tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/tripoli-25065/articlesTripoli – The Conversation2020-01-23T07:55:41Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1303912020-01-23T07:55:41Z2020-01-23T07:55:41ZWhy ‘too many cooks in the kitchen’ could inhibit a peace deal in Libya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311326/original/file-20200122-117917-pv057k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">German Chancellor Angela Merkel speaks with Russian President Vladimir Putin during the International Libya Conference in Berlin, Germany, 19 January 2020</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/ALEXEI NIKOLSKY/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Libya has been deeply unstable, with outside powers providing support to rival armed factions since Muammar Gaddafi <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/aljazeeratop102011/2011/12/20111226114023696528.html">was toppled</a> in a 2011 uprising. In an attempt to break the cycle of violence, world leaders attended a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/berlin-libya-peace-summit-agrees-on-commitment-to-un-arms-embargo/a-52058307">peace summit in Germany</a> at which they agreed to uphold a UN arms embargo and end military backing for the North African country’s warring factions. Moina Spooner from The Conversation Africa asked Jacob Mundy for some background.</em></p>
<p><strong>Would you use the description ‘failed state’ to describe Libya?</strong></p>
<p>I wouldn’t use the term failed state. I would say it’s a divided state. </p>
<p>In Tripoli you have a United Nations-recognised executive authority called the Presidency Council. It is chaired by Fayez Serraj. The authority is backed by powerful militias and interest groups, mainly in the west of the country, as well as Turkey and Qatar. </p>
<p>In the east there’s a parliament that supports Khalifa Haftar, who has managed to build a powerful rival coalition of militias called the Libyan National Army. This has enabled him to extend nominal authority over most of Libya since 2014 – albeit with significant fiscal and military aid from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and at times France and Russia. </p>
<p>Haftar’s supporters often frame him as the best option for stability in Libya. Libya is also caught up in a complex regional struggle – as was Syria – where countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt appear to be on one side with Turkey and Qatar on the other. France and Russia have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260903327451?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=fcsp20">historically</a> been major arms suppliers to Libya, a role they would like to continue once a friendly government is in place.</p>
<p>Since April last year Haftar has been engaged in a ‘final assault’ on Tripoli. It is this fighting that tends to get all the international attention. </p>
<p>But there’s a lot more going on. Even after nearly a decade of civil war, there are still local and national state institutions that function, though the quality and legitimacy of those institutions varies a lot across the country. </p>
<p>There are also economic development initiatives, foreign investments, infrastructural projects and – recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-oil/oil-slides-as-iea-surplus-forecast-overshadows-libya-disruption-idUSKBN1ZL04K">disruptions</a> aside – Libya often exports as much oil now as it did before the 2011 uprising.</p>
<p>It’s a complicated, often paradoxical picture in Libya today. One that easily defies descriptors, like ‘failed state’, or comparisons with other conflicts, like the war in Syria.</p>
<p><strong>What are the main drivers that have got the country into this state?</strong></p>
<p>The country experienced great national unity during the <a href="https://guides.library.cornell.edu/arab_spring/Libya">Arab Spring</a> revolution in 2011 which resulted in <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20191020-remembering-the-death-of-muammar-gaddafi/">the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi’s government</a>. But this quickly dissipated as new and old ideological fissures deepened. There were long repressed movements – like the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood – that were determined never to see the return of anything like the Gaddafi regime. On the other hand, many communities felt that the 2011 uprising was being used as an excuse for all kinds of violence aimed at marginalising former regime elements and plundering the state. </p>
<p>As Libya became more insecure, more militias formed. Though some wanted to become professionalised security forces, others simply became extortion rackets and got involved in criminal activities. They looted state assets and basically held the country hostage. </p>
<p>A major problem was not only the lack of a legitimate transitional national authority, but also the lack of a neutral third party – like a multilateral peace-building mission – to disarm the militias. </p>
<p>The post-revolutionary fissures in Libya cracked wide open when an election in 2014 proved to be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-parliament/libya-faces-chaos-as-top-court-rejects-elected-assembly-idUSKBN0IQ0YF20141106">so indecisive</a> that two competing governments emerged. It was also the year in which Haftar launched his military campaign from the east of the country.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/libya-conflict-boils-down-to-the-man-driving-the-war-khalifa-haftar-115192">Libya conflict boils down to the man driving the war -- Khalifa Haftar</a>
