tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/turkey-protests-9388/articlesTurkey protests – The Conversation2022-12-15T21:35:52Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1966322022-12-15T21:35:52Z2022-12-15T21:35:52ZWhy Istanbul’s mayor was sentenced to jail – and what it means for Turkey’s 2023 presidential race<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501407/original/file-20221215-15-mf4c80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4992%2C3211&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ekrem Imamoglu -- heading to jail or the presidency. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ekrem-imamoglu-mayor-of-istanbul-leaves-amidst-a-crowd-of-news-photo/1245632640?phrase=istanbul%20mayor&adppopup=true">Onur Dogman/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A Turkish court’s decision on Dec. 14, 2022, to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/14/istanbul-mayor-ekrem-imamoglu-sentenced-to-jail-over-fools-insult">jail Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu</a> for two years and seven months for <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/14/turkey-court-convicts-istanbul-mayor-ekrem-imamoglu">insulting public officials</a> hung on comments he made three years ago. But its impact will be felt on an event taking place in a few months time: the Turkish presidential election.</p>
<p>If the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/14/turkey-court-convicts-istanbul-mayor-ekrem-imamoglu">appeals court upholds Imamoglu’s conviction</a> – based on a 2019 speech in which he allegedly called Turkey’s supreme election council “fools” – the opposition figure will be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/istanbul-mayor-says-conviction-reflects-his-success-ahead-anti-erdogan-rally-2022-12-15/">barred from holding any political office</a>. It hands President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a double win: Not only does it mean Erdogan would retake control of Istanbul, but it also would potentially prevent his strongest challenger from running in the June 2023 election.</p>
<p>Whether politically motivated or not, the court ruling might not work out the way Imamoglu’s rivals hope – as Erdogan should well be aware. The Turkish president’s long road to political dominance began with his <a href="https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/receptayyiperdogan/biography/">election as Istanbul mayor in 1994</a>. The secularist elite, who at that time dominated Turkey’s politics and feared the rise of Erdogan’s religious conservatism, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/turkey-germany-erdogan-bohmermann/479814/">banned him from politics</a> through a court decision that saw him imprisoned for four months over inciting religious hatred in a speech. That sentence, in fact, only bolstered Erdogan’s support. Perhaps similarly, Imamoglu’s sentencing was followed by thousands of supporters’ <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/istanbul-mayor-says-conviction-reflects-his-success-ahead-anti-erdogan-rally-2022-12-15/">taking to the streets in protest</a>.</p>
<h2>Erdogan’s declining popularity</h2>
<p>The long-serving president is a pragmatic politician. For over 25 years, Erdogan has pursued a dual strategy to tighten his power grip: gaining legitimacy by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44596072">winning elections</a> while also consolidating power by employing a long list of authoritarian methods, <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/page/detail/turkey-under-erdogan/?k=9780300247886">such as jailing journalists</a> and labeling opposition figures as “terrorists.”</p>
<p>But the 2023 election comes as Erdogan’s position in Turkey appears weaker, with polls suggesting he could <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2022/11/18/turkeys-centenary-could-mark-the-end-of-the-erdogan-era">lose to one of a few potential challengers</a>, with the opposition yet to announce who will contend the election.</p>
<p>Istanbul’s <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/istanbul-election-remaking-of-turkeys-new-political-landscape">municipal election in 2019</a> proved a turning point in Erdogan’s political fortunes. Imamoglu, the candidate of his main opposition, the Republican’s People Party, won against the candidate of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party. Erdogan did not accept the defeat and supported the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-cancels-istanbul-mayoral-election-won-by-opposition-11557162702">cancellation of the election</a> through a decision of the supreme election council, which prompted Imamoglu’s “fools” comment.</p>
<p>Yet Imamoglu won again <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/06/27/erdogans-tactical-gamble-in-istanbul-proves-a-strategic-mistake/">with even a bigger margin</a> in the subsequent rerun election.</p>
<p>Since 2019, Erdogan’s popularity has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-17/turkey-2023-presidential-election-anger-over-prices-threatens-erdogan">declined further</a>, according to most <a href="https://twitter.com/ozersencar1/status/1600112278149406720?s=20&t=MoWjIlJIWzgk31vOsmfquw">public surveys</a>. He is now less popular than both Imamoglu and Ankara’s mayor, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-opposition-desperately-seeks-an-electable-leader/a-63109589">Mansur Yavas</a>, from the same opposition party.</p>
<p>A major reason for Erdogan’s popularity problem is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/05/world/europe/turkey-inflation-erdogan.html">the ongoing economic crisis</a>. Turkey’s annual <a href="https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Consumer-Price-Index-November-2022-45800&dil=2">inflation rate has soared above 80%</a>. In a nationwide <a href="https://twitter.com/ozersencar1/status/1512416195319943174?s=20&t=DwceTwCj4KHVeC4nA9Dgrg">survey of February 2021, 50% said</a> poverty was leading them to skip meals.</p>
<p>The economic crisis is directly associated with <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-releasing-murderers-but-not-political-opponents-from-prison-amid-coronavirus-pandemic-136466">Erdogan’s rule</a>, which has resulted in a <a href="https://en.qantara.de/content/migrating-to-germany-turks-up-sticks-as-prospects-worsen-at-home">brain drain</a> and misguided financial policies, especially his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/10/world/middleeast/erdogan-economy-lira-turkey.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article">insistence on lowering interest rates</a> to reduce inflation – a policy that runs counter to what <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/how-raising-interest-rates-helps-fight-inflation-high-prices-recession-rcna33754">most economists would prescribe</a>.</p>
<p>If the opposition pursues a reasonable strategy, Erdogan is <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2022/11/18/turkeys-centenary-could-mark-the-end-of-the-erdogan-era">heading toward defeat at the June 2023 election</a> – should the ballot be fair and free.</p>
<p>But observers fear he will <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/632">try to game the system</a> or <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-06/erdogan-amends-turkey-s-electoral-laws-to-bolster-his-rule?leadSource=uverify%20wall">change the rules</a> to win the election and keep his superpresidential powers for five more years. </p>
<p>Erdogan has already worked to establish a compliant media, through <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-erdogan-media/">confiscation, crony capitalism and repression</a>, including the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/02/free-turkey-media/">arrest and imprisonment of journalists</a>. In October, Erdogan brought in a new “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/14/turkey-dangerous-dystopian-new-legal-amendments">censorship law</a>” passed to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/13/turkey-new-disinformation-law-could-jail-journalists-for-3-years">further criminalize journalists and control social media</a>. </p>
<p>He also strengthened ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin and normalized relations with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and United Arab Emirates’ Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed in a bid to encourage their <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-plays-up-diplomatic-gains-with-eye-elections-2022-08-09/">financial support in the run-up to the election</a>.</p>
<h2>Will history repeat itself?</h2>
<p>And then there is the direct attack on opposition figures. If Imamoglu is sent to jail, he will not be the only major politician to languish in Turkish prisons. </p>
<p>Selahattin Demirtas, the former co-chair of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party, has been behind bars for over six years. Demirtas <a href="https://twitter.com/hdpdemirtas/status/1140875625072402433?s=20&t=D2C26LnOPezUT_vBzCVRzA">supported Imamoglu during 2019</a> municipal elections and <a href="https://twitter.com/hdpdemirtas/status/1603061373851901952?s=20&t=SROrrXOakgVOFWqPR0WZrg">has criticized the new court sentence against him</a>.</p>
<p>This demonstrates what makes Imamoglu a potentially potent electoral threat to Erdogan: his ability to appeal to voters from various segments of society. He can get the minority but crucial Kurdish vote while retaining strong relations <a href="https://twitter.com/meral_aksener/status/1602989042785820672?s=20&t=wQknCL1w7juVMgJxuxkGbA">with nationalist politicians</a>. He is from a secularist party, but he is able to <a href="https://www.ntv.com.tr/video/turkiye/ekrem-imamoglu-eyup-sultan-camiinde-yasin-suresini-okudu,8rU_W358yEqry5oCw7wA0w">recite the Quran publicly</a> in an overture to religious voters. What Erdogan fears is an opposition figure who can serve as a “big tent” candidate.</p>
<p>This helped Imamoglu defeat Erdogan’s party in Istanbul twice in 2019. In a few months, we will see whether he can pull off the same achievement on the national stage – but that can only happen if Imamoglu is legally able to run. </p>
<p>The danger for Erdogan is that if the jailing of Imamoglu is taken by Turkey’s population to be politically motivated, it might make his rival more popular. If so, it might prove a case of history repeating itself in Turkey – only this time, to Erdogan’s misfortune.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196632/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Conviction means popular opposition figure Ekrem Imamoglu is barred from running for office. It comes as incumbent president Recep Tayyip Erdogan faces dwindling support.Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1015562018-08-20T17:44:44Z2018-08-20T17:44:44ZTurkey’s currency collapse shows just how vulnerable its economy is to a crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232761/original/file-20180820-30584-1v3kc0c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sometimes you have to look back to move forward. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-Economy/44969517b1c74254b4725e3d05699850/42/0">AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>If you happen to be a tourist in Turkey right now, consider yourself lucky. Otherwise, things look grim. </p>
<p>The Turkish lira <a href="https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=TRY&to=USD&view=1Y">has lost as much as a third of its value</a> relative to the U.S. dollar in less than a month and recently hit a record low. As a result, all imported goods became more expensive practically overnight. And because Turkey <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-industrial-sector-highly-dependent-on-raw-material-imports---78393">is heavily dependent</a> on foreign goods, most everything was affected, including gasoline, food, furniture and clothing. Turks are worried that more price hikes and <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2018/08/20/turkey-qatar-central-banks-sign-currency-swap-deal">possible shortages</a> of imported medicine are on the way. </p>
