tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/trade-tariffs-73374/articlesTrade tariffs – The Conversation2024-03-04T22:59:07Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2249482024-03-04T22:59:07Z2024-03-04T22:59:07ZWTO conference ends in division and stalemate – does the global trade body have a viable future?<p>The 13th World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial conference in Abu Dhabi has failed to resolve any issues of significance, raising the inescapable question of whether the global trade body has a future.</p>
<p>The three-day meeting was due to end on February 29. But late into a fourth extra day, the 164 members were struggling to even agree on a declaration, let alone the big issues of agriculture, fisheries and border taxes on electronic commerce.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJdw3ENDQTY">closing ceremony</a> was sombre, and the <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/W12R1.pdf&Open=True">ministerial declaration</a> bland, stripped of the substantive content <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/W12.pdf&Open=True">previously proposed</a>. Outstanding issues were kicked back to the WTO base in Geneva for further discussions, or for the next ministerial conference in 2026.</p>
<p>Briefing journalists in the closing hours, an EU spokesperson noted how hard it would be to pick up the pieces in Geneva after they failed to create momentum at the ministerial conference. She predicted:</p>
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<p>[Trade] will be more and more characterised by power relations than the rule of law, and that will be a problem notably for smaller countries and for developing countries.</p>
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<h2>Restricted access</h2>
<p>That imbalance is already evident, with power politics characterising the conference from the start. </p>
<p>There were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/activists-criticise-civil-society-restrictions-wto-meeting-uae-2024-02-28/">accusations of unprecedented restrictions</a> on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) registered to participate in the conference. These bodies are crucial to bringing the WTO’s impacts on farmers, fishers, workers and other communities into the negotiation arena.</p>
<p>A number of NGOs have <a href="https://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2024/ti240228.htm">submitted formal complaints</a> over their treatment by conference host the United Arab Emirates. They say they were isolated from delegations, banned from distributing papers, and people were arbitrarily detained for handing out press releases. </p>
<p>Critical negotiations were conducted through controversial “green rooms”. These were where the handpicked “double quad” members – the US, UK, European Union, Canada, China, India, South Africa and Brazil – tried to broker outcomes to present to the rest for “transparency”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/privilege-or-poisoned-chalice-as-deputy-chair-at-next-weeks-wto-meeting-nz-confronts-an-organisation-in-crisis-223849">Privilege or poisoned chalice? As deputy chair at next week’s WTO meeting, NZ confronts an organisation in crisis</a>
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<h2>Influence of power politics</h2>
<p>These powerful countries largely determined the outcomes (or lack of them). The US, historically the agenda-setter at WTO ministerial conferences, appeared largely disinterested in the proceedings, with trade representative Katherine Tai leaving early.</p>
<p>The final declaration says nothing about restoring a two-tier dispute body, which has been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-08-30/supply-chains-latest-paralysis-at-wto-appellate-body-hurts-global-trade">paralysed since 2019</a> by the refusal of successive US Republican and Democratic administrations to appoint new judges to the WTO’s <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm">appellate body</a>.</p>
<p>The EU <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_933">failed to secure progress</a> on improvements to the appeal process. Likely Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump has <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/04/trump-floats-more-than-60percent-tariffs-on-chinese-imports.html">already announced</a> he would impose massive WTO-illegal tariffs on China if elected.</p>
<p>China, Japan, the US and EU – all big subsidisers of distant water fishing fleets – blocked an outcome aiming to protect global fish stocks, an issue already deferred from the last ministerial meeting.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/fisheries-deal-wto-insufficient-pacific-islands-fiji-says-2024-02-29/">six Pacific Island</a> WTO members lobbied tirelessly for a freeze and eventual reduction in subsidies. But the text was diluted to the point that no deal was better than a bad deal.</p>
<p>The EU, UK, Switzerland and other pharmaceutical producers had already blocked consensus on lifting patents for <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/india-seeks-5-yr-patent-waiver-for-covid-diagnostics-therapeutics-from-wto-123120600256_1.html">COVID-19 therapeutics</a> and diagnostics, sought by 65 developing countries. A deal brokered in 2021 on COVID vaccines is so complex no country has used it.</p>
<h2>Domestic and global agendas</h2>
<p>India’s equally uncompromising positions also reflected domestic priorities. The 2013 Bali ministerial conference promised developing countries a permanent solution to prevent legal challenges to India’s subsidised stockpiling of food for anti-hunger programmes. </p>
<p>A permanent solution was a red line for India, which faces an election next month and mass protests from farmers concerned at losing subsidies. </p>
<p>Agricultural exporters, including New Zealand, tabled counter-demands to broaden the agriculture negotiations. The public stockpiling issue remains a stalemate, without any real prospect of a breakthrough.</p>
<p><a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/29.pdf&Open=True">India</a> and South Africa formally objected to the adoption of an <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/17R1.pdf">unmandated plurilateral</a> agreement on <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invfac_public_e/invfac_e.htm">investment facilitation</a>. </p>
<p>The concerns were less with the agreement itself and more with the precedent it would create for sub-groups of members to bypass the WTO’s rule book. This would allow powerful states to advance their favoured issues while developing country priorities languish.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-developing-countries-must-unite-to-protect-the-wtos-dispute-settlement-system-224102">Why developing countries must unite to protect the WTO's dispute settlement system</a>
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<h2>Crisis and transformation</h2>
<p>The face-saver for the conference was the temporary extension of a highly contested <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/W26.pdf&Open=True">moratorium</a> on the right to levy customs duties at the border on transmissions of digitised content.</p>
<p>Securing that extension (or preferably a permanent ban on e-commerce customs duties) on behalf of Big Tech was the main US goal for the conference. Developing countries opposed its renewal, so they could impose tariffs both for revenue and to support their own digital industrialisation.</p>
<p>The moratorium will now expire in March 2026, so the battle will resume at the next ministerial conference scheduled to be held in Cameroon that year. </p>
<p>But there is every likelihood the current paralysis at the WTO will continue, and the power politics will intensify. As the previously quoted EU spokesperson also mused:</p>
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<p>Perhaps the WTO needed a good crisis, and perhaps this will lead to a realisation that we cannot continue like this.</p>
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<p>Ideally, that would result in a fundamentally different international institution – one that provides real solutions to the 21st century challenges on which the WTO is unable to deliver.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224948/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Kelsey attended the WTO ministerial as a representative of the Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG), and as an invited Guest of the Chair. She advises a number of developing country governments on these issues. She is not paid by, and this is not written on behalf of, any of them. </span></em></p>The recent World Trade Organization conference in Abu Dhabi has again failed to resolve any of the big issues on the table. Power relations rather than rule-based negotiation will fill the void.Jane Kelsey, Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1661772021-08-22T20:06:51Z2021-08-22T20:06:51ZLand of opportunity: more sustainable Australian farming would protect our lucrative exports (and the planet)<p>The European Union is <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-08-17/australian-exporters-pay-the-price-with-european-carbon-tax/100379998">pressing ahead</a> with carbon border levies – charges on carbon-intensive goods from countries such as Australia that haven’t taken strong action to reduce emissions. The EU will impose such measures on a range of imported industrial materials including aluminium, steel and cement. </p>