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<p>His latest assault on Tripoli shows that his aim is to impose military rule over the rest of the country, as he has done in the east.</p>
<p><strong>Which countries are best placed to broker peace, and why?</strong></p>
<p>The biggest question in Libya today is whether the key external enablers of the conflict can also be peacemakers. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/point-blank-egypt-russia-uae-arms-libya-haftar-191112084552422.html">United Arab Emirates and Egypt</a> are Haftar’s strongest enablers. Russia also offered assistance to Haftar’s forces, notably a contingent of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/libyan-officials-cite-evidence-russian-mercenaries-war-191205083745552.html">mercenaries</a> that helped stave off his defeat in Tripoli this fall.</p>
<p>On the other side, Turkey and Qatar are important conduits of support for the coalition backing Serraj’s administration. Turkey has made matters worse by <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1605396/middle-east">sending veterans</a> of the Syrian civil war to Libya to bolster Serraj’s forces. </p>
<p>Despite this complexity, it’s nevertheless encouraging that Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, and Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51166247">recently joined</a> Germany’s effort to enact a ceasefire. </p>
<p>Recently, the US has appeared to be supportive of the process in Berlin. But the Trump administration’s position has, for the most part, been ambiguous and not helpful. </p>
<p>Key to peace in Libya is support by states, and the Security Council, of the UN arms embargo. Since the beginning of the uprising in 2011, there has been an arms embargo on Libya, which is still present. Yet <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/09/un-says-member-states-violating-libya-arms-embargo">year after year</a>, a panel of UN experts consistently reveals the extent to which both light and heavy arms – from armoured personnel carriers to drones – have found their way from other states to the frontlines in Libya. </p>
<p>The most grotesque aspect of the civil war in Libya has been the naked violations of the embargo. But even if there was political will to enforce it, most arms come through Libya’s vast and porous land borders, not by sea. Countries like Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia would have to help enforce the embargo, but they are some of the worst violators.</p>
<p><strong>Is peace possible, and what are the biggest stumbling blocks?</strong></p>
<p>A real ceasefire would be a good start, but a comprehensive peace agreement is a long way off. The Libyan peace process has suffered from a lack of effective international leadership and a case of ‘too many cooks in the kitchen’. </p>
<p>Currently German leadership is perhaps the only viable option, as Russian, French, Italian, Turkish, Arab and Maghreb-led initiatives have all suffered from being viewed as overly biased or weak. Germany might the best option to manage all of the players in the Libyan crisis. </p>
<p>But having come so close to taking the capital, it’s difficult to imagine Haftar giving up easily. It’s also difficult to imagine progress towards a comprehensive and durable peace without a more robust UN presence in Libya, one that not only has a serious disarmament mandate but also a mandate to enforce an arms embargo.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130391/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacob Mundy received funding from the Fulbright Scholar Program to teach at the Université de Tunis and study the modern political history of Libya</span></em></p>Can the key external enablers of Libya’s conflict also be peacemakers?Jacob Mundy, Associate Professor, Colgate UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1151922019-04-10T08:20:20Z2019-04-10T08:20:20ZLibya conflict boils down to the man driving the war – Khalifa Haftar<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268554/original/file-20190410-2918-1mnlhy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Militants stand on gun-mounted vehicles as they prepare to move to the frontline to join forces loyal to the UN-backed unity government, in Tripoli.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>There’s been <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/04/1036261">an escalation</a> of conflict in Libya. Fighting has moved to the outskirts of the capital, Tripoli, and the United Nations has called for a ceasefire. Moina Spooner from The Conversation Africa spoke to Jacob Mundy, author of a recent book on <a href="http://politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9781509518722">Libya’s ongoing civil conflict</a>, about what’s happening and what can be done to end the clashes.</em></p>
<p><strong>How bad is the situation in Libya and is the whole country affected?</strong></p>
<p>This appears to be the most serious escalation in the fighting since the current <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-libyas-new-elections-might-not-put-the-country-back-on-track-97700">Libyan civil war</a> started in 2014. This war emerged when the end of Muammar Gaddafi’s longstanding regime created a vacuum that various factions tried to fill. </p>
<p>Today Libya is divided between two political-military authorities: a parliament in the east backed by Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army, which now controls large swathes of territory, and an internationally recognised executive in Tripoli backed by militias largely based in the capital and the region around it. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-idUSKCN1RL0ZN">Recent reports</a> show that nearly 50 people have been killed and over 180 wounded. </p>