<p>The catalyst for the current crisis was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2018/aug/17/turkish-lira-volatile-as-us-warns-of-more-sanctions-business-live">U.S. sanctions</a>, which the Trump administration imposed on August 1 after Turkey’s government refused to hand over an American pastor it has detained for almost two years. Turkey responded by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-currency-usa/white-house-condemns-turkeys-tariffs-on-u-s-imports-idUSKBN1L020G">doubling tariffs</a> on U.S. cars, alcohol and other goods. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/19/politics/white-house-rejects-turkey-offer-andrew-brunson/index.html">More U.S. sanctions</a> may be on the way. </p>
<p>Turkey’s real economic troubles, however, go much deeper than the current spat with the U.S. and extend back many years. And while Qatar <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1004025/Turkey-crisis-US-sanctions-Trump-Erdogan-row-lira-plummets-Qatar-15BILLION-investment">has pledged</a> to invest US$15 billion to help Turkey and <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1005604/Turkey-lira-crisis-Qatar-investment-currency-swap-Erdogan-Donald-Trump-US-sanctions">offered other aid</a>, it does nothing to fix its actual problems. </p>
<p>We’ve been studying Turkey’s economy – the <a href="https://knoema.com/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2017-gdp-by-country-data-and-charts">world’s 17th largest</a> – for three decades and recently visited the country, talking to Turks affected by the crisis, from small business owners and CEOs to blue-collar workers and taxi drivers. To understand how it went from <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/behlal-azkan/turkey-islamic-world-west_b_6474746.html">the envy</a> of the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/02/16/martin.egypt.turkey/index.html">Muslim world</a> to the verge of collapse, one must first look into Turkey’s recent history. </p>
<h2>An opportunity lost</h2>
<p>At the end of 2000, Turkey <a href="http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/04bc7b8d-4c66-4f64-af66-d1cc85acf251/sep13-2.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE-04bc7b8d-4c66-4f64-af66-d1cc85acf251-m3fB6-2">suffered</a> a banking crisis that resulted in a significant flight of capital and a severe <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/turkey?year=2001">economic recession</a>. </p>
<p>The International Monetary Fund agreed to lend Turkey <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr0123">$19 billion</a> on the condition that it overhaul and restructure its financial system, as well as open up its economy to the rest of the world. As its coalition government began to implement the structural changes, the crisis created an opening for Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist Justice and Development Party, known by the acronym AKP, which had long been in the shadows of Turkey’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/02/16/in-long-secular-turkey-sharia-is-gradually-taking-over/">stridently secular republic</a>. </p>
<p>Erdogan offered an “honest” alternative to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27749598">decades of high inflation</a> and economic and political instability, and voters were eager for a change. Amid doubts both at home and abroad, his party promised to <a href="http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2008/06/art-561814/">adhere to the IMF program</a> and also said it remained committed to the secular founding principles of the Turkish Republic. </p>
<p>The AKP kept to its pledge and fulfilled the conditions of the IMF “stand-by” agreement. This was helped by its application to join the European Union as a full member, which began in 1999. The process of accession acted as an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-economy-eu-idUSKCN0WR0KD">important anchor</a> and signal of modern Turkey’s economic and social path.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2016/02/06/erdoganomics">economy boomed</a> as a result, buoyed in part by strong global growth. Inflation fell to single digits for the first time in about 30 years, the economy expanded an average of 6.8 percent a year from 2002 to 2007 and exports more than tripled by 2012.</p>
<p>There was a dark side to this rosy picture, however. The Turkish economy was becoming increasingly dependent on imports and foreign cash to support much of this growth. When a country imports more goods and services than it exports, it finances the difference by borrowing abroad, creating a current account deficit. This made Turkey vulnerable to the whims of international investors in the event of a crisis. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232733/original/file-20180820-30593-ws0ro8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Erdogan claims the U.S. is waging ‘economic war’ against Turkey.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-Economy/f4730d550ef444bd93bbc185c47ab57a/9/0">AP Photo/Burhan Ozbilici</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The costs of ‘endless growth’</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/turkeys-economy-is-entering-a-slow-burning-crisis-analysts-warn.html">Those</a> <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/imf-warns-about-overheating-in-turkeys-economy-127608">who warned</a> of the problems lurking below the surface were swept aside as Turkey survived the 2008 global financial crisis with minimal damage and bounced back very quickly, mainly thanks to its restructured financial system after 2001. </p>
<p>While the U.S. and Europe <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/11/non-bank-leverage-surpasses-pre-financial-crisis-high-imf-warns.html">were wallowing in red ink</a>, Turkey’s low levels of household and corporate debt made it a very desirable <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e29f6794-1eb0-11e3-b80b-00144feab7de">destination for foreign capital</a> looking for a relatively safe home that offered stable returns. As a result, Turkey’s banking system was awash in low-cost credit, which <a href="http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1417011882-9.Turkeys_Distressing_Dance_with_Capital_Flows.pdf">financed a spending spree</a> by households and corporations. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the IMF stand-by agreement expired in 2008, and negotiations for a new agreement dragged on until talks <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/turkey-refusing-imf-funds">were suspended</a> two years later as Erdogan announced Turkey’s “graduation” from the program. Instead, he believed he could propel his economy toward “endless growth” and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-erdogans-push-for-endless-growth-brought-turkey-to-the-brink-1534526348">made it easier</a> for Turkish companies to access loans denominated in foreign currencies. This made them even more vulnerable to a drop in the value of the lira. </p>
<p>Erdogan also began to pour more government funds into huge <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/04/26/turkeys-president-hopes-to-turn-huge-building-projects-into-votes">public infrastructure projects</a> like expansive highway systems, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/airplane-mode/erdogan-flexes-political-muscle-new-11b-airport-istanbul-n840886">airports</a> and city hospitals via public-private partnerships. </p>
<p>This, coupled with the favorable credit conditions, caused the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-economy-construction/rpt-turkish-conglomerates-race-into-construction-hunting-quick-profits-idUSL5N17U67V">construction sector to boom</a> – particularly among companies closely associated with the government. The <a href="https://evds2.tcmb.gov.tr/index.php?/evds/portlet/jHQqZSuUssg%3D/en">central bank’s housing price index</a> doubled from the start of 2010 to the end of 2016.</p>
<p>The vibrant economy that resulted in turn helped <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/world/europe/turkey-election-erdogan.html">Erdogan keep winning elections</a>, allowing him to amass more power.</p>
<p>But all that spending worsened the current account deficit even further. As one illustration of the problem, <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/private-sector-foreign-debt-on-the-rise-in-turkey-131948">private sector external debt surged</a> from just 16 percent of GDP in 2003 to almost 40 percent at the end of last year.</p>
<p>But even as we watched these events with growing alarm, Erdogan’s popularity and authoritarianism only grew, and in June, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/world/europe/turkey-election-erdogan.html">he became president</a> with significantly boosted powers to run the government as he sees fit.</p>
<p>One of the biggest fears now is that the currency crisis will lead to the kind of severe capital flight that crashed the economy in 2001. A recent central bank survey <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-inflation/turkish-inflation-spike-central-bank-survey-says">forecasts inflation</a> to reach more than 16 percent by the end of the year.</p>
<p>Making matters worse, Erdogan has been increasing his attacks on the independence of the central bank, historically <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-23/turkey-s-central-bank-steps-aside-in-erdogan-inflicted-crisis">one of the most trusted</a> institutions in the country. He has already eroded the relative independence of Turkey’s regulators by recently installing <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/11a52014-83b1-11e8-96dd-fa565ec55929">his son-in-law as the minister of treasury and finance</a>, one month before the current crisis hit. </p>
<p>This has hurt Turkey’s credibility in the eyes of foreign investors.</p>
<h2>Where Turkey goes from here</h2>
<p>Back in the 1980 and 1990s, Turkey’s main problem was political instability. Today, the problem is the opposite, too much authority invested in the hands of a single politician, whose popularity and political power have made him unable or unwilling to see Turkey’s crisis for what it is. </p>
<p>Rather than address any weaknesses in the economy, Erdogan has doubled down on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-economic-crisis-lira-trump.html">blaming</a> the West, particular the U.S., for <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-president-recep-erdogan-us-economic-currency-a8497391.html">waging</a> an “economic coup” on Turkey. </p>
<p>So where does Turkey go from here? As we see it, it has four options. </p>
<p>The least likely is a return to the long-abandoned IMF plan, which would put constraints on the easy credit Erdogan sees as essential to economic growth. Since Erdogan denies even the existence of a structural problem in the Turkish economy, this is presumably a nonstarter. </p>
<p>Another possibility is Turkey could implement its own stabilization program, perhaps with some support from the EU, mainly by alleviating Turkey’s short-term problems. However, for a variety of reasons, including past tensions and a lack of financial ties, this seems little more likely than a return to the IMF. </p>
<p>A third option is for Turkey to get more aid or loans from non-Western countries with cash to spare – such as China, Russia or Qatar – to solve its short-term financing problems. As we noted earlier, this will not be enough to resolve Turkey’s severe structural problems. And the high costs would be further estrangement from NATO – of which it is a key member – and more strain on its relations with the U.S.</p>
<p>Of course Turkey’s government could simply continue to deny there’s a problem at all, blame outsiders for everything and use the crisis to further entrench its political authority on the business community. In that sad scenario, the current trends will continue to play out, and Turkey will likely experience even higher inflation, bankruptcies, soaring borrowing costs, more debt and lower growth.</p>