<p>But what if these tariffs are one day applied to another key Australian export industry: agriculture? As National Farmers’ Federation chief executive Tony Mahar <a href="https://www.farmonline.com.au/story/7348275/eu-carbon-tariff-avoids-ag-for-now-but-sector-cant-be-naive/">said</a> last month:</p>
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<p>Business and governments across the world are embedding carbon abatement considerations into their trade negotiations and relationships. As an industry dependent on exporting, Australian agriculture must be ready to adjust to a more carbon-conscious trading future. </p>
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<p>In addition to a substantial greenhouse gas footprint from agriculture, Australia also has a truly terrible record on <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337080985_Spending_to_save_What_will_it_cost_to_halt_Australia%27s_extinction_crisis">biodiversity loss</a>. The argument for farmers to adopt more sustainable practices – and for governments to help the shift – is growing ever more compelling. Not only would it safeguard our exports, it would cut emissions and help protect nature.</p>
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<img alt="aerial view of cows and ute" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416912/original/file-20210819-19-ge4pia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C11%2C3758%2C2494&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416912/original/file-20210819-19-ge4pia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416912/original/file-20210819-19-ge4pia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416912/original/file-20210819-19-ge4pia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416912/original/file-20210819-19-ge4pia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416912/original/file-20210819-19-ge4pia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416912/original/file-20210819-19-ge4pia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Australian farming must prepare for a more carbon-conscious future.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dean Lewins/AAP</span></span>
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<h2>Looming carbon tariffs</h2>
<p>The EU policy, known formally as the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/green-taxation-0/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en">Carbon Border Adjustment Measure</a>, aims to shield local industries operating under the EU’s emissions trading scheme and other similar policies. </p>
<p>From 2026, EU importers of some commodities must buy carbon certificates <a href="https://www.austrade.gov.au/news/insights/the-limited-impact-of-the-european-union-s-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-on-australian-agriculture">equivalent to</a> the cost that would have been incurred had the goods been produced under the EU’s emissions trading scheme. </p>
<p>The measure is meant to level the playing field – protecting EU companies from competition by producers in countries that don’t have carbon price regimes. The policy also pressures exporting countries to implement their own effective emissions policies.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/no-point-protesting-australia-faces-carbon-levies-unless-it-changes-course-155200">No point protesting, Australia faces carbon levies unless it changes course</a>
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<p>Australia does not export large volumes of industrial commodities to Europe, so the <a href="https://cdn.aigroup.com.au/Reports/2021/Carbon_Border_Adjustments_Policy_Paper.pdf?_cldee=dGVubmFudC5yZWVkQGFpZ3JvdXAuY29tLmF1&recipientid=contact-7ddca4953c244fa7b29d57951052d4d8-0e0c0eaf389c455685f07176f427283e&esid=26f33b4a-56fe-eb11-94ef-00224810dcd3">immediate effect</a> of the carbon tariff will be small. However, in 2026 the EU will <a href="https://www.austrade.gov.au/news/insights/the-limited-impact-of-the-european-union-s-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-on-australian-agriculture">consider</a> extending the measure’s scope to other products. </p>
<p>Carbon tariffs could also be imposed by other countries Australia exports to, as they increasingly demand cleaner production of goods, and as the principle of free trade seemingly <a href="https://theconversation.com/was-2016-the-year-the-world-turned-its-back-on-free-trade-67240">diminishes</a> in importance. These tariffs could also apply to goods subject to regulation, in addition to emissions trading schemes.</p>
<p>There is no immediate prospect of a carbon tariff on agriculture. But as many countries toughen their emissions targets to 2030 and adopt or strengthen net-zero targets, agriculture could become part of the mix. </p>
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<img alt="Eu flags with building in background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416917/original/file-20210819-15-ke30na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416917/original/file-20210819-15-ke30na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416917/original/file-20210819-15-ke30na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416917/original/file-20210819-15-ke30na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416917/original/file-20210819-15-ke30na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416917/original/file-20210819-15-ke30na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416917/original/file-20210819-15-ke30na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The EU carbon border tariff aims to protect European producers operating under a carbon price.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">OLIVIER HOSLET/EPA</span></span>
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<h2>Carbon levies on agriculture?</h2>
<p>Agriculture accounts for about 13% of Australia’s <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-12/australias-emissions-projections-2020.pdf">total greenhouse gas emissions</a>. The main source of emissions is methane from cattle and sheep. Others include rice fields, fertiliser use, agricultural waste and fuel use. </p>
<p>The industry is clearly sensitive to the problem. The National Farmers’ Federation has <a href="https://nff.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2020.08.06_Policy_NRM_Climate_Change.pdf">endorsed</a> an economy-wide net-zero “aspiration”. It’s also calling for investments in carbon-neutral agricultural technologies to, among other goals, develop new export markets. Meat and Livestock Australia has set a 2030 <a href="https://www.mla.com.au/globalassets/mla-corporate/research-and-development/documents/cn30-information-sheet-final.pdf">carbon-neutral goal</a> for the red meat industry. </p>
<p>If Australia’s major trading partners apply carbon tariffs to agricultural products in future, Australian farmers will have a big incentive to make production less emissions-intensive. Potential ways to achieve this include:</p>
<ul>
<li>better soil and native vegetation cover management</li>
<li>less fertiliser use</li>
<li>switching to lower-emitting sheep and cattle breeds</li>
<li>feed additives which make livestock emit less methane</li>
<li>moving from ruminant livestock to other sources of meat, such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-us-ban-on-kangaroo-leather-would-be-an-animal-welfare-disaster-and-a-missed-farming-opportunity-155904">kangaroo</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>Such measures can result in <a href="https://www.publish.csiro.au/an/AN16438">increased agricultural productivity</a>. </p>
<p>There are two ways Australia can avoid a carbon tariff on agriculture exports. First, agriculture can adopt cleaner production methods and have its goods certified as produced with low emissions. Second, the federal government can implement a comprehensive emissions-reduction policy, which in agriculture might mean minimum production standards to avoid high emissions practices or a <a href="https://theconversation.com/carbon-pricing-works-the-largest-ever-study-puts-it-beyond-doubt-142034">carbon price</a> where practicable. </p>
<p>The existing Emissions Reductions Fund would not help avoid carbon tariffs. This is because it applies only to businesses that opt in, and it subsidises emission-reduction projects rather that placing obligations on those who generate emissions. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/carbon-pricing-works-the-largest-ever-study-puts-it-beyond-doubt-142034">Carbon pricing works: the largest-ever study puts it beyond doubt</a>
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<img alt="farmer feeds cattle" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416923/original/file-20210819-13-1mpll7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416923/original/file-20210819-13-1mpll7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416923/original/file-20210819-13-1mpll7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416923/original/file-20210819-13-1mpll7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416923/original/file-20210819-13-1mpll7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416923/original/file-20210819-13-1mpll7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416923/original/file-20210819-13-1mpll7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Additives to stock feed can lead to fewer methane emissions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span>
