tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/trident-5465/articlesTrident – The Conversation2019-11-28T12:13:40Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1278902019-11-28T12:13:40Z2019-11-28T12:13:40ZUK election 2019: the parties’ competing visions for Britain’s place in the world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304250/original/file-20191128-178089-5fqk19.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=43%2C50%2C896%2C610&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/brexit-flags-united-kingdom-world-map-442034047?src=cd76f39b-ab3f-406c-8516-cd7d427a8f0d-2-36">By christo mitkov christov/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Unusually for a UK election campaign, a key issue of foreign policy is central to the debate. Although previous elections have followed major foreign policy controversies – in 1959 following the Suez invasion, 1983 after the Falklands war and 2005 after the Iraq war – the 2017 and 2019 campaigns have been marked by their focus on the UK’s future relationship with the European Union (EU). Brexit is the <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/11/07/which-issues-will-decide-general-election">top concern</a> for British voters. </p>
<p>The UK’s relationship with the EU will determine the future direction of the UK’s foreign, security, development and international trade relationships, as <a href="https://kar.kent.ac.uk/72156/">my own research</a> has explored. Since 1973, the UK has largely pursued its foreign economic policy with the EU. It has also increasingly coordinated its foreign and defence policy with the EU’s member states and, in recent years, become enmeshed in initiatives to build an <a href="https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8216#fullreport">EU security and defence capability</a>. </p>
<p>The Conservative Party and Brexit Party, who are committed to leaving the EU, offer the prospect of the most significant change in the UK’s place in the world. The Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru and the Green Party, by campaigning to remain within the EU, appear to offer continuity – not withstanding the SNP’s commitment to seeking independence for Scotland. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/labours-brexit-policy-explained-127380">Labour Party’s policy</a>, which offers further renegotiation on the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and a second referendum, presents a less clear cut alternative foreign policy future. </p>
<h2>Foreign policy visions</h2>
<p>The parties’ manifestos grapple with the consequences of their different positions on Brexit for the UK’s foreign, security and defence policies and present different levels of detail of their vision for Britain’s place in the world.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://assets-global.website-files.com/5da42e2cae7ebd3f8bde353c/5dda924905da587992a064ba_Conservative%202019%20Manifesto.pdf">Conservative manifesto</a> states: “Getting Brexit done will allow us to do more on the international stage.” There is no manifesto reference to “Global Britain”, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexits-global-britain-uk-needs-a-clear-economic-strategy-for-its-trading-future-not-a-dead-colonial-fantasy-116707">much-derided term</a> used by the governments of Theresa May and Boris Johnson to characterise a post-Brexit UK foreign policy. </p>
<p>The Conservative manifesto’s foreign policy content is rather stronger on rhetoric than specific commitments. There will be moves to “bolster” alliances and international institutions and “reinvigorate relationships with Europe and seek to strengthen old and new partnerships across the world”. The party also pledges to “expand our influence and protect our values” through cultural institutions, such as the BBC and British Council.</p>
<p>In contrast to the Conservatives, the <a href="https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Real-Change-Labour-Manifesto-2019.pdf">Labour manifesto</a> is expansive on promises for what it calls a “new internationalism”, putting “human rights, international law and tackling climate change” as core international priorities. Labour says it will use the UK’s influence to end the “bomb first, talk later” approach to security. </p>
<p>Unusually for the foreign policy section of a party manifesto, there are specific commitments for the first year of government. These include the introduction of a War Powers Act to require parliamentary approach for military action – a policy commitment shared with <a href="https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/libdems/pages/57307/attachments/original/1574684060/Stop_Brexit_and_Build_a_Brighter_Future.pdf?1574684060">the Liberal Democrats</a>. Labour also commits to an “audit of the impact of Britain’s colonial legacy” with the purpose of understanding “our contribution to the dynamics of violence and insecurity across regions previously under British colonial rule” and to invest an additional £400 million in diplomatic capacity. </p>
<p>Labour also has a detailed shopping list of commitments for British diplomacy. These include the immediate recognition of a Palestinian state, which is also in the Liberal Democrat manifesto. Labour also says it will change British policy on <a href="https://theconversation.com/chagos-islands-uk-refusal-to-return-archipelago-to-mauritius-show-the-limits-of-international-law-127650">the Chagos Islands</a> and Western Sahara, apologise for the 1919 <a href="https://www.historytoday.com/archive/months-past/amritsar-massacre">Amritsar massacre</a>, as well as launch an inquiry into the UK’s “complicity in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jun/28/uks-role-in-rendition-and-torture-of-terrorism-suspects-key-findings">rendition and torture</a>”.</p>
<p>Where there is significant common ground between the UK’s three main parties is on climate change diplomacy and development policy, with all promising to maintain the commitment to spend 0.7% of gross national income on aid, except the Brexit Party which wants to <a href="https://www.thebrexitparty.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Contract-With-The-People.pdf">halve the aid budget</a>. Yet, considering the UK’s membership of the EU has substantially shaped both its <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Climate-and-energy-policy-after-Brexit.pdf">development and environmental policy</a>, there is little reflection in the party manifestos on the consequences of the UK’s departure from the EU on these issues.</p>
<h2>Defence and Trident</h2>
<p>Despite Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn’s <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-corbyn-did-call-for-nato-to-disband-but-its-labour-policy-to-stay-in">record of opposition</a> to NATO and Trident, the UK’s nuclear deterrent, there is no substantive difference between the three main party’s manifestos on these defence issues. The exceptions are <a href="https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/www.snp.org/uploads/2019/11/11_27-SNP-Manifesto-2019-for-download.pdf">the SNP</a> and the <a href="https://www.greenparty.org.uk/assets/files/Elections/Green%20Party%20Manifesto%202019.pdf">Green Party</a>, both of which are committed to abolishing Trident. </p>
<p>All the other parties commit to renew Trident (the Liberal Democrats want to reduce the number of submarines and move away from constant patrolling) and to spend 2% or more of GDP on defence. Labour and the Conservatives stress they will improve opportunities for UK veterans. </p>
<p>As on foreign policy, Labour’s manifesto is more detailed on security and defence spending commitments than that of the Conservatives or Liberal Democrats. Labour commits to increase funding for UN peacekeeping and compensate veterans of British nuclear weapons testing programmes. It also promises to suspend arms sales to Saudi Arabia (also a commitment of the Liberal Democrats) and Israel and to review the UK’s arms export regime. </p>
<p>All three of the UK’s main political parties are committing to more, but different, foreign policy in their manifestos: the Liberal Democrats plan to “renew international liberalism”; Labour seeks a “new internationalism”; and the Conservatives aim to “strengthen Britain in the world”. Most of the electorate is, however, more likely to notice their different positions on Brexit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127890/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Whitman have received funding from the Economic and Social Council (ESRC). He is affiliated with Chatham House as an Associate Fellow. </span></em></p>What the UK’s main political parties have pledged on foreign policy in their manifestos.Richard Whitman, Visiting Fellow, Chatham House and member of the Global Europe Centre, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/947712018-04-19T11:23:04Z2018-04-19T11:23:04ZCould the US win World War III without using nuclear weapons?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215562/original/file-20180419-163975-ucyzm5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/launch-flight-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-over-796516828?src=iVt1MFsH-vME7zeNSCRhRw-1-2">Denis_kh via Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the US, Russia and China test each other’s patience and strategic focus, speculation about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/west-could-sleepwalk-into-a-doomsday-war-with-russia-its-time-to-wake-up-59936">chances of a world war</a> has hit a new high. But many of the people seriously engaged in this weighty discussion often get it wrong. </p>
<p>When it comes to estimating military capability, the Western media is principally concerned with the weapons capabilities of weaker states – and it rarely pays much attention to the colossal capability of the US, which still accounts for most of the world’s defence spending. </p>
<p>Any sensible discussion of what a hypothetical World War III might look like needs to begin with the sheer size and force of America’s military assets. For all that China and Russia are arming up on various measures, US commanders have the power to dominate escalating crises and <a href="https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273">counter opposing forces</a> before they can be used. </p>
<p>Take missile warfare alone. The US Navy already has 4,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles, and the Navy and Air Force are currently taking delivery of <a href="https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/agm-158-jassm-lockheeds-family-of-stealthy-cruise-missiles-014343/">5,000 JASSM conventional cruise missiles</a> with ranges from 200-600 miles. Barely visible to radar, these are designed to destroy “hardened” targets such as nuclear missile silos. Russia and China, by contrast, have nothing of equivalent quantity or quality with which to threaten the US mainland.</p>
<p>The same holds true when it comes to maritime forces. While much is made of Russia’s two frigates and smaller <a href="http://www.interfax.ru/world/607973">vessels</a> stationed off the Syrian coast, France alone has 20 warships and an <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/french-aircraft-carrier-isil-syria-151122164642999.html">aircraft carrier</a> in the Mediterranean – and US standing forces in the area include six destroyers equipped with scores of cruise missiles and anti-missile systems. At the other end of Europe, the Russian military is threatening the small Baltic states, but it is rarely noted that the Russian Baltic fleet is the same size as Denmark’s and half the size of Germany’s.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, China’s aggressively expansionist behaviour in the South China Sea is reported alongside stories of its first aircraft carrier and long-range ballistic missiles. But for all that the Chinese navy is large and growing, according to the <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/about-s-us">International Institute for Strategic Studies</a>, it’s still only numerically equivalent to the combined fleets of Japan and Taiwan, while the US boasts <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/does-the-us-navy-have-10-or-19-aircraft-carriers/">19 aircraft carriers</a> worldwide if its marine assault ships are included.</p>
<p>But overhanging all this, of course, is the nuclear factor. </p>
<h2>Out of the sky</h2>
<p>The US, Russia and China are all nuclear-armed; Vladimir Putin recently unveiled a new fleet of nuclear-capable missiles which he <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43239331">described</a> as “invincible in the face of all existing and future systems”, and some have suggested that China may be <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/is-china-abandoning-its-no-first-use-nuclear-policy/">moving away from its no-first-use policy</a>. This is all undeniably disturbing. While it has long been assumed that the threat of nuclear weapons acts as a deterrent to any war between the major powers, it’s also possible that the world may simply have been <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140428TooCloseforComfortNuclearUseLewisWilliamsPelopidasAghlani.pdf">riding its luck</a>. But once again, the US’s non-nuclear capabilities are all too often overlooked.</p>
<p>US leaders may in fact believe they can <a href="https://www.rbth.com/news/2015/10/12/foreign_ministry_us_prompt_global_strike_concept_impedes_nuclear_disarma_50004.html">remove Russia’s nuclear deterrent</a> with an overwhelming conventional attack backed up by missile defences. This ability was cultivated under the Prompt Global Strike programme, which was initiated before 9/11 and continued during the Obama years. Organised through the US Air Force’s <a href="http://www.afgsc.af.mil/Units/">Global Strike Command</a>, it is to use conventional weapons to attack anywhere on Earth in under 60 minutes.</p>
<p>This is not to say the task would be small. In order to destroy Russia’s nuclear missiles before they can be launched, the US military would need to first blind Russian radar and command and communications to incoming attack, probably using both physical and cyber attacks. It would then have to destroy some 200 fixed and 200 mobile missiles on land, a dozen Russian missile submarines, and Russian bombers. It would then need to shoot down any missiles that could still be fired. </p>
<p>Russia is not well positioned to survive such an attack. Its early warning radars, both satellite and land-based, are <a href="https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-satellite-nuclear-warning-system-down-until-november-47799">decaying</a> and will be hard to replace. At the same time, the US has and is developing a range of technologies to carry out anti-satellite and radar missions, and it has been using them for years. (All the way back in 1985, it <a href="https://www.livescience.com/4832-satellite-22-years.html">shot down a satellite</a> with an F15 jet fighter.) That said, the West is very dependent on satellites too, and Russia and China continue to develop their own anti-satellite systems.</p>
<h2>The air war</h2>
<p>Russia’s bomber aircraft date back to the Soviet era, so despite the alarm they provoke when they <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/russian-bombers-taunt-uk-again-fly-781741">nudge at Western countries’ airspace</a>, they pose no major threat in themselves. Were the Russian and US planes to face each other, the Russians would find themselves under attack from <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/how-su-35s-and-f-22s-compare-2016-4?r=US&IR=T/#f-22-specs-1">planes they couldn’t see</a> and that are any way out of their range.</p>
<p>US and British submarine crews <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014-06/hunt-full-spectrum-asw">claim a perfect record</a> in constantly shadowing Soviet submarines as they left their bases throughout the Cold War. Since then, Russian forces have declined and US anti-submarine warfare has been revived, raising the prospect that Russian submarines could be taken out before they could even launch their missiles.</p>
<p>The core of the Russia’s nuclear forces consists of land-based missiles, some fixed in silos, others mobile on rail and road. The silo-based missiles can now be targeted by several types of missiles, carried by US planes <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/us-military-building-fleet-shadow-bombers-invisible-radar-716452">almost invisible to radar</a>; all are designed to destroy targets protected by deep concrete and steel bunkers. But a problem for US war planners is that it might take hours too long for their missile-carrying planes to reach these targets – hence the need to act in minutes.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The US’s B-2 Spirit stealth bomber.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/fairford-gloucestershire-uk-july-16th-2017-692470852?src=_Ec_B4qhqz_7XYFk5S9cEw-1-0">AMMHPhotography via Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>One apparently simple solution to attacking targets very quickly is to fit quick nuclear ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads. In 2010, Robert Gates, then serving as secretary of defence under Barack Obama, said that the US <a href="https://www.military.com/defensetech/2010/04/12/gates-says-u-s-has-conventionally-armed-icbms">had this capability</a>. Intercontinental ballistic missiles take just 30 minutes to fly between the continental US’s Midwest and Siberia; if launched from well-positioned submarines, the Navy’s Tridents can be even quicker, with a launch-to-target time of under ten minutes.</p>
<p>From 2001, the US Navy prepared to fit its Trident missiles with either inert solid warheads – accurate to within ten metres – or vast splinter/shrapnel weapons. Critics have argued that this would leave a potential enemy unable to tell whether they were under nuclear or conventional attack, meaning they would have to assume the worst. According to US Congressional <a href="https://news.usni.org/2017/02/09/document-report-congress-u-s-prompt-global-strike-ballistic-missiles">researchers</a>, the development work came close to completion, but apparently ceased in 2013. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the US has continued to develop other technologies across its armed services to attack targets around the world in under an hour – foremost among them hypersonic missiles, which could return to Earth at up to ten times the speed of sound, with China and Russia trying to keep up.</p>
<h2>Missile envy</h2>
<p>The remainder of Russia’s nuclear force consists of missiles transported by rail. An article on Kremlin-sponsored news outlet <a href="https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201708301056919137-barguzin-nuke-trains/">Sputnik</a> described how these missile rail cars would be so hard to find that Prompt Global Strike might not be as effective as the US would like – but taken at face value, the article implies that the rest of the Russian nuclear arsenal is in fact relatively vulnerable.</p>
<p>Starting with the “<a href="http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,400021,00.html">Scud hunt</a>” of the First Gulf War, the US military has spent years <a href="http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/JointDoctrine-CounteringAirandMissileThreats.pdf">improving</a> its proficiency at targeting mobile ground-based missiles. Those skills now use remote sensors to attack small ground targets at short notice in the myriad counter-insurgency operations it’s pursued since 2001.</p>
<p>If the “sword” of Prompt Global Strike doesn’t stop the launch of all Russian missiles, then the US could use the “shield” of its own missile defences. These it deployed after it <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-08/abmjul_aug02">walked out of a treaty with Russia</a> banning such weapons in 2002. </p>
<p>While some of these post-2002 missile defence systems have been called <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-limits-of-u-s-missile-defense/">ineffective</a>, the US Navy has a more effective system called Aegis, which one former head of the Pentagon’s missile defence programs claims can <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/09/united-states-navy-north-korea-intercontintal-ballistic-missiles-defense-aegis/">shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles</a>. Some 300 Aegis anti-ballistic missiles now equip 40 US warships; in 2008, one destroyed a satellite as it fell out of orbit. </p>
<h2>War mentality</h2>
<p>In advance of the Iraq war, various governments and onlookers cautioned the US and UK about the potential for unforeseen consequences, but the two governments were driven by a mindset impervious to criticism and misgivings. And despite all the lessons that can be learned from the Iraq disaster, there’s an ample risk today that a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/opinion/security-masculinity-nuclear-weapons.html">similarly gung-ho attitude</a> could take hold.</p>
<p>Foreign casualties generally have little impact on domestic US politics. The hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians who died under first <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/hard-look-iraq-sanctions/">sanctions</a> and then <a href="https://theconversation.com/fudged-statistics-on-the-iraq-war-death-toll-are-still-circulating-today-93975">war</a> did not negatively impact presidents Clinton or George W. Bush. Neither might the prospect of similar casualties in Iran or North Korea or other states, especially if “humanitarian” precision weapons are used.</p>
<p>But more than that, an opinion poll run by Stanford University’s <a href="https://news.stanford.edu/2017/08/08/americans-weigh-nuclear-war/">Scott Sagan</a> found that the US public would not oppose the preemptive use of even nuclear weapons provided that the US itself was not affected. And nuclear Trident offers that temptation.</p>
<p>The control of major conventional weapons as well as WMD needs urgent attention from international civil society, media and political parties. There is still time to galvanise behind the Nobel-winning International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/11/nuclear-annihilation-one-tantrum-away-nobel-peace-prize-winner-warns">nuclear ban treaty</a>, and to revive and globalise the decaying arms control agenda of the <a href="https://www.osce.org/arms-control">Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</a>, which played a vital part in bringing the Cold War to a largely peaceful end.</p>
<p>Like the Kaiser in 1914, perhaps Trump or one of his successors will express dismay when faced with the reality a major US offensive unleashes. But unlike the Kaiser, who saw his empire first defeated and then dismembered, perhaps a 21st-century US president might get away with it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94771/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Plesch receives funding from The Joseph Rowntree Trust. He/ is affiliated with SOAS University of London, <a href="http://www.scrapweapons.com">www.scrapweapons.com</a> and ican.org. </span></em></p>To understand how a new world war might play out, it’s important to remember just how powerful the US really is.Dan Plesch, Director of the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/788692017-06-07T08:45:08Z2017-06-07T08:45:08ZCorbyn’s defence pitch is fully in the mainstream, not a 1980s throwback<p>Once written off as an electoral force even by much of the left, Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour has defied expectations to mount a late surge in the 2017 election polls. The New Statesman’s recent <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/03/stench-decay-and-failure-coming-labour-party-now-overwhelming">lament</a> that the “stench of decay and failure coming from the Labour Party is now overwhelming” seems a distant memory.</p>
<p>The turnaround isn’t just a matter of style; it also has a lot to do with policy. And for a measure of how far Labour’s image has come, there are few better issues to look at than defence.</p>
<p>For the first nine months of her premiership, Theresa May confidently asserted her superiority as a steward of national security while Labour almost tore itself apart on what stance to take, with front bench colleagues sometimes even <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-is-helping-the-tories-by-fighting-trident-renewal-shadow-defence-secretary-claims-a7331596.html">clashing in public</a>. And when May called a snap election, Labour looked set to commit itself to unilateral nuclear disarmament and a re-run of its left-wing <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/8550425.stm">1983 manifesto</a>, still remembered as “the longest suicide note in history”.</p>
<p>But then Labour’s <a href="http://www.labour.org.uk/page/-/Images/manifesto-2017/Labour%20Manifesto%202017.pdf">2017 manifesto</a> arrived – with a blunt commitment to renewing Trident. Corbyn, who only in 2016 addressed a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) rally in Trafalgar Square on the theme of “NHS not Trident”, signed off on a manifesto featuring one vital phrase: “Labour supports the renewal of the nuclear deterrent.” So how did a left-wing pacifist like Corbyn reconcile himself to this policy position? </p>
<p>The simplest answer is that he still hasn’t. In several interviews and a BBC Question Time special, he was visibly cagey about his personal views on the nuclear issue and the all-important dilemma of “pushing the button”. But there’s another way to read this: by his party’s standards, Corbyn’s behaviour simply isn’t that anomalous.</p>
<h2>Pressing on</h2>
<p>For the last 70 years, Labour leaders have generally returned to Labour’s default position on the nuclear deterrent, as they have on defence more generally. And while this year’s manifesto pledge to renew Trident aims to unify a divided party, the nuclear deterrent has divided Labour ever since Britain’s first thermonuclear bomb was tested in 1957. </p>
<p>Many figures on Labour left of old were active in CND, and at the party conferences in 1960 and 1961, they came close to forcing the party to back unilateral disarmament. These moves were passionately opposed by the Labour right, with then-leader Hugh Gaitskell, <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2010/02/gaitskell-speech-fight-again">vowing</a> to “fight, and fight again” to resist the left’s efforts. </p>
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<p>When Harold Wilson won the 1964 general election, he immediately committed the Labour government to pressing ahead with Trident’s predecessor, <a href="http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/skybolt-polaris-missiles.htm">Polaris</a>, which was only a year into its construction. He did so by lying to the party, claiming that the Royal Navy informed him that Polaris was “past the point of no return”. Party unity was Wilson’s primary concern in his 13 years as Labour leader, and the nuclear question was too divisive to be left open.</p>
<p>Corbyn’s Labour has a similar cohesion problem, but there are other reasons besides that he would commit it to renewing the deterrent. After all, defence is not only a matter of keeping the country safe, especially during a general election.</p>
