaphoria-and-the-global-backdrop/24085">Ramaphoria</a>, didn’t just begin when he inherited the mantle of high office. His popularity had already begun to rise in mid-2017 (see Figure 1) when his campaign to lead the ANC <a href="http://ramaphosa.org.za/cyril-ramaphosa-website-siyavuma-anc-2017-campaign/">swung into high gear</a>.</p>
<p>During the April to June 2017 polling period, Ramaphosa and his main competitor for party leader, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, enjoyed equal levels of (un)popularity among the electorate. Their favourability ratings were just 34% and 31%, respectively. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s numbers increased to 47% during the October-December fieldwork, on the eve of the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/54th-national-conference">ANC National Conference</a> in December. They kept on climbing in the new year, to 60% in the January - March 2018 survey. Importantly, positive views of Ramapahosa rose sharply across all age and racial groups, and in all nine provinces. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>There are at least two different ways to explain this upward trend. One account would focus on the widely cited explanation for Ramaphosa’s ascendance to the ANC presidency. That was his ability to strike bargains with other party power brokers who then delivered their provincial delegations on <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/cover-story/2017-12-21-analysis-how-cyril-ramaphosa-won-the-anc-sort-of/">the day of the key vote</a>, making him ANC president. By extension, this logic would also presume that these power brokers were able to shift mass opinion among their respective constituencies.</p>
<p>But such a view would fail to explain why the largest increases in Ramaphosa’s favourability since mid-2017 occurred in the Free State and North West, two of the provinces run by members of the so-called <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/12/19/the-rise-of-the-premier-league-and-their-failed-bid-to-install-ndz_a_23310554/">Premier League</a> of pro-Zuma provincial leaders.</p>
<p>That’s where a second account comes in. This would focus on Ramaphosa’s very conscious attempt to court public opinion directly and to reacquaint himself with average voters. Indeed, Ramaphosa’s <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-10-00-on-the-hustings-with-cr17">"CR17” campaign</a> for the party presidency was organised, well-staffed, and built around a widely publicised speaking tour that projected his image as a leader.</p>
<h2>The change factor</h2>
<p>Just as important was what Ramaphosa said: particularly, his decision to frame his candidacy as a departure from the “normal politics” of the ANC under Zuma. He ran as a <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/12/18/how-he-won-nenegate-convinced-cr17-to-mobilise_a_23310334/">“change” candidate</a> committed to clean government. </p>
<p>He launched this arm of his campaign in April 2017 at the late South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/full-speech-by-cyril-ramaphosa-at-chris-hani-memorial-lecture-20170423">memorial lecture</a> with a sharp attack on Zuma and the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/3-arrested-in-hawks-gupta-raids-20180214">Guptas</a>, Zuma’s friends who are accused of have <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">captured the South African state</a>. </p>
<p>Given the sourness of the public mood at that time, an attack on the sitting president was not an especially daring act. As of April 2017, 70% of South Africans surveyed said Zuma should resign his position as State President.</p>
<p>But it surely was an exercise in courage to make this speech in a forum of the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/kids/tripartite-alliance">ANC-led tripartite governing alliance</a> – and to say it as a deputy president who could be easily fired by a president who had already <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-10-17-zuma-announces-cabinet-reshuffle/">sacked senior cabinet ministers</a>.</p>
<p>Our data suggests that voters had been waiting for a clear signal that Ramaphosa was not a core part of the Zuma network. Voter ratings of Ramaphosa only began to move upward after that speech. Indeed, as Figure 3 shows, until that point Ramaphosa had enjoyed only slightly higher ratings among voters who wanted Zuma to stay in office, compared to those who wanted Zuma to resign. </p>
<p>After his speech at the Hani memorial his popularity rose sharply among the majority of South Africans who wanted Zuma to go.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<h2>Towards a lasting relationship</h2>
<p>The Ramaphosa campaign correctly read the mood of the electorate in 2017 and strategically positioned itself accordingly. It was this crucial decision, as much as any ephemeral “honeymoon” effect, that accounts for the good feelings in which the president now basks. </p>
<p>If he can maintain the focus on clean government, and show that he is committed to fixing the sins of the Zuma years, chances are that the current levels of Ramaphoria" might be more than just a brief honeymoon, but the “beginning of a <a href="https://www.scpr.org/blogs/offramp/2013/07/01/14145/casablanca-a-beautiful-relationship-that-starts-at/">beautiful relationship</a>” with South Africans.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Mattes is Professor of Government and Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Honorary Professor at the Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa at the University of Cape Town, co-founder and Senior Adviser to Afrobarometer, and has previously worked as a consultant to Citizen Surveys. He receives funding from the South African National Research Foundation,</span></em></p>President Cyril Ramaphosa’s popularity has improved the favourability of the governing ANC among South Africans.Robert Mattes, Professor in the Department of Political Studies, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/968032018-05-20T10:39:05Z2018-05-20T10:39:05ZRamaphosa’s new dawn: much better, but not nearly enough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219408/original/file-20180517-26300-oneznk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aaron Ufumeli/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/cyril-ramaphosa">Cyril Ramaphosa’s</a> rise to power has been greeted enthusiastically by most South Africans. Their hope is that the new president represents a leadership cohort within the governing African National Congress (ANC) that’s capable of reversing the toxic legacies of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17450447">Jacob Zuma’s</a> presidency. </p>
<p>Under Ramaphosa, the government is proving forceful in beginning to dismantle Zuma’s patronage networks in both party and state, determined in battling corruption. The new administration is also offering hope that South Africa can pursue a more viable economic trajectory. </p>