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<h2>Tariffs on biodiversity loss?</h2>
<p>In future, environmental border tariffs could well extend to a broader set of environmental harms, such as biodiversity loss.</p>
<p>Australia’s record on species loss is truly <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337080985_Spending_to_save_What_will_it_cost_to_halt_Australia%27s_extinction_crisis">appalling</a> – including in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/230817486_Impacts_of_red_meat_production_on_biodiversity_in_Australia_A_review_and_comparison_with_alternative_protein_production_industries">agricultural landscapes</a> which have been heavily modified.</p>
<p>Some countries are already using financial incentives to reduce damage to nature. For example, plans by the UK government would require farmers to demonstrate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/nov/30/environment-to-benefit-from-biggest-farming-shake-up-in-50-years">environmental improvements</a> to receive farming subsidies.</p>
<p>A key challenge for the agriculture sector is to simultaneously reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve biodiversity outcomes. There are proven, <a href="https://www.publish.csiro.au/book/7844/">science-based ways</a> to do this, such as:</p>
<ul>
<li>protecting patches of remnant native vegetation which provides habitat for animals and helps draw down and store carbon from the atmosphere </li>
<li>creating <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0256089">healthy farm dams</a> which can provide higher-quality drinking water for livestock, improve farm productivity and create wildlife habitat</li>
<li>planting “<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/emr.12303">shelterbelts</a>” – strips of woody vegetation that shelter livestock from wind and sun, provide wildlife habitat (when well designed and managed), and prevent moisture loss from soil. </li>
</ul>
<p>This integrated approach to agricultural production, climate change mitigation and biodiversity conservation is being researched and championed by the Australian National University’s <a href="https://www.sustainablefarms.org.au/">Sustainable Farms</a> project.</p>
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<img alt="girl runs past dam" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416921/original/file-20210819-26417-qy0w6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416921/original/file-20210819-26417-qy0w6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416921/original/file-20210819-26417-qy0w6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416921/original/file-20210819-26417-qy0w6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416921/original/file-20210819-26417-qy0w6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416921/original/file-20210819-26417-qy0w6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416921/original/file-20210819-26417-qy0w6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Changes the management of dams of farms can improve biodiversity and farm production.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Lorimer/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Future-proofing Australian farming</h2>
<p>The Australian government has recognised the need for farming solutions to both climate change and biodiversity loss. For example, it’s currently developing a <a href="https://www.agriculture.gov.au/ag-farm-food/natural-resources/landcare/sustaining-future-australian-farming/carbon-biodiversity-pilot">stewardship program</a> to encourage farmers to improve environmental conditions on their land. </p>
<p>A crucial part of this and similar schemes will be establishing reliable systems for estimating and certifying farm emissions and biodiversity outcomes. Indeed, robust long-term monitoring is vital for such schemes to be seen as credible, nationally and internationally.</p>
<p>The opportunities are ripe for Australian farmers to adopt far more environmentally sustainable land management practices, and in the process, safeguard or even expand Australian agricultural exports.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-farmers-want-more-climate-action-and-theyre-starting-in-their-own-huge-backyards-144792">Australia's farmers want more climate action – and they’re starting in their own (huge) backyards</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166177/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Jotzo leads and has led research projects funded by a variety of funders. He is the economics director at the Sustainable Farms project at The Australian National University.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lindenmayer receives funding from the Australian Government, the Ian Potter Foundation, the William Buckland Foundation, the Australian Research Council, the Riverina Local land Services and Murray Local Land Services.
David Lindenmayer is a Research Director in the Sustainable Farms project at The Australian National University. </span></em></p>Adopting more environmentally conscious farm models would safeguard our agricultural exports, cut emissions and help protect nature.Frank Jotzo, Professor, Crawford School of Public Policy and Head of Energy, Institute for Climate Energy and Disaster Solutions, Australian National UniversityDavid Lindenmayer, Professor, The Fenner School of Environment and Society, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1521482021-05-12T12:48:00Z2021-05-12T12:48:00ZWhat American farmers could gain by rejoining the Asia-Pacific trade deal that Trump spurned<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/375184/original/file-20201215-18-1w95l1w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=53%2C44%2C6000%2C3853&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement covers a broad range of goods and services, including food safety standards. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/6_ee0s7d0Ck">Simon Fanger/Unsplash</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Biden administration has an opportunity to recalibrate American global trade by rejoining the influential Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. Signing on to this partnership has the potential to deliver <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Biden-s-Asia-policy/Biden-s-trade-chief-pick-dodges-question-on-rejoining-TPP">powerful diplomatic and economic gains</a> yet politically, the odds appear slim that there will be political consensus to agree to this partnership. </p>
<p>The U.S. began <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44489">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> negotiations in 2008 during the Bush administration, efforts that were intensified during Barack Obama’s presidency. Hammered out between the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/agricultural-and-resource-economics-review/article/effects-of-tariff-concessions-on-japanese-beef-imports-by-product-and-source/2263506BF6AF507C928F4D1A78A216DB">U.S. and 11 Pacific Rim countries</a>, the intention of joining the partnership was to set trade policy and greatly expand U.S. trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. President Obama signed the agreement in 2016 and less than a year later, immediately after Donald Trump’s inauguration, the U.S. <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-trans-pacific-partnership-survive-after-trump-71821">withdrew from the agreement</a>. </p>
<p>Rejoining the partnership, renamed the <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10000">Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> in 2018, could signal to the world that the U.S. is back in the global engagement arena. It would also strike a stark contrast to the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/02/08/what-will-trumps-embrace-of-bilateralism-mean-for-americas-trade-partners/">previous adminstration’s bilateral</a> and nationalistic approach, <a href="https://cepr.org/content/new-ebook-trade-war-clash-economic-systems-threatening-global-prosperity">which has resulted in tensions with major U.S. trading partners</a>. Aside from improved trade relations, rejoining the this agreement would counter <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/obamas-tpp-wouldve-helped-limit-china-11553454969">China’s economic and geopolitical influence</a> in the Asia-Pacific region.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=e0WqEuoAAAAJ&hl=en">Both</a> of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=3UKxaEcAAAAJ&hl=en">us</a> have worked extensively with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on trade policy issues. As economists specializing in international agricultural trade, our research demonstrates that the U.S. would benefit from rejoining the <a href="https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/">trade accord</a> and, in particular, American agriculture.</p>
