tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/uk-us-relations-28737/articlesUK-US relations – The Conversation2023-07-25T12:24:41Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2097632023-07-25T12:24:41Z2023-07-25T12:24:41ZNATO isn’t the only alliance that countries are eager to join – a brief history of the Five Eyes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538355/original/file-20230719-19-92axgr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=47%2C23%2C5182%2C3457&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The July 2023 NATO summit in Lithuania saw movement toward expanding the alliance.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LithuaniaNATOSummit/379be0fe4c174cd79e040b362b0c85ad/photo">Paul Ellis/Pool Photo via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-takeaways-from-the-nato-summit-and-where-it-leaves-the-military-alliance-209665">NATO summit</a> in <a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-vilnius-summit-will-reflect-fresh-sense-of-purpose-over-ukraine-war-but-hard-questions-remain-over-membership-issues-208293">Vilnius</a>, Lithuania, it is anticipated that <a href="https://theconversation.com/sweden-a-history-of-neutrality-ends-after-200-years-183583">Sweden</a> will soon become <a href="https://theconversation.com/sweden-is-joining-nato-what-that-means-for-the-alliance-and-the-war-in-ukraine-209539">the alliance’s 32nd member</a>.</p>
<p>The heart of this <a href="https://theconversation.com/at-70-is-nato-still-important-5-essential-reads-128267">alliance</a> – which was <a href="https://theconversation.com/soviet-aggression-prompted-the-birth-of-the-nato-alliance-heres-why-that-matters-now-209608">established</a> in the aftermath of World War II to promote the collective security of its mostly Western European members – is <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Article 5</a> of the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_89597.htm">North Atlantic Treaty</a>, which requires that <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">if one member is attacked</a>, then all of the other members will respond as if they themselves had been attacked.</p>
<p>Its most recent addition came in April 2023, when <a href="https://theconversation.com/finland-joins-nato-in-a-major-blow-to-putin-which-doubles-the-length-of-the-alliances-border-with-russia-203217">Finland</a> became <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_213448.htm">the 31st country</a> to join.</p>
<p>At present, NATO currently recognizes <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm">Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine</a> as aspiring members.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-nato-new-alliances-could-defend-democracy-and-counter-putin-177683">NATO isn’t the only alliance</a> that countries across the globe are eager to join.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1338655960">For more than 75 years</a>, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S. have been <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/newly-disclosed-documents-five-eyes-alliance-and-what-they-tell-us-about-intelligence-sharing">sharing intelligence with one another</a> as part of what they call the Five Eyes alliance.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/HOLZER_GIBSON_Ultra_Diplomacy-WIMAD_AFIO_Intelligencer_WinterSpring_2023_Vol28_No1.pdf">I am a former U.S. Army intelligence analyst</a> who now studies and teaches <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=vXXZBEkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">political science</a>. I know from personal experience that the Five Eyes is still very active in the 21st century, even though it’s not as well known as its younger sibling NATO.</p>
<h2>Origins</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An image of a typewritten letter with handwritten markings and a 'Most Secret' stamp across the top." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=732&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=732&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=732&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 1941 document in which U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill approved sharing key intelligence secrets with the U.S.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/">Image courtesy of America’s National Churchill Museum</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1940, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1083458138">during the prime ministership of Winston Churchill</a>, a secret effort by U.K. codebreakers to deconstruct Germany’s Enigma machine succeeded, allowing the British to read German military messages. These messages ended up being a major source of intelligence throughout World War II, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1075737">providing much-needed information</a> about German troop numbers, military maneuvers and technological developments.</p>
<p>British mathematician <a href="https://theconversation.com/imitation-game-will-finally-bring-alan-turing-the-fame-he-so-rightly-deserves-34324">Alan Turing</a> is probably the <a href="https://theconversation.com/alan-turing-visionary-war-hero-and-the-only-choice-for-the-50-note-106470">most widely recognized</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/alan-turing-was-one-of-many-persecuted-by-whitehall-for-their-sexuality-58018">person</a> who worked to help crack the Enigma machine. But in reality it was the <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/575581/geniuses-at-war-by-david-a-price/">collective effort</a> of hundreds of men <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-female-enigmas-of-bletchley-park-in-the-1940s-should-encourage-those-of-tomorrow-36640">and women</a>, including <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/management/organisation-studies/decoding-organization-bletchley-park-codebreaking-and-organization-studies">mathematicians, linguists and even chess champions</a>.</p>
<p>Parallel to these developments, <a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/BROOKS_Stealing_the_Japanese_Codebooks_from_AFIO_Intelligencer_Vol25_No2_Fall_2019.pdf">U.S. codebreakers</a> were able to successfully <a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/OLESON_WIMAD_Breaking_of_JN-25_from_AFIO_Intelligencer_Vol26_No2_WinterSpring_2021.pdf">crack diplomatic codes</a> used by the Japanese.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/world/europe/bletchley-park-us-britain-surveillance.html">In February 1941</a>, an American military delegation was invited to visit the U.K. codebreaking operation, based on an estate called <a href="https://bletchleypark.org.uk">Bletchley Park</a>. However, when “approving the visit, Churchill … <a href="https://youtu.be/nLlzHSmI5tw?t=633">prohibited any British discussion of their success against the Enigma</a>” machine, according to a 2016 speech by Richard Ledgett, then the <a href="https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/1621334/richard-h-ledgett-jr-named-nsas-new-deputy-director/">deputy director of the U.S. National Security Agency</a>.</p>
<p>Upon their arrival, the American officers “<a href="https://news.wcmo.edu/features-carousel/conversation-with-nsa-ledgett/">explained how to break the Japanese codes</a>,” Ledgett said, going on to observe that the information “<a href="https://youtu.be/nLlzHSmI5tw?t=698">caused the British to re-examine their initial decision</a>” to keep their Enigma success a secret.</p>
<p>Afterward, <a href="https://youtu.be/nLlzHSmI5tw?t=3001">Churchill approved a request</a> to reveal “<a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/HOLZER_GIBSON_Ultra_Diplomacy-WIMAD_AFIO_Intelligencer_WinterSpring_2023_Vol28_No1.pdf">to our American colleagues the progress</a> … made in probing German Armed Force cryptography.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1231608251">Throughout the remainder of the war</a>, the U.K. and U.S. continued working together to enhance their codebreaking capabilities. In 1943, this informal relationship was formalized with the Britain-United States of America, or <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/0161-119791885742">BRUSA</a>, agreement.</p>
<p>This intelligence alliance was further strengthened by <a href="https://www.gchq.gov.uk/information/brief-history-of-ukusa">the UKUSA agreement</a> signed on March 5, 1946. That same day, Churchill was at <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZA5ISi9yhhs&t=59s">Westminster College</a> in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2FM3_h33Tg">Fulton, Missouri</a> – the <a href="https://www.wcmo.edu">college</a> where I now teach – giving his “<a href="https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/">Iron Curtain</a>” speech.</p>
<p>In 2010, <a href="https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/ukusa/agreement_outline_5mar46.pdf">this top-secret agreement was declassified</a> and made publicly available for the first time. </p>
<p>Canada joined the UKUSA agreement in 1948. Australia and New Zealand joined in 1956. Thus, the <a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/HOLZER_GIBSON_Ultra_Diplomacy-WIMAD_AFIO_Intelligencer_WinterSpring_2023_Vol28_No1.pdf">the Five Eyes was born</a>.</p>
<h2>Recent developments</h2>