<p>Initially, the fighting was mainly on the outskirts of Tripoli but it now appears that there’s fighting in other locations <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/suffering-grows-from-libya-conflict-jihadists-exploit-vacuum-idUSKCN1RL0ZN?il=0">further east</a> and in the <a href="https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/gunmen-attack-fuqaha-town-al-jufra-central-libya">south, near the Sahara</a>. But these are scattered incidents.</p>
<p>A serious concern is the possibility of a long, drawn-out siege of the capital. In recent years this happened in Libya’s largest second city, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde19/0001/2015/en/">Benghazi</a>, as well as the smaller towns of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/22/libya-civilians-caught-tightening-siege">Derna</a> and <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/alive-and-kicking-sirte-rebuilds-ruins-war">Sirte</a>. All three suffered enormous infrastructural damage and witnessed significant violations of the civilian populations’ rights at the hands of the militias and terrorists fighting for control. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/13-hours-what-actually-happened-at-the-us-consulate-in-benghazi-53832">13 Hours: what actually happened at the US consulate in Benghazi</a>
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<p>The wider metropolitan area of the capital is home to nearly <a href="https://www.cia.gov/LIBRARY/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_ly.html">a third</a> of all Libyans, so the threat to noncombatants —- like the recent surprise <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24462&LangID=E">aerial assault</a> on the civilian airport -— is very real.</p>
<p><strong>What groups are involved?</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27492354">Haftar</a> leads the forces behind the current assault on the capital. A veteran of the Libyan war in Chad in the 1970s and 1980s, he later became an exiled opponent of the regime and reportedly worked with the US Central Intelligence Agency. In 2011, he joined the rebellion against Gaddafi.</p>
<p>In 2014 Haftar <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-libyas-new-elections-might-not-put-the-country-back-on-track-97700">created an</a> alliance of militias to restore security in Benghazi. After the 2011 revolution, Libya witnessed a proliferation of militias, including violent Islamist ones with ties to Al-Qaida and the Islamic State. Haftar and his supporters accused Libya’s interim leaders of turning a blind eye to this growing menace.</p>
<p>Haftar’s forces are called the Libyan National Army. But, like all such security forces in Libya today, this army is really a coalition of militias. The increasingly professional look of Haftar’s troops and equipment is a result of the <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190406-haftar-attacking-tripoli-with-egyptian-uae-and-saudi-arms-libya-general-claims/">support</a> he gets from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. He appears to enjoy <a href="https://intpolicydigest.org/2019/04/01/libyan-general-haftar-s-visit-to-saudi-arabia/">Saudi</a> and <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/04/russia-libya-crisis0hifter-putin.html">Russian support</a>, too. Even France has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190405-libya-khalifa-haftar-west-france-silence-military-tripoli">coordinated with</a> Haftar on counter-terrorism matters. </p>
<p>In terms of domestic politics, Haftar is backed by Libya’s House of Representatives, the country’s interim legislature, which has been based in the east of the country since the civil war broke out in 2014.</p>
<p>Haftar’s assault is officially targeting militias that he describes as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/libya-haftar-ultimate-goal-fear-full-blown-war-190405214022194.html">“terrorists”</a> in the capital. But in reality his opponents are the <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/libya-tripolis-militia-cartel/">various militias</a> that have controlled Tripoli for a number of years, including forces from the powerful city of Misrata. Many of these militias are allied to Libya’s internationally-recognised executive authority, headed by Fayez Serraj.</p>
<p><strong>What has led to the recent escalation of violence?</strong></p>
<p>It’s unclear what exactly triggered Haftar’s sudden move to “liberate” Tripoli. His recent military successes in the east and the south have been the result of months of logistical and social preparation —- that is, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/189-after-showdown-libyas-oil-crescent">building alliances</a> with potential allies in the places he seeks to conquer. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/general-hifters-march-tripoli">Some think</a> that Haftar wanted to disrupt an important UN peace conference that had been planned for this month. Given the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/01/while-you-werent-looking-general-haftar-has-been-taking-over-libya-oil-united-nations/">collapse</a> of talks between Haftar and Serraj earlier this year, Haftar could be seeking to impose himself militarily in the face of opposition to his inclusion in the current or future government of Libya.</p>