<h2>Pathway to a Southeast Asia trade agreement</h2>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384155/original/file-20210215-15-hmmi3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Large shipping containers stacked closely together." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384155/original/file-20210215-15-hmmi3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384155/original/file-20210215-15-hmmi3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384155/original/file-20210215-15-hmmi3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384155/original/file-20210215-15-hmmi3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384155/original/file-20210215-15-hmmi3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384155/original/file-20210215-15-hmmi3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384155/original/file-20210215-15-hmmi3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">International trade agreements can reduce uncertainty for trading partners in the marketplace.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/SPPUHSsaT-8">Marco Pregnolato/Unsplash</a></span>
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<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-692X.12293">Regional trade agreements</a> like the Trans-Pacific Partnership can go far beyond tariffs to tackle deeper trade and domestic issues such as investment, labor, migration, competition, intellectual property and, in some cases, key regulatory issues governing food safety standards.</p>
<p>Although agriculture comprises only about 10% of <a href="https://www.usitc.gov/research_and_analysis/trade_shifts_2019/us.htm">total U.S. exports</a>, the agricultural sector in the U.S. and other countries account for a large share of trade policy considerations. Rejoining the accord has the potential to <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/rebuild-trans-pacific-partnership-back-better">establish economic ties with emerging economies</a> like Vietnam and Malaysia and embrace the need for improved trade relations in Southeast Asia overall. </p>
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<span class="caption">Shipping cranes at the Port of Seattle.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/CpsTAUPoScw">Andy Li/Unsplash</a></span>
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<p>The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership could be the easiest path forward if the U.S. wanted to improve trade relations with Southeast Asia. Joining this partnership could be especially beneficial based on the volume of agricultural trade and expected growth in these markets. At an approximate US$14.3 billion annually, Southeast Asia accounts for a significant amount of U.S. agricultural exports, making it the <a href="https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx">fourth-leading destination</a> behind China, Canada and Mexico.</p>
<p><iframe id="jNqwz" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/jNqwz/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>A return to global engagement</h2>
<p>The Trans-Pacific Partnership was seen as an opportunity for the U.S. <a href="https://www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/tpp-origins-and-outcomes">to shape regional and global trade rules</a>, potentially influencing economic policies and practices in China. However, there are concerns that need to be addressed if the U.S. were to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. </p>
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<span class="caption">Colorful Japanese wine barrels in Tokyo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/9cYtFg2_N5I">Manuel Velasquez/Unsplash</a></span>
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<p>There are important differences between the agreement signed under Obama in 2016 and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Provisions important to the U.S. were changed <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/tpp-cptpp">in the subsequent agreement</a>, such as <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/tpp-cptpp">the investment and intellectual property provisions</a> that offered improved standards on intellectual property relative to past trade agreements. The provisions fall short of the more <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN10822">stringent requirements</a> in the earlier Trans-Pacific Partnership. </p>
<h2>What are the odds?</h2>
<p>Like all trade agreements, joining the partnership would require congressional approval. Historically, Republicans have been more supportive of <a href="https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/nearly-all-us-trade-deals-were-negotiated-signed-and-implemented-republicans">trade agreements</a>. But President Trump’s rhetoric, that past trade agreements <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-anti-trade-tirades-recall-gops-protectionist-past-54631">have been “disastrous” for the U.S. economy</a>, may have lessened Republican support for an agreement like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.</p>
<p>President Joe Biden quickly rejoined the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/paris-climate-agreement/">Paris Climate Agreement</a> and reversed President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/21/readout-of-vice-president-harriss-call-with-world-health-organization-director-general-dr-tedros-adhanom-ghebreyesus/">World Health Organization</a>, showing that the U.S. is back in the global engagement area. </p>
<p>Mega-regional trade agreements offer more than a forum for negotiating trade barriers. They establish procedures that reduce uncertainty in international transactions, make rules that are clear to members and provide an institutional framework to remedy trade concerns or disputes. If the Biden administration wants to signal to the world that the U.S. is pivoting to a more expansive global engagement, joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership could be an initial step.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152148/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Muhammad and Jason Grant receive grant funding from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to work on international agricultural trade and trade policy issues. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jason Grant receives funding from the United States Department of Agriculture. </span></em></p>Rejoining the Trans-Pacific Partnership would boost trade in Southeast Asia, counter China and help show the world the US is back.Andrew Muhammad, Professor of Agriculture and Resource Economics, University of TennesseeJason Grant, Associate Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Virginia TechLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1521732020-12-17T03:44:58Z2020-12-17T03:44:58ZTaking China to the World Trade Organisation plants a seed. It won’t be a quick or easy win<p>Australia is <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-12-16/australia-refers-china-to-world-trade-organization-barley-tariff/12966728">reportedly ready</a> to initiate its first litigation against China at the World Trade Organisation. </p>
<p>China has this year <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3114066/china-australia-relations-canberra-very-concerned-over">taken punitive action</a> against imports of Australian coal, wine, beef, lobster and barley. </p>
<p>It is the five-year 80.5% barley tariff China imposed in May that Australia will take to the World Trade Organisation. More than half of all Australian barley exports in 2019 were sold to China, worth about A$600 million a year to Australian farmers.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336634/original/file-20200521-102628-136xbwy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336634/original/file-20200521-102628-136xbwy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336634/original/file-20200521-102628-136xbwy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336634/original/file-20200521-102628-136xbwy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336634/original/file-20200521-102628-136xbwy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336634/original/file-20200521-102628-136xbwy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336634/original/file-20200521-102628-136xbwy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336634/original/file-20200521-102628-136xbwy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Chinese authorities began an anti-dumping investigation into Australian barley in <a href="https://theconversation.com/barley-is-not-a-random-choice-heres-the-real-reason-china-is-taking-on-australia-over-dumping-107271">November 2018</a>. Anti-dumping trade rules are meant to protect local producers from unfair competition from “dumped” imported goods. </p>
<p>Dumping occurs where a firm sells goods in an overseas market at a price lower than the normal value of the goods. China calculated the normal value of barley using “best information available” on the grounds that Australian producers and exporters failed to provide all information Chinese investigators requested.</p>
<p>The barley tariff will last for five years unless Chinese investigators initiate a review and decide to extend it beyond 2025.</p>