<p>To address the <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2021/05/08/china-wants-the-world-to-know-that-resistance-to-its-rise-is-futile">rising power of China</a>, members of the Five Eyes have recently expanded the scope of the alliance <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/five-eyes-blurring-lines-between-intelligence-policy">beyond intelligence sharing into the realm of policy</a>. Five Eyes <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2019/08/five-country-ministerial-and-quintet-of-attorneys-general-concludes.html">attorneys general</a> now regularly <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/quintet-attorneys-general-statement-support-prosecutor-general-ukraine-and-investigations-and">meet</a>, as do <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1039">finance</a> <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2228642/joint-statement-five-eyes-defense-ministers-meeting/">and defense</a> <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2384146/five-eyes-defence-ministers-meeting-press-release/">ministers</a>. </p>
<p>In November 2020, the once-secretive Five Eyes alliance took the bold step of publicly issuing a joint statement condemning China’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-52765838">National Security Law</a> for “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20201119004529/https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-hong-kong-2/">undermin[ing] Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy</a>.”</p>
<p>China responded by warning that “<a href="http://au.china-embassy.gov.cn/engsghdxwfb_1/202112/t20211221_10473480.htm">attempts by certain countries to meddle in Hong Kong politics</a> … are futile and doomed to fail.”</p>
<p>Notably, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-56970640.amp">China is New Zealand’s largest export market</a>. At the time, New Zealand was also hoping to conclude an <a href="http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/ennewzealand/ennewzealandnews/201911/41742_1.html">upgraded free trade deal</a> with China.</p>
<p>In January 2021, the Five Eyes countries – except New Zealand – issued a joint statement condemning “the <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/joint-statement-arrests-hong-kong">mass arrests of 55 politicians and activists in Hong Kong</a> for subversion under the National Security Law.” That same month, China and New Zealand signed <a href="http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/ennewzealand/ennewzealandnews/202102/44483_1.html">the upgraded free trade deal</a>.</p>
<p>Since that time, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3130094/new-zealand-uncomfortable-growing-scope-five-eyes-members">New Zealand</a> has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_new-zealand-criticized-five-eyes-alliance-stance-china/6205205.html">continued to avoid</a> taking as strong a position <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/03/asia/new-zealand-xinjiang-china-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">as the rest of the Five Eyes</a>. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/new-zealand-will-not-join-the-us-coalition-against-china-anytime-soon/">As a result</a>, the U.S. has sought to circumvent New Zealand’s reluctance by formalizing <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2021/09/22/john-bolton-on-how-a-new-era-of-american-alliances-is-under-way">other agreements</a> without the Kiwis.</p>
<p>For example, in September 2021, Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. announced <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">the AUKUS partnership</a>. Under this agreement, the three countries “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/">will expand and accelerate [the] sharing of sensitive information</a>.” <a href="https://theconversation.com/canadas-exclusion-from-the-aukus-security-pact-reveals-a-failing-national-defence-policy-168235">Canada</a> has expressed a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/08/canada-aukus-defence-pact">desire</a> to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/canadian-membership-aukus-time-action">join</a> the <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2021/09/19/the-strategic-reverberations-of-the-aukus-deal-will-be-big-and-lasting">AUKUS</a> partnership. This would leave New Zealand as the only Five Eyes member <a href="https://theconversation.com/approach-with-caution-why-nz-should-be-wary-of-buying-into-the-aukus-security-pact-203915">outside of the pact</a>.</p>
<p>The Five Eyes alliance has had to deal with other <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/suspicion-creeps-five-eyes">internal difficulties</a> as well. For example, the U.S. has had several notable intelligence failures, including the leaks of classified documents by <a href="https://theconversation.com/redefining-privacy-in-the-age-of-edward-snowden-21891">Edward Snowden</a> and former President Donald <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-exposure-of-highly-classified-documents-could-harm-us-security-and-why-there-are-laws-against-storing-them-insecurely-207484">Trump’s alleged hoarding of classified documents</a>. Both of those events undermine <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/10/ukraine-russia-war-leaks-classified-damage-control/">U.S. assurances</a> to its allies that it can keep a secret.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd looks at a large sign with the Australian, U.K. and U.S. flags, while three men stand at lecterns just below it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The leaders of the U.S., U.K. and Australia make an announcement about the AUKUS alliance in March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/USBritainSunak/65a989fb98ac4a08b7d11a699f2c509c/photo">Stefan Rousseau/Pool via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1633186">Over the years</a>, several countries have been considered as potential candidates to join the Five Eyes, including <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/could-india-join-five-eyes">India</a>, <a href="https://www.australianjewishnews.com/calls-for-israel-to-join-five-eyes-intelligence-network/">Israel</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/us-lawmakers-push-for-german-entrance-to-five-eyes-spy-alliance/a-17246049">Germany</a> and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3148806/chinas-top-diplomat-wang-yi-slams-us-move-south-korea-join">South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>Currently, the most likely candidate is probably <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-five-eyes-to-six-japans-push-to-join-the-wests-intelligence-alliance-159429">Japan</a>. At the end of 2016, Australia and the U.S. signed a <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016-Australia-Japan-U-S-Trilateral-Information-Sharing-Arrangement-Signing.pdf">trilateral agreement</a> with Japan to deepen their covert security cooperation. As of 2020, Japan’s minister of defense was enthusiastically <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Japan-wants-de-facto-Six-Eyes-intelligence-status-defense-chief">in favor of joining</a> the Five Eyes. In 2021, Japan’s ambassador to Australia argued that “in terms of interests and capability, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/japan-should-join-five-eyes-intelligence-network-says-ambassador-20210420-p57kv6.html">Japan is the best candidate</a>” to consider for enlarging the Five Eyes. </p>
<p>In 2022, the U.S. House <a href="https://armedservices.house.gov/subcommittees/intelligence-and-special-operations-117th-congress">Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations</a> “acknowledge[d] that the <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20210901/114012/BILLS-117HR4350ih-ISOSubcommitteeMark.pdf">threat landscape has vastly changed</a> since the inception of the Five Eyes arrangement, with primary threats now emanating from China and Russia.” It recommended “<a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-117hrpt118/html/CRPT-117hrpt118.htm">expanding the Five Eyes arrangement to include … Japan</a>.”</p>
<p>Regardless of whether <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/01/01/how-japan-sees-china">Japan</a> – or others – ends up joining the alliance, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman warned in 2020 that “no matter how many eyes they have, five or 10 or whatever, should anyone dare to undermine China’s sovereignty, security and development interests,” they should “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/china-threatens-to-poke-the-eyes-of-five-eyes-nations-over-hk-20201120-p56gep.html">be careful not to get poked in the eye</a>.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209763/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Holzer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>NATO gets the headlines, but the Five Eyes alliance is another close connection between key Western powers, and it may expand.Joshua Holzer, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Westminster CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2069692023-06-06T14:29:01Z2023-06-06T14:29:01ZUK PM Sunak visits Washington to strengthen ties, watch baseball – having already struck out on trade deal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530357/original/file-20230606-21-psgkb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C3820%2C1784&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">'I don't drink coffee, I take tea' -- the quintessential Englishman in, well, D.C.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-meets-with-britains-prime-minister-news-photo/1251744533?adppopup=true">Paul Faith/WPA Pool/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Alongside <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uks-sunak-says-he-wants-build-biden-ties-washington-trip-2023-06-03/">meetings with President Joe Biden</a>, U.S. business leaders and members of Congress, U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak will <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bac3258e-6051-4658-bdc4-8acfc9410242">take in a baseball game</a> during a Washington trip that starts June 7, 2023. He may be given the honor of <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rishi-sunaks-us-visit-baseball-biden-and-billions-in-investment-lcl8lcjzm">throwing out the first pitch</a>; many at home will be hoping he doesn’t drop the ball.</p>