<p>Those opposed to Haftar <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/03/19/a-minister-a-general-militias-libyas-shifting-balance-of-power/">view him</a> as a potential military dictator, though the forces that seized Tripoli in 2014 and ejected the internationally recognised parliament were to a degree working with the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, which is backed by Turkey and Qatar. </p>
<p>More broadly, there are <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/03/19/a-minister-a-general-militias-libyas-shifting-balance-of-power/">concerns</a> in Libya that the old Gaddafi regime will try to reconstitute itself through people like Haftar. However, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/libya-haftar-ultimate-goal-fear-full-blown-war-190405214022194.html">Haftar and some of his supporters feel</a> that hardline revolutionaries and Islamists have sidelined and antagonised experienced politicians and military leaders because of their roles in the Libyan state before 2011.</p>
<p><strong>Are there any possible solutions?</strong></p>
<p>There is obviously a need for a ceasefire before the situation spirals out of control, though that threshold might have already been crossed. </p>
<p>Donald Trump’s administration in the US <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-removes-troops-from-libya-amid-fighting-in-capital-11554661793">appears</a> to be taking the matter more seriously after deeming Libya not worth its attention for two years. But there are indications that Italy and France are working at <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190122-libya-turns-into-battleground-between-france-and-italy/">cross-purposes</a> in Libya, and Russia may be too. Those with acute leverage over Haftar in Egypt and the Gulf are perhaps the least likely to use it.</p>
<p>The situation will also be very difficult to deescalate because Haftar’s apparent all-or-nothing blitz has painted him into a corner. Those who voiced concern that he wanted to impose himself as a dictator now have all the proof they need. Whatever various grievances had been driving the conflict in Libya in recent years, it now boils down to one issue —- the Haftar question. This clarity of purpose could be the galvanising force Haftar’s opponents have often lacked.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115192/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacob Mundy is currently a Fulbright Scholar in Tunisia.</span></em></p>A serious concern is the possibility of a long, drawn-out siege of Libya’s capital, Tripoli.Jacob Mundy, Associate Professor, Colgate UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/879072017-11-24T12:24:13Z2017-11-24T12:24:13ZLibya and ICC: not indicting Khalifa Haftar makes mockery of international justice<p>The International Criminal Court (ICC) is <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/international-law-group-filed-icc-case-against-haftar-accusing-him-war-crimes-511971722">under pressure</a> to prosecute Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar for crimes against humanity during the civil war that has devastated the country. London-based human rights lawyers Guernica 37 submitted a dossier to the court about Haftar and his forces that included allegations of torture, summary executions and excessive destruction. </p>
<p>Field Marshal Haftar is head of the Libyan National Army, the Western-backed force that helped overthrow former president Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. He is closely allied to the government based in the eastern city of Tobruk, which controls much of the country’s oil fields and has long refused to cooperate with the UN-endorsed rival administration in Tripoli led by Fayez al-Sarraj, the prime minister. </p>
<p>Yet regardless of the strength of the case against Haftar, the chances of him being prosecuted look slim. When it comes to pursuing would-be war criminals through the ICC, politics has a habit of getting in the way. Sadly, Libya is well on the way to becoming the archetypal example. </p>
<h2>Selective indictments</h2>
<p>Libya is not a party to the ICC’s <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf">founding statute</a>, but the court has jurisdiction over the territory thanks to a <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya">referral</a> from the UN Security Council in 2011. So far the ICC has issued five Libya-related arrest warrants, starting with three in the year of the referral: against <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?uri=1099321">Gaddafi himself</a>, his son <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/11-01/11-3">Saif al-Islam</a>, and his brother-in-law and former head of intelligence <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?uri=1099332">Abdullah al-Senussi</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195863/original/file-20171122-6039-ru7dyz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195863/original/file-20171122-6039-ru7dyz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195863/original/file-20171122-6039-ru7dyz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195863/original/file-20171122-6039-ru7dyz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195863/original/file-20171122-6039-ru7dyz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195863/original/file-20171122-6039-ru7dyz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=854&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195863/original/file-20171122-6039-ru7dyz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=854&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195863/original/file-20171122-6039-ru7dyz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=854&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Mahmoud el-Werfalli.</span>