<p>Turkey is entering a Muslim holiday period known as Feast of the Sacrifice. Some Turks may be wondering whether it’s their economy that will be the offering this year.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101556/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Can Erbil is affiliated with Capital Turkish Connections, a Washington DC-based think tank with over 60 non-resident Fellows and Ambassadors. CTC is a private, apolitical, nonprofit organization that facilitates projects and evidence-based dialogue among professionals and policy-makers on developments in Turkey and her evolving relationship with neighboring regions and transatlantic partners.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Umit Ozlale does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US sanctions announced earlier this month may have triggered the plunge in the lira, but the government has been mismanaging Turkey’s economy for years, creating severe vulnerabilities.Can Erbil, Professor of the Practice of Economics, Boston CollegeUmit Ozlale, Professor of Economics, Özyeğin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/618802016-07-01T14:35:10Z2016-07-01T14:35:10ZEuro 2016 sponsors being ambushed on social media by ‘unofficial’ brands<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128994/original/image-20160701-18317-k68cua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-409620058/stock-photo-blurred-fans-on-football-stadium-vintage-effect.html?src=pd-photo-320300492-3_KTcVH8711Rc2sFgfsSzA-2">Trybex</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>While the nations at the UEFA Euro 2016 championships have done battle on the pitch, an equally intense battle has been taking place off it between brands that want tournament exposure. Sponsors such as Coca Cola, McDonalds and Carlsberg spend multiple millions to be associated with the Euros, but they have also had to compete with a bunch of mischievous brands seeking to attach themselves in an unofficial capacity. </p>
<p>This so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/models-messi-and-wacky-races-the-art-of-ambush-marketing-22622">ambush marketing</a> is an established phenomenon, but social media has become the perfect new vehicle for it. We’ve seen this from monitoring marketing activity on these platforms during Euro 2016. UEFA regulations sometimes making it tricky for official sponsors to respond quickly and effectively to events in the campaign, and these ambushers could undermine the value of one of the hottest tickets in advertising – not to mention other major events. </p>
<p>The official sponsors of Euro 2016 are heavily active on social media, of course. Where once 30-second commercials on prime time TV dominated advertising, the likes of Twitter and Facebook <a href="http://www.cuttingedgepr.com/articles/people-trust-media.asp">have become</a> hugely <a href="http://www.techrepublic.com/article/election-tech-why-social-media-is-more-powerful-than-advertising/">important</a> in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media-network/2015/oct/01/social-media-solution-online-advertising-challenges">recent years</a>. </p>
<p>Football fans will be familiar with the relentless scrolling of rotational signage at Euro games showing the hashtags of official sponsors like #probably (Carlsberg) and #MakeYourDebut (SOCAR), and that’s only the tip of the iceberg. A wander through the Twitter, Facebook, or Instagram accounts of these sponsors – others include Continental Tyres, Hyundai-Kia and Turkish Airlines – reveals a mix of the usual competitions, promotions and user-generated content. </p>
<h2>The Iceland cometh</h2>
<p>But beyond this closed circle, a world of brands use social media to draw attention to themselves by ambushing their rivals. One of the stars of Euro 2016 is Iceland – the British frozen food chain. When Iceland qualified for Euro 2016 as the unfancied minnows, their supermarket namesake signed a deal to sponsor them. It has been wreaking havoc ever since. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"747375577963835396"}"></div></p>
<p>Iceland’s 1-1 draw with Portugal on June 14 was a good example. The retailer trolled Nandos, an international restaurant chain with a Portuguese theme, and goaded Portugal striker Cristiano Ronaldo with the offer of chopped onions, to the delight of Twitter users (see below). Though admittedly Iceland <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/weird-news/iceland-tries-humiliate-nandos-social-8204641">was mocked</a> because Nandos is South African not Portuguese, it still drew attention away from official tournament sponsors while undermining a (non-sponsor) rival in the food and drink business. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"742830142163189760"}"></div></p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"743029997326204928"}"></div></p>
<p>At the same time, the chain <a href="http://corp.ballstreet.co.uk/?page_id=312">ran a prize draw</a> for fans to win a year’s supply of Iceland shopping by tweeting the hashtag #ComeonIceland. Traffic was partly driven by former Premier League player Jimmy Bullard <a href="https://twitter.com/jimmybullard/status/742779404741414912">tweeting himself</a> dancing around wearing an Iceland shopping bag as a “football kit”, which prompted some fans to follow his example. This helped the chain to leverage social media’s potential for getting the public to produce branded content for you. Bullard’s original tweet attracted around 2,500 retweets and 2,200 likes. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"742779404741414912"}"></div></p>
<p>Betting company Paddy Power is another ambusher that is savvy with social media and has been tweeting constantly during the tournament. One strand parodies player heat maps to poke fun at poor performances – one about Belgian international Romelu Lukaku’s performance against Italy attracted nearly 1,000 retweets. Another tweet from the online gambler that joked about the Icelandic team’s support during its game against England on June 27 was retweeted more than 300 times and liked over 450 times. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"748067482901020672"}"></div></p>
<h2>The activation problem</h2>
<p>It is very difficult for official sponsors to compete with this kind of messaging because of the nature of their relationship with the tournament owners. When a brand sponsors a tournament they typically spend twice: once to acquire a legal right of association and then again on promotion around the deal to make sure it works properly – known in the trade as “activation”. Carlsberg is <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-17/carlsberg-s-euro-soccer-campaign-said-to-be-worth-90-million">reported to have</a> spent upwards of €80m (£67m) on activation, for example, over and above the €40m it spent to become the tournament’s official beer. </p>
<p>Before an official sponsor can start this activation marketing, it must adhere to UEFA’s strict branding and guidelines. And before they start using hashtags, running competitions or engaging in any other form of activity, they must submit an activation request. </p>
<p>This means companies have to plan their messaging strategy a long way in advance. And because UEFA is concerned with protecting the reputation of the words and images associated with what is one of its marquee events, it can be cautious about what it will allow official sponsors to do. This leads to messaging that tends to be neutral and often lacks the responsiveness and innovative humour of many ambushers, all of which plays badly to the advantages of social media.</p>
<p>It poses a serious challenge for UEFA and the owners of other major sporting events – all of whom tend towards a similar approach. The International Olympic Committee tries to address it <a href="http://www.teresascassa.ca/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=153:ambush-marketing-and-the-olympics&Itemid=84">by obliging</a> host nations to introduce anti-ambush legislation, but arguably this just forces ambushers to become even more creative and eye-catching. Paddy Power for example <a href="http://www.campaignlive.co.uk/article/1142359/paddy-power-sponsors-the-biggest-athletics-event-london">ran a campaign</a> during the London Olympics in 2012 announcing itself official sponsor of an egg and spoon race, saying it was sponsoring the “biggest athletics event in London” – then pointing out it meant in the town of London in the French region of Burgundy. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128993/original/image-20160701-18325-nzei9y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128993/original/image-20160701-18325-nzei9y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128993/original/image-20160701-18325-nzei9y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128993/original/image-20160701-18325-nzei9y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128993/original/image-20160701-18325-nzei9y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128993/original/image-20160701-18325-nzei9y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128993/original/image-20160701-18325-nzei9y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128993/original/image-20160701-18325-nzei9y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Paddy Power’s London 2012 ambush.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Social media is now so vital for advertisers, and the current situation <a href="http://www.doz.com/marketing-resources/euro-2016-marketing-worth-it-sponsor">potentially weakens</a> the business case for spending vast amounts of money on sponsoring these events. It’s not as if this is the only question mark against them either. <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/euro-2016-brand-sponsors-2016-5?IR=T">Reported figures</a> from a spontaneous recognition survey showed, for instance, that while 11% of people correctly identified Adidas as an official sponsor, 9% incorrectly thought that Nike was one, too. MasterCard, another sponsor, had a similar problem with Visa. </p>
<p>If major sports tournaments want to regain the upper hand in this brave new era, they might need to develop an approach suited to the instantaneousness of social media. Until then they risk jeopardising their proposition – an own goal if ever there was one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61880/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Chadwick works for UEFA. He helped develop and teaches on its Certificate in Football Management. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex Fenton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It costs multiple millions to sponsor a global sports event. Why bother when non-sponsors cleverly associate themselves for next to nothing?Simon Chadwick, ‘Class of 92’ Professor of Sports Enterprise, University of SalfordAlex Fenton, Lecturer in Digital Business, University of SalfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/429422015-06-08T20:46:29Z2015-06-08T20:46:29ZTurkey’s general election upset: the rise of the AKP interrupted<p>The general election that took place on June 7 was no doubt one of the most critical in modern Turkish history. </p>
<p>For a significant part of the electorate, the election represented a chance to put a stop to the increasingly authoritarian, religiously conservative, and unabashedly <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Hi8tBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135&lpg=PA135&dq=neo+liberal+policies+AKP&source=bl&ots=P3tIQxn8Og&sig=8G-FTsfOhKPuzEhlj4Ps8KZtb7A&hl=en&sa=X&ei=9L11VaiPNs3YggT2yILQCw&ved=0CF0Q6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=neo%20liberal%20policies%20AKP&f=false">neo-liberal grip</a> of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) over the country. </p>
<p>At stake was the future of Turkey as a liberal democracy.</p>
<p>Of particular concern was the prospect of the AKP securing enough seats in the parliament to be able to push for a constitutional change that would bestow President Tayyip Erdoğan with a more powerful executive presidency.</p>