<p>It is a high-stakes visit for Sunak, his first to Washington since becoming prime minister in October 2022. The British leader will be keen to <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/biden-business-baseball-uk-pms-213136143.html">showcase his close relationship with Biden</a>. And he will want to underscore <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/sanity-returns-to-british-foreign-policy/">his more stable and pragmatic foreign policy</a>, in contrast to his predecessors, <a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnsons-messy-political-legacy-of-lies-scandals-and-delivering-brexit-to-his-base-186601">Boris Johnson</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-prime-minister-forced-from-office-amid-economic-turmoil-chaos-in-parliament-and-a-party-in-disarray-192795">Liz Truss</a>.</p>
<p>Yet Sunak, despite being prime minister for less than a year, is under great pressure. His party remains far <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/uk-opinion-polls">behind in the polls</a>, less than 18 months before the next general election is held in the U.K. </p>
<p>He has little time to burnish his credentials as a leader, and Washington may not be the most fertile ground to do so. Bilateral relations between London and Washington have been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bac3258e-6051-4658-bdc4-8acfc9410242">thorny in recent years</a>, and three topics illustrate the challenges – and possible opportunities – ahead for Sunak: trade, Northern Ireland and security.</p>
<h2>The forgotten trade deal</h2>
<p>Sunak and Biden will have a busy agenda during talks due to take place in the Oval Office on June 8, but one topic will be conspicuously absent. As a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-30/uk-s-sunak-won-t-push-biden-for-trade-deal-on-us-visit-next-week#xj4y7vzkg">Downing Street spokesperson confirmed</a> prior to the trip: “We are not seeking to push a free trade agreement with the U.S. currently.” </p>
<p>This is in stark contrast to what Sunak’s Conservative Party manifesto had touted in the 2019 general election – the second to take place since a 2016 referendum upset the U.K.’s trading setup by triggering the country’s exit from the European Union.</p>
<p>The document promised that in a post-Brexit U.K., 80% of trade would be covered by <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-conservative-manifesto-explained/">free trade agreements within three years</a>.</p>
<p>Negotiations for a trade deal with the U.S. began in 2020 under the Trump administration, but made limited progress. The pandemic, and the question of access of U.S. agricultural goods to the U.K. market, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1fd173a6-8718-4798-b692-685801ec1604">further disrupted talks</a>. In particular, U.K. concerns about <a href="https://www.mercatus.org/research/policy-briefs/removing-barriers-us-uk-agricultural-trade">differing food standard practices in the U.S.</a>, such as chlorine-washed chicken or hormone-treated beef, complicated discussions.</p>
<p>Yet the broad <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/a-new-horizon-in-u-s-trade-policy/">ideological shift in American attitudes toward trade</a> proved the main obstacle. Since taking office, the Biden administration has consistently expressed its skepticism of emulating past free-trade agreements. According to the administration, these deals have too often ended up <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/03/us/politics/biden-free-trade.html">impoverishing American workers</a>, while enriching multinational firms. </p>
<p>That shift on trade policy is not limited to members of the administration. Both Democrats and Republicans, even if for different reasons, have become <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/25/joe-bidens-economy-trade-china-00096781">more critical of unfettered globalization</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a lifejacket stands on a boat in front of white cliffs" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530355/original/file-20230606-23-psgkb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C147%2C3912%2C2468&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530355/original/file-20230606-23-psgkb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530355/original/file-20230606-23-psgkb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530355/original/file-20230606-23-psgkb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530355/original/file-20230606-23-psgkb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530355/original/file-20230606-23-psgkb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530355/original/file-20230606-23-psgkb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Don’t expect the U.S. to throw a lifeline on trade any time soon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BritainPolitics/52fef49e7bc546f4bcc3cbcd3a645ae6/photo?Query=Rishi%20sunak&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=3488&currentItemNo=6">Yui Mok/Pool Photo via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In lieu of any breakthrough on a trade deal between the two countries, the U.K. has been focusing efforts on <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/trade-minister-in-us-to-sign-fourth-trade-pact-with-a-us-state">striking deals with individual U.S. states</a>. In particular, the U.K. government hopes Rishi’s visit can pave the way for closer partnerships with California and Texas.</p>
<p>But these will have only a modest impact at best, when the U.K. economy is forecast to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-recession-economy-inflation-international-monetary-fund-growth-forecast/">grow by only 0.4% in 2023</a>.</p>
<h2>The shadow of Northern Ireland</h2>
<p>With trade unlikely to further cement U.S.-U.K. ties, Sunak will also have to navigate the divisive question of Northern Ireland. There is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jun/10/why-joe-biden-is-so-invested-in-defending-good-friday-agreement">still strong bipartisan support in the U.S. for the 1998 Good Friday Agreement</a>, which ended 30 years of conflict in Northern Ireland. This reflects the historic role played by Democratic and Republican administrations <a href="https://theconversation.com/good-friday-agreement-how-the-us-came-to-be-a-key-broker-in-northern-irelands-peace-deal-202584">in helping to mediate and implement the accord</a>.</p>
<p>In that context, the U.K.’s exit from the EU served only to fuel tension between London and Washington. Brexit negotiations lingered for many years because of the sheer difficulty of reconciling conflicting pressures over the status of Northern Ireland, which is part of the U.K. but borders the Republic of Ireland, which remains an EU member state. </p>
<p>Throughout the prolonged Brexit process, American politicians across the aisle repeatedly expressed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/may/20/pelosi-warns-changes-to-northern-ireland-protocol-could-affect-us-trade-deal-with-britain">their concerns to the U.K. government</a>. They emphasized the need to avoid measures that could restore a hard border on the island of Ireland. Among those airing such views was Joe Biden, who <a href="https://twitter.com/JoeBiden/status/1306334039557586944?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1306334039557586944%7Ctwgr%5E707718523194ac7991194adfce8016bce541f538%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Ftheconversation.com%2Fgood-friday-agreement-how-the-us-came-to-be-a-key-broker-in-northern-irelands-peace-deal-202584">warned in 2020,</a> “We can’t allow the Good Friday Agreement that brought peace to Northern Ireland to become a casualty of Brexit.”</p>
<p>Biden’s deeply rooted <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jun/10/why-joe-biden-is-so-invested-in-defending-good-friday-agreement">emotional attachment to Ireland</a> has hardly abated since he has been in office. His recent visit in April, for the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement, was <a href="https://theconversation.com/good-friday-agreement-joe-bidens-historic-visit-to-ireland-comes-during-turbulent-times-203258">rich in personal significance and symbolism</a>. </p>
<p>Most of the trip was viewed as a homecoming, with Biden visiting his ancestral roots in Ireland. His time in Northern Ireland was brief in comparison, with only a <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11964121/Joe-Biden-meet-Rishi-Sunak-visit-Belfast-today-no-trade-talks.html">terse meeting with Sunak</a>. And if the message was not sufficiently clear, later remarks by Biden at a fundraiser <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/joe-biden-northern-ireland-brits-screw-around/">left little doubt</a> as to the president’s feelings. He went to the island of Ireland “to make sure the Brits didn’t screw around” with the region’s peace process, he said.</p>
<p>Sunak did <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bac3258e-6051-4658-bdc4-8acfc9410242">win some praise for the recent Windsor Framework</a>, which addressed some of the tension over Northern Ireland. But he has yet to solve the prolonged <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1488bce3-7da9-4d16-b3f1-d4c465e218a5">boycott of power-sharing institutions</a> by the pro-U.K. Democratic Unionist Party.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, Sunak will have his work cut out for him to convince Biden that the U.K. can play a constructive role in further stabilizing Northern Ireland. </p>
<h2>Better off sticking to security and China</h2>
<p>Trade and Northern Ireland will likely bring little joy for Sunak. He will, however, be on far more fertile ground when the discussion shifts to the realm of security.</p>