<p>Yet the Ramaphosa moment is far from being a new beginning.</p>
<p>First, much of the momentum behind Ramaphosa’s assault on corruption comes from fear in party ranks that the ANC is facing the very real prospect of losing its majority at 2019’s general election. The loss of control over three major metros in the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/lgedashboard2016/leaderboard.aspx">2016 local government elections</a> came as a great shock to many in the party. The ANC had become complacent about maintaining itself in power. </p>
<p>This was despite extensive evidence – accumulated over five democratic general elections – that the ANC’s electoral dominance was being eroded by a mix of enlivened opposition. It came in the form of a more racially diverse <a href="https://www.da.org.za/">Democratic Alliance</a> (DA) and the Africanist populism of the <a href="https://www.effonline.org/">Economic Freedom Fighters</a> (EFF). </p>
<p>From this perspective, ANC “renewal” – the suggestion that the party is capable of overcoming its flaws and restoring its liberation credentials – is necessary for both self-belief and public persuasion. There should be no doubt that there is significant support for the project within the party. But it could well flounder.</p>
<p>If much of the momentum behind ANC “renewal” is situational rather than driven by conviction, then a reformist ANC leadership under Ramaphosa is going to confront major obstacles in the path ahead. </p>
<h2>Return to the ANC’s old elites</h2>
<p>Academic and political analyst Jonny Steinberg has <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2018-05-11-jonny-steinberg-sa-needs-many-presidents-with-backgrounds-like-zumas/">argued</a> that those who assumed state power in 1994 were the descendants of an African elite who, after white conquest, had attended mission schools. This elite had remained intact across generations. The majority of those who led the struggle for freedom were mission-educated, culminating in the presidencies of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. </p>
<p>In contrast, Zuma was the son of a domestic worker too poor to send him to school. Such a man might have featured as a genuine revolutionary. Instead, Zuma betrayed the hopes of the poor and workers by, in the words of Steinberg, empowering “a bureaucratic bourgeoisie to steal one public utility at a time” while,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>spitting venom at the descendants of the old mission-educated elite, claiming they had used their generations of privilege to sew up a deal with white people. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Steinberg’s analysis suggests that the Ramaphosa presidency signifies the return of state power to the hands of the ANC’s traditional elite. But a reformist president and ANC elite at the centre won’t be able to impose their will on those running either the country’s provinces or its state owned enterprises. As the examples of premier <a href="https://www.news24.com/Tags/People/supra_mahumapelo">Supra Mahumapelo</a> in North West province and commissioner <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Tom-Moyane">Tom Moyane</a> at the South African Revenue Service demonstrate, there will be strong resistance from within the ranks of the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie”. </p>
<p>Present indications are that Ramaphosa will prove able to assert his authority. And that he’s willing to face down political turbulence.</p>
<p>It’s likely that succession of high profile prosecutions are still to come. Even so, the state’s capacity to unravel ANC patronage networks is likely to prove limited. Pursuit of state capture kingpins at the major parastatals and in the provinces will prove hard. In any case, the enthusiasm of the ANC for having its dirty-linen washed in public is likely to diminish, especially if an election is nicely won. </p>
<p>On top of this it should not be overlooked that the newly dominant Ramaphosa faction may need – or want – to establish patronage networks of its own. It will need to make its own peace with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, a class which is very much of the ANC’s own making since 1994.</p>
<h2>Changing the political economy</h2>
<p>ANC renewal and the war on corruption is one thing. But transforming the character of the South African economy is quite another. </p>
<p>One view is that the recovery of looted resources and a clampdown on future corruption will provide a more socially just and equitable government. And that it will lead to considerably high rates of growth and developmental welfare. </p>
<p>The thrust of the narrative is not untrue. But this wouldn’t, on its own, amount to a significant change in the economy’s overall trajectory. That’s because there’s little in the government’s economic policy that can seriously be construed as radical.</p>
<p>Much is made of the ANC’s commitment to <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/222155/ramaphosas-plan-for-radical-economic-transformation-and-tackling-unemployment/">“radical economic empowerment”</a>. In particular, the party’s decision to embrace a policy of expropriating land without compensation. Ramaphosa has taken the policy on board. But he’s stressed that land reform must go forward only as a result of extensive dialogue and without endangering food security. </p>
<p>Beyond such ambiguity, and vague commitments to rendering the economy more efficient and competitive, there’s little to suggest that Ramaphosa intends to take the economy in a new direction. There is, for instance, little about breaking up the cartels that dominate the economy. Or of tackling the economy’s historic reliance on the extraction of resources. </p>
<p>Nor is there any evidence – beyond Ramaphosa’s promise of a <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2017/11/14/ramaphosa-new-deal-for-sa/">new model</a> of public ownership – that an overhaul of the state economic enterprises such as the power utility Eskom and South African Airways is imminent. </p>
<p>And beyond rhetoric, there is little evidence of new thinking about how to tackle massive inequality or reduce the chronic level of unemployment. </p>
<p>These are early days, and the juggling short-term crises is, perhaps, inevitably taking priority over long-term thinking. But present indications are that the Ramaphosa presidency may prove to be little more than an attempt to purge Zuma-ism from an Mbeki-style neoliberal economy. </p>
<p>The future verdict may well be: much better, but far from enough.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96803/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation </span></em></p>ANC renewal and the war on corruption is one thing. But transforming the character of the South African political economy is quite another.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.