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<p>Two years later, in 2013, the court issued a warrant against <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya/khaled">Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled</a>, former head of the internal security agency. It wasn’t until this August that it indicted someone not connected to the Gaddafi regime – <a href="https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/08/15/international-criminal-court-issues-arrest-warrant-for-saiqas-mahmoud-warfali/">Mahmoud el-Werfalli</a>, the field commander of the Special Forces Brigade (Al-Saiqa). </p>
<p>El-Werfalli is answerable to Haftar through Al-Saiqa’s close affiliation with the Libyan National Army. Indeed, the ICC chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda recently <a href="https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/icc-prosecutor-urges-handover-al-saiqa-brigade-commander-others-wanted-alleged-crimes-libya">directly appealed</a> to Haftar to have el-Werfalli turned over, since he is accused of the torture and murder of 33 people in Benghazi. </p>
<p>Yet neither el-Werfalli nor the other indicted men have been brought to The Hague for trial. All but Gaddafi are alive, but the continuing chaos has made it difficult for police and security forces to extradite them. Many <a href="https://www.globalresearch.ca/libyan-rebels-and-international-criminal-court-icc-battle-over-seif-al-islam-gaddafis-son/5337498">have also criticised</a> the ICC for being political in its pursuits and practising one-sided justice that has favoured the anti-Gaddafi forces and ultimately the UN Security Council member states. </p>
<p>The reality is that war crimes have almost certainly been committed by all sides in this bloody conflict. Besides Guernica 37, another outfit named Lawyers for Justice in Libya, based in London and Tripoli, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/nov/04/iccs-investigation-libya-war-crimes-male-rape-court-hague-trial">has been</a> urging the court to be “more proactive” against claims of countless atrocities against civilians, including systematic male rape. Equally, the ICC should arguably look at the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-europe-33854238/libya-s-migrants-treated-like-animals">callous treatment</a> of migrants in Libyan detention centres, since this too could qualify as a war crime. </p>
<h2>Politics before justice?</h2>
<p>The ICC’s reputation in Libya was not helped by allegations that its former chief prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ocampo-affair-the-former-icc-chief-s-dubious-libyan-ties-a-1171195.html">allegedly</a> had business ties to a man closely linked to Haftar. It raises questions about whether it helped the warlord avoid indictment in the earlier years of the civil war.</p>
<p>After Ocampo was replaced by Fatou Bensouda in 2012, the policy of pursuing only Gaddafi henchmen appeared to continue. This year’s decision to indict el-Werfalli was on the face of it a welcome change of direction. Yet that happened after Bensouda paid a <a href="https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/10/07/2017/Foreign-Minister-meets-Chief-Prosecutor-of-ICC">controversial visit</a> to Qatar in July and met with the country’s foreign minister and emir, prompting <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/31/will-the-international-criminal-courts-latest-target-in-libya-be-brought-to-justice/?utm_term=.a2cfba7caa9d">claims</a> the two events were linked.</p>
<p>Qatar has allegedly played a very important role throughout the Libyan conflict <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/giorgio-cafiero/the-uae-and-qatar-wage-a-_b_8801602.html">by supporting</a>, alongside Turkey, the Islamist factions that have been fighting Haftar’s army. In turn, the eastern government of Libya has been <a href="https://www.middleeastobserver.org/2017/05/12/libya-uae-uses-us-made-warplanes-to-support-the-russian-backed-khalifa-haftar/">backed by</a> the likes of United Arab Emirates, the Saudis, Egypt and the Russians. When the Saudis and several other Middle Eastern countries <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism">cut off</a> diplomatic relations with Qatar in June, so did Tobruk. </p>
<p>The reactions of France, the UK and the US to the latest pressure on Haftar have been striking – bear in mind they are three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council that gave the ICC jurisdiction in Libya. When the court indicted el-Werfalli, these countries issued a joint statement <a href="https://www.middleeastobserver.org/2017/08/20/39232/">welcoming</a> an announcement from Haftar that he would investigate the claims against his subordinate. The statement made no explicit reference to the ICC or the arrest warrant, in a sign that the West was not backing Bensouda’s move. </p>
<p>In the face of the more recent calls for Haftar himself to be prosecuted, the same countries have been silent. With the French president, <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/libya-pm-serraj-rival-ceasefire-agreement-paris-france-conference-macron">Emmanuel Macron</a>, and the UK foreign secretary, <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/boris-johnson-meets-libyan-renegade-general-khalifa-haftar-510069746">Boris Johnson</a>, both having held talks with Haftar in recent months, the West appears to have decided that any lasting peace requires his involvement. </p>