<p>The results are not good news for the AKP. They may have received the largest share of the votes — <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33047047">40.85%</a> — but they failed to secure enough seats to have a majority and to make the constitutional amendment for a more powerful presidency.</p>
<p>So how can the results be explained and why do they matter? What do they mean for the future of AKP in Turkish politics and, more generally, what do they say about the future of democracy in Turkey?</p>
<h2>A winning streak between 2002 and 2014</h2>
<p>In 2002, in the first-ever general election it participated in, the AKP got 34% of the popular vote and became the first party to govern Turkey without a coalition since 1991. </p>
<p>This was a huge success for a party that had been <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1018363/Justice-and-Development-Party">founded</a> just over a year before as a democratic, conservative but non-confessional challenge to establishment Turkish politics. </p>
<p>The party’s electoral success <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13608746.2014.920571">continued</a> in the 2007 general election (46.6% of the popular vote) and in 2011 (almost 50%). In August 2014, in the first-ever direct election of the Turkish president, Erdogan, the leader of the AKP, won with almost 52%.</p>
<p>The electoral popularity of the AKP was unprecedented but not all that surprising to those who follow Turkish politics closely. </p>
<p>The 1990s in Turkey — often referred to as the “lost decade” — were defined by poor economic performance and unstable coalition governments.</p>
<p>Into this dispiriting situation, the AKP emerged not as an Islamist but a center-right party eager to carry on a reformist, democratic, pro-growth policy agenda. </p>
<p>In a relatively short amount of time, the party managed to build a wide<a href="http://turkishstudies.org/documents/pdf/publications/RepublicanPeoplesPartyAndThe2007GeneralElections.pdf"> coalition of supporters</a> from citizens who had grown estranged from the inward-looking, pro-military and nationalist policies that had dominated Turkish politics for so long. </p>
<p>Political and economic developments of the years following the AKP’s coming to power only enhanced their popularity.</p>
<p>The real gross domestic product (GDP) of Turkey (or GDP at constant prices) <a href="http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2013/06/how-well-did-the-turkish-economy-do-over-the-last-decade.html">rose</a> by 64% between 2002 and 2012, and real GDP per capita by 43%. </p>
<p>During the first few years of its government, the party seemed to be enthusiastically promoting Turkey’s bid for EU accession. Turkey had applied for a membership in the European Community back in 1987 and – after many years of lobbying – was finally granted candidacy in 1999. Ever since its foundation, Turkish political elites had wanted to position <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.464.9517&rep=rep1&type=pdf">Turkey as a part of Europe</a>: the AKP’s dynamic involvement in this process was widely welcome. </p>
<p>The political power of the military, whose intervention in parliamentary and executive affairs had been a mainstay of Turkish politics (there were three <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/04/20124472814687973.html">military coups</a> between 1960 and 1980), was being curtailed. </p>
<p>And although it later proved to be a rather inept plan lacking specificity and real effort, talks of a <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/12/01/kurdish-opening-in-turkey-origins-and-future/2ndb">“Kurdish opening” </a>gave hope to Kurdish citizens and liberal segments of the electorate that the long-festering sore of Kurdish insurgency in the east of the country would finally be addressed. </p>
<p>The AKP also rolled out a set of popular <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13608746.2014.979031">social policies</a>. It extended the level of <a href="http://turkey.angloinfo.com/healthcare/health-system/health-insurance/">free medical services</a> for the poor. It also provided <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2597/476030PUB0Cond101Official0Use0Only1.pdf?sequence=1">cash transfers</a> for the poor, single women, and the disabled.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84269/original/image-20150608-8677-jkdtfa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Happier days for Tayyip Erdogan in Davos.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8a/Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan-WEF_Davos_2009.jpg/1024px-Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan-WEF_Davos_2009.jpg">World Economic Forum, swiss-image.ch/Photo by Andy Mettler</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Abroad, Prime Minister and then President Tayyip Erdogan was <a href="http://www.worldleaders.columbia.edu/participants/recep-tayyip-erdo%C4%9F">embraced</a> as the architect of a new Turkey that set an example for the larger Middle East with its success in combining Islam, democracy and a thriving free-market economy.</p>
<h2>The authoritarian turn</h2>
<p>In the past few years especially, however, the AKP and its captain Erdogan – now the president of Turkey, residing in a 1,100-room <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29912398">presidential palace</a> which cost over US$600 million to build – openly embraced a more narrow view of democracy. </p>
<p>Erdogan appeared to think that having the support of 50% of the electorate gave him and his party the mandate to push ahead with an increasingly conservative agenda. </p>
<p>Moreover, this electoral authoritarianism has taken on a noticeably Islamic character. </p>
<p>From launching education reforms meant to raise “pious generations” to the active promotion of traditional family-based lifestyles, from placing restrictions on alcohol consumption to advocating for a ban on abortions, AKP and Erdogan made it clear that they meant business when it came to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13608746.2014.920571">legislating their religious values</a>.</p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Freedom%20in%20the%20World%202014%20Booklet.pdf">Freedom House report</a>, as of 2014 Turkey had already become a case of “modern authoritarianism.” </p>
<p>If the rulers in a traditional authoritarian system openly and violently suppress freedoms, the rulers of the modern authoritarianism, the report notes, use more subtle, but ultimately more effective techniques: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Central to modern authoritarian strategy is the capture of institutions that undergird political pluralism. The goal is to dominate not only the executive and legislative branches, but also the media, the judiciary, civil society, the economy, and the security force.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Indeed, as the report notes, under the AKP government, the past few years saw a notable intensification of these techniques, including:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“jailing reporters (Turkey leads the world in the number of imprisoned journalists), pressuring independent publishers to sell their holdings to government cronies, and threatening media owners with reprisals if critical journalists are not silenced.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The city park that proved a lightening rod</h2>
<p>In June 2013, the government cracked down on what started as a peaceful protest by mostly well-educated, non-political, middle-class youth against plans to erect yet another shopping mall in one of the few remaining green areas in Istanbul. </p>
<p>The attempt to protect Gezi Park was initially a popular reaction to the juggernaut of a construction boom that rarely consulted local residents. </p>
<p>Once the police used disproportionate force to clear out the protestors, opposition spread. If people had initially gone to Taksim Square to protect the people’s park against privatization, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22753752">they stayed</a> to show the government what a people’s democracy looks like. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84270/original/image-20150608-8719-1h206kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">And this wasn’t the only protest in June 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a1/2013_Taksim_Gezi_Park_protests_%2815th_June%29.jpg/640px-2013_Taksim_Gezi_Park_protests_%2815th_June%29.jpg">Fleshstorm</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The government <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/erdogan-gezi-conspiracy-taksim-governance-authoritarian-akp.html">dismissed the protests</a> as the work of an international and national conspiracy backed by the financial lobby, the US and Israel. An <a href="http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/gezi_eylemlerinin_bilancosu_aciklandi-1138770">estimated 2.5 million citizens</a> participated in the protests. </p>
<p>The Gezi protests tarnished the legitimacy of Erdogan’s government, and things were only made worse for the AKP by the corruption scandal involving <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/turkish-ministers-sons-arrested-corruption-investigation">the sons of three cabinet ministers</a> and several businessmen, as well as Erdogan himself and his son. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, the results of the recent election should not come as a big surprise. But the vote was not just a negative verdict on the AKP; it was also a positive boost for the opposition parties.</p>
<h2>The success of the opposition parties</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84272/original/image-20150608-8677-1eoiu7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Not as much orange as the AKP would have liked.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Basak Kus</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>The 2015 general election has ended the single party rule of the AKP and put the opposition parties at the center of the Turkish politics.</p>
<p>Most significantly, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP - founded in 2012), representing a coalition of Kurdish voters and left-wing liberals, entered parliament for the first time with 13% of the votes and 80 seats. Their campaign emphasized pluralism and the rights of minorities and oppressed groups. Erdogan’s <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-03/atheists-gays-and-boozers-erdogan-tars-rivals-as-polls-narrow">attempts</a> to denigrate the HDP by calling it a party of gays and atheists failed. </p>
<p>The country’s oldest party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), won 25% and 132 seats. More importantly, perhaps, the CHP played a skillful role in the campaign by respectfully engaging with the HDP during the campaign and signaled its support for HDP’s passing the electoral threshold. </p>
<p>By all signs, the CHP is undergoing a significant transformation. The battle between the more pro-military, exclusively secular, and nationalistic wing of the party and the more liberal and pluralist side seems to have tilted in favor of the latter. During its campaign, the party highlighted social justice issues such as poverty and debt and quit its dogmatic stance on a variety of religious and ethnic issues. It also began to show interest in <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2011/08/03/10178/meet-the-new-republican-party-in-turkey/">engaging Washington</a> in policy conversations. </p>
<h2>What lies ahead?</h2>
<p>Turkey may still be AKP land, with the party having won the largest share of votes in 59 Turkish cities, but if one looks at the parliament, it is a different, much more variegated picture.</p>
<p>There are many challenges ahead. What would a coalition government look like? Opposition leaders have not shown a willingness to enter a coalition with the AKP. Indeed, the leader of the MHP has already called for holding early elections.</p>
<p>Yet, there is so much to be hopeful about. The election results ended one-party rule and put an end to Erdogan’s bid for absolute power. The HDP’s entering parliament is particularly meaningful. During the campaign, the HDP gave voice not only to Kurds, but also to gays and women:<a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/more-turkish-female-mps-enter-parliament-ever-1030929946"> 40%</a> of the new HDP members of parliament are women. </p>