<p>If Labour is to keep May’s overall majority in the single figures, it must hold on to or pick up various marginal constituencies. Trident matters to two in particular: the Labour-held seat of <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2016/02/inside-barrow-shipyard-eye-political-storm-labour-and-beyond">Barrow-in-Furness</a>, where the Trident successor system will be built; and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-40137011">Plymouth Sutton and Devonport</a>, a Conservative-held seat with a strong naval tradition. Their respective MPs enjoy majorities of only about 800 and 500 votes, and the impact of Labour’s nuclear commitments could be crucial. </p>
<p>The deterrent also happens to have a very considerable economic impact in the west of Scotland, where Labour surely wants to claw back some of the seats it lost in 2015.</p>
<h2>Staying strong</h2>
<p>The Trident debate has overshadowed Labour’s commitment to the other aspects of defence, such as conventional weapons and the defence industry. As a left-winger, Corbyn may be more comfortable arguing that defence funding should be diverted to cyber warfare, intelligence and policing, while <a href="https://twitter.com/_youhadonejob1/status/871913009324707842">criticising</a> the Conservative government for scrapping HMS Ark Royal and the Harrier jump-jet, which was commissioned by Labour in the 1970s. </p>
<p>Indeed, the defence industry figures strongly in Labour’s manifesto, which declines to indulge any of Michael Foot’s ideas about “converting” defence production for commercial use. The manifesto also proposes a defence industrial strategy white paper, with a plan to “provide good jobs down the supply chain”.</p>
<p>Historically, Labour was responsible for initiating Britain’s first atomic bomb, and committing ground forces in Korean War and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It devoted enormous sums of public expenditure to the military, especially in the Cold War. And while many of its rank and file are passionately devoted to disarmament, a good many Labour voters <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/03/15/uk-should-commit-nato-2-defence-spending-target-pu/">believe in a strong defence policy</a> – as do the public as a whole.</p>
<p>Understandable then that for all of the chatter about its leader’s supposedly radical beliefs, Corbyn’s Labour has gone to the electorate with a plan concerned much more with continuity than change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78869/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Mc Loughlin is Associate Lecturer in History at the University of Exeter</span></em></p>The way Corbyn’s Labour has handled Trident and defence is perfectly in line with Labour’s history since the 1960s.Keith Mc Loughlin, Associate Lecturer in History, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/718232017-01-24T16:08:22Z2017-01-24T16:08:22ZThe real reason why Trident’s missile fiasco is so scary for politicians<p>In March 2012 HMS Vengeance, one of the UK’s four Vanguard-class submarines that carry Trident II nuclear missiles, entered the Devonport naval base in Plymouth for a major overhaul. Before doing so, its nuclear warheads were removed at the Coulport naval base on the Clyde. The submarine made its way across the Atlantic to the US Strategic Weapons Facility at King’s Bay, Georgia, on America’s east coast. There, its arsenal of US-designed and built Trident missiles were removed. The missiles were processed into a much larger pool of missiles that equip the US’ Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines.</p>
<p>More than three years later, in December 2015, HMS Vengeance was recommissioned and journeyed back across the Atlantic to King’s Bay to be reloaded with missiles. In January 2016 an extensive series of sea trials began to test and certify the crew and equipment for its return to active service. This culminated in a live test fire of a Trident missile in June 2016 at the US missile test range at Port Canaveral, off the coast of Florida. This is known as a demonstration and shakedown operation (DASO).</p>
<p>We now know the test went wrong. The missile trajectory was supposed to follow the US Navy’s Eastern Test Range, which extends to the southern Atlantic, off the west coast of Africa. This range is made up of a series of shore and sea-based tracking facilities.</p>
<p>However, as was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jan/22/mod-cannot-fall-back-on-usual-excuses-to-explain-trident-misfire">reported</a>, the problem seems to have involved the communication of data between the missile and one or more of these facilities – rather than a problem with the missile or the launch system. It is unclear what, if anything, malfunctioned with the UK submarine and its fire control system and what malfunctioned with the missile, its guidance systems, or the systems comprising the test range.</p>
<p>Tests of certified and operationally deployed missiles happen quite often and sometimes, they fail. On July 27 2011, for example, a routine flight test of a US <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/new-details-emerge-about-us-nuclear-missile-test-failure/">Minuteman III</a> inter-continental ballistic missile failed and the missile was deliberately destroyed mid-flight.</p>
<p>The Trident missile actually has an exceptional record. The US Navy has conducted over 160 successful flight tests since missile design was completed in 1989, making it the world’s most reliable large ballistic missile – until last June.</p>
<p>But why the cover up? There are two reasons. The first, which is speculative, is that the US government regards the details of the failure of its missile (to which Britain purchased a right to deploy but do not “own”) or the failure of its test-flight communication systems and software, as proprietary information that it has not authorised the UK to disclose at any level of detail, perhaps because of <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4150190/PM-Theresa-did-know-Trident-failure.html">wider concerns</a> about what went wrong.</p>
<p>The second, and probable core reason, is the intense political sensitivity that surrounds Trident in the UK. The test failure came just as the British parliament was about to debate and vote on whether to continue with the Trident replacement programme. This would enable the UK to deploy nuclear weapons in the coming decades.</p>
<h2>What makes a deterrent?</h2>
<p>The central issue in all this is the political need for certainty when it comes to nuclear weapons. The UK’s political leaders routinely insist that the country needs its own nuclear weapons in order to protect the state from a major armed attack by another state. The Whitehall narrative insists that nuclear deterrence – the threat of a nuclear attack to prevent the escalation of armed conflict to the point of all-out war, including nuclear war – works without problem. In fact, it is so reliable, it effectively guarantees protection against attack. This is how it is sold to the public: nuclear weapons assure safety and protection; no nuclear weapons means weakness and vulnerability.</p>
<p>This is why Trident is so often referred to as “the deterrent”, as if it successfully deters simply by existing. Means and ends are one and the same. This narrative of “nuclear absolutism” (UK nuclear weapons are absolutely necessary and nuclear deterrence works absolutely) is part of the marketing strategy for maintaining an independent UK nuclear weapons capability.</p>
<p>And a vital part of this narrative is the absolute reliability of the weapon system. Politicians, the public, and whoever the UK is targeting need to know, need to believe, that if the order to fire is given, then the UK’s missiles will be launched and massive nuclear violence will follow.</p>
<p>The problem is that the practice of nuclear deterrence is not perfect. It involves people, weapon technologies, systems, bureaucracies and cultures. Sometimes things do go wrong and when they do, the illusion of certainty is compromised, and this creates problems. It raises questions about the nature of the risk and whether it is worth taking, questions that Theresa May, for one, doesn’t want asking.</p>
<h2>Accidents happen</h2>
<p>We know that organisations can struggle to deliver <a href="http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/a-limit-to-safety-en-618.pdf">persistently safe outcomes</a> with complex systems. This can result in disasters like the Challenger space shuttle explosion in 1986, the Deep Water horizon oil rig disaster in 2010 and the Fukushima Daiichi reactor meltdown in 2011. </p>
<p>This is the wider lesson from the Trident test failure: accidents happen with nuclear weapon systems, just as they do with any complex socio-technological system. But the consequences of things going wrong with nuclear weapons and the practice of nuclear deterrence in which they are embedded are enormous. This is particularly so in crises that can induce risk taking, misperception, and extreme stress.</p>
<p>The consequences could be the detonation of tens, hundreds, or even thousands of nuclear warheads, causing <a href="http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/an-illusion-of-safety-en-611.pdf">catastrophic harm</a>.</p>
<p>Proponents of nuclear deterrence might accept this risk by arguing that it is very small. Yet <a href="http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/goodby_shultz_-_the_war_that_must_never_be_fought_-_scribd.pdf">we cannot know that</a> and we should not deceive ourselves by thinking nuclear weapons are intrinsically safe and nuclear deterrence is foolproof. They are not and, given the consequences of failure, it is why a majority of states voted at the UN General Assembly in October 2016 to begin a formal process to <a href="http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/draft-un-resolution-to-ban-nuclear-weapons-in-2017/">ban nuclear weapons</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71823/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Ritchie has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. He is a member of the British Pugwash Group, the British International Studies Association, and the Royal United Services Institute's Project on Nuclear Issues.</span></em></p>The entire concept of nuclear deterrence depends on the assumption that everything will always work perfectly.Nick Ritchie, Senior Lecturer (International Security), University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/717442017-01-23T16:31:04Z2017-01-23T16:31:04ZTrident missile failure: just how safe is the UK’s nuclear deterrent?<p>The Sunday Times has caused a furore by <a href="https://modmedia.blog.gov.uk/2017/01/22/defence-in-the-media-22-january-2017/">reporting</a> that a 2016 test of the UK’s submarine-borne strategic nuclear deterrent ended in failure. After the submarine HMS Vengeance returned to sea following a £350M refit, it <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4438392.stm">tested a Trident-II D-5 missile</a> off the coast of Florida. Immediately after launch, the unarmed missile reportedly veered off course and flew towards the US mainland rather than following its planned trajectory towards a sea target near West Africa. </p>
<p>Details of the <a href="http://bit.ly/2jgLMf5">technical aspects of the failure</a> have not been released for reasons of national security, and aren’t likely to be. But the political fallout has already begun. </p>
<p>Confronted with the revelations on live television, the UK’s prime minister, Theresa May, initially <a href="https://twitter.com/MarrShow/status/823109940554264576">refused to confirm</a> whether she was made aware of the incident before a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/18/mps-vote-in-favour-of-trident-renewal-nuclear-deterrent">crucial House of Commons vote</a> a month later which confirmed the renewal of the submarines that carry the deterrent. However, Downing Street <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38714047">later confirmed</a> that she was indeed informed before the vote was held. </p>
<p>As May and her government try to take control of the story, the crucial question for the British people is whether they should continue to share Theresa May’s “<a href="http://bit.ly/2jgKGQB">absolute faith</a>” in the Trident-II missile following this event.</p>
<h2>The UK’s strategic deterrent</h2>
<p>Under the banner of Operation Relentless, the UK has maintained a posture of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/successor-submarine-programme-factsheet/successor-submarine-programme-factsheet">“continuous at sea deterrence”</a> (CASD) since 1969. In practice, this means that for the last 48 years, at least one British submarine carrying nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles has been on patrol in the Atlantic Ocean at all times. The posture is meant to <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/successor-submarine-programme-factsheet/successor-submarine-programme-factsheet">deter</a> “the most extreme threats to our national security and way of life” by ensuring that any nuclear attack on the UK can be met with a credible retaliatory nuclear strike.</p>
<p>The UK has had two classes of nuclear-powered submarine capable of carrying nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles (SSBNs): four <a href="http://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/blog/hms-resolution-britains-first-maritime-nuclear-deterrent/">Resolution</a> class SSBNs, which patrolled from 1969 until 1996, and their successors, the four <a href="http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/the-equipment/submarines/ballistic-submarines/vanguard-ballistic">Vanguard class SSBNs</a>, which have patrolled since 1993. </p>
<p>At any one time, one SSBN is on patrol providing the strategic deterrent, one is recovering from the previous patrol, one is preparing to depart for patrol, and one is in refit. This amounts to a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf">minimum nuclear deterrent posture</a>, putatively providing a credible nuclear deterrent with the smallest possible number of submarines and warheads, and therefore at the lowest practicable expense.</p>
<p>The Vanguard class SSBNs are equipped with 16 missile tubes that carry the Trident-II D-5 missile, built to deliver British-produced warheads with an explosive yield the equivalent of eight Hiroshima bombs. These missiles carry Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (<a href="https://www.britannica.com/technology/MIRV">MIRV</a>) payloads, and each missile is believed to be capable of delivering three warheads, each with around a 100-kiloton yield. In 2010, the British government decided to <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf">limit the number of missiles</a> to eight, with a maximum of 40 warheads carried on each SSBN.</p>
<p>While devastating compared with conventional weapons, the Trident-II missiles carry nuclear warheads that are <a href="http://www.boeing.com/history/products/lgm-30-minuteman.page">significantly less powerful</a> than those of other nuclear weapons deployed in the past. As a result, today’s nuclear weapons are designed with <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/inventing-accuracy">high-precision guidance systems</a>, unlike their forebears.</p>
<h2>Should we be concerned?</h2>
<p>When the test failed in June 2016, HMS Vengeance was engaged in a <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/us/news/press-releases/2016/september/ssc-space-trdent.html">Demonstration and Shakedown Operation</a>, a requirement for returning to service following an extensive 40-month refit that culminates in the launch of an unarmed Trident-II D-5 missile. These operations are tests of the submarine and its crew, but are also meant to demonstrate to the UK’s allies and adversaries that its strategic deterrent is credible. </p>
<p>While a government spokesperson reported that Vengeance’s crew <a href="https://modmedia.blog.gov.uk/2017/01/22/defence-in-the-media-22-january-2017/">were themselves tested successfully</a>, the missile’s failure is a serious problem for the demonstration of credibility aspect of the test. Because of the <a href="http://bbc.in/2joFQOF">high cost of launch</a>, the UK doesn’t get many chances to mount these demonstrations; what’s more, the last successful demonstration, conducted by HMS Vigilant in 2012, was <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/183977/the-silent-deep/">closely observed by both allies and adversaries</a>, particularly because it was expected to be the last such test before the UK government’s “<a href="https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/key-issues-parliament-2015/defence-and-security/trident/">Main Gate</a>” decision to renew the deterrent. </p>
<p>The success of that test and the huge parliamentary majority at the 2016 vote were meant to set a smooth path to renewing the deterrent. Now it’s been established that not just the government but the Prime Minister herself were aware that the Vengeance test had failed, the issue of renewal is suddenly live again.</p>
<p>This isn’t just a domestic matter. While the UK does produce its own warheads, it does not manufacture its own missiles. Under contract from the US Government, defence company Lockheed Martin <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/us/products/trident-ii-d5-fleet-ballistic-missile--fbm-.html">produces the Trident-II D-5 missiles</a>, which are placed into a “common pool” shared by both the UK and US. A missile failure therefore has serious implications for the credibility of the US’s submarine-borne deterrent as well as the UK’s.</p>
<p>Ultimately, though, this is the <a href="http://www.astronautix.com/t/tridentd-5.html">first publicly recorded failure</a> of a Trident-II D-5 missile since 1989, as opposed to the more than 160 successful launches carried out since then. So while <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/5301.html">academics</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/oct/25/command-control-eric-schlosser-review">journalists</a> have rightly drawn attention to safety and security concerns about nuclear weapons, our worries should be taken alongside all the information we have. </p>
<p>Missiles are highly complicated pieces of technology, and we still don’t know why or how this one failed. Without more information, no one should jump to conclusions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71744/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert J Downes receives funding from the John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. The views expressed here are his alone.</span></em></p>Reports of a failed Trident missile launch have all sorts of political and security implications – but they don’t necessarily spell catastrophe.Robert J Downes, MacArthur Fellow in Nuclear Security, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/679832016-11-10T08:17:36Z2016-11-10T08:17:36ZBritain’s needless kick in the teeth for its struggling steel mills<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145225/original/image-20161109-19068-1pnk7zt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C105%2C1595%2C929&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/defenceimages/14419385728/in/photolist-nYc81L-9RgP8D-rPGk72-qGEHTD-L7ubS-eCD6wK-rRsy6h-rc2tyJ-s8Td3C-s6JyBs-s6Jo2E-rRrer3-s92zvV-rc2zyE-s8TgDL-wRkPLt-s6Jkwj-rRroZG-jEbTQ-s92bUx-KSMrW-rRzCmX-s8XYcR-s8Y8Gc-dhoFXW-bTV832-fjiw1U-rce5EH-aDicVL-rcdPVT-9oDaQf-rcehHv-s8w12H-ceJUmj-bXntV6-ceJUf1-eD8mav-bXntNR-ceJU77-FYapF-o79Xeo-eFSkCB-ceJUab-4p7qKp-tzj7d-GmVJV-eFSkFF-GC5BF-mYPgFy-x9hBP8">Defence Images/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It seemed like an easy win. Just as the UK wrestled with the economic fallout from the Brexit vote, the government had a chance to offer a fillip to one of the country’s struggling industries. But alongside news that work on the £41 billion fleet of Trident nuclear submarines would start at <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/10/10/british-steel-could-have-gone-into-trident-subs---but-the-contra/">BAE Systems in Cumbria</a>, came an announcement that France would be providing the steel. Rarely has salt been so liberally applied to an open wound.</p>
<p>Back in July, MPs voted for the renewal of Trident by a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/18/mps-vote-in-favour-of-trident-renewal-nuclear-deterrent">huge majority</a>. The debate included a lengthy discussion of the implications that voting against would have on jobs. Unions came out in <a href="http://www.unitetheunion.org/news/first-glasgow-members-support-industrial-action-ballot/unite-executive-council-statement-on-trident/">favour of renewal</a> given the thousands of jobs and the communities potentially affected in the defence industry, but also up the supply chain to industries like steel. </p>
<p>Members of a parliamentary group which looks at the steel industry explicitly addressed the potential for UK steel if it were used at a recent debate in <a href="https://www.theyworkforyou.com/whall/?id=2016-11-03a.445.0&s=steel+industry#g492.0">Westminster Hall</a>. This came after an earlier statement from Prime Minister Theresa May, during which she assured MPs that it would be used where it presented <a href="https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2016-07-18b.566.2">“good value”</a>. Senior officials from the steelworkers’ union, Community, have argued that using UK steel could have saved <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/trident-submarines-built-french-steel-8980420#ICID=sharebar_twitter">1,000 jobs</a> and helped to reopen the Scunthorpe plate mill which was mothballed in October 2015. </p>
<p>The only glimmer of hope has come from <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/10/08/why-britain---and-bae-systems---must-make-a-success-of-the-41bn/">Ministry of Defence statements</a> claiming that British steel will be used in later stages of the Trident programme</p>
<h2>Pedal to the metal</h2>
<p>There have been some positive developments in the steel industry. Investment firm Greybull Capital acquired the Scunthorpe plant and launched under the name British Steel <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/01/tata-steel-sale-to-greybull-saving-jobs-and-bringing-back-british-steel">in June this year</a>. UK based steel product group Liberty House <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-37486003">reopened the Dalzell plant</a> in Lanarkshire at the end of September, saving a number of the jobs initially affected. In truth, though, the UK steel industry has been in crisis since mid-2015, when Tata Steel announced 720 job losses at their Rotherham plant. Since then, capacity has been taken out and thousands of jobs have been cut along with the closure of the SSI plant in Teeside. </p>
<p>Of course, this reflects a longer trend of employment contraction in the UK steel industry since the 1980s, and following privatisation in 1988. More pressure was clearly piled on by the 2008 financial crisis. Since then, the industry has desperately sought support from the government to address issues such as Chinese dumping of cheap steel, and high energy prices and business rates compared to European rivals. </p>
<p>A coalition of MPs, unions and industry bodies has sought to address the growing crisis with a <a href="http://www.eef.org.uk/uksteel/Representing-our-sector/briefings/uk-steel-action-still-required-of-government.htm">demand for five urgent actions from government</a>. These involved action on anti-dumping, blocking moves to give China <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/572f435e-0784-11e6-9b51-0fb5e65703ce">the status to avoid tariffs on exports</a>, a level playing field on business rates, R&D investment into the sector, and environmental improvements. The <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmbis/546/546.pdf">government also recommended</a> that the National Infrastructure Commission looks closely at procurement of British steel in major domestic construction projects. </p>
<p>Past procurement issues have been highlighted in debates, such as the use of foreign steel for the new Forth Bridge in Scotland and in wind turbine blades. This was characterised as a missed opportunity to support the UK steel industry, and safeguard jobs and related communities. And it isn’t like it can’t happen. The recent award of the steel contract for Hinkley Point nuclear plant to Welsh firm Celsa Steel demonstrates that commitments to local procurement can be achieved.</p>
<p>As parliament wrestled with the UK steel crisis, it was difficult, if not impossible, to find an MP not in agreement with the strategic importance of the industry. Government even championed these new procurement rules whereby decisions must take into consideration the potential impacts on society, jobs and staff safety in the development of major construction projects involving steel.</p>
<p>Specific procurement guidelines now “encourage” government departments to take into account the social impact of competing suppliers. The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/procurement-policy-note-1615-procuring-steel-in-major-projects">policy</a> seems to already be broken. Trident only illustrates that it needs to become mandatory. The main industry body, UK Steel, is urging Greg Clark, the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, to move in this direction.</p>
<h2>Skill sets</h2>
<p>BAE Systems has claimed the French steel represents 0.5% of the whole value of the Trident project, but this still equates to roughly £150m of missed business. While the specific costs and benefits cannot be precisely determined, the steel industry is of national significance. Geographically skewed to industrial areas of the country such as Wales, the Midlands, Yorkshire and the North East, it is responsible for the retention of relatively high-paid, high-skill jobs in areas that are deindustrialising. </p>
<p>When steel plants close or cut capacity, those workers exit employment or are reemployed in lower skilled, lower paid jobs. Economic demand is sucked out of an area and its skill base denuded. The prospect of an economic rebalancing around low pay, low skill, and low value added becomes very real. It has been <a href="http://www.ippr.org/news-and-media/press-releases/lost-jobs-from-steel-crisis-could-cost-uk-government-4-6bn">estimated</a> that typically for every steel worker made redundant, the exchequer loses £10,000 of revenue and welfare costs increase by £10,000. This is in no one’s interest. </p>