<p>This makes the ICC’s pursuit of el-Werfalli a mystery – putting pressure on Haftar and his henchmen via the court may undermine the warlord’s likely candidacy in next spring’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/07/libyan-rivals-agree-to-a-ceasefire-and-elections/534897/">presidential elections</a>. All the same, Haftar’s strong international support should ensure he is not indicted personally. The longer the court ignores him, the stronger the sense that prevailing political conditions are more relevant to ICC business in Libya than protecting and promoting human rights. </p>
<p>The ICC should operate in a fair manner free of double standards, but time and again it has failed to do so. Numerous African countries <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Claims-of-ICC-bias-and-double-standards-at-ASP-annual-meeting/2558-3467836-4h8fb2z/index.html">have objected</a> to the disproportionate number of indictments against black leaders while, for example, Tony Blair has never been pursued over Iraq. Meanwhile, the ICC’s selective interventions in Uganda <a href="http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Topics/Dealing_with_the_Past/Resources/Parrott_Louise_The_Role_of_the_International_Criminal_Court.pdf">have prompted</a> criticisms that it prioritises peace over justice. </p>
<p>The truth is that the international community’s attitude to justice and accountability risks fostering a culture of impunity for human rights violations. At best, non-Western countries take the ICC’s pronouncements with a pinch of salt. At worst, they see it as a modern vehicle for Western imperialism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87907/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilia Xypolia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Libyan warlord and presidential hopeful looks likely to avoid a summons to The Hague.Ilia Xypolia, Research fellow, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/799432017-07-02T08:36:35Z2017-07-02T08:36:35ZNews of Saif al-Islam’s release: regional politics fuels rumour mill in Libya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175848/original/file-20170627-24749-zt2h9r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saif al-Islam, son of late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The release of Saif al-Islam son of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi dominated the media for several days <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-40236808">in early June</a>. But the saga of Saif’s unconfirmed release fits right into broader regional politics and the contest for power and influence by countries in the region. </p>
<p>Libya descended into chaos following the overthrow and killing of its long time leader Gaddafi in 2011 after <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8838340/Libya-rebellion-timeline.html">a popular uprising</a>. Several militias and groups emerged after Gaddafi’s death seizing <a href="https://pure.abdn.ac.uk:8443/ws/files/68607751/The_rocky_road_ahead_to_peace_the_Arab_U.pdf">different regions of the country</a>. </p>
<p>In the 2011 conflict it was the NATO invasion that changed the balance of power in Libya. Today it’s the diplomatic, financial and material support that the local rival actors receive from external interests that’s shaping the power game in the country. The two main players are the eastern-based factional Tobruk government which is aligned with the self-styled Libya National Army of General Khalifa Haftar, and the UN-backed government in the capital, Tripoli.</p>
<p>Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have been very active in the Libyan conflict. Under the goal set by Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to eradicate terrorism, its military aligns with the Tobruk-based government and Haftar forces. Cairo has consistently violated the UN-imposed arms embargo in their efforts to support the Haftar forces with weapons among other things <a href="http://undocs.org/S/2017/466">as the latest</a> report by the UN panel of experts illustrates. </p>
<p>The powerful role played by Egypt and the UAE in Libya was also evident in the decision taken by Libya’s Tobruk government to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-libya-idUSKBN18W11M">cut diplomatic ties</a> with Qatar along with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain. </p>
<p>Qatar has also been an important actor in the Libyan conflict. Like Turkey, it has been of accused of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/qatar/11110931/How-Qatar-is-funding-the-rise-of-Islamist-extremists.html">supporting Islamist groups</a> in Libya. Qatar’s involvement in Libyan affairs was noticeable even during the last days of Gaddafi’s regime when it was <a href="http://acdemocracy.org/libya-ali-al-salabi-and-the-re-emerging-muslim-brotherhood/">pressing for the release</a>of members of the Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<p>Qatar’s involvement in the conflict violates the UN imposed embargo as it supplies weapons and provides <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/06/qatar-uae-libya-connection-170612080219306.html">financial support to Islamist-leaning factions</a>, mainly in the western part of the country. </p>
<p>It’s no coincidence that only a few days after the embargo on Qatar by its neighbours Saif was allegedly released. The Libyan conflict has long been considered as a proxy war of Gulf Arab rivalry with the UAE and Qatar backing competing militias in Libya. The timing and the particulars of the release of Saif could only benefit the anti-Qatar camp in Libya, as it could portray the Haftar as the sole conciliatory player in the Libyan conflict who could bring old rivals under his magnanimous protection.</p>