<p>What can Australia hope to achieve from a WTO dispute? </p>
<p>Not a quick and easy win. A formal resolution will likely take years. But it plants a seed, starting a structured process for dialogue. This is an important step in the right direction.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/barley-is-not-a-random-choice-heres-the-real-reason-china-is-taking-on-australia-over-dumping-107271">Barley is not a random choice – here's the real reason China is taking on Australia over dumping</a>
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<h2>A lengthy process</h2>
<p>WTO litigation is no quick fix. There is a set process that moves through three phases – consultation, adjudication and compliance. </p>
<p>The standard timetable would ideally have disputes move through consultation and adjudication within a year. In reality it often take several years, particularly if appeals or compliance actions are involved.</p>
<p>The timetable schedules 60 days for the first stage of negotiations, though these can take many more months. That’s worthwhile if it leads to a resolution. But given the tensions between China and Australia, a quick resolution looks remote.</p>
<p>The adjudication process typically involves a decision by a WTO panel followed by an appeal to the organisation’s Appellate Body. </p>
<p>A WTO panel is meant to issue its decision within nine months of its establishment, but it usually takes much more time. If the panel’s decision is appealed, the Appellate Body is meant to make its decisions within 90 days, but nor is this time frame met in many cases. </p>
<p>Once a WTO decision is final, it is up to the losing party to comply with the ruling. That may include a request for time to make the necessary changes. In practice, this can <a href="http://www.worldtradelaw.net/databases/rptawards.php">take six to 15 months</a>.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/an-all-out-trade-war-with-china-would-cost-australia-6-of-gdp-151070">An all-out trade war with China would cost Australia 6% of GDP</a>
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<h2>Appeals blockage</h2>
<p>One complication is the current non-functioning WTO appeals process. Appointing judges to the WTO’s Appellate Body requires agreement from all WTO member nations. <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/05/28/triage-care-for-the-wto/">US obstruction</a> of new appointments has reduced the number of judges to zero, and the Appellate Body requires three judges to hear appeals.</p>
<p>This paralysis has created a major loophole, enabling an “appeal into the void” to block unfavourable rulings.</p>
<p>In light of this, the 27 European Union nations and 22 other WTO members – including both China and Australia – have signed on to a temporary appeals process known as the “<a href="https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2176">multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement</a>” (MPIA). </p>
<p>Given China’s <a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/06/28/content_281476201898696.htm">commitment</a> to the WTO and its dispute settlement system, there is no reason to anticipate it snubbing interim arrangements if an appeal arises. But the appeal process is also likely to take just as long as the Appellate Body procedure.</p>
<h2>No guaranteed win</h2>
<p>Federal Trade Minister Simon Birmingham has expressed confidence in Australia’s “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/australia-to-take-china-to-the-wto-over-barley-tariffs-20201216-p56nzf.html">strong case</a>” but victory against China is not assured. </p>
<p>China’s tariff on Australian barley comprises an “<a href="http://trb.mofcom.gov.cn/article/cs/202005/20200502965862.shtml">anti-dumping duty</a>” of 73.6% and a “<a href="http://trb.mofcom.gov.cn/article/cs/202005/20200502965863.shtml">countervailing duty</a>” of 6.9%. Anti-dumping and countervailing calculations are highly technical. Whether China’s barley tariff has violated WTO rules will require detailed examination of its methodology. </p>
<p>A key challenge to the Chinese methodology is that it largely disregarded information on domestic sales by Australian barley producers and used data from Australian sales to Egypt.</p>
<p>The WTO has found China’s use of similar methods in several past <a href="https://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/chinas-implementation-of-the-rulings-of-the-world-trade-organization-9781509913565/">disputes</a> breached WTO rules. But every case depends on very specific facts. The past rulings against China do not necessarily predict the result here.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-china-believed-it-had-a-case-to-hit-australian-barley-with-tariffs-140633">Why China believed it had a case to hit Australian barley with tariffs</a>
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<h2>No compensation</h2>
<p>Even if Australia is successful, a “win” isn’t total. </p>
<p>The WTO system is designed to make states change their ways. It is not designed to compensate those harmed by illegal trade measures. In other words, an Australian win may require China only to remove the tariff, not compensate those who paid more or lost revenue as a result.</p>
<p>There is also a risk that China could simply initiate a re-investigation of the barley tariff, which might lead to a decision to impose duties very similar to the original ones. In some past disputes, it took China <a href="https://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/chinas-implementation-of-the-rulings-of-the-world-trade-organization-9781509913565/">five years or longer</a> to remove duties. </p>
<p>So even if the World Trade Organisation rules in favour of Australia, this might not lead to the tariff’s end before its current expiry date in 2025. </p>
<h2>Still the best option</h2>
<p>Despite all this, the World Trade Organisation is Australia’s best step.</p>
<p>The WTO is not perfect, but it is now a tested and respected mechanism to resolve trade disputes. </p>
<p>WTO litigation also compels the disputing parties to enter into consultations – and talking is something Australia’s officials have had difficulty having with their Chinese counterparts.</p>
<p>China might drag its heels in other ways, but it can be expected to respect the WTO’s procedural rules and enter into these negotiations. Those talks could help repair communication channels better than missives through social media and press conferences.</p>
<h2>Litigation the new normal</h2>
<p>In commencing a formal dispute, Australia also sends a firm but dignified message – that it is willing to use international rules and procedures to solve grievances. </p>
<p>WTO litigation is a normal feature of trade relations between countries. Even close allies bring disputes against one another – such as New Zealand’s <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds367_e.htm">case against Australia’s restrictions</a> on New Zealand apples, or Australia’s case <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds537_e.htm">against Canadian restrictions </a> on imported wines in liquor stores. </p>
<p>China and Australia badly need a <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-can-repair-its-relationship-with-china-here-are-3-ways-to-start-150455">relationship reset</a>. Meeting in a rules-based forum with structured processes for dialogue can do no harm.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152173/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lisa Toohey is a 2020 Fulbright Fellow, sponsored by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Weihuan Zhou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A formal resolution off Australia’s complaint about Chinese barley tariffs will likely take years. But at least it starts a structured process for dialogue.Weihuan Zhou, Senior Lecturer and member of Herbert Smith Freehills CIBEL Centre, Faculty of Law, UNSW Sydney, UNSW SydneyLisa Toohey, Professor of Law, University of NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1385292020-05-13T20:03:46Z2020-05-13T20:03:46ZPandemic dents Australians’ views of both China and the United States<p>Both China and the United States have suffered reputational damage with the Australian public as a result of their handling of the coronavirus crisis, according to a Lowy COVIDpoll.</p>
<p>Most Australians (68%) say they feel “less favourable towards China’s system of government” when thinking about China’s handling of the outbreak.</p>
<p>Nearly seven in ten (69%) think China has dealt with it badly.</p>
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<p>An overwhelming 90% believe the US has performed badly. The US is rated at the bottom of a list of six countries, also including Singapore, the United Kingdom and Italy, in how well COVID has been handled.</p>
<p>In contrast, 93% think Australia has done well so far.</p>
<p>Building on the anti-Trump feeling that showed up in earlier Lowy polling, 73% said they would prefer Democratic candidate Joe Biden to become president at the November election, compared 23% who want Donald Trump to be re-elected.</p>
<p>The poll of 3036 was done April 14-27.</p>
<p>It comes as trade relations with China have become increasingly tense this week with disputes over Australian exports of barley and beef. China has suspended imports from four abattoirs in Australia and threatened hefty tariffs on Australian barley.</p>