<p>As controversial as the Trident project is in many quarters, if it is to go ahead then the decision not to award the contracts for steel to UK producers is bewildering. It seems to reflect an enduring belief in the ability of an unfettered market not to fail. Meaningful industrial strategy requires intervention. If Greg Clark wants credibility for himself and his department, public contracts need to be revisited, procurement protocols made mandatory and an assurance given that a decision such as that around Trident will not be repeated. The history of the European steel industry is one of continual state intervention: nothing has changed other than the economic precipice on which the UK steel industry now finds itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67983/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An industry in crisis needs a government that can deliver help where it’s needed.Chris McLachlan, Senior Lecturer Human Resources, University of HertfordshireIan Greenwood, Associate Professor in Industrial Relations and Human Resource Management, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/626552016-07-19T09:36:18Z2016-07-19T09:36:18ZWhy British politicians find it so hard to vote against nuclear weapons<p>In 1982, Robert Lifton and Richard Falk wrote about the condition of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20750902?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">“nuclearism”</a> – the idea that nuclear weapons can solve our political, strategic and social problems and that they are an essential means of ensuring peace.</p>
<p>This ideology is based on a series of illusions. It rests on the assumption that the use of nuclear weapons can be managed, that their effects can be controlled, and that protection and recovery in a nuclear war are meaningful ideas. Nuclearism thrives despite the absence of compelling evidence about the security benefits of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>It is argued that the nuclear deterrence prevented the Cold War from turning into all out war. But as academic <a href="http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/goodby_shultz_-_the_war_that_must_never_be_fought_-_scribd.pdf">Benoît Pelopidas</a> argues:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The nuclear peace is not a fact. It is a hypothesis trying to link two observable facts: the existence of nuclear weapons in the world since 1945 and the absence of war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the same period. The nuclear peace hypothesis faces the challenge of proving a negative. In these circumstances, faith in the nuclear peace becomes a bet or a matter of trust.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He also reminds us that proxy wars raged throughout the Cold War, regardless of the deterrent, killing several million people.</p>
<h2>A powerful attachment</h2>
<p>Symptoms of nuclearism abound in UK politics, particularly in Westminster. The two main political parties – <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2016/jul/18/trident-debate-renewal-corbyn-may-idealism-as-mps-prepare-for-trident-vote-politics-live">Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn’s opposition</a> is the exception rather the rule – display a deep commitment to retaining nuclear weapons based on a faith in the <a href="http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/trident-renewal-lessons-for-parliament-from-chilcot_3968.html">necessity and reliability of nuclear deterrence</a> for national security. </p>
<p>And sure enough, in the latest opportunity to debate the Trident nuclear weapon system, MPs have voted to push ahead with a like-for-like replacement by 472 votes to 117. The system will be renewed with the procurement of four replacement ballistic missile submarines. Corbyn voted against renewal but was largely defied by his party. Only 47 of its 230 MPs voted with him. </p>
<p>MPs often speak of Trident as the “ultimate insurance” – a guarantee of protection against nuclear strikes. They describe the idea of getting rid of this expensive system as a <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/17/theresa-may-britain-must-renew-trident-because-of-increased-thre/">“reckless gamble”</a> – to use Prime Minister Theresa May’s favoured term.</p>
<p>They speak less openly about it, but MPs also justify Trident replacement in terms the number of jobs that could be lost if Britain relinquished nuclear weapons and how Trident reflects the sort of country Britain thinks it is. The possession of nuclear weapons is bound up with notions of being a major power in global politics and a key player in NATO, resisting Russian aggression. With Trident, the narrative goes, Britain remains the ally of choice for the United States and a force for good in the world.</p>
<p>Together, nuclearism, national identity and the local politics of jobs and industry have kept UK nuclear weapons policy on a path of least resistance towards replacement.</p>
<p>It seems unlikely now that momentum behind replacing Trident will falter. There was a period in 2014 when disillusionment with austerity, the possibility of Scottish independence, and a firmer push against nuclearism by the Liberal Democrats in coalition and Labour under Ed Miliband could have aligned to shift the debate, but that moment has passed – at least for now. </p>
<p>It might return but it will require three developments. First, the UK will need to loosen its attachment to nuclear weapons. This does not mean jettisoning internationalism, but it does mean a shift away from the idea that nuclear weapons are a “requirement” in terms of threats the country faces and how it thinks it should act in the world. Such a shift could be hastened by the negotiation of an <a href="http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/AR06_TREATY_REPORT_27.4.14.pdf">international treaty banning nuclear weapons</a> that has gathered <a href="http://unidir.ilpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/No-1-Synopsis-NR.pdf">significant momentum</a>.</p>
<p>Second, the renewal project’s price tag – currently estimated to be £31bn plus £10bn contingency – <a href="http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/Feeding-monster-April2016.pdf">would also need to be questioned further</a>. That’s possible if Brexit has a lasting impact on GDP, the cost of the Trident replacement project continues to rise, and conventional defence forces <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/17/trident-vote-abstaining-nuclear-submarines">continue to be cut</a>. A decision could be reached that the economy cannot, or should not, bear the weight of another generation of nuclear weaponry, or that the opportunity costs for defence are simply too great. The unions and industry could be placated with the promise of additional nuclear-powered but conventionally-armed attack submarines.</p>
<p>And finally, it will require a change in NATO’s relationship with Russia. Russian military actions over the past few years have been used to justify keeping Trident as a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-case-for-the-retention-of-the-uks-independent-nuclear-deterrent">necessary deterrent</a>. The efficacy of UK nuclear deterrent threats in this context is questionable, but the trope of Russian aggression requiring NATO nuclear resistance is a familiar and superficially appealing one.</p>
<p>Unless and until a mutually acceptable security relationship between NATO and Moscow can be re-established and more firmly institutionalised, invoking the Russian “enemy” will continue to galvanise <a href="http://www.comres.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/SM_IoS_Jan2016_tables.pdf">popular support for Trident</a>.</p>
<h2>Fading hope</h2>
<p>If these changes were realised, they could sufficiently reduce the perceived value of nuclear weapons. However, as time passes, the Trident successor project develops, and sunk costs increase. That makes it less likely that any future government would abandon the project. This is what happened to the incoming New Labour government in 1997, which came to power just as the current Trident system was being completed. It was too late for it to see the point in putting the breaks on even if it had wanted to. </p>
<p>That said, the shadow of the SNP hangs over the entire successor programme. Upgrading Trident is, in effect, a gamble that Scotland will remain in the Union for at least the next few decades. The price of new facilities to host Trident submarines and warheads south of the border in the event of a successful second independence referendum could tip the cost of maintaining the UK’s nuclear weapons enterprise over the edge.</p>
<p>Technological and ideological continuity look set to characterise UK nuclear weapons policy for now. This latest debate saw MPs pass another “decision in principle” and further work is now likely to be authorised.</p>
<p>Disruption to that process will hinge on cost, identity conceptions, Scotland and perhaps an international legal prohibition on nuclear weapons. That’s a tall order, but we shouldn’t stop pushing for debate and change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62655/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Ritchie has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. He his on the Executive Committee of the British Pugwash Group and works closely with NGOs on nuclear disarmament and arms control issues.
</span></em></p>MPs have voted to upgrade Trident, despite the enormous price tag and questions over its utility.Nick Ritchie, Lecturer (International Security), University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/533432016-01-19T14:21:54Z2016-01-19T14:21:54ZExplainer: why Jeremy Corbyn’s ‘third way’ for Trident actually makes sense<p>Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn recently floated the possibility of a “third way” for Britian’s nuclear weapons policy: instead of either complete nuclear disarmament or replacing Trident with a like-for-like system, he has <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jan/17/labours-defence-policy-review-given-third-option-for-trident-stance">suggested</a> building replacement submarines that “don’t have to have nuclear warheads on them”. He has been <a href="http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/politics/6868102/Labour-leader-Jeremy-Corbyn-destroys-final-trace-of-credibility.html">ridiculed</a> in the press – but the idea deserves serious thought.</p>
<p>The practice of nuclear deterrence in the UK has long been associated with having one or more nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines at sea at all times, invulnerable to attack and ready to fire tens of thermonuclear warheads at short notice, each capable of inflicting massive and indiscriminate nuclear devastation. </p>
<p>But this isn’t the only way to think about nuclear deterrence, or the only way the UK can use Trident submarines. Rather than thinking of nuclear deterrence as an all-or-nothing proposition – you either do it this way or you don’t do it all – it’s more accurate to think of it as a spectrum of possible postures. </p>
<p>At one end lies the “maximum deterrence” practiced by the United States during the Cold War. This was based on nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, and tens of thousands of weapons, ranging from nuclear shells for front-line troops to vast fields of inter-continental ballistic missiles. Then comes what the UK, France and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-china-joined-the-nuclear-weapons-club-43500">China</a> currently practice, which is often called “<a href="https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201112_whr_small_nuclear_forces_0.pdf">minimum deterrence</a>” based on smaller numbers and more limited roles. </p>
<p>But there are also strategies of just the sort Corbyn is suggesting. </p>
<h2>Just in case…</h2>
<p>The first of these is the “recessed” or “<a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Nuclear_Weapons_in_A_Transformed_World.html?id=WcgZ00ILrKEC&redir_esc=y">virtual</a>” deterrence, the sort practiced by India through the 1980s and 1990s, which is based on the non-weaponisation of a nascent nuclear weapons capability – a “bomb in the basement” model, where everything is in place to deploy within several weeks or months but not permanently ready to launch. This was seen as enough to deter Pakistan at the time. </p>
<p>The next move along the spectrum goes from non-deployment to non-production of nuclear weapons. This is often used to describe the position of <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/1996/07/01/japan-s-nuclear-future-plutonium-debate-and-east-asian-security">Japan</a>, sometimes <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-brazil-and-argentina-defused-their-nuclear-rivalry-44163">Brazil</a>, and perhaps in the future <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-irans-hardliners-still-threaten-the-nuclear-deal-53236">Iran</a>. This has been called “<a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Earth-Abolition-Stanford-Nuclear-Series/dp/0804737029">weaponless deterrence</a>”, meaning a state has no nuclear weapons or components but has the necessary fissile materials and industrial base to produce nuclear weapons within a year or two.</p>
<p>Taking such a step <a href="http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/Trident_Options.pdf">“down the nuclear ladder”</a> rests on a judgement that UK security no longer requires a permanent and assured capability to inflict nuclear violence upon other countries at short notice. The Cabinet Office investigated some of these different ways of thinking about nuclear deterrence in its 2013 <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/212745/20130716_Trident_Alternatives_Study.pdf">Trident Alternatives Review</a> at the behest of the Liberal Democrats in the coalition government, who never accepted the case for a like-for-like replacement of the Trident system.</p>
<p>The idea of reducing the readiness of nuclear forces, or “de-alerting”, is also part of a package of measures long advocated by non-nuclear-weapon states to diminish the role of nuclear weapons. This includes removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles, as Corbyn has suggested. </p>
<p>There is precedent here. In the 1990s, former CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner advocated a policy of “<a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Caging_the_Nuclear_Genie.html?id=GInbAAAAMAAJ">strategic escrow</a>” – de-alerting US and Russian nuclear weapons by removing warheads from their delivery vehicles and securely storing them some distance away in facilities open to external inspection, so that eventually there would be no nuclear weapons immediately ready to fire. </p>
<p>The US did exactly this with its nuclear-armed <a href="http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/Trident_Options.pdf">Tomahawk cruise missile</a> arsenal for nearly two decades. In 1992 the missiles were withdrawn from operational status, but plans were put in place to enable their redeployment in a crisis. This included periodic certification of a number of submarines in the US’s Pacific and Atlantic fleets to ensure they could deploy and fire the missiles within 30 days of a redeployment decision. The missiles were eventually retired in 2010.</p>
<p>The UK could also do other things with its ballistic missile submarines. Rather than remaining single-purpose, inflexible and enormously expensive nuclear delivery machines, they could be adapted for a host of other military missions. The US did this in the 2000s when it withdrew four of its Trident missile-carrying submarines and <a href="http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/kennedy.html">converted</a> them for conventional war-fighting roles. Most of the Trident missile tubes were converted to accommodate seven Tomahawk cruise missiles each, a huge increase in conventional fire power. The remaining missile tubes were adapted to carry equipment and supplies for special operations forces or to deploy unmanned aerial and undersea vehicles for intelligence gathering. </p>
<p>It would be difficult to quickly and easily re-role UK submarines, but it could be done over a period of time should the government decide that the UK faces a permanent existential nuclear threat (the government accepts it doesn’t now and hasn’t since the early 1990s).</p>
<h2>Not so fast</h2>
<p>So Corbyn’s idea of a third way is hardly without merit. Alternative nuclear postures and conventional roles for Trident’s planned “successor” submarines are certainly possible, ones that reduce the role of nuclear weapons and open up the possibility of further scale-backs. </p>
<p>The real problem is that Corybn has floated the idea mostly to placate the powerful Unite and GMB unions, which represent the manufacturing and engineering jobs at Barrow where the submarines are built, and at Faslane and Devonport where they are maintained. And it hasn’t even achieved that: the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/12105507/GMB-to-oppose-Jeremy-Corbyns-proposal-for-Trident-submarines-without-nuclear-missiles.html">GMB</a> has already said it won’t support it.</p>
<p>More importantly, the fact that Corbyn’s commitment to nuclear disarmament has been ridiculed as retro hard-left fantasy demonstrates just what a powerful cultural grip nuclear weapons have over our politics – this at a time when the vast majority of countries in the world support precisely Corbyn’s nuclear politics. </p>
<p>In fact, 121 countries have recently acceded to the “<a href="http://www.icanw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/HINW14vienna_Pledge_Document.pdf">humanitarian pledge</a>” pioneered by the Austrian government in December 2014 to “fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons” and “stigmatise, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences”. </p>
<p>So there’s actually a perfectly good rationale for Corbyn to stick to his nuclear principles, as Green MP <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/18/trident-weapon-free-jeremy-corbyn-renewing-fleet-warheads-disarmament">Caroline Lucas</a> has urged. He could, instead, propose the UK order more nuclear-powered but not nuclear-armed Astute-class attack submarines, thereby <a href="http://www.centreforum.org/assets/pubs/retiring-trident.pdf">maintaining the much-prized submarine industry</a>. </p>
<p>Of course, such conventional capabilities are designed for just the sort of military interventions to which Corbyn is steadfastly opposed – and that’s another argument altogether.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53343/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Ritchie has received funding from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and the Economic and Social Research Council. He serves on the executive committee of the British Pugwash Group and the Royal United Services Institute's Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) UK and he co-convenes the British International Studies Association's working group on Global Nuclear Order.</span></em></p>Laugh at Jeremy Corbyn all you like, but he’s right: nuclear deterrence isn’t a zero-sum game.Nick Ritchie, Lecturer (International Security), University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/510022015-11-24T14:11:32Z2015-11-24T14:11:32ZPoll says 66% of Labour members support Corbyn – but it’s hard to find a friend in parliament<p>After a barrage of bad press over his position on Trident and his flip-flop over the so-called “shoot-to-kill” policy for armed terrorists, you’d expect Jeremy Corbyn’s stock to be sinking fast, even among the most starry eyed of the “Jez-we-can” supporters who voted him in as leader of the Labour party in September. But a new <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/article4622011.ece">YouGov poll reported in The Times</a> has found that Corbyn enjoys the support of 66% of party members, a remarkable rise of seven points over the 59% who supported him at the leadership vote.</p>
<p>But his parliamentary colleagues aren’t as enthusiastic, to say the least, and his authority on the opposition benches will be sorely tested in coming days. First the party must respond to the government’s plans on defence spending and, within a matter of days, he and his team must also craft an effective response to the chancellor of the exchequer’s autumn statement. </p>
<p>To make matters even more tricky for Labour, the government will present new proposals to parliament on how to tackle the threat from Islamic State that may involve plans to extend the air campaign against the group from Iraq into Syria. </p>
<p>On all of these issues, the <a href="http://www.organizedrage.com/2015/07/interview-with-labour-party-leadership.html">broadly pacifist instincts of Corbyn</a> and his grassroots supporters are at odds with what his colleagues in the Parliamentary Labour Party feel is a more belligerent mood in the country. And the as the uneasy truce between the two sides begins visibly to break down, the Labour Party finds itself in a Mexican stand-off that could end very badly for all involved.</p>
<h2>Treble trouble</h2>
<p>Labour’s troubles are threefold. The first and most obvious source of conflict is ideological. Ever since World War I, when the the likes of the UK Labour Party, the Australian Labor Party and the German Social Democratic Party <a href="http://www.youngfabians.org.uk/labour_and_the_first_world_war">split over the slaughter in the trenches</a>, left-of-centre parties have been divided between a principled pacifist wing and what has normally been a majority prepared to back military force when considered necessary. </p>
<p>As I <a href="https://theconversation.com/plenty-for-labours-new-recruits-but-corbyn-speech-was-no-vote-winner-48290">have written here</a> questions of defence, and in particular the future of the Trident nuclear deterrent, have the potential to split Labour. Corbyn’s recent remarks, in which he undermined Labour policy by stating that <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2015/09/jeremy-corbyn-says-he-would-never-push-button-trident">he would never sanction a nuclear strike</a>, and more recently when he changed his mind over the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34840708">so-called “shoot-to-kill”</a> policy in the event of a potential Paris-style attack in the UK, have deeply angered many members of the parliamentary group.</p>
<p>The second problem is one of competence. Given that they have spent their careers on the backbenches, it is no surprise that left wingers like Corbyn and John McDonnell lack experience in managing the news cycle across a range of complex policy areas and ensuring that colleagues are all singing from the same hymn sheet. </p>
<p>It is a little more surprising to see colleagues such as Diane Abbott and Ken Livingstone, both of whom have more experience of running things, shooting from the hip as they have done in recent weeks. In the month since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-a-spin-why-seumas-milne-is-the-wrong-spokesman-for-jeremy-corbyn-49621">controversial appointment of Seamus Milne</a> as Corbyn’s head of communications things have, if anything, deteriorated further. In a private exchange, a Labour insider recently likened the party to a novelty advent calendar, in which every day the British public can open a new door to reveal a fresh calamity, an instance of surreal posturing, or just an example of rank incompetence. </p>
<p>The third problem, however, does not lie with Corbyn and his supporters but rather with some of his parliamentary opponents. For whether they like it or not, Corbyn is the democratically elected leader of the Labour Party and enjoys the support of the majority of the membership. If he were to be removed by parliamentary colleagues against the wishes of ordinary members there would be civil war.</p>
<h2>Problem of discipline</h2>
<p>No potential successor, such as Chuka Umunna or Dan Jarvis, would want to take over in such disarray. At the same time, no serious political party can tolerate the kind of sniping from the wings and briefings against the leader that we are currently seeing and still remain credible with the voters. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, Corbyn and his supporters appear to be unwilling to discipline the worst offenders (for example the MP Simon Danczuk) for fear of appearing to carry out a sectarian purge of the Labour right. At present all involved in Labour’s Mexican stand-off have a gun pointed directly at their own feet.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"665959284690305024"}"></div></p>
<p>So where does Labour go from here? Corbyn’s leadership is not drinking in the last-chance saloon just yet, but a failure to perform convincingly in the defence debate could be deeply damaging. And, even if he does manage to cobble together a compromise on the broad parameters of Britain’s defence, the question of Trident remains unresolved and seemingly intractable. </p>
<p>In an effort to avoid conflict, Corbyn has put the Trident issue out to internal review – but the clock is ticking. The government plans to bring the issue to parliament before the end of the year and there is no sign that Labour will be able or willing to present a united front in one of the most important strategic debates of our time.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51002/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Lees is a member of the Labour Party.</span></em></p>Corbyn can’t replicate his wider popularity among MPs. Will it cost him?Charles Lees, Professor of Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/504342015-11-12T15:08:48Z2015-11-12T15:08:48ZTrident and why military chiefs should stay out of politics<p>A spat has broken out in the UK about whether leading members of the military should speak out on political matters. Appearing on a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2015/nov/09/general-houghton-would-be-worried-jeremy-corbyns-views-translated-power-trident-video">BBC politics programme</a>, Nicholas Houghton, chief of the defence staff, was asked about what it would mean if a British leader was explicitly opposed to nuclear weapons and whether such a position would effectively make the nuclear deterrent pointless.</p>
<p>The British nuclear deterrent can hardly have been a surprise topic of discussion when Houghton began his interview with presenter Andrew Marr. The election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the Labour Party has brought the subject back to the fore. Corbyn, a life-long member of the <a href="http://www.cnduk.org/">Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</a>, has repeatedly signalled his desire to change his party’s defence policy. He would like to abandon plans to replace the current force of submarines carrying ballistic missiles with a new non-nuclear fleet. </p>
<p>Houghton’s comments and Corbyn’s response might initially be construed as little more than a storm in a teacup – but, in fact, they reflect the increased politicisation of the UK’s senior officer corps, a trend has been emerging for more than a decade. </p>
<p>Houghton knows about the constitutional convention that military leaders do not enter the political arena. He would, therefore, have been prepared to walk on egg shells if this topic came up – and his initial answers on deterrence theory were factual and appropriate given his position. However, he crossed the line when discussing whether deterrence would be undermined if a political leader said they would never press the nuclear button.</p>
<p>Houghton suggested that he would be “worried” if “that thought were translated into power”. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34759626">He added</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The whole thing about deterrence rests on the credibility of its use …