<h2>Complexities</h2>
<p>The Abubaker Sadiq brigade of Libya’s north western city of Zintan where Saif was captured during the uprising announced that it released the former Libyan heir to comply with a new amnesty law issued by the Tobruk government.</p>
<p>But Ibrahim Massud Ali, general prosecutor of the UN-backed and internationally recognised Tripoli-based government, <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/freed-saif-al-islam-qaddafi-still-wanted-by-libya-court-prosecutor">argues</a> that Saif doesn’t fulfil amnesty requirements and that the son of the late Libyan strongman is still wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity. The court issued <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/11-01/11-3">a warrant of arrest</a> for Saif in 2011 before his capture. </p>
<p>In addition, many would see Saif’s release as a huge injustice and a betrayal of the uprisings that sacked his father and put him in captivity since he was one of the most prominent figures in his father’s regime and was touted to be his preferred successor.</p>
<p>On learning of his release Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/15/libya-surrender-saif-al-islam-gaddafi-icc">issued a statement</a> asking that he surrender to the ICC.</p>
<p>It’s unclear how, if he came before the court, Saif’s case would evolve. The ICC may have lost the moral right to try him given the fact that many African governments view it as a <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/icc-now-instrument-imperialism">“tool of Western imperialism”</a>. </p>
<p>The Trump administration’s indifference to the promotion of human rights as a foreign policy objective muddies the water further. And the US has shown more interest in the vast oil reserves of Libya than in the well being of a country that’s become a hotbed for extremists. </p>
<p>Added to this heady mix is Russia’s role with Moscow appearing to have a strong relationship with General Haftar. This only further delegitimises the UN-backed Government of National Accord. </p>
<h2>Propaganda and Information Warfare</h2>
<p>We need to take the news of Saif with a pinch of salt. The past six years of warfare in Libya has also been conducted on the news front too. The fabrication of news has become <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-libya-media-hoax-fabricated-scenes-of-jubilation-and-euphoria-on-green-square/26155">common practice</a>. In the light of this many have <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_CllijYitA">questioned the veracity</a> of reports about Saif’s release. Last time he was seen by independent observers was in the summer of 2014 in Zintan. </p>
<p>So we need to wait to see some visual proof of his release and his status before taking the reports seriously. </p>
<p>Aeschylus, 25 centuries ago, noted that the first casualty of war is truth. This seems to be true of the situation in Libya.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79943/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilia Xypolia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The news of Saif al-Islam’s release should be taken with a pinch of salt. During the past six years of warfare in Libya the fabrication of news has become common practice.Ilia Xypolia, Research fellow, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/551752016-02-23T12:46:43Z2016-02-23T12:46:43ZLibya’s new unity government faces the mother of all rebuilding jobs<p>Five years after the collapse of Libya, a new UN-backed national unity government has finally <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/15/hopes-for-peace-in-libya-as-make-up-of-new-unity-government-announced">been unveiled</a>. It seeks to bring together the existing rival governments in the east and west of Libya, mainly to collaborate in the fight against groups affiliated to the Islamic State. The first elections are planned for 2018. If it is to succeed in building a viable country, however, this new government will first need to make Libya stable again. </p>
<p>Libya’s political system has completely broken down since 2011. What began early that year with <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12477275">protests against</a> the arrest of Fathi Tirbil, a legal advocate for families of the victims of the 1996 Abu Slim prison massacre, soon escalated to a <a href="http://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011">civil war</a> and NATO-led intervention against the government. </p>
<p>After the Gaddafi regime had been overthrown and international observers <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/libyas-first-free-elections-in-50-years/a-16080604">reported</a> free and fair elections in July 2012, many optimistically foresaw a transition to democracy. Alas, the country’s new political institutions had neither the capacity nor the mechanisms to support a viable system. For example, the National Transitional Council (NTC) – which acted as the interim government – was internally divided and, in any case, was not very representative of the rebel forces that overthrew Gaddafi.</p>
<p>Despite the announcement about the new unity government, Libya is far from united. The government will compete for power with the Tripoli-based General National Congress in the west, which has a consultative role in the new system; as well as the Tobruk-based parliament in the east and various tribal militias and jihadist groups.</p>
<p>Violence flared up again in 2014, as the various competing players struggled over political power and control of energy resources. The country is currently in chaos. </p>