<p>The results are also important for the future of Turkey’s foreign relations. </p>
<p>A politically stable Turkey is critical to regional stability. </p>
<p>Over the past few years, observers from the US and EU have raised concerns regarding the increasing tide of authoritarianism and threat to civil liberties. The actions of the Turkish government at home undermined its democratic credentials abroad. </p>
<p>Indeed, the Turkish government’s religious agenda was believed to have spilled over to its foreign policy. This view solidified particularly after the Syrian crisis, leading to questions about the “Sunnification” of Turkish foreign policy. </p>
<p>A more democratic rule, and a political leader who is open to dialogue and committed to a secular foreign policy, will benefit not only the citizens of Turkey, but also allies of the country in building coalitions to tackle the ever more challenging situation in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42942/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basak Kus does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The June 7 elections were no doubt one of the most critical in modern Turkish history.Basak Kus, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/394562015-03-31T17:01:07Z2015-03-31T17:01:07ZThe rise and rise of Recep Tayyip Erdogan – and a slide towards autocracy in Turkey<p>Ever since Recep Tayyip Erdogan moved from <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28961495">being prime minister to president of Turkey</a> in 2014, the country’s politics have continued an alarming drift towards autocracy. Erdogan has taken his strong party identity and command-and-control style with him – and is seriously eroding the nation’s checks and balances on personal power. </p>
<p>Turkey’s various presidents have been men of party political and military backgrounds alike. Though it would be naïve to suggest that none of them had any pre-existing political agenda, the record of direct party political manoeuvring is scant.</p>
<p>The previous president, <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-a-lees/can-abdullah-guel-save-turkey_b_5719609.html">Abdullah Gül</a> was often <a href="http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/289904--turkeys-president-ratifies-controversial-internet-bill">condemned</a> for his uncritical ratification of legislation passed by parliament, but in general he made an effort to stay above party politics – Gül and Erdogan shared a background in the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP). Gül’s predecessor, former constitutional court judge <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/738386.stm">Ahmet Necdet Sezer</a>, was a firm check on the early years of AKP governments. </p>
<p>But things are different now. The structures that hold back the increasing authority of Erdogan and his party have been under attack for some time – and Erdogan may be on the brink of finally overwhelming them. He is quite openly manouvering to concentrate power in his person rather than the office he holds, and he has been doing so for some time. </p>
<h2>Hands on</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-fractures-behind-turkeys-uprising-carry-a-global-warning-14941">Gezi Park demonstrations</a> in May and June 2013, for instance, were sparked in part by his arrogant statements on municipal issues in Istanbul, blithely overriding the governor, mayor and city council.</p>
<p>When a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/turkish-ministers-sons-arrested-corruption-investigation">massive corruption scandal</a> broke in December 2013, Erdogan became combative. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/25/recep-tayyip-erdogan-investigated-corruption-turkey">Wiretaps were released</a> implicating AKP ministers, Erdogan and their sons in wide-scale embezzlement. Erdogan first dismissed the wiretaps as forgeries, then held them up as <a href="http://www.aa.com.tr/en/tag/292841--pm-erdogan-leaked-tape-quot-fabrication-quot">evidence of a conspiracy</a>.</p>
<p>But ultimately, any “conspiracy” against him clearly failed, as 25 police officers and various others were <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/19/turkey-25-police-arrested-erdogan-wiretapping-scandal">arrested in raids</a> against those who instituted the wiretaps in the first place.</p>
<p>This was just one of many failed attempts to rein Erdogan in. After the wiretap scandal, he not only bounced back, but campaigned to great effect in the municipal elections of March 2014, sometimes appearing simultaneously in different places by way of a <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/posttv/world/erdogan-hits-campaign-trail--via-hologram/2014/03/18/bd57e180-aec7-11e3-b8b3-44b1d1cd4c1f_video.html">hologram</a>. And despite the previous year’s upheavals the AKP <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26807067">won a majority</a> across the country. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Erdogan appears in hologram form in 2014.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Neither Erdogan’s overreach nor evidence of corruption moved the electorate against the AKP. The verdict seemed to be “<a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/why-erdogan-keeps-winning.html">they steal, but they work hard</a>,” in contrast to previous more secular-minded governments which were also accused of corruption, but were not seen to be working for the good of the country.</p>
<p>And while the AKP certainly benefited from heavily favourable coverage by the state broadcaster TRT, the charisma and personal power of Erdogan himself was also a major factor. Any attack on Erdogan simply seems to galvanise his supporters behind him.</p>
<h2>Rallying the troops</h2>
<p>Now Erdogan is president, not prime minister, he is meant to be on a much tighter leash. Article 101 of the Turkish constitution makes it <a href="https://www.tccb.gov.tr/pages/presidency/power/">explicit</a> that the president must sever all connections with their party. But Erdogan is not just flouting this core requirement; he is <a href="http://politics.bgnnews.com/president-erdogans-campaigning-for-ak-party-draws-condemnation-haberi/3163">openly campaigning</a> for his party in the run-up to the 2015 general election.</p>
<p>So far, Erdogan has already addressed voters in a number of cities, including <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-president-erdogan-mum-on-govt-criticism-pkk-leaders-call.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79993&NewsCatID=338">Denizli</a>, <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/presidential-system-not-for-afterlife-erdogan-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79328&NewsCatID=338">Gaziantep</a>, and most recently the capital <a href="http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/483564--turkey-erdogan-rejects-criticism-of-presidential-system">Ankara</a>. </p>
<p>Erdogan has also been giving a series of lectures to “<a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-urges-muhtars-to-protect-women-from-violence-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79480&NewsCatID=338">muhtars</a>”, village and neighbourhood officials who are elected but not affiliated with political parties. Since these officials have local influence and a role in registering voters, recruiting them to a party political agenda is also against the law. </p>
<p>Most shockingly of all, Erdogan has actually started asking the electorate to return 400 MPs for the AKP, which would provide the AKP government with the majority it needs to unilaterally amend the constitution. For the president to make this plea at all is illegal.</p>
<p>Regardless of what happens in the election, substantial damage has already been done. The previously ceremonial chair of the presidency is rapidly being turned into a powerful executive post, drawing influence and authority from a Parliament subservient to the person rather than the institution.</p>
<p>Little stands in Erdogan’s way. He chose his successor as PM, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/27/turkey-foreign-minister-ahmet-davutoglu-succeed-erdogan">Ahmet Davutoğlu</a>, precisely for his malleability, and Turkey’s moves towards a <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-moves-closer-to-becoming-a-fully-fledged-police-state-38063">police state</a> bear Erdogan’s fingerprints. </p>
<p>It is not inconceivable that if they were elected, 400 AKP members of parliament (out of a total of 550) under the de facto leadership of Erdogan could vote to rewrite the constitution and overnight make his currently illegal electioneering legal – and along with it, his radical effort to gather ever more unaccountable power for himself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39456/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mustafa Coban does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey’s president is meant to be a non-partisan, ceremonial figure – but Recep Erdogan is openly asking voters to hand him more power.Mustafa Coban, PhD Candidate, Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/250992014-04-02T16:19:04Z2014-04-02T16:19:04ZErdogan’s local election triumph papers over cracks in ailing Turkish democracy<p>The Turkish people <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/31/turkey-election-blow-democracy-ironic-erdogan">went to the polls at the weekend</a> against a backdrop of some of the most serious unrest the country has seen in living memory. The local elections, in which the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2014/03/turkey-elections-test-erdogans-rule-2014331161154603492.html">achieved an impressive 45% of the vote</a>, is the first of three polls, to be followed in August by the country’s first direct presidential election. A general election will follow next year.</p>
<p>This is a convincing electoral victory for any government that has been in power for nearly 12 years but more so in the case of Turkey where the government has had to deal with serious unrest in the form of mass demonstrations in June that turned into a nationwide protest movement.</p>
<p>More recently, there has been a series of corruption allegations surrounding the inner circle of the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which has embroiled three cabinet members and their sons as well as members of the prime minister’s own family. There have been some <a href="https://theconversation.com/rift-with-party-fuels-crisis-at-heart-of-turkeys-government-21665">extraordinary developments</a> – not least when incriminating conversations involving high-ranking political figures and business and media personalities (including an alleged conversation between the prime minister himself and his son about getting rid of stashes of cash) were being leaked through social media on a daily basis. </p>
<p>For its part, the government responded by adopting increasingly authoritative measures, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/twitter-ban-erdogan-bringing-down-democracy-in-turkey-24643">placing bans on the use of Twitter and YouTube</a>, which were widely condemned both inside and outside Turkey.</p>
<h2>Behind the polls</h2>
<p>The exit poll results published by Turkish daily Radikal yesterday, presents some interesting clues as to how AKP achieved such a strong result. Among those who voted for the AKP, 75% indicated that corruption and sleaze allegations played no role in their vote, and more interestingly, 20.1% stated that their preferences were strengthened as a result. Similarly, 79.4% disclosed that the leakages of recorded tapes had no impact on their choice while 14.6% indicating that the leakages had reinforced their preference for the ruling party. Meanwhile, when it comes to the Twitter and YouTube bans, 82.3% of AKP voters said the ban had been irrelevant, while 11.9% said it had actually confirmed their preference for the governing party.</p>