If a prime minister said they would never press the nuclear button the deterrent is then completely undermined.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Corbyn has called on the government to <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/foreign-and-defence/articles/story/jeremy-corbyn-hits-back-defence-chief-trident-row">investigate</a>, accusing Houghton of undermining democracy and of political interference. Meanwhile the prime minister, David Cameron, is backing Houghton, as is <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/ex-navy-chief-lord-west-threatens-to-quit-labour-over-jeremy-corbyns-vow-to-scrap-trident-a6726841.html">Alan West</a>, a Labour peer and former head of the navy.</p>
<h2>The bigger problem</h2>
<p>Corbyn’s reaction shows him to be an overly sensitive unilateralist and Houghton’s remarks are sure to be soon forgotten. But this incident is indicative of something more enduring – the increasing politicisation of the UK’s officer corps.</p>
<p>Since the early 1990, the armed services have had an increasingly powerful voice within the Ministry of Defence. In operations from <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/bosnia-and-herzegovina">Bosnia</a> in the early 1990s to <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/libya">Libya</a> in 2011 the military has increasingly become involved in defining the political goals and measures – taking control away from the civil service.</p>
<p>One example of this – easy to identify because the soldier in question, Brigadier David Richards, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/oct/24/taking-command-review-general-david-richards">wrote about it in his autobiography, Taking Command,</a> – is the way Richards made the unilateral decision to turn what had been strictly a humanitarian and peacekeeping intervention into a military operation without recourse to Whitehall.</p>
<p>This shift has partly come as a result of a lack of ministerial lead but it is also a reflection of an institutional requirement to have control. Richards, who went on to become chief of the defence staff, is <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10185613/A-last-salvo-from-General-Sir-David-Richards.html">quite open</a> about seeking to set the political agenda and engage in politics.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I am very clear in my military advice to the government that we need to understand what the political objective is before we recommend what military effort and forces should be applied to it.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Then of course there is the presence of retired officers in parliament. A number have been elected to sit on both government and opposition benches. In the Lords, however, the convention has been that all Houghton’s predecessors as chiefs of the defence staff have sat as cross-benchers with no overt party affiliation.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101292/original/image-20151109-29321-ysbnfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101292/original/image-20151109-29321-ysbnfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101292/original/image-20151109-29321-ysbnfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101292/original/image-20151109-29321-ysbnfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101292/original/image-20151109-29321-ysbnfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101292/original/image-20151109-29321-ysbnfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101292/original/image-20151109-29321-ysbnfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nick Houghton.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ministry of Defence</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This changed during the last Labour government’s time in office, when two former single service chiefs affiliated themselves with political parties in the House of Lords. West was the first, becoming a Labour lord and later a <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1575848/Telegraph-profile-Admiral-Lord-West.html">government minister</a>. Then <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/richard-dannatt">Richard Dannatt</a> adopted the Conservative whip. Both have been very outspoken and highly critical of each other’s parties and both have complained that they were not listened to when serving as head of the armed forces.</p>
<p>Outside parliament, retired military officers are much more often found campaigning for particular interest groups than they used to be. They can be heard offering their views on the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/patrick-cockburn-the-army-wont-face-the-truth-about-afghanistan-and-iraq-2377747.html">failures of Britain’s campaigns</a> in Iraq and Afghanistan, generally pointing fingers at the government rather than the armed forces. This largely uncontested discourse has enabled a variety of myths to emerge, such as the idea that the cuts made in the 2010 defence and security review meant the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16812442">Falklands could not be retaken</a> if Argentina were to occupy them.</p>
<p>In questioning whether Houghton crossed the line between military matters and politics, Corbyn has raised an issue at the very heart of British democracy. Whatever one might think of Tony Blair and the Labour leadership at the time, it can only be hoped that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-chilcot-inquiry-has-taken-so-long-and-why-we-should-wait-to-judge-it-46766">Chilcot Inquiry</a> will also seek to highlight the culpability of Britain’s senior military leadership in the planning for and conduct of wars. If it did, the British military might learn to be far more circumspect.</p>
<p>But this is unlikely. The rise of the political general, with his presumption that only he really understands strategy and can think both militarily and politically, is deeply disturbing.</p>
<p>Now is an apposite time to cull the growing ranks of the senior officer core and for civil servants to have power restored to them. If the House of Lords is to be <a href="http://www.sunnation.co.uk/pm-open-to-calls-to-cull-peers-from-house-of-lords/">culled</a>, perhaps a good start would be with those retired generals and admirals who have accepted the party whip.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50434/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Mark Dorman is the Commissioning Editor of the journal International Affairs which is closely linked with the think-tank Chatham House.</span></em></p>British chief of defence staff did cross the line when discussing the nuclear option.Andrew Mark Dorman, Professor of International Security, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/485532015-10-14T05:28:25Z2015-10-14T05:28:25ZAll at sea: making sense of the UK’s muddled nuclear policy<p>The chancellor of the exchequer, George Osborne, has recently been waving huge wads of cash at different (but similarly delinquent) parts of UK nuclear policy. In August, he sailed triumphantly up the Clyde to the Trident-hosting Faslane Naval base to announce <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/aug/31/faslane-naval-base-clyde-500m-jobs-george-osborne">£500m of investment</a>. This was a move many considered to be jumping the gun, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/georgeosborne/11834734/George-Osborne-denies-jumping-the-gun-over-Trident.html">or even “arrogant”</a> given that no final decision has been made on its renewal. </p>
<p>A few weeks later, on his tour of China, Osborne was announcing <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/energy/11878566/Hinkley-Point-new-nuclear-plant-edges-closer-with-2-billion-Government-guarantee.html">an astonishing £2 billion loan guarantee</a> to city investors if the developers of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-the-hinkley-c-nuclear-deal-looks-astonishing-thats-because-it-is-47947">Hinkley C reactor</a> go bust. And this is additional to a <a href="http://news.sky.com/story/1157272/hinkley-point-nuclear-plant-deal-to-go-ahead">guaranteed strike price of £92.50 per megawatt hour</a> for 35 years (roughly double the current price of electricity – and <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/407059/Contracts_for_Difference_-_Auction_Results_-_Official_Statistics.pdf">significantly more than the current strike price for several renewables</a>). As <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/23/hinkley-point-squandermania-george-osborne-china">Simon Jenkins writes</a> in relation to the chancellor’s recent announcements: “You can accuse George Osborne of many things, but austerity isn’t one of them”.</p>
<h2>No laughing matter</h2>
<p>It has got to the point with Hinkley C where one must wonder how Osborne, the secretary of state for Energy and Climate Change, Amber Rudd and the chief executive of EDF, Vincent de Rivaz, manage to keep straight faces while repeating what a good deal the project will be for everybody. The French state-owned energy firm EDF is due to partner with the Chinese under the deal <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/sep/25/george-osborne-presses-on-with-hinkley-power-station-despite-criticism">announced by Osborne</a> in Beijing, and Rivaz’s boss, Jean-Bernard Levy, has admitted that the Chinese state is the only investor that can be <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/only-china-wants-to-invest-in-britains-new-2bn-hinkley-point-nuclear-plant-because-no-one-else-10513752.html">persuaded that the project is viable</a>. </p>
<p>Even this is only possible, with still-secret commitments that the Chinese can then build <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33092379">their own further nuclear power stations in the UK</a>. Indeed, there is now <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/damian-carrington-blog/2015/sep/21/hinkley-point-nuclear-station-enemies">virtually no commentator in the British media</a>, or elsewhere, who seriously considers the Hinkley C project to be a sensible idea. As the <a href="http://new.spectator.co.uk/2014/02/why-has-britain-signed-up-for-the-worlds-most-expensive-power-station/">most expensive nuclear power station ever built</a>, left and right are united in recognising it as one of the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/23/hinkley-point-squandermania-george-osborne-china">worst infrastructure project decisions in British history</a>. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/dec/16/greenpolitics.environment">Experts formerly claiming nuclear to be a “necessity”</a> now <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/energy/nuclearpower/11244499/Nuclear-power-may-not-be-needed-says-top-atomic-advocate.html">seem to have realised</a> that other low-carbon pathways are not only possible, <a href="http://www.theecologist.org/blogs_and_comments/commentators/2985547/shame_upon_them_the_governments_nuclear_lies_exposed.html">but manifestly more attractive</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=318&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=318&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=318&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Off the grid. Power games.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nayukim/5704133786/in/photolist-9G4bff-8fB3n1-7fPcNv-6hxGTB-dDhLgN-dMa93K-6f4tHd-6ujT2p-exjV6s-e6dsaa-6xcXpM-jGQXWA-5AvSJX-eAj9Hi-wNG4wT-aiigho-6YuaPm-az4yEU-56aTUt-7mpwpq-4drMr4-6H5j8H-unXgdr-qaR3J-dGymt1-Bh48K-7LoPYX-rebJBm-qjKuiC-2tkDrw-6j6GCU-aERAyd-7g6wZH-mT4QF-62sb1b-tDMLSG-DnExC-87bmts-2Ns44B-5sPkjb-ax47SF-bjoEkR-4S8cbC-ftqfCt-6Pdhim-yxi2xG-6jbgEq-2tkMyd-BkQGQ-9QZckg">Nayu Kim</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>British journalists who were noisily <a href="http://www.monbiot.com/2012/10/09/the-heart-of-the-matter/">insisting people were wrong</a> to protest against Hinkley C are now themselves <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/18/we-are-pro-nuclear-but-hinkley-c-must-be-scrapped">equally vociferously arguing</a> against the power station. As support for renewables are cut and commitments to Hinkley remain, international observers <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/22/al-gore-puzzled-by-ukcuts-to-renewable-energy-support">look on in wonder at UK energy policy</a> – but for all the wrong reasons. </p>
<p>It seems a sorry end for the <a href="https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/sussexenergygroup/2015/02/17/the-politics-of-the-uk-nuclear-renaissance/">unusual partisan attachment</a> that the UK government has shown for new nuclear since 2008. With all the <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/85470214/Letter-to-David-Cameron-on-nuclear-power">efforts of orchestrated pro-nuclear advocacy</a> – <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2011/jun/15/italy-nuclear-referendum">lambasting anyone</a> daring to depart from complete ideological commitment to new nuclear – it might be expected that nuclear plans would be looking more secure. But the main aims now seem to be <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/18/nuclear-environmentalists-scrap-hinkley-c-plans">blame management</a> and <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/c9e9fe1e-604c-11e5-a28b-50226830d644,Authorised=false.html?siteedition=uk&_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2Fc9e9fe1e-604c-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html%3Fsiteedition%3Duk&_i_referer=&classification=conditional_standard&iab=barrier-app#axzz3nJQv5ZzR">saving face</a>.</p>
<h2>Route map</h2>
<p>Never plausible to anyone recalling past episodes of nuclear enthusiasm, the latest bout of zeal for a “nuclear renaissance” has now lost all credibility. With global investments in renewable electricity two years ago <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-14/fossil-fuels-just-lost-the-race-against-renewables">overtaking those in all fossil fuel generation put together</a>, the direction of change is clear. <a href="http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_RE_Power_Costs_2014_report.pdf">Numerous</a> <a href="http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/Flagship-Projects/Global-Energy-Assessment/GEA-Summary-web.pdf">international assessments</a> show renewables are already price-competitive even with optimistic costings for new nuclear. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Panel beaters. Renewables are outpacing nuclear.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/126337375@N05/15986041648/in/photolist-33fGbC-goDsq4-a8779z-zpfY7D-99MMwG-9QUEgj-a89Zsh-qmCDeJ-rzeVyL-qmM3ic-uWtVef-9QUEJ7-8Wid58-cDri8b-uXZC2x-b89YkF-m5fNmZ-m5gzW7-9QUEqw-9QRPdv-9QRPic-9QUEmu-9QRNWP-9QUE8W-a877h4-9QUECf-uWtYbh-uWtUPY-uWtXNJ-uEvv9R-uXeqta-uWXYFx-u17Hcg-uEo4kQ-uWXV5z-u17HBe-uEnT99-u17HPP-uEvAFH-tZX2UC-uEo3a3-dbg82N-vrJry5-v9rpuS-qM3sRp">BELECTRIC UK</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite better nuclear engineering and a worse renewable resource, <a href="https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=2015-18-swps-johnston-stirling.pdf&site=25">developments in Germany reinforce the picture</a>. Even in the UK, where official analysis tends to remain <a href="http://www.michaelmeacher.info/weblog/2011/04/how-is-this-nuclear-obsession-explained/">eccentrically romantic about nuclear</a>, the picture has long been clear for anyone with an open mind. As early as <a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.berr.gov.uk/files/file10719.pdf">2003</a> the most detailed energy white paper for decades found nuclear power “unattractive” – before being overturned by a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272376/6887.pdf">cursory revision</a> that was itself rejected by <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/new-nuclear-power-plans-unlawful-452507">judicial review for being too superficial</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://infrastructure.planninginspectorate.gov.uk/wp-content/ipc/uploads/projects/EN010049/2.%20Post-Submission/Representations/ExA%20Questions/Round%201/Responses/2.1.2%20Poyry%20Report.pdf">Specialist analyses</a> for the UK government – of kinds that the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2015-07-13/6774/">has resisted making public</a> – repeatedly find many renewables to offer better value than new nuclear. This is borne out in the <a href="http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2015/02/uk-renewables-auction-pushes-down-costs/">government’s own data for electricity contracts</a>. And, for any project with such a long lifetime, perhaps even more damning is that <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/db44f166-d927-11e4-b907-00144feab7de.html#axzz3nJQv5ZzR">renewable costs keep dropping</a>, while <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/08/hinkley-point-european-commission-nuclear-power-station-somerset">nuclear costs keep rising</a>.</p>
<p>So it is an understatement to say it is odd that DECC is cutting support for <a href="http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2015/07/decc-amber-rudd-reduces-subsidies-for-renewable-energy/">onshore wind, solar power</a> and <a href="http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2411785/energy-efficiency-support-faces-gbp40m-cuts-as-decc-trims-budget">ending support for home energy efficiency</a> – while unswervingly staying committed to extortionate new nuclear power. Former minister for energy, Ed Davey, puts it bluntly:</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://twitter.com/edwardjdavey">Twitter</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For Davey, the only explanation can be one of partisan commitment by Osborne – because <a href="https://twitter.com/TimPBouverie/status/645971907695804416">“he just wanted a nuclear power plant”</a>. It is sure that Osborne <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2011/jun/15/italy-nuclear-referendum">is no environmentalist</a>. With so much nuclear work contracted abroad and UK employment allowed to haemorrhage in other sectors – for instance in <a href="http://www.gazettelive.co.uk/business/business-news/osbornes-low-watt-indifference-failed-10154181">steel</a> and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/27/slashing-household-solar-subsides-kill-off-industry-government-feed-in-tariff">solar power</a> – it doesn’t seem Osborne is motivated by jobs. </p>
<p>Attracting Chinese infrastructure investment may play a role, but the realities make it clear there are many more economically promising alternatives than nuclear. And encouraging Chinese involvement in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/serious-issues-for-george-osborne-on-chinas-role-in-the-uks-nuclear-future-48541">technology with such grave national security implications</a> further compounds the oddity. George Osborne’s nuclear obsession really does require some kind of explanation.</p>
<h2>‘Deep state’</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/aug/07/shining-a-light-on-britains-nuclear-state">As we have explored elsewhere</a>, perhaps the best clue lies in Osborne’s trip up the Clyde to Faslane; maybe the real commitment here is to maintaining Britain’s nuclear arsenal. Amid the clamour of the recent China visit, it was also announced that <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34342784">a big slice of Hinkley contracts would go to Rolls Royce</a> – the makers of Britain’s nuclear submarine reactors. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">HMS Vigilant returns to port.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/defenceimages/14419385728/in/photolist-nYc81L-tcz62k-5EE7UC-evC8Kz-s99WjK-s99WZn-rcmy8z-rPQ2QT-s6S2AJ-rRyCS7-rRGQVF-rc9Wd1-s99WaM-s99WCv-rcmxi8-9oNtW6-5FdFB8-jEbTQ-qBite-9ab9pK-9xGrka-qBkbE-qBkcd-qBits-qBfRR-qBisZ-qBisU-eoigDM-eoih3T-23fm5q-yrqGKS-5EnLjR-3fTs2u-5EzPc2-9NEnS2-o7tgZe-o79Xeo-o2HyZT-5EzPiT-5EzPnr-qBitg-qBfRo-qBfRs-qBfRM-qBkbw-qBfRF-qBkc1-qBkbN-qBfRx-qBitk">Defence Images</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
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<p>The calculation seems to be, that trickle-down from foreign power reactor manufacturers may be just enough to sustain a national industrial capability sufficient to continue the nuclear-armed status that current debates remind is so <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/04/09/uk-britain-election-nuclear-idUKKBN0N00HO20150409">emotively cherished both by Tories</a> and at the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11839043/The-case-for-renewing-Trident-is-irrefutable.html">top of Labour</a>. There are <a href="http://steps-centre.org/author/philj/">tantalising signs</a> that this lay behind the strange reversal in nuclear white papers mentioned above. If this is not at the bottom of Osborne’s mind, it is difficult to know what is.</p>
<p>If so, the implications for the health of UK politics are extremely serious. The Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Party is <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/01/trident-corbyn-shadow-cabinet-labour">raising these issues anew</a>. All sides are limbering up for the coming argument over Trident. But if the above analysis is true, then massive financial pre-commitments are being made (<a href="http://www.robedwards.com/2014/11/revealed-westminsters-37-million-us-deal-for-trident-missile-launchers.html">and some already firmly in place</a>) on an unprecedented scale, that risk effectively locking in a decision before the process of making it has ostensibly begun. </p>
<p>With mainstream press reports of senior British Army figures <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/british-army-could-stage-mutiny-under-corbyn-says-senior-serving-general-10509742.html">mooting mutiny under a Corbyn government</a>, this carries more than a whiff of something akin to an unaccountable British <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/anthony-barnett/is-there-uk-deep-state">“deep state”</a>. For anyone who cares about <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-germany-is-dumping-nuclear-power-and-britain-isnt-46359">democracy</a> – whatever their views on nuclear power or nuclear weapons – now is the moment to ask some searching questions about what nuclear policy is doing to British politics. And there seems no-one better to ask than Osborne.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48553/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Johnstone receives funding from The ESRC and works at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University of Sussex. Phil is also a member of the Nuclear Consulting Group. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andy Stirling receives funding from the ESRC for research on this topic. Alongside many other commitments (including advisory roles for the UK Government on energy and other technology policy issues and for the nuclear industry on energy diversity), he has worked in the past for Greenpeace International and currently serves (unpaid) on the board of Greenpeace UK.</span></em></p>Is George Osborne deploying the ‘Deep State’ to secure a long-term nuclear arsenal for Britain?Philip Johnstone, Research Fellow, SPRU, University of Sussex Business School, University of SussexAndy Stirling, Professor of Science & Technology Policy and co-director of the ESRC STEPS Centre, University of Sussex Business School, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/473262015-09-14T14:42:00Z2015-09-14T14:42:00ZBritish socialism is back – but what does Jeremy Corbyn becoming Labour leader mean for the rest of the world?<p>The British Labour Party has a new leader in the form of Jeremy Corbyn – a left-wing politician who has spent more than 30 years rebelling against the party line.</p>
<p>Corbyn has some particularly controversial views on foreign policy issues and his win was described by British prime minister David Cameron, a Conservative, as a “<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/09/14/david-cameron-jeremy-corbyn-labour-party-twitter_n_8131880.html?1442211041">threat to our national security</a>”.</p>
<p>The congratulations sent to Corbyn (over Twitter, of course) by the Argentinian president, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, were a reminder of just how contrary Corbyn can be.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"642729245266046976"}"></div></p>
<p>He is a <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-hailed-by-argentinian-president-cristina-fernandez-de-kirchner-as-a-great-friend-of-latin-america-following-leadership-win-10498662.html">supporter</a> of joint-governance in the Falklands Islands, or Las Malvinas, which the two countries fought a war over in 1982. This is where he stands on some other key foreign policy issues:</p>
<h2>Europe</h2>
<p>With a referendum on European Union membership expected by <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/uk-confirms-eu-referendum-held-2017-150528031525030.html">2017</a>, Corbyn’s views on this matter are crucial to his leadership. The prevailing view is that the UK will probably vote to remain inside the EU, but that depends on many things.</p>
<p>Corbyn has indicated that he voted <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/11859648/Jeremy-Corbyn-admits-he-voted-for-Britain-to-leave-Europe-in-1975.html">against</a> British membership of the what was the European Community in 1975, the last time a referendum was held on the issue. There is no indication that he has had a change of heart. He has not specifically outlined his views on the EU during the campaign but it is believed that he is still a euro-sceptic.</p>
<p>Hilary Benn, shadow foreign secretary in Corbyn’s team, has <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6391bae2-5ab3-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz3liotbHu6">indicated</a> that the party will support continued EU membership in the referendum, but the party position does not necessarily constrain Corbyn if he wishes to personally back the campaign to exit the union.</p>
<p>This might not be a comfortable position for Corbyn, due to the prominent role of Nigel Farage, leader of the right-wing UK Independence Party, which wants Britain out of the EU. But these strange bedfellows may well be forced to work together if they wish to win the argument.</p>
<p>Many international partners, such as France, Germany and the US, see the UK’s membership of the EU as vital, so Corbyn will not make friends in these quarters if he continues along the same path.</p>
<h2>NATO</h2>
<p>NATO constitutes the cornerstone of British foreign policy – its commitment to the alliance remains undiminished 60 years after its inception.</p>
<p>However, some left-wingers within the Labour party, including Corbyn, <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/jeremy-corbyn-snaps-liz-kendall-6331863">argue</a> that NATO is an outdated organisation, a relic from the Cold War which limits the ability of nations to have meaningful relationships with Russia.</p>