<p>The prime minister has signaled on many occasions his <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-17/sunak-says-uk-aligned-with-us-on-china-mulls-investment-curbs#xj4y7vzkg">very close alignment with the U.S.</a> insofar as tackling China. At the recent G7 summit in Japan, Sunak <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/britain-prime-minister-rishi-sunak-ranks-china-top-threat-global-security-g7-summit/">defined Beijing</a> as “the biggest challenge of our age to global security and prosperity.” And the March 2023 <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/13/fact-sheet-trilateral-australia-uk-us-partnership-on-nuclear-powered-submarines/">signing of the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal</a> in San Diego further confirmed the U.K.’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p>Regarding Ukraine, the U.K. has frequently been at the vanguard of providing support and new weapons to Kyiv. In May 2023, Sunak announced a plan, with Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/16/uk-and-netherlands-agree-international-coalition-to-help-ukraine-with-f-16-jets">build an “international coalition</a>” to help Ukraine acquire F-16 fighter jets. </p>
<p>Britain also led the way in being the first Western country <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/05/15/britain-to-train-ukrainian-pilots-supply-more-missiles-and-drones/">to supply long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine</a>. This was after being the first country to agree to deliver battle tanks to support the Ukrainian army. And that bullishness <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/how-the-uk-helped-convince-the-us-and-its-allies-to-spend-big-to-help-ukraine-in-its-war-with-russia-193918302.html">reportedly played a key part</a> in convincing Washington to lift its objection to sending F-16s to Ukraine.</p>
<p>The alignment in the field of global security will undoubtedly help Sunak’s attempt to ingratiate himself with Biden. But the harder test will be whether this convergence between Washington and London can extend to NATO. </p>
<p>The alliance will hold a crucial summit in Lithuania in July, where it will discuss longer-term plans to support Ukraine. That will include the thorny question of offering NATO membership to Kiev, which does not yet <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/05/14/ukraine-nato-membership-vilnius-summit/">have unanimous support among members</a>.</p>
<p>Even without talk of a trade deal, in terms of agenda items on Sunak’s visit, the bases are loaded. It is questionable whether he can hit a home run though.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Garret Martin receives funding from the European Union for the research center he co-directs at American University, the Transatlantic Policy Center.</span></em></p>The UK leader’s visit to the US comes amid trouble at home, with low ratings for his Conservative Party. But don’t expect much joy for Sunak on trade or Northern Ireland.Garret Martin, Senior Professorial Lecturer, Co-Director Transatlantic Policy Center, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2029342023-04-27T12:32:29Z2023-04-27T12:32:29ZBiden’s coronation no-show is no snub – more telling is whom he sends to King Charles’ big day<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523020/original/file-20230426-221-38efal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C6%2C2009%2C1278&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Scranton Joe meets Buckingham Chaz.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BritainRoyalsBiden/cccfb92c68354978b4cf7199933f7a50/photo?Query=Charles%20Biden&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1400&currentItemNo=55">Jane Barlow/Pool Photo via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The fact that first lady Jill Biden, but not her husband, President Joe Biden, will be attending King Charles III’s coronation on May 6, 2023, has not gone down too well with sections of the U.K. press. A “<a href="https://www.the-sun.com/news/7801384/joe-biden-ireland-visit-good-friday-agreement/">royal snub</a>,” <a href="https://www.gbnews.com/royal/king-charles-joe-biden-turns-down-invitation-coronationinvita">screamed headlines</a>, while commentators grumbled about “<a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/irish-joe-is-more-cringe-than-craic-7qfmjzk93">Irish Joe</a>” and his “<a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/us/1757664/joe-biden-king-charles-coronation-northern-ireland-dxus">hatred” of the Brits</a>.</p>
<p>The truth is, no U.S. president has ever attended a British coronation ceremony. Indeed, American presidents tend to avoid royal ceremonies of all stripes. Biden did <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/bidens-attend-packed-funeral-for-queen-elizabeth-ii-/6753216.html">attend Queen Elizabeth II’s funeral</a> in September 2022, but that was very much the exception, not the rule.</p>
<p>Given the U.S.’s particular history – and its parting of ways with the U.K. back in 1776 – it’s easy to see why a president might feel uneasy about witnessing the anointing of a new sovereign. No matter how “special” the relationship, some distinctions need to be preserved.</p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://www.bu.edu/history/profile/arianne-chernock/">historian of America’s relationship with the U.K. monarchy</a>, I believe it would be wrong to assume that Joe Biden’s absence signals a lack of engagement, or appreciation, for the coronation as a significant global occasion. Jill Biden’s attendance, after all, matters. </p>
<p>What’s more, she will be joined by an American coronation delegation. The composition of the delegation has yet to be announced. But if <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/page/detail/?k=9780300229943">history is a guide</a>, who is sent across the Atlantic will telegraph particular American ideas and aspirations. The delegation will also reflect the president’s own personal agenda.</p>
<h2>Signaling intent</h2>
<p>This was true for the delegation <a href="https://www.fdrlibrary.org/royal-visit">President Franklin D. Roosevelt</a> sent to King George VI’s coronation in 1937, staged just two years before hostilities broke out in Europe. That party was headed by <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/macarthur-general-john-j-pershing/">General John J. Pershing</a>, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces during World War I, and included James Gerard, <a href="https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2003/04/james-w-gerard-his-image-of-imperial-germany-1913-1918/">former U.S. Ambassador to Germany</a>, and Admiral Hugh Rodman, a former commander-in-chief in the U.S. Navy.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a fancy hat and military uniform stands on the steps of a hotel." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523024/original/file-20230426-489-zb2ot9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523024/original/file-20230426-489-zb2ot9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523024/original/file-20230426-489-zb2ot9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523024/original/file-20230426-489-zb2ot9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523024/original/file-20230426-489-zb2ot9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=570&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523024/original/file-20230426-489-zb2ot9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=570&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523024/original/file-20230426-489-zb2ot9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=570&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gen. John J. Pershing, second to the left, sets off for Buckingham Palace, London, on May 10, 1937. (AP Photo/Staff/Len Puttnam)</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/KingGeorgeVICoronation/4584720ed89e410ebef95c48d4a4cc74/photo?Query=Pershing%20coronation&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Staff/Len Puttnam</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Pershing and Gerard were committed internationalists, eager to use American power to contain European fascism. Gerard had reviewed Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” for The New York Times in 1933, in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/06/books/a-hymn-of-hate.html">which he expressed</a> his “fear for the world’s future.” In dispatching both to the coronation, Roosevelt was signaling where he stood on Nazi Germany. </p>
<h2>Elevating women</h2>
<p>Even more telling is the delegation that President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent to <a href="https://text-message.blogs.archives.gov/2018/05/31/the-coronation-of-queen-elizabeth-ii/">Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation</a> in June 1953. In this postwar moment – marked by escalating tensions with the Soviet Union and the <a href="https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/age-of-eisenhower/mcarthyism-red-scare">accompanying Red Scare</a> at home – Eisenhower chose his four representatives carefully. Two, <a href="https://history.defense.gov/Multimedia/Biographies/Article-View/Article/571266/george-c-marshall/">General George C. Marshall</a> and <a href="https://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-Staff/Chairman/General-of-the-Army-Omar-Nelson-Bradley/">General Omar Bradley</a>, were military heavyweights. Marshall, who headed the delegation, had been U.S. Army chief of staff during World War II. More recently, as secretary of state, he had helped implement <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/marshall-plan">the Marshall Plan</a>, which provided crucial funding to postwar Europe. </p>