<p>These results were achieved on the back of an election campaign that had been almost single-handedly run by Erdogan himself. The prime minister billed the campaign as a “new war of independence” in which “the nation was under attack”. Local issues were conspicuous by their absence.</p>
<p>Erdogan’s line was that the corruption allegations were the work of a “parallel state” and he sought the support of his followers to “wipe them out”. Parallel state refers to a network of devotees of the Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen who had been close allies of the AKP until a recent falling-out commonly thought to be the result of an internal power struggle between the two.</p>
<p>It’s interesting that these serious allegations of graft, any one of which bring down a government in many democracies, actually helped the pro-Islamic AKP consolidate its support. Two important characteristics of the AKP power base played a key role in this. This is partly down to economic factors – the effective welfare system that the party put in place, which has been made possible by Turkey’s steady economic growth since 2002, allowed millions of low income earners to have access to healthcare, schools and transport. </p>
<p>Another factor worth noting is that AKP’s ten-year administration has given the conservative masses – mostly politically powerless before 2002 a voice and a sense of somehow being part of the ruling class. The most visible measure of this has been the lifting of the headscarves ban for university students and public sector employees. Being such a dominant figurehead in the government, Erdogan is personally credited with these gains and the AKP voters associate their own prospects with those of the prime minister and his political future. </p>
<h2>What next for Turkey?</h2>
<p>Although the election victory is clear, the government’s fight for control prior to the election was achieved at the expense of democracy. New laws giving increased powers to the justice minister in appointing and dismissing judges and prosecutors call into question the separation of powers while the new internet law gives excessive powers to the government in control of digital media. Some of these worrying changes may be reversible, there have been indications that the Twitter and YouTube bans may be lifted. But there is no expectation that the repressive atmosphere will disappear any time soon.</p>
<p>Turkey today is deeply polarised: with 45% of the electorate are fiercely loyal to the prime minister while a substantial part of the remaining 55% feel just as strongly the other way and it is not clear how consensus might be reached. The prime minister’s victory speech, mostly conciliatory in the past, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/31/us-turkey-election-idUSBREA2R12X20140331">has already pointed in the direction of worsening of tensions</a> by referring to his determination to “pay back” and “wipe out the traitors”.</p>
<p>The stakes are very high. After years of enjoying favourable conditions in international financial markets, the Turkish economy is now <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/jessecolombo/2014/03/05/why-the-worst-is-still-ahead-for-turkeys-bubble-economy/">facing an uncertain future</a>. Turkey is currently seen as one of the fragile five: the group of countries that are identified as vulnerable due to their high current account deficits. Economic uncertainty has intensified following the US Fed’s reversal of its easy money policy that was put in place in response to the global financial crisis. Although the fiscal indicators may appear sound, inflation is already on the up while growth forecasts for 2014 and 2015 are in the modest 2%-3% range.</p>
<p>Turkey continues to face serious challenges both economically and politically, in spite of the decisive electoral results on Sunday. How the government chooses to deal with its renewed mandate will determine how the rest of the election marathon will pan out. The polarising “divide and rule” policy which has so often been on display may have helped towards the electoral victory but will do no good for Turkey’s prospects.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25099/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gulcin Ozkan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Turkish people went to the polls at the weekend against a backdrop of some of the most serious unrest the country has seen in living memory. The local elections, in which the ruling AKP (Justice and…Gulcin Ozkan, Professor of Economics, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/246432014-03-21T15:36:53Z2014-03-21T15:36:53ZTwitter ban: Erdogan bringing down democracy in Turkey<p>In an extraordinary move Turkey has <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/21/turkey-blocks-twitter-prime-minister">banned Twitter</a>, blocking access to the social networking site that has more than 10m users in the country. The ban has come just hours after the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, addressing an election rally in the western city of Bursa, stated: “We shall root out Twitter, I don’t care what the international community says, everyone will witness the power of the Turkish Republic.”</p>
<p>The ban has been widely seen as a sinister move towards silencing serious corruption allegations surrounding the key members of the government that have been leaked through the social media in recent days. Although the ban has been effective only for a few of hours, the users – including notably the president as well as the deputy prime minister – have been <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/21/turkey-twitter-users-flout-ban-erdogan">quick to find way of getting round it</a>. Still, the move signals a grave turn of events that have shattered the image of Turkey as a rising star and growing democracy.</p>
<p>The key date in all this is <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-25414150">December 17</a> last year. As a result of a corruption investigation, police detained scores of people, including the sons of three cabinet ministers who subsequently resigned and who are currently facing serious charges along with their sons.</p>
<p>This was a turning point for the AKP (Justice and Development Party) that has been in power since 2002 and has posed the greatest challenge yet to Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the dominant figure in Turkish politics over the past 11 years.</p>
<h2>Protests go nationwide</h2>
<p>At this point the government, dominant for so long, was already operating in radically changed political landscape in the aftermath of the mass protests last summer. Following the heavy-handed involvement of the security forces, <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-gezi-turkey-in-media-and-campus-clampdown-18028">demonstrations</a> against an urban development project in Gezi Park in Istanbul quickly turned into a nationwide protest movement in June 2013.</p>
<p>One major consequence of the Gezi movement – as the protests have come to be known – has been that it marked the collapse of a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-urban-uprising-has-smashed-national-wall-of-fear-14916">fear threshold</a>”. This effectively ended a long period of complete lack of opposition to the government on the part of civil society and particularly in the mainstream media. The initiative shown by mostly young people provided the spark for other segments of the society and a basis on which to build real opposition.</p>
<p>The second effect of the movement directly follows from the way the government and particularly the prime minister chose to respond to the protests. The divisive talk of “us” against “them” that was adopted during the protest and in the aftermath has only deepened the polarisation. So much so that there was no official apology for the deaths of the six young people who lost their lives as a direct result of police force during the protests. </p>
<p>The youngest victim was <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-students-and-academics-treated-as-states-enemy-within-23952">Berkin Elvan</a> who was 15 when he died last week after spending 269 days in a coma as a result of being hit by a teargas canister in the head on his way to buy bread on the morning of June 16.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, however damaging this polarisation may have been for the society in the long-term, the prime minister has succeeded in consolidating his grassroots support. His followers appear to have bought into the argument that most protesters were traitors who posed a serious threat to the very existence of pious Muslims, the predominant source of AKP’s power base.</p>
<h2>Government tainted by sleaze</h2>
<p>When set against this background, the corruption scandal with very serious allegations regarding the financial dealings of those closely associated with the prime minister including his family members poses a very different kind challenge for the AKP and for the prime minister, in particular.</p>
<p>This is the first time in the history of Turkey that a prime minister is at the centre of such grave allegations. Second, sleaze and bribery, the subject of the criminal investigation, are against the principles of Islam which has provided much of what the AKP has stood for. The AKP has set “fighting against corruption” as one of its main missions, hence the word Justice in the party’s name. The corruption allegations therefore present an existential threat, not only to the prime minister, but also to the political movement that he represents.</p>
<p>What complicates things further is how the probe had been instigated and conducted. The government defends its position by arguing that the investigation is a coup attempt by officials close to the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13503361">Hizmet movement</a> that has been acting as a parallel state within the higher echelons of power. The Hizmet (Turkish for “service”) movement is inspired by the Islamic cleric, Fethullah Gulen, who has been living in self-imposed exile in the US for the past 15 years and commands a formidable control over a large number of schools, companies and media outlets in 140 countries.</p>
<p>Hizmet has no visible organisation but has millions of devotees, argued to be working for “service to others”. The government line is that the followers of the movement infiltrated the state machinery through the judiciary and the police. It maintains that Hizmet members were active in both the preparation of the corruption case as well as in the arrests and detentions since December 17. The government argues this is an act of revenge for <a href="http://www.worldbulletin.net/todays-news/129924/turkeys-parliament-approves-closure-of-prep-schools">its plan</a> to close a large number of preparatory schools in Turkey – many of which belong to Hizmet.</p>
<p>In what has been seen as a counter attack, the government announced that it now has the evidence that prosecutors close to the Hizmet movement have unlawfully monitored thousands of phones belonging to journalists, business leaders as well as government ministers. For the public this has become an extraordinary reality show: tapes are being leaked almost daily on the internet exposing potentially explosive financial dealings of government members. And the tape wars are set to intensify in the run up to the local elections on March 30.</p>
<h2>Democracy under threat</h2>
<p>In an effort to regain control of this situation, the government has <a href="http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579324851349937312">removed the prosecutors</a> who were in charge of the corruption investigation. A large number of police officers have been either dismissed or displaced and Parliament has passed a substantial amendment to the existing law on High Council of Judges and Prosecutors seriously curbing its powers, handing them instead to the justice minister. There has also been a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26311770">new internet law</a> giving the government excessive powers in monitoring the digital media. </p>