<p>While Tom Watson, the new Labour deputy leader, has already indicated his <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-already-at-odds-with-deputy-tom-watson-over-trident-nato-and-the-eu-10499194.html">support</a> for NATO, Corbyn will find it very difficult to abandon his existing position. If he became prime minister, it seems likely that he would <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/Jeremy_Corbyn/11843949/Jeremy-Corbyns-views-on-Army-completely-irresponsible-former-Labour-minister-says.html">reduce funding</a> on defence spending below the 2% floor set by NATO. This would reduce the UK role within the organisation if not officially removing it from membership altogether. Such a move would surely downgrade the UK’s international position.</p>
<h2>Syria</h2>
<p>Cameron has made it clear that he wants to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jul/19/david-cameron-syria-isis-air-strikes">extend</a> the British bombing campaign against Islamic State beyond Iraq into Syria. He argues that to bomb the organisation in Iraq but not Syria is strategically illiterate and the issue is to be revisited within the House of Commons.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94673/original/image-20150914-4680-o60034.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94673/original/image-20150914-4680-o60034.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94673/original/image-20150914-4680-o60034.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94673/original/image-20150914-4680-o60034.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94673/original/image-20150914-4680-o60034.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94673/original/image-20150914-4680-o60034.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94673/original/image-20150914-4680-o60034.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Jeremy Corbyn at the front of the Stop Bombing Gaza Demonstration, Summer 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/theweeklybull/14693369555/">Flickr/The Weekly Bull</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
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<p>As a pacifist, Corbyn will never back any plans for military action in Syria. In reference to other political hot spots, such as the Palestinian territories, he has suggested that <a href="http://stopwar.org.uk/news/jeremy-corbyn-why-i-support-the-international-campaign-for-palestinian-human-rights">dialogue</a> is the way to ensure peace and it seems likely that he could suggest something similar in this instance rather than military action.</p>
<p>This will put him at odds with many members of his own party. Elements of the Labour party believe tackling Islamic State is the only way to stem the flow of displaced people from the region and reduce the terrible human cost of war.</p>
<p>Corbyn’s pacifism makes a compromise on this issue unlikely but such a stance by a British prime minister would undermine the so-called special relationship between the UK and the US.</p>
<h2>Nuclear weapons</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/trident-debate-there-are-16000-nuclear-missiles-in-the-world---but-who-has-them-and-does-britain-really-need-its-own-arsenal-10164387.html">Trident nuclear programme</a> is nearing the end of its life and plans for the future need to be agreed within the next two years.</p>
<p>Like many on the left, including the <a href="http://www.snp.org/media-centre/news/2015/apr/trident-unusable-and-indefensible">Scottish National Party</a>, Corbyn is <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/jeremy-corbyn-plans-uk-nuclear-disarmament-70-years-hiroshima">opposed</a> to nuclear weapons. He believes it would be better for the UK to lead by example by scrapping the nuclear deterrent at the end of its life, if not before.</p>
<p>This is a tricky issue for the Labour Party, especially considering it was <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6448173.stm">Tony Blair</a> who opened talks on replacing Trident when he was prime minister. For him, the weapons system was essential for the UK.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94671/original/image-20150914-4698-1jqz4zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94671/original/image-20150914-4698-1jqz4zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94671/original/image-20150914-4698-1jqz4zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94671/original/image-20150914-4698-1jqz4zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94671/original/image-20150914-4698-1jqz4zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94671/original/image-20150914-4698-1jqz4zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94671/original/image-20150914-4698-1jqz4zl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Corbyn addresses a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament protest.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/theweeklybull/16969795658/">Flickr/The Weekly Bull</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
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<p>Corbyn is extremely unlikely to compromise on this issue, as nuclear disarmament is a touchstone for the left, as well as being a strongly held personal belief. Were the UK to decommission Trident or fail to replace it, this would devalue the country’s international position and perhaps exclude it from important negotiations on wider nuclear disarmament, as well as bringing into question the UK’s permanent seat on the <a href="http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/concoughlin/100001565/getting-rid-of-trident-will-make-britain-a-third-rate-power/">UN Security Council</a>. </p>
<h2>US-UK relations</h2>
<p>The importance of Britain’s special relationship with the US is without question. Successive prime ministers have tried hard to build strong relationships with US presidents to ensure that ties between the two nations remain strong and able to weather the storms which batter it from time to time (such as the Iraq war)</p>
<p>Corbyn is not anti-American, but he does appear to believe that the US-UK relationship is damaging. He believes it forces the UK to undertake action which is not in its best <a href="http://www.stopwar.org.uk/news/iraq-crisis-shows-it-s-time-for-uk-to-cut-free-from-us-and-nato-war-policies-says-jeremy-corbyn-mp">interests</a> (such as intervention in Libya) and that it limits the country’s ability to have meaningful international relationships with nations such as Russia.</p>
<p>Were Corbyn to become prime minister, it seems very likely that he would reduce contact with the US and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labour-leadership-jeremy-corbyn-hints-at-warmer-relations-with-russia-10449856.html">increase</a> contact with Russia, with unknown results.</p>
<p>Jeremy Corbyn has only just been elected as leader of the opposition so many questions remain unanswered. Over coming next days and weeks, we will see if he is willing to compromise on his previously held views. It should be noted that these views have often made him an enemy of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33619645">previous party leaders</a> but he has unflinchingly remained committed to them, rebelling against his party line more than <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34184265">500 times</a> while a backbench MP.</p>
<p>While leadership often calls for compromise, it seems likely that Corbyn will be unwilling – and in some cases unable – to give ground on these key foreign policy issues. That said, it’s also worth remembering that he isn’t prime minister – just leader of an increasingly splintered Labour party.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47326/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Victoria Honeyman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With strong views on NATO and the EU, the new leader of the opposition is bound to ruffle feathers abroad.Victoria Honeyman, Lecturer in British Politics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/441022015-07-06T05:14:16Z2015-07-06T05:14:16ZWhy the military is divided over Britain’s nuclear deterrent<p>One thing was very striking at the recent Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) <a href="https://www.rusi.org/landwarfare">Land Warfare Conference</a>, where current British Army personnel including top brass and Ministry of Defence officials were heavily present. The issue of replacing Trident, the UK’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, was not discussed at all. </p>
<p>This conference was taking place a few months ahead of Conservative plans to renew the deterrent like for like. This was <a href="https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf">guaranteed by</a> the party’s victory at the general election in May, and has since <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm150608/debtext/150608-0001.htm">been reaffirmed</a> by Michael Fallon, the defence secretary.</p>
<p>Yet when it comes to Trident, the British military are “split on this issue as never before”. That was the conclusion of a <a href="http://www.nuclearinfo.org/sites/default/files/Military%20attitudes%20to%20nuclear%20weapons%20-%20full%20report.pdf">report</a> by the Nuclear Education Trust and Nuclear Information Service that was published at the end of June. So why the difference in views?</p>
<h2>The need for UK nuclear weapons</h2>
<p>Admittedly the report tends to emphasise the minority views in the data, coming from one organisation whose fundamental goal is to “make nuclear issues accessible to all regardless of age and ability” (Nuclear Education Trust) and another that is dedicated to disarmament (Nuclear Information Service). It also represents a mere snapshot of the views of mainly ex-military personnel based on 35 in-depth interviews. That said, it undoubtedly offers an insight into the variety of views on Trident that exist within UK defence circles. </p>
<p>It will be no surprise that most interviewees favoured UK nuclear weapons and replacing Trident. And those who demonstrated concerns were not opposed per se, but raised issues of costs and effectiveness. What was interesting, and may shed light on the silence at the RUSI conference, is that the majority of military personnel interviewed had “little interest in Trident” at all. </p>
<p>The report noted that army personnel are the “least supportive” as they have the “least to gain” in contrast to the Royal Navy, which feels Trident justifies its claim as the senior service responsible for the strategic defence of the United Kingdom. These grievances (some may call it tribalism) should presumably be understood in terms of materials and priorities as the cost of Trident limits investment in the conventional capabilities of the army and RAF. </p>
<p>No single weapons system can protect against all threats, of course. Even with the continuous at-sea deterrent provided by Trident, the UK would still remain vulnerable to threats below the nuclear threshold <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9850192/Trident-is-no-longer-key-to-Britains-security.html">such as</a> climate change, cyber war and nuclear terrorism. Yet there may be greater threats above the nuclear threshold if the UK were to <a href="https://www.rusi.org/publications/journal/ref:A536CF6E4B14D9/#.VZROWu1Viko">unilaterally</a> reduce its nuclear capability. Russia’s recent <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/25/us-usa-nuclear-arms-idUSKBN0P52FC20150625">nuclear sabre-rattling</a> is a case in point. </p>
<p>Deterrence can fail, of course. It is also ill-suited to many of today’s security threats, and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/apr/27/nuclear-waste-scotland">accidents</a> can happen – as one <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-32908665">whistleblower</a> recently augured. Yet most realists will still tell you that the very destructiveness of nuclear weapons helps to decrease the probability for war between great powers.</p>
<h2>Costs and strategy</h2>
<p>A related issue is the balance of costs between nuclear and conventional defences. Although most interviewees in the report favoured “high-priority” government spending on the nuclear deterrent, they didn’t want this to undermine conventional capabilities and said the cost of replacing Trident should fall outside the Ministry of Defence budget. Yet this logic assumes that savings from either abandoning nuclear weapons or reducing our current deterrent would be reinvested in conventional forces. There is no guarantee of this.</p>
<p>The report demonstrated an increasingly common argument: <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7a3592c2-e1c9-11e4-8d5b-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3ekp5YvYH">Trident is</a> useless as a military tool and frivolously wastes billions on a symbol of strength. The fact that it is arguably more of a political tool used to be reflected in the fact that the Treasury met the cost of the deterrent. In 2010, however, it was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10812825">moved over to</a> the defence budget. </p>
<p>It is <a href="https://www.rusi.org/publications/journal/ref:A536CF6E4B14D9/#.VZepCu1Vikp">estimated</a> that the cost of replacing the four Trident-equipped Vanguard-class submarines will consume 10%-12% of the defence budget during the procurement stage but will be reduced to 5%-6% once the next generation of submarines comes online in the late 2030s. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2015-scotland-32236184">According to</a> the ministry, it will cost £17.5bn to £23.4bn at 2013-2014 prices to procure the replacement system. (Though it has been claimed by the likes of the Scottish Nationalists that the total costs of procurement and the running costs of the replacement deterrent “over its lifetime” <a href="https://theconversation.com/fact-check-will-renewing-trident-cost-100-billion-39002">will reach</a> £100bn.)</p>
<p>Later this year, the government <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/policy/2015/06/08/uk-fallon-strategic-defense-and-security-review-2015/28691491/">will conduct</a> its strategic defence and security review. We are told it will be a full-scale review of all the threats and the capabilities facing the UK. But given the commitment to like-for-like replacement that I mentioned earlier, it is unlikely that this review will see Trident as no longer key to Britain’s security. </p>
<p>This is at a time when the UK’s defence budget <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/defence/article4454545.ece">is facing</a> another 5% or £1bn cut. Couple that with the sizeable cost of Trident renewal and it can only have an effect on the UK’s conventional forces. </p>
<p>As one young army officer so eloquently put it at the RUSI conference, we may have the manpower and the equipment but will we have the money left to do anything with them? A pan-military conference might feel understandably awkward about airing its divisions in public, but the rest of us must not. How much faith we put in nuclear weapons as a traditional deterrent in an age of fluctuating threats is a public debate that needs to take place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44102/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon J Smith receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for research on the Drivers of Military Strategic Reform.</span></em></p>Splits over Trident can create stalemate between the UK’s forces, but the public needs to debate renewing the deterrent before time runs out.Simon J Smith, Research Associate, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/420042015-05-20T05:06:36Z2015-05-20T05:06:36ZTrident whistleblower must now contend with outdated, unfair laws<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82259/original/image-20150519-30494-1yoz1ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Busted.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/defenceimages/8867866163/in/photolist-evC8Ec-fmb3Dj-9ab9pK-9oNtW6-dkxhD8-9YTYJu-5FdFB8-5EE7UC-qBite-evC8Kz-9xGrka-qBkcd-qBkc1-qBitg-qBfRM-qBkbN-qBisZ-9rk6NA-8BrGia-5FdPnn-23fm5q-5EnLjR-qBfRR-qBfRs-qBits-qBisU-qBfRF-qBkbw-qBfRx-qBfRo-qBkbE-qBitk-9YTXxw-9YR1Q2-9YTTZC-9YTRH7-9YQWbr-5EzHGF-9YQVa8-9YTQw5-9YTNHq-9YQUtn-Bvf4r-5EzPiT-drdaMx-5Fbvar-5Fdzwg-5EzPc2-o7tgZe-9k9DdJ">UK MoD/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>William McNeilly, a Royal Navy submariner who <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-32791755">blew the whistle</a> on safety and security problems with the UK’s nuclear deterrent, has returned to Britain and handed himself in to police custody. An able seaman in the Royal Navy, McNeilly compiled an 18-page memo entitled The Secret Nuclear Threat and published it on the internet. </p>
<p>It makes 30 allegations regarding the safety and security of Trident, detailing how missile safety alarms were muted, security checks not carried out, and a collision with a French nuclear submarine covered up. </p>
<p>McNeilly has suggested that he attempted to raise his concerns through the chain of command on multiple occasions, but to no avail. He may now face prosecution under Section 2 of the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/6/contents">Official Secrets Act 1989</a>, which concerns defence matters. <a href="http://www.banthebomb.org/index.php/news/1791-petition-to-pardon-the-trident-whistleblower">Petitions</a> have already been set up requesting that the prime minister pardon McNeilly for his disclosures. </p>
<p>But assuming that the government pushes ahead and prosecutes him, exactly what is McNeilly up against?</p>
<h2>Damaging disclosure</h2>
<p>The Official Secrets Act 1989 is as much a relic of the Cold War as Trident. It criminalises the unauthorised disclosure of official documents. A disclosure is considered damaging if it affects the capability of the armed forces, causes or would likely cause harm to citizens or equipment or endangers the interests of the UK abroad. </p>
<p>As with the other categories in the act which provide “damaging disclosure” tests, there is no scope to weigh any public interest benefit against the damaging effects of the disclosure. The only acceptable defence is for a Crown Servant to argue that they did not know or have reasonable cause to believe that their disclosure would be damaging. The act does not contain any clear provision that would allow whistleblowers to defend their disclosures based on public interest. </p>
<p>Ultimately, section 9 of the act provides the best protection. Prosecution requires the consent of the attorney general, who must weigh up whether it would be in the public interest to proceed. In this case, public support can act as a persuasive factor. </p>
<h2>Who’s exempt?</h2>
<p>There are also very mixed protections for service personnel who want to raise concerns. Unlike their counterparts in the Ministry of Defence, members of the UK armed forces are exempt from the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/23/contents">Public Interest Disclosure Act</a>. The act allows workers to make a claim to an employment tribunal if they suffer detrimental treatment or dismissal as a result of raising a concern. </p>
<p>The MoD’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/408161/Whistleblowing_and_Raising_a_concern.pdf">policy and guidance document</a> for both civilian and service whistleblowers makes it clear that the defence authorities have agreed to “honour the spirit” of the act, meaning they will follow prescribed procedures and will protect individuals from retaliation or victimisation. Superficially it seems as though that should protect service whistleblowers.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82262/original/image-20150519-30548-1tlq0h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82262/original/image-20150519-30548-1tlq0h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82262/original/image-20150519-30548-1tlq0h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82262/original/image-20150519-30548-1tlq0h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82262/original/image-20150519-30548-1tlq0h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82262/original/image-20150519-30548-1tlq0h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82262/original/image-20150519-30548-1tlq0h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hemmed in.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lightspring</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the principles in PIDA do not easily apply to whistleblowing in the armed forces. The act does not prescribe any procedures for organisations to follow; instead, it operates a “stepped disclosure” regime, meaning protection can be obtained if a worker raises a concern internally, to a prescribed person (for example a national regulator) or makes a wider disclosure, for example to the media. The higher the step, the more the worker has to prove to get protection. </p>
<p>Yet the act only comes into play after whistleblowers have suffered detriment or been dismissed, meaning that all it can provide is the opportunity to sue the employer that fires or punishes a whistleblower after it’s done so.</p>
<h2>Broken system</h2>
<p>In places, the guidance clearly distinguishes civilian staff from service personnel, but at other points that distinction in blurred, making it hard to know who’s entitled to what. </p>
<p>This is a serious oversight, since the experience of service personnel utilising the procedures without legal protection is likely to be very different to those working in a civilian capacity. </p>
<p>Service personnel can raise concerns to their commanding officer or to the service police. Both civilian staff and service personnel have access to Fraud Focal Points who deal with matters concerning fraud, theft or corruption. However, they do not currently record whether concerns have been raised by civilian personnel, service personnel or members of the public.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the MoD’s guidance is a feast of contradictions. It seeks to follow the principles of PIDA, but simultaneously instructs that whistleblowers should not contact the media or members of parliament even though PIDA can protect disclosures to both in certain circumstances. </p>
<p>The guidance and systems used to handle whistleblowing cases are in dire need of review, and their confused nature means it’s not clear how the system is currently operating in practice. To make matters worse, records kept under the <a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110805174918/http:/www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/0D289346-3BAA-4446-9164-4600458D1CE9/0/AnOverviewoftheServiceJusticeSystemandtheArmedForcesAct.pdf">Service Justice System</a> do not record instances of whistleblowing, and concerns raised are not centrally recorded or monitored. </p>
<p>It is high time we got an armed forces whistleblowing law onto the statute books and reformed the existing procedures. Most of all, we have to work out whether the system we have is actually a barrier to effective whistleblowing – and if so, how to change it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42004/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ashley Savage receives funding from the European Commission and the Socio-Legal Studies Association.</span></em></p>The structures in place to prosecute and protect military whistleblowers are outdated Cold War relics – and we don’t even know how they’re being used.Ashley Savage, Senior lecturer, Northumbria University, NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/401102015-04-13T21:08:26Z2015-04-13T21:08:26ZManifesto Check: Labour leaves the door open to downscale Trident<p>The most noticeable aspect of the defence and the armed forces section of <a href="http://b.3cdn.net/labouruk/e1d45da42456423b8c_vwm6brbvb.pdf">Labour’s manifesto</a> is its brevity, especially given the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-32027431">current level of instability</a> in the international environment. The section is overwhelmingly rhetorical, and there is hardly any mention of real policy – bar a few exceptions. </p>
<p>Labour indicates a desire to balance fiscal responsibility with a strong defence strategy for the UK; but this is a fraught task. The renewal of Trident is a cornerstone issue within the wider debate on defence spending. The SNP has already <a href="http://www.snp.org/media-centre/news/2015/apr/trident-unusable-and-indefensible">opposed the move</a>, claiming that it <a href="https://theconversation.com/fact-check-will-renewing-trident-cost-100-billion-39002">would cost £100 billion</a>, which could be better spent. </p>
<p>Trident itself is a system of four Vanguard-class nuclear submarines, which allows one sub to be on patrol at any given moment, providing what’s known as a continuous at-sea deterrent (CASD). The manifesto clearly states that “Labour remains committed to a minimum, credible, independent nuclear capability, delivered through a Continuous At-Sea Deterrent”. But a commitment to four submarines is not specifically stated. So, one must assume that Labour is at least willing to explore the idea of a CASD with a downsized submarine force. </p>
<p>The document also mentions that Labour “will conduct a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in the first year of government” that will be “fiscally responsible” and “strategically driven”. But historically, achieving both of these aims in one SDSR has proven quite problematic. </p>
<p>My own discussions with both defence analysts and Ministry of Defence officials suggest that most defence and security experts understood the 1998 SDSR – undertaken by the last Labour government – to be strategy-led, rather than treasury-driven. The opposite was true with the 2010 SDSR under the coalition government. It remains to be seen whether the next SDSR will be closer to the 2010 iteration or to the previous Labour 1998 review. But the wording here clearly signals a desire to balance both strategy and finance.</p>
<h2>The 2%</h2>
<p>There is no mention of the commitment the UK made to sustain defence spending at 2% of gross domestic product. At the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/351406/Wales_Summit_Declaration.pdf">NATO Wales Summit</a>, the UK agreed that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Allies currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence will aim to continue to do so. Likewise, Allies spending more than 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research & Development, will continue to do so.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Although an SDSR conducted after the election – along with <a href="http://www.yourbritain.org.uk/agenda-2015/policy-review/zero-based-review">a 2015 Spending Review</a> – may ultimately reaffirm the UK’s commitment to maintaining defence spending at 2% of GDP, this does not seem likely. A recent <a href="https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201409_BP_Financial_Context_of_the_2015_SDSR.pdf">report by the Royal United Services Institute</a> (RUSI) has presented four possible scenarios for UK defence spending up until 2020. All but one of these scenarios see defence spending falling below the 2% mark.</p>