<p>Although the barley row has been going on some time, as have some of the beef complaints, the actions on both fronts are seen as retaliation for Australia pushing for a inquiry into the origin and handling of COVID-19.</p>
<p>As of late Wednesday trade minister Simon Birmingham had not been able to get in contact with his Chinese counterpart.</p>
<p>The trade difficulties are also generating domestic pressure.</p>
<p>On Wednesday Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk said she was writing to Birmingham asking him to get a resolution to the beef dispute as soon as possible. She said thousands of Queensland jobs were involved.</p>
<p>Australia China Business Council CEO Helen Sawczak said: “To go out like a shag on a rock little Australia demanding an inquiry and insinuating blame was probably not a great foreign policy move.”</p>
<p>On the other hand some Coalition backbenchers have been taking strong public positions against China, complicating the government’s attempt to manage the disputes between the two countries. </p>
<p>In the Lowy poll, 37% said that when the world recovers from the crisis, China will be “more powerful” than it was before the crisis; 27% said it would be less powerful; 36% predicted no change. In 2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis 72% said China would be more powerful.</p>
<p>Just over half (53%) say the US will be less powerful; 41% predict no change; 6% believe American power will grow. In 2009 33% said the US would be less powerful than before.</p>
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<p>Lowy’s Natasha Kassam, author of the Lowy report, said: “Despite Beijing’s efforts to shift the focus from its early mismanagement and coverup of the virus, to its apparent success in containment and providing support to struggling countries, Australians appear unconvinced.</p>
<p>"Australians’ views of China during the pandemic track with the previous downturn in sentiment towards China: in 2019, only a third of Australians said they trusted China, and the same number had confidence in China’s leader Xi Jinping to do the right thing in world affairs.</p>
<p>"As much as Australians have expressed disappointment in China’s handling of the outbreak, they are even more concerned by the response of the United States.</p>
<p>"While watching the current tragedy unfold in the United States, the competence and reliability of the United States is looming even larger as a question for Australians,” Kassam said.</p>
<p>In the poll, people gave a big thumbs up to Australian medical authorities and governments. More than nine in ten (92%) said they were confident the chief medical officers were doing a good job responding to the outbreak. The rating for states and territories was 86%, and 82% for the federal government. Confidence in the performance of the World Health Organisation was a much lower 59%.</p>
<p>Australians are not retreating from globalisation as a result of the crisis. Seven in 10 people say globalisation is “mostly good for Australia”. This is consistent with 2019.</p>
<p>Some 53% want “more global co-operation rather than every country putting their own interests first” in a global crisis.</p>
<p>A majority (59%) say they are just as likely to travel overseas as before, when COVID is contained.</p>
<p>Asked their preferred sources of information during the coronavirus outbreak (and allowed to choose up to three), 59% chose the Prime Minister and government officials, 50% government websites, 50% the ABC, 31% newspapers and news websites, 28% commercial, pay TV news and radio, 20% social media, and 5% word-of-mouth.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138529/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A recent Lowy COVIDpoll has the Australian public disappointed in America and China’s response to the coronavirus crisisMichelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1229752019-09-05T18:41:15Z2019-09-05T18:41:15ZUS tariffs on French wine: big talk, potentially unintended consequences<p>French wine has been the subject of an ongoing trade dispute between the United States and the European Union, and it’s one that doesn’t show signs of cooling off. In November 2018 President Donald Trump threatened to <a href="https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1062331024426913792">increase US tariffs on French wine</a>, and in July he <a href="https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1154791664625606657">repeated the threat</a>, this time in response to France’s proposed <a href="https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/gafa-tax-a-major-step-towards-a-fairer-and-more-efficient-tax-system">“GAFA tax”</a>.</p>
<p>In Trump’s November 2018 tweet, he stated, “On Trade, France makes excellent wine, but so does the US” This is reminiscent of what US president Thomas Jefferson wrote in a <a href="https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-8329">1808 letter</a>: “We could, in the United States, make as great a variety of wines as are made in Europe, not exactly of the same kinds, but doubtless as good.” Trump and Jefferson differ in their tone, but both suggest that the US and France both make excellent wines, and that there may be a role for the US government in boosting the domestic industry. Whether tariffs are the way to do it is a separate question, however, and deserves analysis.</p>
<h2>Taxes, but not the same ones</h2>
<p>Wine leads the way when it comes to agricultural trade between the United States and the European Union. In 2018, EU wine exports to the US totaled <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/european-union">5.6 billion euros</a>, nearly 27% of total imports for the sector. </p>
<p>While the European Union and United States both apply significant tariffs on wine imports, they’re fundamentally different: EU rates are higher for bottled products and sparkling wines, while the US tariffs are higher for bulk wines. Trade in wine is also affected by “nontariff barriers”, a range of domestic support measures and regulations in both regions. The EU has had a long history of supporting wine grape production, which is heavily regulated. In the US, state-level regulations govern the sale and distribution of wine, ultimately increasing costs to EU exporters.</p>
<p><a href="https://dataweb.usitc.gov/tariff/database">Published tariff rates</a> remind us that European tariffs are higher on commercial premium (low-value bottled products), super premium (high-value bottled products), and sparkling wines, yet it is the opposite when it comes to bulk wine where average US tariffs are higher than the ones applied by the EU.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290941/original/file-20190904-175696-13hg6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290941/original/file-20190904-175696-13hg6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290941/original/file-20190904-175696-13hg6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290941/original/file-20190904-175696-13hg6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290941/original/file-20190904-175696-13hg6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=280&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290941/original/file-20190904-175696-13hg6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=280&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290941/original/file-20190904-175696-13hg6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=280&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://dataweb.usitc.gov/tariff/database">TARIC, USITC</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While it is true that tariffs on bottled wine imported in the United States are lower than tariffs on bottled wine imported in France, it is important to remember that French tariffs are decided by the European Union, not France. Moreover, the tariffs are applied in the same way to all non-EU countries that belong to the WTO – the United States, certainly, but all other WTO members as well. These tariffs are the result of the EU complying with the WTO rules agreed to in 1995 to reduce agricultural tariffs by at least 15% and on average by 36% from tariffs pre-1995.</p>
<h2>Winners and losers</h2>