<p>Bradley, likewise, had played a decisive role in the war, and now served as chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Eisenhower selected both to convey a clear message about American influence abroad. His third delegate, meanwhile, was <a href="https://www.oyez.org/justices/earl_warren">Earl Warren</a>, governor of California and a crucial Eisenhower supporter. The president would soon appoint Warren chief justice of the Supreme Court.</p>
<p>Less predictable, though still important, was Eisenhower’s fourth delegate: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/08/business/media/08cowles.html">Fleur Cowles</a>, the fashionable former editor of Flair magazine and wife of the publisher, Mike Cowles.</p>
<p>In some ways, this was Eisenhower’s most inscrutable choice. A self-made woman – she was born Florence Freidman, the daughter of a salesman – Cowles had only recently become a powerful presence in the Republican Party. She and her husband gave generously to Ike’s presidential campaign.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A woman in sunglasses and winter coat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523026/original/file-20230426-18-tbcw5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523026/original/file-20230426-18-tbcw5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523026/original/file-20230426-18-tbcw5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523026/original/file-20230426-18-tbcw5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523026/original/file-20230426-18-tbcw5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1014&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523026/original/file-20230426-18-tbcw5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1014&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523026/original/file-20230426-18-tbcw5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1014&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">American writer and editor Fleur Cowles.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/american-writer-fleur-cowles-foreign-editor-of-look-news-photo/940104666?adppopup=true">Photo by Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Fleur Cowles’ newcomer status elicited ire in some quarters – as did the fact that Eisenhower had selected a woman at all. “Wouldn’t a G.I. be better able to represent the president?” quipped one grumpy journalist.</p>
<p>But the pick had its own logic. The coronation of Elizabeth II <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-1953-queen-crazy-american-women-looked-to-elizabeth-ii-as-a-source-of-inspiration-that-sentiment-never-faded-190289">was a female-centered event</a>, and Eisenhower likely recognized this. In choosing Cowles, Eisenhower played into this female narrative, while also signaling his own, sometimes contradictory, aspirations for the modern American woman.</p>
<p>As Eisenhower would <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/a-republican-president-a-liberal-justice-their-memorials-show-how-united-america-really-is/2020/09/21/daad3b0e-fc0e-11ea-b555-4d71a9254f4b_story.html">explain just a few years later</a>, the process of “recognizing the equality of women” was not yet complete, though he still believed women’s primary role to be that of “central figure in the home.” As some of Cowles’ admirers explained, she embodied this idealized version of the postwar career woman – elegant, ambitious, and yet still committed to her family.</p>
<h2>Pinned down on US positions</h2>
<p>The composition of Eisenhower’s delegation, then, spoke volumes about the president’s priorities, both at home and abroad.</p>
<p>Once the delegation arrived in London, its role as a diplomatic corps became only more evident. Far from avoiding politics, the delegates sought platforms to broadcast American policies. Marshall, for example, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1953/06/06/archives/marshall-denies-u-s-has-war-aim-asks-cheering-london-audience-for.html">gave a talk at the English-Speaking Union</a> justifying the U.S. military presence in Korea and warning of the dangers of Soviet propaganda.</p>
<p>More informally, the delegation fielded frequent questions from the press about controversial issues and did its best to remain in lockstep with the president. As Cowles <a href="https://www.hrc.utexas.edu/press/releases/2011/fleur-cowles-archive.html">recalled of the trip</a>, if she wasn’t “being pin[ned] down” about Sen. Joe McCarthy’s <a href="https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/age-of-eisenhower/mcarthyism-red-scare">Communist witch hunt</a>, she was being grilled about the impending execution of <a href="https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/research/online-documents/julius-and-ethel-rosenberg">Julius and Ethel Rosenberg</a>, whose trial on charges of espionage had “been turned into a cause celebre in Europe.” In short, attending the coronation was real work.</p>
<p>So instead of fixating on why Joe Biden isn’t attending, observers on both sides of the pond should focus on the delegation that Jill will be leading. The choices, whenever they’re announced, will tell us much about how President Biden wants to position himself ahead of his 2024 presidential bid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202934/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arianne Chernock does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>No US president has ever attended a British royal coronation – but history shows that they signal intent by whom they choose to go in their stead.Arianne Chernock, Professor of History, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1836842022-06-06T12:23:48Z2022-06-06T12:23:48ZRonald Reagan’s Westminster speech: why it is still relevant, 40 years later<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466402/original/file-20220531-16-e5z267.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=21%2C27%2C2023%2C1266&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Reagan emphasised the special relationship between the US and the UK.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2e/Photograph_of_President_Reagan_addressing_British_Parliament%2C_London%2C_England_-_NARA_-_198531.jpg">Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ronald Reagan became the first US president to address both houses of parliament on June 8 1982. His <a href="https://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan-institute/scholarly-initiatives/essay-series-on-presidential-principles-and-beliefs/the-westminster-speech-june-8-1982/">Westminster speech</a> created a stir at the time. It marked the start of the evolution of the <a href="https://millercenter.org/president/reagan/foreign-affairs">Reagan doctrine</a>, his approach to foreign affairs that sought to support freedom and roll back Communist aggression.</p>
<p>The UK prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, was determined to grant Reagan the rare honour of addressing British parliamentarians at Westminster. Her political opponents were not so keen. For Labour leader Michael Foot, Reagan’s conservative policies made him too divisive a figure to speak. But the speech went ahead and Reagan later wrote in his memoirs that it was one of his most important.</p>
<p>Words matter. Those of the US president in particular have enormous influence on political and popular discourse. Forty years on, several lines from the Westminster speech still carry weight.</p>
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<h2>Reagan on geopolitics</h2>
<p>The US <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/kennan">policy of containment</a> toward the Soviet Union during the cold war had resulted in the consolidation of a divided world. It had led politicians, policymakers and scholars to accept that the globe would remain split between the capitalist west and the communist east, with each bloc competing for influence over the so-called third world. </p>
<p>Since the Nixon administration, the American pursuit of <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/detente">a <em>détente</em></a> – an easing of tensions with the Soviet Union – had underlined the notion that the cold war could only be managed, not won. Reagan’s Westminster speech, by contrast, was a bold declaration that the cold war actually could be won. He imagined a world beyond the threat of nuclear war:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The march of freedom and democracy […] will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>His comments drew admiration from his supporters, but bemusement from others. While the <a href="https://www.npg.org.uk/collections/search/portrait/mw251471/Gone-with-the-Wind-Ronald-Reagan-Margaret-Thatcher">popular perception</a> is that Reagan enjoyed Thatcher’s iron-clad support in aggression toward the Soviet Union, the reality was more complicated. </p>
<p>It is true that <a href="https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/124394">Thatcher admired</a> the Westminster speech, but she was <a href="https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/143809">less impressed</a> with Reagan’s dream of a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14794012.2016.1230259">world without nuclear weapons</a>. Reagan almost made this a reality when he met Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavik in 1986. Upon hearing about this meeting, Thatcher furiously told her aides that technology could not be un-invented and she would not abandon the UK’s nuclear deterrent. </p>