<p>The manifesto also states that the “UK defence and security industry is a key contributor to our economy, with a turnover of £22 billion a year.” The Defence Growth Partnership <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/329781/bis-14-953-defence-growth-partnership-delivering-growth-implementing-the-strategic-vision-for-the-uk-defence-sector.pdf">report released last December</a> concurs with this figure. Yet, it is glaringly obvious that any centrist government would “work to secure defence jobs across the UK, protect the supply chain and support industry.” This sweeping collection of buzz words offers no real insight into how the Labour party aims to achieve its ambitions.</p>
<p>Given that the UK has been involved in conflict for <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ng-interactive/2014/feb/11/britain-100-years-of-conflict">more than a decade</a>, it is appropriate that the service of our military personnel should be supported through tangible actions. The Labour manifesto commits to strengthening “the covenant between our nation and our Armed Forces”. This is commendable, but there is little in the way of stated policy to achieve this. “A Veterans’ Register” is mentioned, but it is quite unclear how such a register will ensure our veterans receive the attention they warrant, or even what is meant by “proper support”. This section of the manifesto is highly rhetorical, and lacks any real policy substance.</p>
<p>These days, there is no doubt that cyber-security is a fundamental aspect of national (and collective) defence and security. It is commendable that the manifesto addresses such threats, but again this section is quite lacking when it comes to substantial policy proposals. For example, it is less than clear how merely signing up to “a cyber-security charter” reduces risk in this respect. </p>
<p><em>The Conversation’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/manifesto-check-2015">Manifesto Check</a> deploys academic expertise to scrutinise the parties’ plans.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40110/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon J Smith receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), but this article does not reflect the views of the research councils.</span></em></p>On defence, the Labour manifesto is full of fine words, but lacking in substance.Simon J Smith, Research Associate, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/395392015-04-10T05:24:42Z2015-04-10T05:24:42ZTrident wars are more political posturing than dawn of a nuclear-free age<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77516/original/image-20150409-15250-1xkstyh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A big decision looms.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/defenceimages/8950656444/in/photolist-4TzLSG-2Axq1w-eCWsjQ-a7Amu5-rcuNZ-a7mJSi-a7mJYp-fvnE9D-9oNtW6-9mSHEh-4mGP5h-6kGnyH-cySsbW-a89U3o-6qR3p8-a7pALC-a7Bnom-5ot79N-k4t6M1-gSJXr2">Ministry of Defence</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The key decision on whether or not to replace the submarines that carry the <a href="https://theconversation.com/fact-check-will-renewing-trident-cost-100-billion-39002">Trident nuclear weapons system</a> will have to be made almost immediately by the next UK government.</p>
<p>Production contracts for the next generation of submarines are due to be awarded some time in 2016. That makes the political decisions made after May 7 central to whether the UK remains in the exclusive nuclear weapons club for the long term.</p>
<p>Defence minister Michael Fallon has already launched a blistering attack on Labour, warning that Ed Miliband would <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/apr/09/ed-miliband-trident-election-labour-snp-nuclear">“barter away”</a> Trident under pressure from the SNP if voted into government.</p>
<p>This followed a pledge by Nicola Sturgeon to make Trident a <a href="http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/nicola-sturgeon-draws-red-line-over-trident-1-3635059">red-line issue</a> in any post-election negotiations. She <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/scottish-politics/sturgeon-the-snp-will-absolutely-not-vote-for-the-renewal-of-trident.1428577248">vowed</a> that SNP representatives would not, under any circumstances, agree to continue a UK nuclear weapons capability. </p>
<p>While all the parties involved in this election seem to have firm – and rather varied – positions on Trident, none is likely to engender meaningful change. It is highly likely that the Vanguard submarines that carry the Trident nuclear-armed missiles will be replaced. </p>
<h2>Current capacity</h2>
<p>At the moment, the UK operates a policy of “minimum nuclear deterrence”. It maintains just enough nuclear weaponry to deter an attack from an enemy.</p>
<p>It has a fleet of four Vanguard-class nuclear-powered submarines. At least one of these stealthy 150-metre, 16,000-ton boats is on patrol at all times somewhere underneath the ocean, ready to hit targets anywhere in the world – a posture known as <a href="http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/operations/global/continuous-at-sea-deterrent">continuous at-sea deterrence</a>.</p>
<p>Each submarine can theoretically carry up to 192 independently targetable nuclear warheads, each with a potential yield of 100 kilotons (several times that of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945). However, the government decided in 2010 that this should be limited to a maximum of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf">eight missiles carrying 40 warheads per boat</a>.</p>
<p>If a decision is made to build the new submarines, they would be due to be available by the late 2020s. They would gradually replace the existing fleet, providing the UK with a sophisticated retaliatory nuclear weapons capability well into the 2050s. The Trident missiles – which are “leased” from the United States – will not need to be upgraded or replaced until at least the 2040s.</p>
<h2>Where the parties stand</h2>
<p>A Conservative majority at the election would almost certainly mean like-for-like replacement of the fleet, including four new submarines.</p>
<p>A Labour victory would probably mean something similar – it was after all the last Labour government that began making the case for <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27378/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf">like-for-like replacement back in 2006</a>. While it is possible this might be based on a reduced posture, such as three rather than four submarines, shadow chancellor Ed Balls seems to have committed Labour to maintaining continuous at-sea deterrence. This is despite concerns from some Labour MPs about the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-31896570">cost of replacement</a>.</p>
<p>The Liberal Democrats are critical of a like-for-like replacement, arguing that the threats to the UK have changed markedly since the Cold War – when Trident was originally set up.</p>
<p>That said, they are at least nominally committed to the findings of the 2013 <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/212745/20130716_Trident_Alternatives_Study.pdf">Trident Alternatives Review</a>, which said that Trident is the most cost-effective option for nuclear deterrence. The Lib Dems may propose reducing the number of submarines and discontinuing continuous at-sea deterrence, but with submarines available for deployment on a <a href="http://www.libdems.org.uk/trident">contingency posture</a>.</p>
<h2>Pressure from the left</h2>
<p>Things will get more interesting if the smaller parties come away with more influence in the government. The Scottish National Party has made its position abundantly clear, even if Ed Miliband has <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2015-scotland-32124685">ruled out</a> any formal coalition agreement.</p>
<p>The Greens and Plaid Cymru have joined the SNP in raising their objections to Trident and all three have suggested that the system would be a key issue for any <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2015/january/mps-debate-trident-renewal/">possible coalition agreement</a>. Although UKIP seems to be supportive of replacement, it has appeared uncertain in the past.</p>
<p>The most likely outcome – be it a Conservative or Labour-led government – is replacement and continuous at-sea deterrence. While the type of governing agreement Labour and the other parties reach would be important, it is likely that there would be a cross-party majority for Trident replacement in the House of Commons. So ultimately, opposition from the SNP or anyone else might come to very little. Had the Scottish referendum resulted in independence, the Trident base at <a href="https://theconversation.com/scotland-no-vote-has-halted-a-wider-debate-about-trident-31987">Faslane</a> could well have been lost, but that is no longer the issue.</p>
<p>Ultimately, despite the hype, the most likely scenario appears to be that, barring a shock result on the May 7, the next UK government will make the decision to remain in the nuclear weapons business well into the second half of this century. </p>
<p>So while the political manoeuvring will be fascinating, this election is highly unlikely to lead to nuclear disarmament.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Futter receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. This article reflects the author's views and not those of the ESRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Hopkins does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The future of four submarines has become the spat-of-the-day in election 2015.Andrew Futter, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, University of LeicesterAnthony Hopkins, Visiting Lecturer, , University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/390022015-03-19T16:58:52Z2015-03-19T16:58:52ZFact Check: will renewing Trident cost £100 billion?<blockquote>
<p>In total, renewing Trident will cost around £100 billion, at 2012 prices, over the next 35 years … It will take up almost a tenth of the UK’s annual defence budget – and around a quarter of the capital budget for the period from 2018 to 2030. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Nicola Sturgeon, Scotland’s first minister, <a href="http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-Beyond-the-Budget-174c.aspx">at a talk</a> at the London School of Economics</strong>.</p>
<p>Given Nicola Sturgeon and her Scottish National Party’s policy against “<a href="http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-Beyond-the-Budget-174c.aspx">renewing the Trident nuclear missile system on principle</a>” – currently based at HM Naval Base Clyde some 25 miles from Glasgow – it is worth investigating the accuracy of the first minister’s statements. </p>
<p>It should be made clear that the term Trident is often used as a shorthand for what is the entirety of the UK’s nuclear forces. Trident, strictly speaking, is only the missile delivery system of a deterrent that consists of three interconnected parts. According to a <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN06526/the-trident-successor-programme-an-update">recent research briefing</a> by the House of Commons: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The nuclear deterrent system is composed of three parts: nuclear warheads which are mounted on Trident II D5 ballistic missiles which are launched from Vanguard-class nuclear powered submarines.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>We can distinguish between the more limited cost of the “successor programme” for the current nuclear deterrent (which the House of Commons report estimates at £17.5bn to £23.4bn for the overall programme, including £12.9 to £16.4bn for the submarines) and any estimates for the total costs of procurement and the running costs of the replacement deterrent “over its lifetime”. The “Main Gate” decision on renewing the Vanguard-class submarines is scheduled for sometime in 2016 and full operational service would occur between 2028 and 2035. </p>
<p>The first minister has, by her own admission, based her figures on a report released by <a href="http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/trident_commission_finalreport.pdf">The Trident Commission</a> in 2014. By offering a £100 billion estimate it is clear that she is alluding to the latter of the two means of calculating the expenditures: the replacement and total lifetime cost and not just the cost of replacing the three components of the deterrent alone. The figures she offered were calculated with estimates taken from the report. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/trident_commission_background_papers.pdf">Background Paper</a> to the Trident Commission Report states that, the “Net Present Value of this total spend from 2012 to 2060 (capital alongside running costs after 2028 for the new system)… comes to £57.6 billion”.</p>
<p>Sturgeon has arrived at the figure of around £100 billion by multiplying the estimated annual cost of £2.9 billion in 2012 figures that is set out in the report, by 35 years. Why 35 years – taking us to 2050 – is more of a mystery, as the Trident Commission report projects out until 2062, as the graph below shows.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75357/original/image-20150319-1577-13f2xf6.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75357/original/image-20150319-1577-13f2xf6.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75357/original/image-20150319-1577-13f2xf6.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75357/original/image-20150319-1577-13f2xf6.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75357/original/image-20150319-1577-13f2xf6.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=618&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75357/original/image-20150319-1577-13f2xf6.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=618&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75357/original/image-20150319-1577-13f2xf6.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=618&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/trident_commission_finalreport.pdf">Trident Commission Final Report</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These amounts are all “ball park” figures, “illustrative estimates” and projections based on 2012 prices from what open source data is available. They cannot, therefore, be expected to remain fixed especially given inflationary trends in defence procurement. </p>
<p>In recent years, there have been a series of differing estimates offered for the total lifetime expense to the like-for-like replacement deterrent as well as series of estimations for <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/212745/20130716_Trident_Alternatives_Study.pdf">Trident Alternatives</a>. In 2006, the Liberal Democrats suggested that “<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/sep/21/military.armstrade">the true cost of replacing and operating the Trident nuclear missile system would be at least £76 billion</a>” while Greenpeace came to a figure of <a href="http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/blog/peace/trident-costs-are-running-out-control-20090917">£97 billion</a>. The recent House of Commons report also refers to the £100 billion estimate but it credits the <a href="http://www.cnduk.org/campaigns/no-to-trident">Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</a> for arriving at this sum.</p>
<p>In the process of researching these estimates, analysts at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) confirmed to me that Nicola Sturgeon’s numbers were “roughly accurate”. Furthermore, a 2013 report released by RUSI, <a href="https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RUSI_Jnl_158_6_Chalmers_low_res.pdf">Towards the UK’s Nuclear Century</a>, indicates the successor replacement cost to be at “between £19 billion and £25 billion at 2012-13 prices” but cautioned that estimates for the existing successor programme are “provisional” until the scheduled 2016 “Main Gate” decision on investment transpires. This report also concurs with Sturgeon’s claim that the deterrent will consume 10% the UK’s annual defence budget. It states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If defence spending remains constant in real terms after 2015-16, spending on the nuclear force could rise to approximately 10% of the defence budget by around 2022-2023, peaking at around 12% by the middle of the decade, and then not falling below 10% until the successor submarine production draws to a close in the first half of the 2030s.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Nicola Sturgeon’s estimate for the total cost of renewing the nuclear force is generally accurate. This estimate is based on the Trident Commission’s report figures of a £2.9 billion average annual cost (in 2012 figures) and an average of 9.4% of the total defence budget annually. If one takes the £2.9 billion annual cost and multiplies this by 35 years you reach a figure of £101.5 billion. </p>
<p>But it should be understood that besides mere replacement, this figure includes the procurement of submarines, the total cost of a missile extension programme, in-service costs and replacement warheads as well as decommissioning costs. It should also be noted that these are all just ball park assessments and that, as the Trident Commission report states, these figures are only “illustrative estimates”. That said, the tremendous cost of retaining a first tier nuclear deterrent combined with the recent trend in declining defence budgets suggests that a real impact on existing and future conventional capabilities is tangible.</p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>The judgement that Nicola Sturgeon’s numbers were generally accurate seems appropriate. It should be recognised that there can be no facts in this area, since we have no idea what renewing Trident will cost, and there are no official estimates. However, this fact check draws on serious estimates, particularly by the independent cross-party Trident Commission 2014 report, run by BASIC and the 2013 RUSI report. </p>
<p>The author is also very clear on what the £100 billion estimate covers. This is both the capital costs associated with the replacement and the subsequent lifetime running costs for the three elements nuclear warheads, missiles and submarines. </p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39002/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon J Smith receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ron Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nicola Sturgeon has set out her Scottish National Party’s opposition to renewing Britain’s nuclear deterrent. Will it cost that much?Simon J Smith, Research Associate, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/382522015-03-02T17:24:16Z2015-03-02T17:24:16ZWhy the UK should heed a warning from the US over defence spending<p>Raymond Odierno, head of the US Army, has revealed that he has concerns about the UK’s commitments to defence and international security, telling the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11443204/Britain-is-becoming-a-friend-who-cant-be-trusted-says-top-US-general.html">Daily Telegraph</a> that cuts to the UK defence budget have made him doubt its ability to fulfil its commitments to the US as a military ally. </p>
<p>British defence has indeed been hit hard by austerity, even as the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere continued. Our <a href="http://www.bath.ac.uk/polis/research/projects/military-strategic-reform-economic-crisis-changing-warfare/">research</a> shows that while the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy have fared better under austere circumstances, it has been the British Army that has been hit hardest. Odierno, it seems, is tapping into this problem and the UK should take note.</p>
<h2>The NATO target</h2>
<p>Falling defence budgets are in no way unique to the UK. European military expenditure has been steadily decreasing since the 2007-8 financial crisis. The average spend on defence among Europe’s NATO members is about <a href="http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2015/02/20/04389e1d/ELN%20NATO%20Budgets%20Brief.pdf">1.6% of GDP</a>, while the US contributes more than 75% of all NATO defence expenditure. The NATO-set target of spending 2% of GDP on defence is currently only met by a small number of the 28 Allies. Odierno appears to have been referring to this target when issuing his warning about the UK.</p>
<p>The 2% target was recognised at the political level for the first time in 2014 through the <a href="http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm">North Atlantic Council Summit Declaration</a> but NATO members were given a 10-year window to increase their spending and the language used to seal the deal was far from concrete. The chances of them actually meeting the target under these conditions are debatable.</p>
<p>The UK was a strong supporter of the 2% target, and has urged its allies to commit to it. But it is now likely to fall below the 2% target itself for the first time when the government carries out its next <a href="https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201409_BP_Financial_Context_of_the_2015_SDSR.pdf">review of defence spending</a> this year.</p>
<p>In fact, if the UK stays on its current trajectory its defence budget would be the <a href="http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2015/02/20/04389e1d/ELN%20NATO%20Budgets%20Brief.pdf">smallest</a> it has been for 25 years – never mind meeting 2% of GDP. </p>
<p>It is <a href="http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=59173">unrealistic</a> to expect many European nations to meet the NATO 2% target, for political, economic and historical reasons. Germany, for example, would have to spend an extra €37 billion to hit the target. And doing so would make it the leading defence spender in Europe – something the UK and France may find slightly disconcerting.</p>
<p>But given the UK’s traditional role as a leading player in NATO and a key operational partner to the US, dropping below the 2% mark is a worry.</p>
<h2>Capacity and influence</h2>
<p>Odierno has warned that if the British Army doesn’t keep up with spending, it will no longer be able to send its own divisions into conflict zones – only smaller brigades that would operate inside US divisions.</p>
<p>On one hand, this isn’t necessarily a major blow. Countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Spain have all considerably reduced the size of their armies. Now that modern warfare is fought more from the air (and the sea) rather than on land itself, the need for large standing armies becomes arguably unnecessary and expensive.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the loss of division command raises bigger problems. The UK has always been recognised as setting the standard of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11394108/The-grim-truth-about-our-defence-budget.html">transatlantic burden-sharing</a> but with a smaller budget, it would have less say at the overall strategic and operational levels.</p>
<p>What’s more, operating as part of a multi-national division can be difficult. Research suggests that multi-national units remain sub-standard to single nation commands. Whether this is because of language, military procedure or culture is unclear but the effect is the same.</p>
<p>The British Army is grappling with a shrinking level of regular, professional combat soldiers as it transforms to a larger reserve force and it is looking less and less likely that it will be able to maintain the 2% NATO target after 2016. </p>
<p>The impact of austerity on the defence budget will no doubt lead to difficult decisions having to be made. Does the US really want the UK to retain a first class Trident deterrent, or would it rather see that money spent on more conventional capabilities such as personnel?</p>
<p>Many might think that the US is using the impending British election to direct future defence spending in the UK, although this is a mantra that has been coming from Washington since the NATO alliance first formed. Regardless, there may be wisdom in Odierno’s words. There are benefits to commanding from the front rather than marching behind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/38252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David J. Galbreath receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for research on transformation in European militaries.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon J Smith receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for research on transformation in European militaries. </span></em></p>The head of the US army isn’t keen for a key ally to opt out of its commitments.David J Galbreath, Professor of International Security, Editor of European Security, University of BathSimon J Smith, Research Associate, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/370192015-02-02T16:18:53Z2015-02-02T16:18:53ZWhy our political classes won’t have any real debate on Trident until after the election<p>In the run-up to the Scottish independence referendum, the UK government refused to admit to any contingency plans for relocating Trident, the four Vanguard-class submarines mounted with nuclear warheads that are stationed at the Faslane naval base some 25 miles from Glasgow. </p>
<p>Though the Scottish National Party (SNP) had long made clear that an independent Scotland would not want Trident within its territory, it made no political sense for the UK government to show weakness by contemplating anything less than a No victory in the referendum. </p>
<p>Labour is in a similar position over questions of a potential power-sharing deal with the Scottish nationalists should it become the biggest party in a <a href="http://thedailyheckle.net/chances-hung-parliament-2015/">hung parliament</a> after the May general election. Hence it has been playing coy and keeping <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-31029492">quiet</a> about whether it would do a deal with the SNP, should predictions come to pass <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/21/poll-snp-labour-scottish-seats-election">that they will</a> “wipe out Labour in Scotland”. </p>
<p>On the Trident issue, Labour’s latest gambit has been for the shadow foreign secretary, Douglas Alexander, to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/11382571/Douglas-Alexander-rejects-Trident-deal-with-SNP.html">say that</a> the party would exclude the nuclear deterrent from any coalition discussions. </p>
<h2>Trident’s three prongs</h2>
<p>Time will tell if Alexander’s comments leave any room for manoeuvre, but it is a reminder that there are three issues to consider in the context of Trident. First there is the short-term election struggle, of course. This is tangled up with the second strand, which is the UK government and the MoD’s reluctance to ever be held hostage again over control of Trident. The current arrangement meant that the SNP could have used it as a significant bargaining chip had Scotland voted Yes last September. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1179&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1179&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1179&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1481&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1481&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1481&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prong, prong, prong.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.epa.eu/politics-photos/citizens-initiative-recall-photos/cnd-protests-outside-awe-aldermaston-photos-02032900">Jiripravda</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Finally, there is the debate over the long-term strategic viability and expense of replacing the deterrent in its current configuration. It is currently due to be decided by a parliamentary vote next year. </p>