<p>In the past it has always been military strongmen who have usurped democracy in Turkey – never a democratically elected government. But the latest moves have sparked concerns about losing the separation of powers. When combined with the 10% electoral threshold currently in operation in Turkey, which denies smaller parties representation in favour of the larger parties and especially benefits the AKP, voting a political party in will now effectively mean gaining control over the executive, the legislative as well as the judiciary.</p>
<p>The fallout between the AKP and the Hizmet movement is interesting because the two have worked in harmony for much of the AKP’s reign since 2002 – it’s the first time a pro-Islam party has so openly clashed with an Islamic movement that shares the same power base. An important part of this division has been to open a third front in what is already a very polarised society where the dividing line had been between the AKP supporting conservatives and his opponents.</p>
<p>This struggle within the Islamic movement threatens Turkey’s democratic institutions as well as the very fabric of its society. It would be a shame were all the progress made towards democracy since the violence of the 1970s and 1980s to be lost in this way. The stakes are that high. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/24643/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gulcin Ozkan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In an extraordinary move Turkey has banned Twitter, blocking access to the social networking site that has more than 10m users in the country. The ban has come just hours after the prime minister, Recep…Gulcin Ozkan, Professor of Economics, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/239522014-03-12T13:21:34Z2014-03-12T13:21:34ZTurkish students and academics treated as state’s enemy within<p>Demonstrations have broken out across Turkey following the <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/15-year-old-gezi-victim-berkin-elvan-dies-after-269-days-in-coma-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=63429&NewsCatID=341">death of Berkin Elvan</a>, a 15-year-old boy, who fell into a coma during last summer’s Gezi park protests after he was struck in the head by a teargas canister. He remained unconscious for 269 days, until he passed away on 11 March. Elvan will be remembered as the innocent adolescent who got caught up in a demonstration while on his way to buy bread. </p>
<p>As news spread of Elvan’s tragic death, universities throughout Turkey held <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/03/11/turkey-violence-istanbul-ankara-_n_4943585.html?utm_hp_ref=uk">sit-ins and protests</a>. As students at one of the country’s most prestigious public universities, Middle East Technical University (METU), tried to march to the city centre, they were met with teargas and water cannons. Just hours after, people from all over Turkey took to the streets in massive demonstrations that resembled the first days of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-urban-uprising-has-smashed-national-wall-of-fear-14916">Gezi park protests</a>. </p>
<p>It has only been a little over two weeks since <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/police-crush-odtu-protest-ahead-of-disputed-boulevards-opening-ceremony.aspx?pageID=238&nID=62914&NewsCatID=341">previous violent clashes took place at METU</a>. Students were protesting against a controversial highway that was built right through the campus’s green area, which led to the uprooting of thousands of trees. They were also calling on the government to resign in light of the continued corruption claims that first emerged in a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/26/world/europe/turkish-cabinet-members-resign.html?_r=0">massive investigation last December</a>. </p>
<p>Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, used his usual defamatory language to describe the protesters, calling them “<a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-calls-protesters-atheists-leftists-terrorists.aspx?pageID=238&nid=63068&NewsCatID=338&utm_content=buffereb537&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer">atheists, leftists, and terrorists</a>”. His attitude towards Turkey’s top students – treating them as nothing more than enemies within – shows his overall disdain for any free thought or academic freedom. </p>
<h2>Students must toe the line</h2>
<p>During the past decade in power, Erdogan has tried to create the illusion that he made a clean break from the habits of the former secular regime. But within the realm of education we see his Muslim conservative AKP-led government has actually continued the tradition of Turkey’s former governments, placing immense pressure on young people to remain in line with the ruling party, or regime’s, ideology. </p>
<p>True, Erdogan is rightfully praised for eradicating a great injustice of the former secular establishment within the university campus – the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11880622">ban of the Islamic headscarf in the classroom</a>, which barred observant Muslim women from the classroom. However, with constant pressure placed on students to remain depoliticised (if not supporting his views), he is replacing one oppressive system for another. </p>
<p>This is perhaps why he chose not to abolish the Council of Higher Education (YÖK), which was created by the 1982 constitution, a vestige of Turkey’s 1980 Coup d’etat, as a means to keep tight reins over both academics and students. </p>
<p>In fact, during recent years hundreds of students have been arrested, many during protests that took place when government ministers were visiting campuses. Some were jailed on trumped-up charges of terrorism. </p>
<p>For example, in 2010, two students by the name of Ferhat Tüzer and Berna Yılmaz <a href="http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/98084/">were arrested</a> after holding up a sign calling for free education during a speech given by Erdogan. They were detained without trial for 18 months, accused of being members of a terrorist organisation. Due to the complicated sentencing and trial periods, getting information on the progress of cases involving detained students is not easy. However, it is clear that many students have been unjustly sentenced for voicing political dissent on campus.</p>
<h2>Gezi fallout</h2>
<p>Following last summer’s Gezi Park protests, the government increased its attempts to <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-gezi-turkey-in-media-and-campus-clampdown-18028">stamp out dissent among university students</a> and has even attempted to stamp its conservative values on the student population. </p>
<p>For example, Erdogan showed this when he called on legislation to <a href="http://www.louisfishman.blogspot.fr/2013/11/a-debate-on-co-ed-dorms-places-new.html">block co-ed housing of university students</a>, not just in dormitories, but also in private residences. The attempt failed, due to strong internal opposition within his own party. But it could come back on the agenda once again, depending how the political map transforms in the future. Nevertheless, the Gezi protests confirmed that regardless of one’s take on conservative values, Erdogan is trying to remove any opposition whatsoever from Turkish society.</p>
<h2>Reaching into schools</h2>
<p>Erdogan’s attempts to tighten his hold over education are stretching into schools. A <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26397755">recent law is set to close down thousands of prep-schools by September 2015</a>, which educate millions of students working on high school and university entrance exams. While Erdogan claims that the closing of the schools is an attempt by the public sector to “take back” education, from the start it was clear that it was aimed at the <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ef8cb6a-8cc0-11e3-ad57-00144feab7de.html">Gulen religious network</a> (the Hizmet), which runs a large number of these schools. </p>
<p>The movement’s spiritual leader, Fethullah Gulen, is an Islamic religious preacher and former ally of Erdogan’s, now residing in the United States. Since the uncovering of the 17 December corruption probe, the two men are now in an all-out-war. While hitting at the Hizmet’s finances is certainly one reason driving the AKP to shut down the schools, it also seems to want to curb competing religious ideologies and sects. </p>
<p>If the present state of affairs is any sign of the future of education in Turkey, then we certainly need to be worried. It comes as new legislation is also placing <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/news-340150-journalists-concerned-about-freedom-of-expression-in-turkey.html">restrictions on internet freedom</a> and a revamping of the judicial system. There are also numerous revelations of direct intervention by Erdogan on media outlets, in addition to the fact that <a href="http://cpj.org/reports/2013/12/second-worst-year-on-record-for-jailed-journalists.php">Turkey has the most jailed journalists in the world</a>. All this points to the fact that the government is capable of placing new restrictions on universities if it sees fit. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/turkey-erdogan-government-academic-freedom.html">Recent changes to bylaws of the Higher Education Board</a> are an initial sign that academics who speak out against the government could be subjected to sanctions. In early March, it was revealed that two academics were <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/news-341168-two-academics-expelled-from-turkish-university-for-joining-gezi-protests.html">expelled from Marmara University’s faculty of communication</a>, due to the fact that they missed class time in adherence of a union strike in solidarity with Gezi protesters. As this is a new case, it will be interesting to see if the expelled academics will appeal. </p>
<p>Turkey has had its issues in the past with academic freedom. But the developments since the Gezi protests and the recent clampdown on dissent in the wake of the corruption probe, have left Turkish academics and students even more on edge about the future of the country’s education system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/23952/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louis Fishman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Demonstrations have broken out across Turkey following the death of Berkin Elvan, a 15-year-old boy, who fell into a coma during last summer’s Gezi park protests after he was struck in the head by a teargas…Louis Fishman, Assistant professor of history, Brooklyn CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/180282013-09-10T10:27:49Z2013-09-10T10:27:49ZAfter Gezi, Turkey in media and campus clampdown<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31017/original/sqjr7nx6-1378735328.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C246%2C612%2C365&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Support for Turkish opposition - and concern about the press - has spread around the globe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rubén Díaz</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As autumn comes to Turkey, the spirit of Gezi Park can still be felt in the air. After months of mass anti-government demonstrations, the only common consensus is that political climate will never being the same again. </p>
<p>The AKP government is ready to take harsh actions against even the slightest possibility of a protest. Gezi Park is closed as soon as there is a call for a gathering or related activity on Twitter. As the new academic year begins, police forces – rather than private security staff – will be positioned on <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/police-resort-to-tear-gas-to-quell-protests-denouncing-campus-crossing-road-at-odtu.aspx?pageID=238&nID=53955&NewsCatID=340">university campuses</a>. It seems that the government gets the chills even from graffiti on the walls of back streets. One example read: “We will be back in September, make your pepper gas ready, mate!”</p>