<p>Reagan’s rhetoric at Westminster challenged conventional wisdom about both the nature of international relations and the role of government in American life. His <a href="https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/inaugural-address-1981">1981 inaugural address</a> had similarly broken with the status quo, declaring that “government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem”. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher walk side by side outside of the White House" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466403/original/file-20220531-16-qzfg8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466403/original/file-20220531-16-qzfg8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=832&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466403/original/file-20220531-16-qzfg8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=832&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466403/original/file-20220531-16-qzfg8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=832&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466403/original/file-20220531-16-qzfg8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1046&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466403/original/file-20220531-16-qzfg8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1046&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466403/original/file-20220531-16-qzfg8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1046&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Reagan and Thatcher had a close personal and diplomatic relationship while in office, though peppered with tension at times.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/Reagan_Thatcher.jpg">White House Photographic Office, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Anglo-American relations</h2>
<p>Reagan’s speech made references to celebrated transatlantic figures and the history of Anglo-American relations. As has been emphasised since the second world war and is still commonplace today, this sought to underline the specialness of the Anglo-American relationship.</p>
<p>Of course, given the United States’ beginnings as a rebellion against the colonial rule of the British king, Anglo-American relations have not always been celebrated as “special”. At Westminster, <a href="https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104581">Reagan joked</a> that “it was best to let bygones be bygones”, referring to comments Thatcher made in 1981 during a visit to Washington DC about the American revolution and “a little rebellion now and then” being “a good thing”.</p>
<p>Reagan also praised Winston Churchill’s leadership, echoing some of his particularly famous observations about totalitarian regimes reaching from “<a href="https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/">Stettin on the Baltic</a> to Varna on the Black Sea”. And he publicly declared his support for the <a href="https://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/1982_falklands">Falklands war</a>, which had broken out two months prior. As British and Argentinian forces disputed the sovereignty of those South Atlantic islands, Reagan sought to put to rest <a href="https://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/1982_falklands">widespread doubts</a> about US support for the British position. </p>
<p>Reagan’s administration had been divided on the issue. Some believed a peace agreement was urgently needed to avoid the military junta that ruled Argentina being humiliated by the conflict, as it risked the rise of a leftist government there. Reagan, by contrast, emphasised to the British politicians the <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781137283665">shared Anglo-American commitment</a> to democracy and the rule of law. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Voices have been raised protesting their sacrifice for lumps of rock and earth so far away. But those young men aren’t fighting for mere real estate. They fight for a cause – for the belief that armed aggression must not be allowed to succeed. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The speech demonstrates the significance attached to the words of a US president. Thatcher would not be the last prime minister to be grateful for <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/cameron-personally-requested-obamas-back-of-the-queue-brexit-warning-11423669">presidential support</a> for a controversial policy. </p>
<p>It is also an example of the overlap between domestic politics and foreign affairs. It further established the “special relationship” between Reagan and Thatcher. The president had endorsed Thatcher’s decision to go to war for the Falklands. The prime minster had ensured Reagan delivered a major speech to an international, and, crucially, a domestic audience back in the US. </p>
<p>At Westminster Reagan called for allies to join “a crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation”, where “all people are at last free to determine their own destiny”. He argued that “military strength is a prerequisite to peace” albeit “in the hope it will never be used”. This has striking parallels with the resurgence of Nato’s unity in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>For Reaganites – who describe the 40th president as the “great communicator” – his ideas and delivery were timeless. For his critics, this speech was another example of the reckless and dangerous rhetoric with which he escalated tensions, even risking a “hot war” with the Soviet Union. Less than a year later, he would go on to describe the USSR as an “<a href="https://www.reaganfoundation.org/library-museum/permanent-exhibitions/berlin-wall/from-the-archives/remarks-at-the-annual-convention-of-the-national-association-of-evangelicals-in-orlando-florida/">evil empire</a>”. Forty years on, his words at Westminster drive home a truth about history: <em>plus ça change</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183684/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Cooper's research has been supported by grants and fellowships from the US-UK Fulbright Commission, the Norwegian Nobel Institute, the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library and the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. </span></em></p>Reagan was the first US president to address the UK parliament. What he said still carries weight for Anglo-American relations decades on.James Cooper, Associate Professor of History and American Studies, York St John UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1683422021-09-27T13:17:02Z2021-09-27T13:17:02ZGlobal Britain is becoming a stooge of the US<p>The scenes as American and British troops withdrew from Afghanistan were heartbreaking. People desperate to leave the country they love, offering up their children for transportation to a more peaceful country, being crushed to death for a chance at freedom. </p>
<p>Those horrific scenes were also visual confirmation of Britain’s waning influence in the world, despite hoping to become <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/john-bew-global-britain-uk-eu/">“Global Britain”</a> in the wake of Brexit. Tom Tugendhat, a Conservative member of parliament and chair of the foreign affairs select committee, described the departure from Afghanistan as “the biggest <a href="https://twitter.com/tomtugendhat/status/1427204680900349952?lang=en">foreign policy disaster</a> since Suez”. </p>
<p>The 1956 Suez crisis – which ended with the US pressuring the British and French to end their invasion of Egypt – was a turning point in British foreign policy. It held up a mirror to the British political establishment, showing the public very clearly how Britain’s overseas influence <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/mar/14/past.education1">had declined</a>. </p>
<p>The Leave campaign pitched post-EU Britain as an outward-looking world leader, fighting for the ideals the UK holds dear. But when push came to shove in Afghanistan, here were the British, again following the US’s lead. </p>
<p>In his first official <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/21/joe-biden-boris-johnson-relationship-513496">private meeting</a> with US president Joe Biden since Biden took office, Boris Johnson was keen to leverage the “special relationship” to build Britain’s international status and cement its position as the ally of choice for the US. But a closer look at the status of this relationship suggests the UK has, instead of taking a step towards becoming “Global Britain”, traded its leading role in the EU for a subordinate one in the shadow of the US.</p>
<p>The “special relationship’” is built on military cooperation and the sharing of intelligence and the complementary elements of the US and UK intelligence services allow valuable information to travel in both directions. Any problems or issues within the relationship, such as the repercussions of the tragic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/oct/22/harry-dunn-death-timeline-key-events-anne-sacoolas">death of Harry Dunn</a> after being hit by a vehicle driven by the wife of a US intelligence officer, are quickly compartmentalised and largely forgotten about to maintain the working practices of the two partners. </p>
<p>By 2016, with the arrival of Donald Trump in the White House, many observers of British foreign policy recognised that the heady days of the Thatcher-Reagan or Blair-Bush partnerships were gone. In the short term, Britain’s priorities were the Brexit negotiations and to build a relationship with Trump, beginning with a state visit to the UK. While the relationship between Theresa May and Trump may not have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/13/special-relationship-trump-and-mays-is-almost-pathological-john-crace">been perfect</a> (nor the relationship between <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/politics/boris-johnson-donald-trump-relationship-b1721070.html">Johnson and Trump</a>) it did at least keep the train on the tracks as far as the relationship was concerned. </p>