<p>Any change in tariffs between the United States and the EU has the capacity to affect trade and will lead to changes in welfare among stakeholders in this sector. Increasing US tariffs on French wines will also increase them on wines from Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Germany. Ultimately this will increase the cost to import wines into the United States and this added cost will fall on European exporters, US importers, and US consumers, while the US government will collect additional tariff revenue.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00036846.2017.1386278?journalCode=raec20">2018 research</a> examined how changes in US and European tariffs and domestic regulations would affect the key stakeholders in the wine industry. Results suggest that modest increases in US tariffs would increase profits for US wine producers and impose costs on US wine consumers, with a net decrease in US welfare. Overall, however, it would not have a substantial effect in the US market in the short run.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290945/original/file-20190904-175663-1pbhlai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290945/original/file-20190904-175663-1pbhlai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290945/original/file-20190904-175663-1pbhlai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290945/original/file-20190904-175663-1pbhlai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290945/original/file-20190904-175663-1pbhlai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290945/original/file-20190904-175663-1pbhlai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290945/original/file-20190904-175663-1pbhlai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Higher US tariffs on French wines would penalize European exporters, US importers, and US consumers. Here, barrels of white Bordeaux wine age at the Chateau de Rochemorin, Martillac, France.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5397972">Elfabriciodelamancha/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The China connection</h2>
<p>The United States isn’t the only customer for EU wine producers, of course, and Trump’s threats of tariffs could have unintended consequences in global market – particularly in the context of the ongoing trade disputes with China. </p>
<p>In response to US tariffs on steel and other products, China has imposed three rounds of duties on American wine, and the effective rate is now <a href="https://www.wineinstitute.org/resources/pressroom/051320190">close to 100%</a>. The Chinese wine market is currently not a major one for US exporters, but it could be given the rising interest in wine among Chinese consumers. Currently, the lion’s share of the country’s imports are from Europe, and in particular France. So as US wine becomes more expensive in China thanks to Chinese tariffs, demand for French wines could grow.</p>
<p>Higher US tariffs applied to European wines may thus give EU producers additional incentive to develop their brands in the expanding Chinese market. Although the direct effects of higher US tariffs on EU wines might be negligible in the United States, the indirect effect of losing out in wine market in China could have much bigger consequences for US producers in the long run.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122975/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>French wine is the subject of an ongoing trade dispute between the US and EU, but tariffs could have impacts not intended by US president Donald Trump.Florine Livat, Associate Professor of Economics, Kedge Business SchoolBradley Rickard, Associate Professor of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1077042019-09-04T06:19:56Z2019-09-04T06:19:56ZAgriculture a likely stumbling block in free trade negotiations between NZ and EU<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283200/original/file-20190709-51278-1gn0ocm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5161%2C3249&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Agriculture is an important sector for both New Zealand and the European Union.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stephanie Lecocq</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last year, the European Union (EU) launched negotiations for a comprehensive free trade agreement (<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-new-zealand-trade-agreement/">FTA</a>) with New Zealand. This was seen as a bold step that may significantly boost trade and investment between the two parties. </p>
<p>Two rounds of <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/eu-fta/eu-nz-free-trade-agreement-overview/">negotiations have since been concluded</a> successfully, but talks could take two to three years. </p>
<p>The EU is one of New Zealand’s major trading partners with which it has no FTA. Partnering with the EU represents an opportunity for New Zealand exporters and access to the world’s largest single market with transparent rules and regulations, with almost 500 million consumers. </p>
<p>Here I explore the <a href="https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/handle/10092/15843">trade issues</a> the partners are likely to face during the negotiation process. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/planned-trade-deal-with-europe-could-keep-medicine-prices-too-high-102836">Planned trade deal with Europe could keep medicine prices too high</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Current trade</h2>
<p>The EU is New Zealand’s third-largest trading partner after China and Australia. By comparison, New Zealand was only the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/new-zealand/">50th largest trading partner</a> in goods to the EU in 2017. </p>
<p>In 2016, New Zealand’s two-way trade with the EU accounted for around NZ$8.8 billion of exports and NZ$12.1 billion of imports in goods and services.</p>
<iframe title="New Zealand's two-way trade with the European Union" aria-label="Interactive line chart" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/pdtEh/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="border: none;" width="100%" height="433"></iframe>
<p>Traditionally, New Zealand largely exports agricultural products to the EU, while manufactured goods dominate EU exports to New Zealand. There is a clear difference in the types of products that dominate imports and exports between the two parties. </p>
<p>In 2016, New Zealand’s top exports to the EU were sheep meat, wine, fruits and wool. In the same year, the EU primarily exported industrial or mechanical goods such as cars, aircraft, medication, tractors, trucks and vans into New Zealand.</p>
<iframe title="NZ exports to the EU (left), NZ imports from the EU (right)" aria-label="Table" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Lpp6P/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="border: none;" width="100%" height="734"></iframe>
<h2>Trade barriers</h2>
<p>As New Zealand and the EU have no bilateral trade agreement but are both members of the World Trade Organisation (<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm">WTO</a>), they trade on the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle. This was mostly established through a series of negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47.pdf">GATT</a>). With regards to a free trade agreement, New Zealand and the EU both face issues that may prove stumbling blocks. In particular, this could affect trade in agricultural products. </p>
<p>Agriculture is an important sector in both regions and both are net exporters of agricultural products. New Zealand’s economy relies on the export of agricultural commodities. In 2015, the top three export commodities were dairy, meat and wood, amounting to 50% of total exports, with milk products alone accounting for around 30% of total exports. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-will-reshape-the-worlds-agricultural-trade-102721">Climate change will reshape the world’s agricultural trade</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>New Zealand is a small and open economy, dependent on international trade and market access to key trading partners. The EU provides a stable market for New Zealand’s exporters. As New Zealand agriculture experiences minimal government intervention, it is market oriented. Measures such as export subsidies for agricultural goods do not exist. </p>
<p>New Zealand has relatively low tariffs for most products, making market access easy for the EU. In particular, New Zealand’s <a href="https://www.mbie.govt.nz/business-and-employment/business/trade-and-tariffs/tariffs-in-new-zealand/">tariffs on imported agricultural products</a> are considered to be the lowest in the world. Import quotas and licensing as a method of protectionism do not exist. Conversely, in the EU, agriculture is heavily protected and subsidised and as such the EU has relatively high tariffs and other trade restrictions, especially for agricultural commodities. </p>
<p>In 2014, the EU’s average applied most-favoured nation tariff (the lowest possible tariff a country can assess on another country) rate was 6.4%, three times higher than in New Zealand. The applied MFN tariff rate was 14.4% on agricultural products and 4.3% for non-agricultural products (eight and two times higher than New Zealand, respectively).</p>
<p>Furthermore, in the EU the share of other types of tariff rates (such as compound and specific tariffs) is high, providing a greater degree of protection. Tariff quota is one of the border protection methods used in the EU to limit the quantity of agricultural products imported. For New Zealand, this means access to the EU market is currently limited.</p>
<h2>Prospects for the FTA</h2>
<p>By trading with the EU on the MFN principle, New Zealand faces relatively high tariffs on its agricultural products in the EU market in comparison to some of its competitors. If New Zealand were to gain free access and liberalise trade in agricultural products, it would stimulate more exports to the EU, resulting in an increase in producer returns. </p>