<p>While society has become even more polarized by the Gezi Park protests and even by the failed 2020 Olympics candidacy of the city of Istanbul, authorities have mastered the targeting of journalists in subtle ways. The most prominent journalists, columnists, TV personalities with critical voices have been <a href="http://humanrightsturkey.org/2013/07/24/turkish-journalism-more-bad-news/">forced to step down</a> and been replaced by loyalist peers. This clearance of opposition has been swift, bold, and shameless. The Turkey Journalists’ Labour Union (<a href="http://www.tgs.org.tr/">TGS</a>) announced that 59 journalists were sacked in apparent retaliation for their coverage of the Gezi Park protests.</p>
<p>Media companies have finances at stake as a result of investments in various other sectors such as construction, energy, banking, and telecommunications – so they prefer to look the other way when it comes to the issues of human rights, press freedom and professional ethics.</p>
<p>While a growing number of journalists are resorting to self-censorship to survive, Turkey has the humiliating title of “the world’s biggest prison for journalists” – courtesy of <a href="http://en.rsf.org/">Reporters Without Borders</a>. The number of imprisoned journalists in Turkey varies depending on which international press freedom associations figures you look at. But the average from the like of The International Press Institute (IPI), Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Reporters without Borders is around 50. According to the opposition <a href="http://www.chp.org.tr/en/">Republican People’s Party</a> (CHP), it is 64 and another 123 are facing trial on charges of terrorism.</p>
<p>On August 5, at least 12 journalists accused of colluding with an anti-government conspiracy known as <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23571739">Ergenekon</a> were among those who received long jail terms from an Istanbul court hearing the case. Ergenekon is known as “the trial of the century” in the Turkish press. Although there are many defendants with criminal pasts, there is a growing public view that many people, including journalists have been punished because of their hard-line secularist and ultranationalist views.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31018/original/r7xnxg3v-1378736976.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31018/original/r7xnxg3v-1378736976.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31018/original/r7xnxg3v-1378736976.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31018/original/r7xnxg3v-1378736976.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31018/original/r7xnxg3v-1378736976.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31018/original/r7xnxg3v-1378736976.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31018/original/r7xnxg3v-1378736976.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Taksim Square earlier this year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alan Hilditch</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mustafa Balbay, a former reporter for the strongly secularist daily <a href="http://en.cumhuriyet.com/">Cumhuriyet</a> and Ankara Parliamentary representative for the opposition party CHP, was sentenced to 34 years and eight months in prison while journalist, politician and former Biz TV owner Tuncay Özkan was given an aggravated life sentence (without possibility of pardon). Balbay has been detained for the past four years, Özkan for five.</p>
<p>On September 11, there will be another hearing, this time for <a href="http://www.odatv.com/">Oda TV</a> which is an online news portal known for its fierce criticism of the government. This trial involves 12 journalists including investigative reporters Ahmet Sik and Nedim Sener. The charges against the journalists are “aiding an armed terrorist organisation”, “inciting hatred and hostility”, and “obtaining confidential state security documents.” But even though authorities claimed they had serious evidence to prove those accusations, it has so far not been presented in court. All of the defendants deny the charges against them.</p>
<p>Last December deputy prime minister Bülent Arinç pledged reforms that would address press freedom violations and lead to the release of imprisoned journalists. Unfortunately, the reform package had no positive impact on this issue so far.</p>
<p>Kurdish journalists suffer most from the Penal Code and anti-Terror laws that equate covering the activities of the illegal terrorist group PKK with terrorism itself. It seems that it is getting harder to keep balance between preventing the praising of violence and freedom of expression. On the other hand, the state officials flatly deny all allegations of lack of press freedom by calling them either a major foreign conspiracy or an unfair political move against the government. The government claims that most of the imprisoned journalists are being charged with serious crimes, such as membership of an armed terrorist organisation, that have nothing to do with journalism.</p>
<p>But the nation’s imprisonments surpassing many oppressive countries, like Iran and China unfortunately makes Turkey among the least hospitable nations for journalists in Europe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/18028/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asli Tunc does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As autumn comes to Turkey, the spirit of Gezi Park can still be felt in the air. After months of mass anti-government demonstrations, the only common consensus is that political climate will never being…Asli Tunc, Professor, Head of Media School, Istanbul Bilgi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/149162013-06-03T16:16:44Z2013-06-03T16:16:44ZTurkish urban uprising has smashed national wall of fear<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/24957/original/d3wrdqb7-1370268532.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Defenders of Taksim Square have sparked a nationwide mobilisation</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fotomovimiento</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Why is it that with all the accumulated experience in the world and the dramatic ends of many political leaders, democratic or authoritarian, Lord Acton always turns out to be right? Yes indeed, “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. And when that happens, sooner or later the power holders slip and lose it all, at times in degrading fashion. This is the most important message of the events that have taken place in Turkey over the course of the past week.</p>
<p>Turkey’s immensely successful Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, re-elected for the third time with half the tallied vote in 2011, is now being taught one of the lessons that follows absolute corruption of power. He faces a massive popular mobilisation. This is mainly in reaction to his arrogance, autocratic tendencies, intolerance and abrasive/condescending style.</p>
<p>Once his power was consolidated and the demilitarisation of Turkish politics was secured and the secularist authoritarians were on the defensive, Erdogan all but dropped any effort to build consensus for his policies. He stopped listening to the liberal democratic circles that were instrumental in helping him gain legitimacy when he was first elected both domestically and abroad. A strictly majoritarian understanding of politics, as against a pluralistic one, not just in legislative matters but in terms of lifestyles and cultural topics as well gained further ground.</p>
<p>Increasingly many important pieces of legislature were passed without much public debate if at all. The government’s insistence, again without public debate or any effort to explain the matter to the public, on pursuing nuclear power reactors and urban renovation projects that destroy the natural and historical environment of Turkey’s major cities accumulated resentment among disparate segments of the population. Most importantly it fed a feeling of rising injustice and unfairness. A sense of being closed in began to set in.</p>
<p>The mobilisation started in Turkey’s main metropolis, Istanbul and solidarity marches and movements then spread through the entire country. It flared up only after the police used excessive force and pepper gas against a couple of dozen people who were sitting in the park to obstruct the uprooting of trees. This move was part of a vast project to turn Taksim Square into a pedestrian zone that the government undertook without consulting or listening to the residents of the neighbourhood, urban planners or other concerned constituencies.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/UHnv6tGmIGI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">This type of civil, spontaneous, politically unaffiliated movement is unprecedented in Turkey. Just like the occupy movements that spread around the world, or the demonstrations of the Arab Spring, it is urban, youthful, educated and non-ideological. As in other similar demonstrations the social media played a determining role both in the organisation of the mobilisation and dissemination of information and images from Taksim and other places.
One side effect of the events had been the loss by the Turkish media of the last vestiges of legitimacy it may have enjoyed by a public that was sickened by its sycophancy, subservience and sacrifice of media ethics and professionalism at the altar of business interests. On Friday night of the 28 news channels Turkey has, just one covered the events in Taksim.
Even after the mobilisation comes to an end, as it inevitably will, the sense of empowerment against a government that dominated the political scene for the last ten and a half years, that both centralised and monopolised power is unlikely to evaporate. In all likelihood the past five days will take their rightful place in Turkey’s chronicles as the “five days that changed the course of Turkey’s politics in the 21st Century”.
In fact these were the days when Turkey’s urban public broke the wall of fear that has been built around it particularly in the last three-to-four years and escaped from its desperation caused by the absence of a viable democratic alternative on the political scene.
Long quiescent and atomised, the urban public revolted against the arbitrariness of the government, against disenfranchisement, against violations of their private space, against expropriations of their property to make space for gated communities or shopping malls.
The public is also aghast because of assaults to their way of life, (symbolised most notably by attempts to criminalise abortion and the new alcohol regulation bill that was passed) and detentions without trials for months for the simplest act of protest by students and others. It is incensed by the fact of Turkey ranking first in terms of journalists’ incarceration in the world. Finally it just had enough of the verbal abuse and police brutality that inflicts all political and public space in Turkey.
It is not yet clear that the prime minister will hear the message or heed the lesson. His initial reactions suggest that he will do neither. But he should. For this movement is not, or no longer, just about the Gezi Park, that little patch of a park with its 606 trees near Istanbul’s main public square.
It is about Turkey’s future identity. It is about creating a genuinely secular, democratic republic that is comfortable with all the constituent elements of its identity and the institutionalisation of the rule of law, independence of the judiciary and respect for citizens’ private lives.
This week Turkey is closer to attaining that goal than last, however arduous, long and full of traps the road ahead might be.</span></figcaption>
</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/14916/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Soli Ozel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why is it that with all the accumulated experience in the world and the dramatic ends of many political leaders, democratic or authoritarian, Lord Acton always turns out to be right? Yes indeed, “power…Soli Ozel, Professor of International Relations, Kadir Has University, IstanbulLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.