<p>The election of Biden, the Obama-era vice president and a Democrat, promised someone perhaps more level-headed than Trump. Still, there were concerns over Biden’s – an Irish-American Catholic’s – views on Northern Ireland and the Brexit negotiations, compounded by some objectionable comments Johnson <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-54863576">made about Obama</a> when Biden was vice president.</p>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>So far, we have seen very little of that “specialness” between Biden and Johnson, but tensions and complaints over Afghanistan were eased with two recent initiatives. </p>
<p>The first was AUKUS, the deal between the <a href="https://theconversation.com/aukus-is-an-arms-race-with-china-the-price-of-global-britain-168107">US, UK and Australia</a> to provide nuclear submarines for use in the Pacific region. </p>
<p>Beyond its immediate financial benefits for the UK, this deal builds a stronger relationship with Australia, where Britain is very keen to sign a trade deal, and it demonstrates some closeness between the UK and the US. Being able to “get one over” on the French is, for some, just <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/sep/21/aukus-row-european-union-demands-apology-from-australia-over-frances-treatment-before-trade-talks">an added benefit</a>. </p>
<p>The second was the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/sep/20/us-travel-ban-lifted-uk-eu-flights-allowed-vaccinated-latest-covid-restrictions">easing of travel restrictions</a> between the US and the UK (and large parts of the EU). This was something the UK and EU had been working on and the success was counted, in both London and Brussels, as a sign of improving relations with Washington.</p>
<p>However, the UK government would be foolish to believe their own hype. The “special relationship” is far more special in London than it is in Washington and the election of Biden will not change that. While a post-Brexit Britain needs the US more than ever, the US needs the UK considerably less, and benefits come with costs. </p>
<p>After his meeting with Biden, Johnson claimed he <a href="https://twitter.com/bbcjlandale/status/1440690141459222544">hadn’t been asked</a> about Northern Ireland and the issue of Brexit. The White House transcripts disagreed, demonstrating that the US are unafraid to demand action and the UK can do very little to frustrate them. While Johnson may be able to ignore Biden’s demands in private, he will be far less able if they ever become loudly public.</p>
<p>The US has always been able to shout “jump” and the UK ask “how high?” but the public humiliation which goes with that does not fit well with the post-Brexit rhetoric of a strong, “global” Britain. Voters may well hold the Johnson government responsible for any perceived decline they see in the UK’s global influence.</p>
<p>As happened in Suez, the UK has been reminded that it is an – but not the only – important country internationally. It isn’t in the big leagues, and therefore it will need to ensure it remains allied to a much bigger player if it wants to see its influence bear fruit. </p>
<p>That could have been the EU perhaps, or even the UN security council or Nato. But as Britain has done before, it has looked to the US – an example, perhaps, of what French foreign minister Clement Beaune described as Britain’s <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/france-accuses-britain-of-retreating-to-americas-lap-with-new-us-australia-submarine-deal-1206610">“accepted vassalisation”</a>.</p>
<p>Britain in the 1950s was wedded to the US, acting as a partner rather than leading the charge. Now, while the UK continues to support the US, the influence it has seems negligible. While it may bring comfort to the UK to feel it is a partner to a superpower, being its stooge or subordinate is an unpleasant place to be, no matter how much you tell yourself it values your opinion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168342/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Victoria Honeyman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The image of a post-Brexit Britain with a strong international presence is being lost to the so-called special relationship.Victoria Honeyman, Associate Professor of British Politics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1625672021-06-11T14:57:13Z2021-06-11T14:57:13ZWith new Atlantic Charter, Biden and Johnson reset the special relationship<p>Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill first met in the summer of 1941 on HMS Prince of Wales to create the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf">Atlantic Charter</a>, establishing the terms of their countries’ relationship in war, and, as it was to prove, in peace.</p>
<p>Eighty years later, Joe Biden and Boris Johnson meet <a href="https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2021/june/10/20210610-atlantic-charter">in front of</a> a new HMS Prince of Wales to renew the constitution of the “special relationship”, with the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/10/the-new-atlantic-charter/">New Atlantic Charter</a>. These are about as piquant a series of historical coincidences as an administration (or historian) could wish for.</p>
<p>Both charters commit the US and the UK to what they deem the pressing issues of the day. The original’s call for the lowering of trade barriers, self-determination, and economic cooperation remains not only pertinent, but crucial, both for a post-Brexit, “global” Britain, and for an America which wants once again to lead through alliances.</p>
<p>In an age when the world is actually becoming <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-decline-democracy-has-accelerated">less democratic</a>, the new accord makes paramount the defence of democracy, followed by strengthening international institutions, recognising sovereignty and territorial integrity, supporting collective security, and a rules-based global economy. It ends with tackling the climate crisis – a notion unknown in 1941 – and, topically, the catastrophic impact of health crises. </p>
<p>Where once there was war, now there is pandemic. Both <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/10/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-historic-vaccine-donation-half-a-billion-pfizer-vaccines-to-the-worlds-lowest-income-nations/">Biden</a> and <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-donate-100-million-coronavirus-vaccine-doses">Johnson</a> have announced plans to collectively vaccinate 600 million people through another legacy of 1941, the World Health Organization. The leaders of the two countries which led the fightback in the second world war may think of themselves as leading the world again, but against a different kind of tyranny.</p>
<h2>Historic echoes</h2>
<p>Five months after Roosevelt and Churchill met, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbour and delivered what the prime minister wanted most: America in the war. Two days later, the Japanese sank the HMS Prince of Wales and another experience was shared.</p>
<p>On the eve of his departure, Biden <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/06/05/joe-biden-europe-trip-agenda/">noted his intention to</a> “affirm the special relationship between our nations”. This set up Johnson’s revelation that he didn’t like the term, saying he thought it was “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/07/boris-johnson-minister-of-chaos/619010/">needy and weak</a>”. To freshen it up, he renamed it the “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-57436035">indestructable relationship</a>”. This isn’t the first attempt to revamp it.</p>
<p>For example, it’s not uncommon for the US and UK to publicly mark anniversaries of the furniture of the special relationship: the NSA and GCHQ marked 75 years of their <a href="https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/Feature-Stories/Article-View/Article/2494453/gchq-and-nsa-celebrate-75-years-of-partnership/">intelligence partnership</a> while the US has celebrated how <a href="https://uk.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/special-relationship-anniversary-1946-2016/">Churchill coined the term.</a>. Churchill happens to be the Brit most revered by Americans – to the extent of having a <a href="https://www.surflant.usff.navy.mil/ddg81/">warship</a> named after him.</p>
<p>And this week, the 21st century may be seen to look back to the 20th. There’s even a biographical relationship: President Biden is as old as the Atlantic Charter. And he became a senator in 1973, the year that Britain pivoted from the new world back <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/1/newsid_2459000/2459167.stm">to the old</a>. After the G7, Biden and Johnson will go on to NATO – yet another legacy of 1941 (as are the summits themselves).</p>
<h2>A changing relationship</h2>
<p>The precedents for the two men alone are auspicious. Biden-Johnson succeeds Trump-May and Trump-Johnson, respectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-in-the-uk-a-state-visit-offered-in-haste-and-regretted-at-leisure-118192%22%22">the worst</a>, and the most <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-trump-to-biden-why-boris-johnson-will-be-relieved-by-the-end-of-the-affair-149999%22%22">dysfunctional</a> presidential and prime ministerial relationships in history.</p>
<p>Neither having much in the way of fixed beliefs, for Trump and Johnson the personal had primacy. The preoccupation with their personalities and idiosyncrasies overwhelmed other aspects of US-UK relations.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, Biden – the most career of career politicians – and Johnson – whose non-conformity is central to his appeal – find their relationship more than usually freighted with baggage.</p>
<p>Overtly Irish-American, Biden publicly <a href="https://twitter.com/joebiden/status/1306334039557586944?lang=en">voiced his concerns</a> about the implications of Brexit trade issues on peace in Northern Ireland. </p>