<p>The Tory-led coalition <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/19/david-cameron-delay-trident-replacement">came out</a> in favour of like-for-like renewal of the current deterrent in 2010, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/dec/04/nuclear.liberaldemocrats">echoing</a> the position of Labour since 2006. Yet Labour leader Ed Miliband <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ed-miliband/11325940/Ed-Miliband-hints-he-may-back-replacing-Trident-with-cheaper-system.html">has hinted</a> that he would favour a “least-cost nuclear deterrent”. </p>
<p>It is the recent combination of these three issues that is creating such uncertainty over the future of the deterrent. Although the political posturing makes for great headlines in the run-up to the general election, it is the last narrative on efficiency and utility that is in the most need of attention. But it is also the least likely to take centre stage until after May.</p>
<h2>Wales watching</h2>
<p>The fact that Labour is both unclear about its Trident plans and could potentially do a deal with the SNP is contributing to the uncertainty. It is no surprise that national newspapers are replete with stories on the potential ramifications of a hung parliament – and one would expect them to reach saturation point the closer we inch towards the election.</p>
<p>For instance, <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2929226/Trident-quit-Scotland-Wales-Secret-plan-nuclear-subs-triggered-rise-SNP.html">recent statements</a> that “work has now begun on the practicalities of shifting Britain’s nuclear defence systems to Pembrokeshire” in Wales have all the hallmarks of the sort of political white noise that the film maker Adam Curtis <a href="http://www.e-flux.com/program/adam-curtis-the-desperate-edge-of-now/">frequently observes</a>. </p>
<p>Although the county’s deep-sea port of Milford Haven has been recognised as one potential alternative to Faslane since the 1960s, it was rejected at that time because of its dangerous proximity to two liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities in the area. The new claims seem to have more to do with local <a href="http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/five-reasons-moving-trident-milford-8530796">Welsh politics</a> than they do with any serious plan for any UK government to relocate Trident there. </p>
<p>If contingency plans are underway, Milford Haven would be just one of the options being considered. The most suitable site (but by no means without problems) is <a href="http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/devonport">HMNB Devonport</a> at Plymouth, which is, crucially, also in England. It would seem to make little sense to move Trident from one region of the UK with separatist tendencies to another, no matter how undeveloped they are in Wales as compared to Scotland. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lock gates at Milford Haven, through which Trident is unlikely to sail.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Construction_of_additional_Lock_Gates_at_Milford_Haven_DSC_1778_-2.jpg#mediaviewer/File:Construction_of_additional_Lock_Gates_at_Milford_Haven_DSC_1778_-2.jpg">Talsarnau Times</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Scottish possibilities</h2>
<p>There certainly is a need for a commissioned study to scrutinise possible relocation options as Professor Malcolm Chalmers of the Royal United Services Institute defence think tank <a href="https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201408_OP_Relocation_Relocation_Relocation.pdf">proposed</a> before the Scottish referendum. It is also worth considering where Labour/SNP discussions might lead, notwithstanding Alexander’s intervention. </p>
<p>On the Labour side, Miliband’s hints about a reduced deterrent leaves the door open for a limited deal. And the SNP’s position is not quite as hard-line as during the Scottish referendum. They are no longer asking for the removal of Trident from Scotland. In exchange for their support in Westminster, they want a commitment to “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-30479621">no Trident renewal</a>”. </p>
<p>The idea of Labour accepting a deal that would essentially disarm the UK of its deterrent overnight is not credible, but agreement to delay the 2016 decision on replacement could be in the party’s interest. This could allow a proper debate on the real utility of Trident while extending the SNP some political cover. It is also worth bearing in mind that the relocation options might widen if Trident were replaced by a smaller deterrent. </p>
<h2>The big question</h2>
<p>But more importantly, we need a serious debate that gives serious public reflection to Trident’s practicality and effectiveness as a deterrent. For one thing there is the economic debate. Can a top-shelf replacement of Trident be justified in an age of austerity and shrinking defence budgets? If it is a given that the UK will continue to think of itself as a premier security provider, will it best achieve this by spending diminishing resources on additional conventional forces or on another Rolls-Royce version of Trident?</p>
<p>Or does the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/trident-alternatives-review">Government’s Trident Alternatives Review</a> suggest a third way between a £20bn replacement and complete abandonment? These issues are even more acute since the capital costs for replacement will now be paid through the MoD budget and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10812825">not the UK Treasury</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trident: still fit for purpose?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine-launched_ballistic_missile#mediaviewer/File:Trident_missile_launch.jpg">Unknown</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>An equally crucial question is whether Trident is strategically viable in the 21st century. Does it deter the <a href="https://theconversation.com/trident-time-to-rethink-britains-nuclear-future-13762">extremely challenging and modern threats</a> in our current interdependent security environment – global warming, transnational terrorism, pandemics? Or does the role of nuclear weapons in deterring war between states still override these concerns? </p>
<p>We may also want to ask to what extent the like-for-like replacement is really about overlaps in US and UK submarine procurement contracts. Then there is the question of the ramifications for nuclear proliferation if the UK demonstrates to the world that retaining a cheaper version of the deterrent is a viable option. </p>
<p>These are the issues that should really be preoccupying the electorate and our political leaders. Yet political horse-trading and speculative proposals for Trident relocation and termination will remain the dominant headlines until the election. Once it is out of the way, hopefully a more rigorous and meaningful debate on Trident can finally take place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37019/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon J Smith receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p>In the run-up to the Scottish independence referendum, the UK government refused to admit to any contingency plans for relocating Trident, the four Vanguard-class submarines mounted with nuclear warheads…Simon J Smith, Research Associate, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/352882014-12-10T06:21:22Z2014-12-10T06:21:22ZTrident prods Scottish Labour leadership contenders all the way to finishing line<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/66771/original/image-20141209-32165-xbib3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Since Scots can't make up their minds on Trident, why all the politicking?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/defenceimages/8950656444/in/photolist-eCWsjQ-a7Amu5-rcuNZ-9MeTse-a7mJSi-9aWxRg-9eA46e-9aZFR7-9aZG8Q-a7mJYp-9cPkSF-rUXif-9eD9U7-kr5w5z-rUSFx-9oNtW6-9eA4JH-hMfwc-9mSHEh-4mGP5h-nP6hTs-eK1K2S-6kGnyH-e7dKsb-5tTBts-9eD9FL-6qR3p8-o8vzAo-dEkMHx-a7pALC-8FTyzt-gSJXr2-dEr1Qb-a7Bnom-7Gi5Zt-5ot79N-a6YTZ5-o6yrC9-34UZfu-eeGrDM-7YvvxZ-7RaPou-6UipAH-Cpnvc-cySsbW-a7mJTH-iT6N7k-k4qE4x-oG4VVg-k4t6M1">UK Ministry of Defence</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Polling is shortly to close in the battle to become the next Scottish Labour leader, the result of which will be announced on December 13. Given the party’s position <a href="https://www.snp.org/media-centre/news/2014/dec/osbornes-performance-sees-approval-rating-fall">in the polls</a>, whoever takes on this role has a mountain to climb – be it Jim Murphy (<a href="http://sports.ladbrokes.com/en-gb/Politics/Scottish-Labour-Party-LeaderPolitics/Scottish-Labour-Party-Leader-t210004319">odds 1-4</a>), Neil Findlay (3-1) or Sarah Boyack (25-1). According to the <a href="http://survation.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Scottish-Attitudes-November-Tables_1_46.pdf">latest poll</a>, conducted by Survation, only 24% of people in Scotland intend to vote for Labour in the UK general election next May – a statistic that could yet impede Ed Miliband’s route to Downing Street. </p>
<p>As many as 46% intend to vote for the Scottish National Party (SNP), while 17% currently back the Conservatives and 6% the Liberal Democrats. Contrast this with the 2010 UK general election, where 42% voted Labour while just 19% backed the SNP. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/election2011/overview/html/scotland.stm">Even in the last Scottish parliament election</a> in 2011, when the SNP won an overall majority, Labour still secured 32% of the constituency vote. </p>
<h2>Personality paradox</h2>
<p>How might Labour recover? Does it need to elect a popular individual? Or do its prospects depend on the policies the new leader brings to the table? The same Survation poll suggested that policies not personalities will be key. Nearly half of voters (49%) said that having “better policies for Scotland” would make them more likely to vote Labour. Only 37% said that having a better Scottish leader would do so.</p>
<p>This fits the evidence of current UK-wide polls. The <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/12/07/other-lead-2/">latest YouGov poll</a> of UK-wide voting intentions puts Labour on 33%, one point ahead of the Conservatives, even though Miliband’s ratings are much lower than those for David Cameron. Only 17% <a href="http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/n965i9mzb8/YG-Archive-Pol-Sunday-Times-results-311014.pdf">say that</a> Miliband is doing well as leader of the Labour party, compared with 40% who think Cameron is doing well as prime minister. </p>
<p>It might also explain the relative closeness of the Scottish race. Although Murphy is still the favourite, Findlay is giving him a good run for his money. Of the three voting blocs, the unions are expected to swing behind Findlay and the politicians behind Murphy. That leaves the party membership holding the balance of power, and <a href="http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/top-stories/jack-mcconnell-warns-labour-against-lurch-to-left-1-3627909">Findlay’s people</a> insisting he has the edge. </p>
<h2>The Trident tango</h2>
<p>So if policies are the more important factor in persuading people to vote for a party, then the policies put forward by the new Scottish Labour party leader could be vital to their efforts to restore the Labour vote. So how are the three potential new leaders of the Scottish Labour party attempting to differentiate themselves on policies? </p>
<p>Two of the key issues that have emerged during the campaigning have been income tax and nuclear weapons. Murphy supported the full devolution of income tax to the Scottish parliament, whereas Findlay and Boyack both expressed reservations. But events have overtaken these declarations with the publication on November 27 of the <a href="http://www.smith-commission.scot/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.pdf">Smith Commission report</a> into new Scottish powers, which recommended that full control over income-tax rates and bands should be devolved. </p>
<p>On the contentious issue of Trident, which is headquartered at the mouth of the River Clyde in the west of Scotland, Findlay stands out as the anti-nuclear-weapons candidate. His stance goes beyond even the SNP’s promise in the referendum that an independent Scotland would require the UK to remove Trident from Scottish soil. </p>
<p>If elected, he <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/11234327/Scottish-Labour-leadership-candidate-promises-to-oppose-Trident.html">has promised</a> to lobby Miliband to scrap Britain’s nuclear weapons capability entirely, arguing that the savings could be better spent on tackling poverty and youth unemployment and on improving social care and social housing. Both Murphy and the SNP <a href="http://www.snpcnd.org/index.php?subaction=showfull&id=1416157020&archive=&start_from=&ucat=&">counter that</a> whatever Findlay would like to happen, this is not a decision that Scottish Labour will ultimately make, and that Labour in London will reject this position.</p>
<h2>What the voters think</h2>
<p>But how popular is an anti-nuclear-weapons stance with the general public in Scotland? Evidence from the <a href="http://www.natcen.ac.uk/our-research/research/scottish-social-attitudes/">Scottish Social Attitudes (SSA) survey</a> suggests that people in Scotland are in fact fairly evenly divided on the issue. On the one hand, the 2013 survey found that more people (46%) were against Britain having nuclear weapons than were in favour (37%). </p>
<p>But asked whether Britain should be required to remove its nuclear weapons from an independent Scotland, slightly fewer (37%) reckoned it should than said it should not (42%). And when the latter question was repeated in 2014, the two proportions were again almost the same, at 42% and 37% respectively.</p>
<p>This division is mirrored by Labour supporters. While 48% oppose the principle of Britain having nuclear weapons, 36% are in favour, almost exactly in line with the figures for Scots as a whole. They are also almost exactly evenly divided between those who think an independent Scotland should require Britain to remove its nuclear weapons and those who do not. </p>
<p>In truth whatever stance he or she takes on the issue, the next Scottish leader will run the risk of contradicting the views of a significant body of the party’s current supporters. Policies may matter to voters, but on this issue at least the new leader may well discover that the best strategy is not to say very much at all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35288/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan receives funding from the ESRC</span></em></p>Polling is shortly to close in the battle to become the next Scottish Labour leader, the result of which will be announced on December 13. Given the party’s position in the polls, whoever takes on this…Susan Reid, Research Director, ScotCen Social ResearchLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/319872014-09-24T08:55:49Z2014-09-24T08:55:49ZScotland No vote has halted a wider debate about Trident<p>Nowhere was the relief over Scotland’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/scotland-decided-experts-react-to-no-vote-31908">decision last week to remain part of the United Kingdom</a> more acutely felt than with those responsible for Britain’s nuclear deterrent system, Trident.</p>
<p>The Scottish National Party had promised that independence would lead to the removal of Trident submarines and the associated nuclear warhead storage facilities from <a href="http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/where-we-are/naval-base/clyde">their bases on the Clyde estuary</a>, not far from Glasgow. Irrespective of various Ministry of Defence contingency plans, it would have been very difficult if not impossible to relocate them. Consequently, a vote for Scottish independence could also have been a vote for UK unilateral nuclear disarmament.</p>
<h2>Crisis averted?</h2>
<p>The UK is presently in the process of replacing the Trident system. While last year’s <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rebecca-johnson/trident-alternatives-review-elephant-in-room">Trident Alternatives Review</a>, conducted at the behest of the Liberal Democrats, pointed to other reduced nuclear options, a replacement will almost certainly involve like-for-like replacement of the current four-boat submarine force. </p>
<p>As a result, should the successor to Trident programme be given the “green light” after next years’ general election (which seems probable), the first of a new generation of nuclear-armed submarines will be deployed by around 2030 – and Britain will retain a highly sophisticated nuclear weapons capability with global reach well into the second half of the 21st century. </p>
<p>Put bluntly, that means the UK will always have a submarine somewhere at sea and ready to fire its long-range nuclear armed missiles at short notice.</p>
<p>Since work on the new submarines will not start until 2016 at the earliest, a Yes vote might have sunk these plans before they had even begun. It would also have forced the UK government to look long and hard at the nuclear issue, and would have propelled the question right into the heart of public debate. </p>
<p>Instead, at a crucial moment, the No vote has papered over the cracks that are starting to appear in the nuclear rationale. The Scottish result is therefore an important victory for those committed to making sure the UK has an independent nuclear deterrent for decades to come – and a missed opportunity for those opposed to it.</p>
<h2>Eve of destruction</h2>
<p>The argument that nuclear weapons are an insurance against an uncertain future remains seductive, but it’s undeniably less persuasive than it was during the Cold War. </p>
<p>Even with eight states (nine including Israel) still nuclear-armed and the global non-proliferation effort <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/the-cold-war-is-long-gone-but-the-nuclear-threat-is-still-here/249867/">fraying</a>, the logic of existential deterrence that birthed Trident in the first place has unquestionably weakened: the biggest dangers the UK is now facing appears to be <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/%7Eachaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Asymmetric_warfare.html">asymmetric threats</a> from cross-border groups such as Islamic State, not an ideological bloc of belligerent nuclear-armed states. </p>
<p>And because the need for the deterrent is no longer a given, a relocation from Scotland would have forced planners and officials to make the case for spending a colossal sum of money on it; far less will be required for mere replacement. </p>
<p>But even more importantly, the UK government would have had to give considerable thought to what the country’s future deterrence requirements actually are. That would mean answering difficult questions about who, exactly, needs to be deterred – and whether nuclear weapons still in fact serve this function as they have in the past. </p>
<h2>The new normal</h2>
<p>International pressure against nuclear weapons has grown considerably in recent years, particularly since Barack Obama’s <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered">Prague Speech</a> in 2009 and his ensuing receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize. All this has greatly strengthened the notion of an international <a href="http://web.mit.edu/mitir/2007/spring/taboo.html">taboo</a> against the use of nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>And given the rapid development of hi-tech modern military systems and capabilities (such as drones, precision-guided weapons and <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/stuxnet-was-far-more-dangerous-than-previous-thought-2013-11">cyber weapons</a>) that may one day finally end the centrality of nuclear forces, the long-term rationale for, and utility of, the UK nuclear deterrent are both becoming increasingly blurred. </p>
<p>These dynamics will be particularly acute for Britain, given its <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/11/uk-nuclear-weapons-dismantled-trident">small nuclear stockpile</a> and strong <a href="http://www.greenhamwpc.org.uk/">domestic anti-nuclear history</a>. But while there will certainly be much debate surrounding the final “main gate” decision <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jul/01/trident-nuclear-missile-renewal-study">now scheduled for 2016</a>, it will never be as heated and critical as the furore that would have been generated by the relocation of the entire UK nuclear weapons complex. That in turn makes it all the more likely the decision will be waved through in two year’s time.</p>
<p>As a result, we may well come to look back on the Scottish independence referendum as the moment when the UK missed a chance to have an open and productive debate about its relationship with nuclear weapons – and instead it has all but guaranteed itself a nuclear-armed 21st century.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31987/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Futter receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council.</span></em></p>Nowhere was the relief over Scotland’s decision last week to remain part of the United Kingdom more acutely felt than with those responsible for Britain’s nuclear deterrent system, Trident. The Scottish…Andrew Futter, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/315822014-09-15T05:21:54Z2014-09-15T05:21:54ZAn independent Scotland might have to agree a deal on Trident to get into NATO<p>As Scotland teeters on the brink of independence these next few days, the question of Trident is one issue in particular that is bound to cause a few sleepless nights in Edinburgh, London and Washington DC. </p>
<p>Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde is home to the four Vanguard-class Trident-equipped submarines (at Faslane). Nearby is the storage depot for the nuclear warheads (at Coulport). The Scottish government is at present <a href="http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/293639/0090721.pdf">“unable to decide whether or not nuclear weapons are based”</a> in Scotland, a position which the SNP would seek to overturn with independence. As most people following the debate will know, the desire to rid Scotland of Trident is fundamental to the SNP campaign and, according to deputy first minister Nicola Sturgeon, <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/uc643-iv/uc643.pdf">“not negotiable”</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Google Maps</span></span>
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<p>Of course, the position of the UK government is the exact opposite. Worse, according to a former <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmscotaf/676/676.pdf">minister of state</a> for the armed forces, “the UK government are not making plans for independence… and hence we are not making plans to move the nuclear deterrent or indeed the submarines from HM Naval Base Clyde.”</p>
<h2>Timescale differences</h2>
<p>The Scottish government’s white paper on independence, <a href="http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0043/00439021.pdf">“Scotland’s Future,”</a> calls for “the removal of Trident within the first term of the Scottish parliament following independence.” Given their ambition to see Scotland become fully independent on March 24, 2016, this would mean removal by 2020. </p>
<p>There <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmscotaf/676/676.pdf">is a view</a> that everything could be removed from Scotland within 24 months, but there is a major problem. The chances are quite slim that two replacement facilities (one to base the submarines and another to store the nuclear warheads) could be agreed and – more importantly – deemed safe enough to be operational in that narrow time period. In other words, the weapons could be removed in that period but without a suitable replacement. This would mean that the UK could be effectively disarmed of its deterrent – some may say this is no bad thing, of course. This aspect is therefore likely to dominate negotiations.</p>
<p>And what chance that a replacement could be found in the UK at all? According to a recent <a href="https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201408_OP_Relocation_Relocation_Relocation.pdf">report published by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)</a>, the two most suitable locations (in England) to replace Faslane and Coulport are HMNB Devonport at Plymouth and a facility that would need to be generated near Falmouth in Cornwall. </p>
<p>Although these sites are geographically superior to some of the other locations that have been suggested, they are still located near sizable population centres. Milford Haven has been ruled out due to its proximity to natural gas terminals and Barrow-in-Furness due to the lack of a suitable location for storing the warheads in the vicinity. It is important to remember that this is not the 1960s, when the ministry of defence could get away with much more, so getting the local populations to acquiesce could also prove rather tricky. And after all that, what if Cornwall decided it wanted to go independent sometime down the road as well?</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Suitable replacement sites at Falmouth and Davenport/Plymouth.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Google Maps</span></span>
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<p>Joking aside, the estimated cost for preparing any future facilities for Trident, according to the <a href="https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201408_OP_Relocation_Relocation_Relocation.pdf">same RUSI report</a>, would be between “£2.5bn and £3.5bn in 2012/13 prices,” not including the cost of acquiring any additional land. But if the procurement process for the two (or one) UK aircraft carriers is anything to go by, expect long delays and dramatically higher cost overruns to those first estimated. </p>
<h2>Overseas options?</h2>
<p>Other options have been proposed including “sharing facilities” in either the United States or France. However the UK government is <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmscotaf/861/86104.htm">on record as saying</a> that, “operations from any base in the US or France would greatly compromise the independence of the deterrent and there would be significant political and legal obstacles.”</p>