<p>As a competitive producer of agricultural products, New Zealand would likely argue for the inclusion of agricultural products in an FTA, while EU producers of the same may be expected to object. It is important to note that agricultural lobbyists oppose the EU’s FTAs and strongly push for agriculture to be protected within EU trade agreements. </p>
<p>EU farmers fear that once agriculture is liberalised, New Zealand dairy and meat products will flood the EU market. But this is unlikely to happen based on the <a href="https://law.usask.ca/documents/research/estey-journal/Obadovic19-2lay.pdf">economic modelling results</a>. My <a href="https://law.usask.ca/documents/research/estey-journal/Obadovic19-2lay.pdf">research</a> suggests the EU might import more of some agricultural products from New Zealand than before. But regarding total trade, the EU would stay a net exporter of the same products, and EU production and consumption would not be negatively affected by the FTA.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107704/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Irena Obadovic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New Zealand is in the process of negotiating a free-trade agreement with the EU. Agriculture is likely to become an issue because it is heavily subsidised in Europe but not in New Zealand.Irena Obadovic, Post-doctoral Scientist, University of CanterburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1201032019-07-10T15:07:25Z2019-07-10T15:07:25ZWhy South Africa should revert to greater protection for some of its industries<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283340/original/file-20190709-44497-1tcwcyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The automobile sector has grown most strongly since 1994 behind tariff protection</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After years of relative silence, debates about the pros and cons of tariffs in international trade have become a regular feature. The renewed interest has been sparked by the actions of US President Donald Trump, the first president since the Great Depression to impose, or threaten to impose, higher tariffs on imported goods.</p>
<p>In March this year, the US imposed <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline/">tariffs</a> of 25% on Chinese imports worth $250 billion a year. Although the intended extension of the measures to all Chinese goods is presently on hold, the US has threatened <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c9vwxgl4p0dt/trump-tariffs">similar steps</a> against the European Union.</p>
<p>The debate is important for countries that are struggling to diversify their economies, in South Africa’s case to build its capacity in medium and high technology-based industries. </p>
<p>South Africa’s manufacturing sector has been significantly affected by trade liberalisation policies dating back to the nineties. At the time, these were widely adopted as a means of stimulating national economies in developed countries that were characterised as being hamstrung by high input costs and stagnant local markets. It was <a href="https://www.oecd.org/trade/understanding-the-global-trading-system/why-open-markets-matter/">argued </a>that open markets would help create jobs, raise levels of productivity and competitiveness, and ultimately increase economic output.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20421338.2019.1610250">Our study</a>, has shown that, relative to our peer group and stage of industrial development, South Africa’s industrial policy is too focused on supply-side instruments. These include tax allowances for research and development, and direct financial support for human resource development or capital investment. </p>
<p>The study began with two initial propositions: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>that the transition had been overdone; and that </p></li>
<li><p>the country’s more traditional manufacturing sectors, such as leather goods and footwear, metal products and clothing, had been slow to respond to the new policy framework. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The study confirms both.</p>
<p>We conclude that the policy changes of the nineties were too extensive and South Africa’s industrial policy regime should be rebalanced as a means of growing employment and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). A combined approach of selective tariffs and better marketing to potential beneficiaries could rebuild the important contribution of manufacturing to the economy.</p>
<h2>The nineties</h2>
<p>In the nineties, South Africa was emerging from a period of heavy protection and isolation. It was partly self-imposed and partly the consequence of international sanctions. The lowering of tariffs was seen as a means to achieve two objectives. First, to <a href="http://forum.tips.org.za/images/Policy_mixes_as_a_means_of_overcoming_challenges_to_innovation_in_developing_countries_insights_from_a_mixed_methods_study_of_South_Africas_manufacturing_sector_v2.pdf">raise</a> the international competitiveness of its manufacturing base. And, second, to loosen the stranglehold of upstream industries, including manufacturers of basic chemicals, iron and steel, and paper. </p>
<p>In broad terms, the nineties can be characterised by the shift in the industrial policy regime reliant on market protection, high tariff levels and state procurement (collectively known as demand-side support) to a proliferation of instruments, such as research and development tax incentives and a focus on reducing the input costs of firms (known as supply-side support).</p>
<p>Between 1991 and 2001, <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_242878/lang--en/index.htm">average tariff levels</a> fell from 27.5% in 1990 to about 8% in 2006 and 5% in 2016. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, the promises of economic growth and job creation in the manufacturing sector as a consequence of trade liberalisation were not forthcoming. The reform led, instead, to many casualties, with firms in the vulnerable industries contracting and shedding jobs. </p>
<p>Although increasing by 50% from 1994 to 2006, the contribution of manufacturing to GDP has hardly changed since 2007, despite an overall 26% growth in the economy (2007 to 2018). As a result, the proportion that manufacturing contributed to the economy dropped from 21% in 1994 to 13.2% in 2018. </p>
<p>Several segments of the manufacturing sector have weakened considerably. In some cases, they have disappeared almost entirely. Output of the textiles, clothing, leather and footwear sub-sector has declined by 40%. Textile manufacturing has been the worst performer, with its economic output now less than 60% of its 1994 level.</p>
<h2>The exception - automobiles</h2>
<p>The automobile sector has grown most strongly since 1994. It is the one sub-sector which retained high tariff protection. These can be effective. But tariffs in support of the automobile sector have not been cheap. They came at a considerable <a href="http://www.tips.org.za/manufacturing-data/the-real-economy-bulletin/quarterly-bulletin/item/3584-the-real-economy-bulletin-fourth-quarter-2018">cost</a> to the economy, and in this case, also to government. It is estimated that the cost to the Department of Trade and Industry of the <a href="https://www.naacam.co.za/automotive-production">Automotive Production and Development Programme</a> has been R5 billion a year.</p>
<p>In terms of the policy focus, the data supported the view that supply-side measures are too dominant and the overall policy mix should be re-balanced to provide more demand-side support. The support can be principally in the form of tariff protection and a revision to the local content specifications for public procurement. This will be done to revitalise South Africa’s manufacturing sector in an approach analogous to the automobile sector.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the results of the study have shown that the traditional industries have failed to respond sufficiently to the post-1994 policy shift. They made little use of the new instruments. Policy changes invoke a similar set of responses. Traditional firms have been suspicious of the new instruments and reluctant to engage with them. On the other hand, the more open firms were enthusiastic about new possibilities that such policy changes may reveal. </p>
<p>The use of research and development tax incentives, a key component of the supply-side incentives, has been highly variable. The major beneficiaries have been the high-technology sub-sectors, which have strong absorptive capability, characterised by a willingess to identify and absorb useful external knowledge.</p>
<p>We recommend that more effort should be made to assist the traditional industries in understanding, and hence benefiting from, the new policy environment, rather than allowing them to disappear entirely. A wider re-balancing of innovation policy in favour of stronger demand-side instruments is also recommended.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120103/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Richard Walwyn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s economic reforms of the 1990s were overdone, destroying some industries and thus impacting economic growth and job creation. A re-balancing of industrial policy is called for.David Richard Walwyn, Professor of Technology Management, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.