<p>If the new government is to prevail, it must overcome the following three major challenges:</p>
<p><strong>1. State-building and reconciliation</strong></p>
<p>It has to build new democratic institutions out of nothing; during the Gaddafi era nobody participated in politics outside the ruling elites. The previous attempt to establish democracy through the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18341022">General National Congress</a> has been hamstrung by internal conflict between its political blocs. </p>
<p>Libya is a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-tribes-idUSTRE77O43R20110825">complex mix</a> of tribal divisions between Arabs, Berbers and Africans from further south. The new government has to achieve a national reconciliation by including everyone. This must be reflected in a new constitution, following the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Libya_2011.pdf">interim constitutional declaration</a> of 2011, which guarantees cultural rights for all Libyans – a reverse of Gaddafi-era discrimination against black African ethnic groups. A Constitution Drafting Assembly produced a draft of a new constitution last autumn, but <a href="http://www.icj.org/libya-revise-draft-constitution-to-ensure-compliance-with-international-standards/">was seen</a> as flawed and non-inclusive. </p>
<p><strong>2. Oil and social cohesion</strong></p>
<p>It is impossible for Libya to move towards democracy without first reaching a certain degree of economic equality: the EU-funded <a href="http://www.arabtrans.eu/">Arab Transitions project</a> confirmed that in Libya and other <a href="http://middleeast.about.com/od/humanrightsdemocracy/a/Definition-Of-The-Arab-Spring.htm">Arab Spring</a> nations, economic equality and social justice were key reasons for the upheaval. Central to this is the oil industry, which <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/au.html">makes up</a> about 80% of GDP and 99% of government revenue. Unless the wealth is shared around, Libya will always be vulnerable to extremism. </p>
<p>Many of the country’s oil facilities are still occupied by militias and paramilitary groups, which raise enormous funds from exporting it. The future of the national oil company is unclear, with rival political factions competing for control – and the situation is the same with the central bank. Over the past five years, the economy has been severely disrupted. Getting this back on track is vital. </p>
<p><strong>3. Security</strong></p>
<p>The Gaddafi regime was notoriously violent against dissidents. After it was gone, it proved very difficult to make the country secure. The various revolutionary groups were not willing to give up their arms and become loyal to the security forces of the National Transitional Council. </p>
<p>In October 2011 the NTC’s solution was <a href="http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2012/08/31/why-libyas-supreme-security-committee-must-be-brought-to-heel-before-its-too-late/">to recruit</a> about 100,000 revolutionaries from these groups to the Supreme Security Committee. It then attempted in 2012 to create an alternative parallel army, the <a href="http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/libyan-shield-force-lsf">Libyan Shield</a>. This too tried to integrate the militias into state security structures by maintaining their existing battalions and allowing them to be relatively autonomous. Unfortunately it put them on the state payroll without making them very loyal to the government. </p>
<p>Four years on and the struggle between various armed elements, local militias and state security forces is an everyday phenomenon. The state remains fragmented, has little capacity to enforce law and order and does not possess a monopoly over the means of violence. The militias serving under the Supreme Security Committee and Libyan Shield don’t trust the new system, so they don’t function as united entities. </p>
<p>Libya also needs to deal with the growing threat of the Islamic State. This has been made worse by the fact that growing numbers of senior IS fighters from Syria have relocated to Libya since the Russians <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/war-against-isis-2015-russia-will-not-launch-ground-invasion-syria-putin-says-2136298">intervened</a> last year. IS has been using Libya as a launch pad for attacks on the surrounding countries. Solving this problem involves taking weapons out of the wrong hands and making the borders properly secure – working in concert with the likes of the US, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/12166908/US-air-strike-on-Libya-kills-two-abducted-Serbians.html">which bombed</a> an IS camp at Sabratha in central Libya on February 19, killing 40. </p>
<p>In sum, Libya will remain unstable without reconciliation and proper democracy, and without a new social contract. But until there is a certain level of basic security the situation is likely to get worse. To achieve these things the country’s competing parties must work together. Introducing a new unity government for Libya is one thing – making inroads into the country’s problems is quite another.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55175/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilia Xypolia receives funding from the European Union's Framework 7 Programme, grant number 320214</span></em></p>With everything from Islamic State to disenfranchised black Africans to deal with, the former Gaddafi stronghold has everything to achieve.Ilia Xypolia, Research fellow, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.