<p>And what about the US view? Many there would be none too pleased if they suddenly found that their only other nuclear ally in NATO was suddenly disarmed of its deterrent; although they do not seem to be doing much <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/09/scotland-independence-vote-us-headache">contingency planning</a> either. </p>
<p>On a recent visit to Washington one think-tanker there put it to me this way: “If the Scots go, than you can kiss-off keeping the two key strategic bases. From our point of view (USA), it will really mean you (UK) are finished as a major power. You are done!”</p>
<p>The truth is many in the US will argue, <em>sotto voce</em>, that the UK does not really need a Rolls Royce version of the deterrent, especially if it comes at the price of a bonsai conventional force. But that does not mean that they want the UK to give up the capability altogether.</p>
<h2>Temp Trident?</h2>
<p>There is also the possibility of a temporary leasing agreement between Scotland and the UK. This would keep Trident in Scotland past the 2020 deadline but potentially see new facilities ready in time for 2028, when the current Vanguard-class submarines are due to start being replaceed at an estimated total cost of £20bn (assuming the electorate do not take the opportunity to scupper those plans as well). </p>
<p>One must assume that when it comes to nuclear weapons, cool heads would prevail in post-independence negotiations but nothing is certain. Delaying a permanent removal until satisfactory alternatives are arranged would help to avoid the prospect of what could be a major deterioration in relations with London. UK officials have made clear that a forced removal of Trident from Scotland would affect discussions “across the whole piece” of pan-governmental negotiation. After all, the reputation of the UK as a state that punches above its weight would be at stake.</p>
<p>A temporary leasing arrangement, if it could be negotiated, would also have benefits for Scotland. If London and Edinburgh could see eye to eye on this thorny issue, the likelihood of garnering UK support for Scotland membership in NATO would be much enhanced. The chances of obtaining the share of the UK’s current conventional assets that the Scottish government seeks would also be strengthened. </p>
<p>Purging Scotland (and the world) of nuclear weapons is a noble historical ambition for a would be fledgling state, but an independent Scotland may want to think twice about alienating a multitude of its potential allies in the process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31582/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon is a member of the Scotland Institute think tank.</span></em></p>As Scotland teeters on the brink of independence these next few days, the question of Trident is one issue in particular that is bound to cause a few sleepless nights in Edinburgh, London and Washington…Simon J Smith, Research Associate, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/288822014-07-08T05:13:05Z2014-07-08T05:13:05ZTrident report just the start of the debate on UK nuclear future<p>Ever since I was a teenager in the renewed Cold War of the 1980s, I have feared losing not only my life, but the lives of everyone, absolutely everyone, in a nuclear conflagration. It is easy to forget that this <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-five-biggest-threats-to-human-existence-27053">gravest of all threats</a> to the survival of our planet is still very much with us, every day, as we tweet and cappuccino our way through the first part of the 21st century. </p>
<p>So it was disappointing to see the Guardian’s headline when the <a href="http://www.basicint.org/tridentcommission/">findings</a> of the BASIC Trident Commission became public. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jul/01/trident-nuclear-missile-renewal-study">Trident gets thumbs up in report that will dismay anti-nuclear campaigners</a>, the paper declared. But this story and others like it missed some major reasons for anti-nuclear campaigners to be positive in the face of an ongoing nuclear threat.</p>
<p>Three years ago, BASIC (British American Security Information Council), which I chair, brought together several members of the UK foreign policy and defence establishment of different political persuasions to investigate the arguments for and against Britain’s retention of a nuclear deterrence and the renewal of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/trident-time-to-rethink-britains-nuclear-future-13762">Trident nuclear weapons system</a>. </p>
<p>Perhaps not surprisingly, given its members’ backgrounds, the commission – composed of a former Conservative foreign minister, a former Labour defence secretary, a former leader of the Liberal Democrats, two former diplomats, a scientist, a general, and an academic – concluded that Britain must retain its nuclear weapons to deter what they perceive as tangible threats to national security. </p>
<p>But a closer reading reveals the significant distance travelled in the thinking of <a href="http://www.nti.org/about/leadership-staff/des-browne/">Des Browne</a>, <a href="http://www.malcolmrifkind.com">Malcolm Rikfind</a>, <a href="http://www.mingcampbell.org.uk">Ming Campbell</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alyson_Bailes">Alyson Bailes</a>, <a href="http://www.una.org.uk/content/sir-jeremy-greenstock-biography">Jeremy Greenstock</a>, <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/lords/lord-guthrie-of-craigiebank/3608">Charles Guthrie</a>, <a href="http://www.history.qmul.ac.uk/staff/profile/4539-professor-peter-hennessy">Peter Hennessy</a>, and <a href="http://www.ast.cam.ac.uk/%7Emjr/">Martin Rees</a>. The dialogue on Trident and Britain’s nuclear future has been cracked further open, not closed down, by the commission’s findings.</p>
<h2>Britain won’t go it alone</h2>
<p>The commissioners’ argument was based on only three possible scenarios under which an independent nuclear deterrence might be decisive. One, that Russia or another significantly armed nuclear state might aggressively threaten Britain. Two, that a smaller existing or emerging nuclear state might gain global reach and threaten the UK. Or three, that some other existential threat from bio-weapons or an as yet undeveloped weapon of mass destruction might be arrayed against the UK. </p>
<p>In all three scenarios, they conclude, Britain’s nuclear weapons could act as an effective deterrent. Crucially, they discounted the Blair government’s argument that Trident presented some sort of vague insurance policy against an uncertain world. They believed this argument was dangerous and irresponsible.</p>
<p>While anti-nuclear campaigners might decry the headline conclusions that the commission favours retaining Britain’s nuclear deterrence, they should actually be encouraged by the soft underbelly of the reasons given . It’s worth noting that the commissioners did not agree over the relative probability of the three scenarios they observed, nor the degree to which having a British nuclear deterrence would prove relevant in their prevention.</p>
<p>The commissioners contend that “we cannot expect the United States to shoulder indefinitely the awesome responsibilities that lie in providing extended nuclear deterrence to Europe”, yet where is the evidence that the US would withdraw its commitments should the UK or any other NATO ally face the sort of threats described above? </p>
<p>Indeed, the commissioners conclude: “The relationship with the United States is critical to the maintenance of our nuclear programme and to the broader credibility of the UK’s security and place in the world.” Essentially then, Britain would <em>not</em> have to face these threats alone, and its nuclear programme would lack credibility if they did have to go solo in this barely imagined future.</p>
<h2>The road to disarmament</h2>
<p>So the real headlines coming out of the Trident commission should be about the absolute rejection of some of the conventional arguments in favour of Trident renewal. The commissioners dismiss the claim that Britain’s status as a global power is dependent upon retaining its nuclear weapons. They also reject the economic arguments concerning jobs and the potential impact on British industry.</p>
<p>Fundamentally, the commission advocates for Britain to take a leadership role in the journey towards disarmament. It recognises unequivocally that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A world with fewer nuclear weapons and fewer states that possess them is not only a safer world if achieved in a stable and controlled manner, it would also be a very large gain directly for global security.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Even more strikingly, the commissioners agreed, “a world with no nuclear weapons would be a bigger gain still”.</p>
<p>The Trident Commission then, in passages missed entirely by the extensive press coverage last week, has argued for the British government to consider reductions in warhead numbers and changes to its targeting positions; have a stronger policy that makes clear the UK would not threaten the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or under threat or attack from chemical or biological weapons; and potentially step away from the belief that at least one of our nuclear armed submarines must be on patrol at all times.</p>
<p>Most significant of all, perhaps, the commissioners believe that the Government should consider a further delay to the final decision to renew Trident that is due in 2016. As they make clear, there could be great advantages from further delay in terms of costs, technological developments, and the diplomatic successes that might be possible to make renewal unnecessary. The commission has effectively thrown open the debate on Trident renewal and raised questions about almost every assumption relating to the conviction that Britain absolutely must retain its nuclear weapons, no matter what, and that the decision for renewal must be made soon.</p>
<h2>The threat we can’t ignore</h2>
<p>This process over the past three years has taught me without doubt, that if we cannot speak openly and honestly with those with whom we assume we disagree, and challenge each other’s perceptions and prejudices, then we will never overcome the massive obstacles we face in dealing with threats to our security. </p>
<p>Britain’s role can appear small and insignificant. But I believe the Trident commissioners’ ability to confront their own assumptions about our nuclear future, consider alternatives, and challenge the conventional, is something we can all learn from. We may not agree with their conclusions. We may be sad, or disappointed, that they have not gone further in their thinking about how to achieve the multilateral disarmament they espouse, but they have started a dialogue that we cannot afford to let fall silent.</p>
<p>The final decision to renew Trident is just two years away. We must make sure that this report is not the end but the beginning of what could be one of the most important debates this country has ever had.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28882/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Trevor McCrisken is Chair of BASIC (British American Security Information Council). The opinions stated here are his personal reflections, not those of the organisation.</span></em></p>Ever since I was a teenager in the renewed Cold War of the 1980s, I have feared losing not only my life, but the lives of everyone, absolutely everyone, in a nuclear conflagration. It is easy to forget…Trevor McCrisken, Associate Professor, US Politics and International Studies, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/287522014-07-03T05:01:31Z2014-07-03T05:01:31ZScotland Decides ’14: could Salmond shift on retaining nuclear weapons?<p>One long-running sore in the Scottish independence referendum campaign concerns the future UK’s nuclear deterrent. Scottish Nationalists say an independent Scotland <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28113133">will no longer house</a> any of the UK’s nuclear arsenal at Faslane and Coulport. The party <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/referendum-news/scottish-constitution-would-ban-nuclear-weapons.19078977">even wants</a> the anti-nuclear stance written into the proposed Scottish constitution. </p>
<p>Recently the party’s position on nuclear was called into question when the <a href="http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCYQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.heraldscotland.com%2Fpolitics%2Freferendum-news%2Fblow-for-snp-after-new-poll-reveals-support-for-trident.24514174&ei=0jK0U_aKGeiK7Ab35IFI&usg=AFQjCNEOEPkoUt1UwYvQG2JvV44fN3SeSw&bvm=bv.70138588,d.ZGU">latest British Social Attitudes survey indicated</a> that the Scottish public possibly had a more pro-nuclear stance. With the UK Trident Commission <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-28098583">this week proposing</a> that the country should maintain its nuclear capability, we asked our panel where this issue was heading. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Trevor Salmon, Emeritus Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen</strong></p>
<p>It is all very well for the SNP to argue that an independent Scotland would join NATO because of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-19993694">their conference decision</a>, but the nuclear issue will actually be the key. You could argue that only three of NATO’s members possess nuclear weapons; that Norway and Denmark have national legislation that does not allow nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime; and that about 20 neither possess or host nuclear weapons. But that misses the point. </p>
<p>Norway, Denmark and many of those other nuclear-free countries joined NATO in a different era. The Danes and Norwegians both joined in 1949, at a time when the cold war had just begun and the priority for the allies was to assemble a broad defence base. The Americans may not have liked their positions, but they were willing to tolerate them at the time. That wouldn’t necessarily be the case now. </p>
<p>When you join NATO you undertake a formal obligation to respect and meet the political, legal and military obligations and commitments, and to accept all of its principles, policies and procedures previously adopted by members. This means that every member accepts the alliance’s nuclear first-strike capability, if NATO is losing a conventional war.</p>
<p>One question that Alex Salmond has never answered is whether if NATO tried to use nuclear weapons, would he attempt to veto it. Of course in reality everyone knows that although the veto may be implied by the fact that NATO is supposed to act by consensus, there would be no veto in practice. The US and Iceland are not equal. All the same, NATO will not allow a state that is philosophically against nuclear weapons to join. If the answer to the Salmond question is yes, NATO would never let him in. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/lords/lord-robertson-of-port-ellen/672">Lord Robertson</a> has said, other states that have applied to join NATO since 1989, such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, were told to resolve territorial and other disputes so that they did not import problems with their neighbours into NATO
. </p>
<p>The whole question of nuclear weapons in Scotland would require long and complex negotiations. It would be unrealistic to suppose that the British PM and government would easily give up Faslane’s nuclear facilities. There may be a proposal for a constitutional legally binding guarantee to close down the nuclear facilities under an SNP government by 2020, but there is no political mileage for the British PM to agree to this – not if they wish to win the British election after 2015!</p>
<p>As well as the theological and philosophical arguments about having nuclear weapons, there are also political arguments. Sweden has long argued that its decision not to go down the nuclear route added to its status in the world and gave it leverage. But it must be said that Norway has played a key role in the Middle East rather than Sweden.</p>
<p><strong>Michael Keating, Professor of Politics, University of Aberdeen</strong></p>
<p>The most recent British Social Attitudes survey didn’t show that the Scots wanted to keep Trident, contrary to how it was reported in <a href="http://www.jackiebaillie.co.uk/new-poll-shows-more-scots-want-to-keep-trident">some quarters</a>. A majority were opposed to Britain having nuclear weapons, which is also what previous surveys have shown.</p>
<p>When they were asked whether nuclear weapons should stay in Scotland after independence, a slightly higher proportion agreed than disagreed. But I would not put too much weight on this. It just means that most voters are relaxed about compromises with the UK after independence. The SNP are not out of line with Scottish opinion here. If the unionists are going to make that an argument, it’s probably not going to be a winning argument.</p>
<p>It’s hard to imagine the SNP abandoning its commitment to remove Trident as it is a core issue for many in the party. The Labour party is divided on nuclear weapons. The Conservatives could talk about it, but of course they don’t have a lot of credibility in Scotland.</p>
<p>Perhaps for these reasons, the unionists have been a little bit quiet on this subject. When they talk about Trident, the focus is usually on jobs rather than arguing it’s necessary because we are going to use it or because it’s essential for British defence. The argument about defence in general also rapidly becomes one about jobs.</p>
<p>I don’t think anybody thinks that the weapons would go by 2020. There would probably be some sort of transitional arrangement. During that time, the UK might have changed its mind about Trident altogether.</p>
<p>I still have difficulty in believing that the UK is going to spend up to £100bn on a weapons system it’s never going to use. It begs credibility, particularly when most the armed forces don’t want it, and are being deprived of resources for basic kit. It seems a gigantic national prestige project.</p>
<p>That’s probably why there’s quite a lot of scepticism about the whole thing. At some point, a British government will likely say this is going to be a waste of money. Scottish independence might provoke it, or it may not. The whole debate seems slightly unreal to me.</p>
<p>As far as NATO is concerned, nobody is really paying attention to what the two sides are saying. If people think about it at all, they assume Scotland would get in since nobody has an interest in creating a hole in NATO coverage.</p>
<p>This debate does tell us something about the wider referendum campaign. If you look at public opinion in Scotland, there’s not a lot of support for independence in a hard sense. People want control of domestic policy, of welfare and taxation. They are not that interested in getting control of defence policy, which is perhaps one reason why this does not look like a make-or-break issue for the electorate.</p>
<p><em>To read other editions of Scotland Decides ‘14, click <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/scotland-decides-14">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28752/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael receives funding from the economic and social research council</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Trevor Salmon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>One long-running sore in the Scottish independence referendum campaign concerns the future UK’s nuclear deterrent. Scottish Nationalists say an independent Scotland will no longer house any of the UK’s…Michael Keating, Chair in Scottish Politics, University of AberdeenTrevor Salmon, Emeritus Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/137622013-05-15T23:57:30Z2013-05-15T23:57:30ZTrident: time to rethink Britain’s nuclear future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/23323/original/rg7vtyhc-1367937436.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=225%2C214%2C2656%2C1964&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sorry captain, I thought the big red button made it go faster.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA/Andy Buchanan</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Coalition government is pressing ahead with a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/39252/191212a_uk_future_nuc_deter2012_update.pdf">long, expensive and controversial programme</a> to replace the Trident nuclear weapon system beginning with the procurement of a new fleet of submarines armed with ballistic missiles. But serious questions have been asked about the necessity of staying in the nuclear weapons business and whether a like-for-like replacement of the current system is the most appropriate policy.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9843848/The-alternatives-to-Trident-carry-an-enormous-risk.html">Conservatives</a> and <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9900234/There-is-no-magic-alternative-to-Trident-Britain-has-got-to-keep-it.html">significant Labour figures</a> such as John Hutton and George Robertson insist it is. They maintain it is essential for UK security to continue to deploy a fleet of dedicated submarines, one of which is always at sea ready to fire up 40 thermonuclear warheads. The Liberal Democrats have <a href="http://www.libdems.org.uk/siteFiles/resources/docs/News/MCTrident%20Review.pdf">questioned this logic</a> and are developing options for a smaller, cheaper replacement through a government-sanctioned <a href="http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/basic_ritchie_beyond_trident_report.pdf">Trident Alternatives Study</a>. </p>
<p>Yet the strategic security case for retaining nuclear weapons is thin and the opportunity costs for the Ministry of Defence are significant as its budget is cut. Meanwhile, the world is looking for leadership on nuclear disarmament and the public is <a href="http://www.populus.co.uk/uploads/download_pdf-220207-More-4-News-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf">ambivalent</a> at best.</p>
<p>Supporters of Trident’s replacement talk about “future uncertainty”, arguing we had better hang on to our nuclear weapons just in case. If the costs were minimal and the effect of our retaining nuclear weapons benign, all well and good. But that is not the case.</p>
<h2>Counting the cost</h2>
<p>The costs involved are significant: £25 billion to replace the current system, plus £2-3 billion per year to operate it. This is a big chunk of the ministry’s budget at a time when <a href="http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Briefing_Mid_Term_Blues.pdf">it is shrinking</a>. It means if we replace Trident we will not be able to procure other, arguably more relevant and useful, conventional military capabilities. </p>
<p>So it is necessary to question whether Trident is an appropriate investment given the types of security threats we have a pretty good idea we are going to face over the coming decades. These include a range of transnational and sub-national security threats arising from the effects of climate change, socio-economic inequality, resource scarcity, nationalism or exclusivist ideologies and failed or failing states.</p>
<p>We have limited defence resources with which to confront these challenges. Nuclear weapons provide little solution to the types of conflict and security challenges resulting from current and projected diverse and interdependent sources of insecurity.</p>
<h2>Thinking the unthinkable</h2>
<p>We must also ask whether it could ever be right to use our nuclear weapons to inflict devastation upon another society. We have made an abiding commitment that we would only ever use nuclear weapons in accordance with international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict. </p>
<p>We have explicitly accepted the judgment of the 1996 International Court of Justice <a href="http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=498&code=unan&p1=3&p2=4&case=95&k=e1&p3=5">Advisory Opinion</a> on the “legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons” that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law”. This holds that the only circumstances in which nuclear use might be lawful is in “an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake”. </p>
<p>Advocates of Trident replacement urge us to look to the long-term, to mid-century and beyond, where we simply cannot predict with any degree of certainty what the world will look like. But the further ahead we look the starker the choice we face becomes. We know we cannot escape uncertainty, but we face, in the end, living with the uncertainties of one of two nuclear futures. </p>
<p>The first is what Ken Booth calls “<a href="http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/booth_the_choice.pdf">radical nuclear multipolarity</a>”: an unstable nuclear world in which the multiple security challenges we know we are going to face are suffused with nuclear weapons across a growing number of states with unsecured stockpiles of material that is in turn keenly eyed by non-state actors. </p>
<p>The alternative is building global institutions to facilitate a world free of nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>A like-for-like Trident replacement will inevitably reinforce the logic of nuclear deterrence and the attractiveness of nuclear weapons, revalidate nuclear weapons as an essential currency of power in international politics, and reproduce a global nuclear system moving inexorably toward radical nuclear multipolarity with all the dangers that entails. Our retention of nuclear weapons is not cheap and it is certainly not benign.</p>
<p>But our political masters do not tend to think in decades. For them the next election is always around the corner. Trident is and always has been a heavily politicised issue. Labour continues to see electoral liability in stepping away from anything other than the nuclear status quo. The Conservatives (and many in Labour) wrap our nuclear weapons in a cloak of “major powerdom”, or what Tony Blair called being a “<a href="http://www.economist.com/node/930018">pivotal</a>” power on the world stage. Being a nuclear weapon state, for them, is part of who we are and how we act in the world. It is about elite conceptions of national role, status, influence, responsibility, power, and credibility (not least in Washington). </p>
<p>Nuclear business-as-usual is Whitehall’s default setting. But questions of cost, public support, relevance, and global leadership towards a world free of nuclear weapons are raising serious obstacles along that path.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/13762/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Ritchie receives funding from Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and the Economic and Social Research Council. He is affiliated with British Pugwash Group (Hon. Secretary); Nuclear Information Service (board member); Project on Nuclear Issues at the Royal United Services Institutes (board member).</span></em></p>The Coalition government is pressing ahead with a long, expensive and controversial programme to replace the Trident nuclear weapon system beginning with the procurement of a new fleet of submarines armed…Nick Ritchie, Lecturer (International Security), University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.