<p>Johnson’s reckless remark about <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36112694">Obama the Kenyan</a> “has never gone away”. According to a member of Biden’s <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mr-president-i-have-a-mr-johnson-on-the-line-will-you-accept-the-call-rg8mxsfhf">campaign team</a>: “Biden’s got a long memory and Boris is not in his good books. Biden and Obama are like family.”</p>
<p>Equally unwisely, Biden described the new prime minister as a “<a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/474419-biden-calls-boris-johnson-a-physical-and-emotional-clone-of-trump">kind of a physical and emotional clone</a>” of Trump. Such antipathy stemmed from both the pro-Trump present and the anti-Obama past of the prime minister.</p>
<p>But ascending to office can do wonders to opinions. Biden appropriated Johnson’s slogan about the impending post-pandemic reconstruction: “<a href="https://joebiden.com/build-back-better/">Build Back Better</a>”, while Johnson immediately welcomed the “incoming Biden-Harris administration” and spoke of “<a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2020-11-11/debates/DAA7FB2E-1B29-4C00-A085-26530A5BEA74/Engagements">the previous president</a>” without Trump’s name passing his lips.</p>
<p>With Biden’s election, in London and Washington the commentators’ word of choice for US-UK relations was “<a href="https://orema.hypotheses.org/786">reset</a>”. With Biden’s record of pragmatism and cooperation and the fortuitous coincidence of UK leadership of the UN Security Council – the core of the 1941 settlement –- as well as the G7 and COP26, an opportunity presented itself. </p>
<p>Scepticism will persist about the nature and extent – even the existence – of the special relationship. But the first world leader the new American president spoke to (other than those of the two countries bordering his own) was British, the first he met in person was British and the first country he visited as president was Britain.</p>
<p>And when they met, the president and the prime minister chose to retell the origin story of the special relationship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162567/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Farr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Eighty years after Churchill and Roosevelt established the Atlantic Charter, Biden and Johnson have pressed the ‘reset’ button.Martin Farr, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary British History, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1495502020-11-12T16:26:17Z2020-11-12T16:26:17ZWhat Joe Biden’s win means for the world: round-up of Conversation expert reaction<p>As soon as the major American broadcast networks announced Joe Biden and Kamala Harris as winners of the US election on November 7, congratulations <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-54845979">poured in</a> from around the world. In the ensuing days, the new president-elect began speaking on the phone with leaders of some of America’s most traditional allies, who were all keen to stress the closeness of their countries’ respective relationships with the US. </p>
<p>The Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau, was <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/pm-trudeau-first-world-leader-to-speak-with-biden-raises-key-issues-1.5181235">the first to speak with Biden</a> in a conversation that touched on COVID-19, climate change and global security. The Irish taoiseach, Micheál Martin, said his call with Biden, who has Irish ancestry, was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-54896377">a “warm conversation”</a>, while a call with Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, stressed the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/joe-biden-speaks-to-leaders-of-germany-france-and-britain/a-55558898">importance of transatlantic cooperation</a>. </p>
<p>Experts from around the world have been analysing what the US election results mean on The Conversation in recent days. Here is a round-up of some of the themes that have emerged – and the global challenges and opportunities ahead for a Biden administration. </p>
<h2>Foreign policy</h2>
<p>As Biden’s team gets to work on the presidential transition, Donald Trump still holds the keys to the White House until January 20. A lot could still happen in foreign policy during <a href="https://theconversation.com/lost-in-transition-how-trumps-lame-duck-presidency-could-have-a-lasting-impact-on-us-foreign-policy-149595">this testing transition period</a>, but beyond that, many expect a return to a foreign policy built on traditional alliances.</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>A change in tone.</strong> A return to diplomacy will be at the forefront of the new Biden administration, according to Neta Crawford of Boston University. She writes that Biden, who has hinted at a smaller military presence overseas, “may make modest cuts in the US military budget” and <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-wins-experts-on-what-it-means-for-race-relations-us-foreign-policy-and-the-supreme-court-149327">is likely to seek to end the war in Afghanistan</a> and transition the troops there into a regional counter-terrorism role. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>International order.</strong> Many have expressed hopes that a Biden administration will return some semblance of “normality” to the international liberal order. Juan Luis Manfredi at Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, is convinced Biden will understand European sensibilities and the need to support a particular type of international order. <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-y-harris-restauradores-de-la-sociedad-estadounidense-149704">He writes (in Spanish)</a> that “closeness, calm and pragmatism” will be the balm of American society under a Biden presidency. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Where to fit in</strong>. Some have identified a debate within the Biden camp on whether to restore US foreign policy to its pre-Trump era, or to reform it by forging new alliances. Frédéric Charillon and Patrick Chevallereau from the Université Clermont Auvergne suggest (in French) that the new administration’s biggest difficulty could be the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-quoi-pourrait-ressembler-la-politique-etrangere-de-joe-biden-149381">absence of a clearly identifiable international system</a>. A reluctance among some countries in Asia to make the choice between Beijing and Washington, the growth of hybrid wars such as the conflict in Ukraine, as well as the “sharp power” of disinformation, make for a blurring of the strategic landscape. </p></li>
</ul>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/CHTExH7jU77/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<h2>Pinch points</h2>
<p>Leaders across the world will be busy thinking about what a new Biden administration means for their region. His presidency will have ramifications for some key geopolitical theatres in the months ahead. </p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Brexit and the Irish border.</strong> Biden’s win comes as negotiations between the UK and EU on a post-Brexit trade deal reach a crunch point. Biden is adamant that a deal should respect the terms of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which forged the way for peace in Northern Ireland, writes Etain Tannam of Trinity College Dublin. She thinks that a Biden administration <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-joe-biden-mean-for-brexit-149928">“greatly increases the prospects of an EU-UK” deal</a>, and explains why the future of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland remains so crucial. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Chinese duel.</strong> The biggest foreign policy question facing Biden will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-will-place-asia-back-at-the-centre-of-foreign-policy-but-will-his-old-school-diplomacy-still-work-148095">how to approach the People’s Republic of China</a>, explains Nick Bisley at La Trobe University. While he predicts a Biden administration won’t significantly wind back the US-China trade conflict and will continue to work to limit China’s ambitions to change Asia’s regional order, “it is likely to try to build on some areas of common interest to improve co-operation”.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Human rights.</strong> In south-east Asia, where almost “every country” has human rights problems, Yohanes Sulaiman at Jenderal Achmad Yani University <a href="https://theconversation.com/whoever-wins-the-us-election-human-rights-in-southeast-asia-are-losing-149440">doubts whether a Biden presidency</a> will start forcefully pushing a human rights agenda in the region. Part of the reason is the scale of the challenge ahead for the US to win the hearts of south-east Asian governments in its efforts to balance China’s growing power in the region. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Russia’s borderlands.</strong> Political tensions have boiled over in recent months in some of Russia’s neighbours, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/belarus-protests-91739">Belarus</a>, Kyrgyzstan and most recently Georgia. Tracey German at King’s College London writes that while Russia and its post-Soviet neighbours are “unlikely to constitute foreign policy priorities for the incoming Biden administration”, new priorities to promote democracy and rebuild ties with Nato have <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-biden-brings-a-new-us-challenge-to-putins-backyard-149765">prompted disquiet in the Kremlin</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Climate hope</h2>
<p>As soon as he is inaugurated, Biden plans to rejoin the Paris Agreement on climate change, <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-decision-to-quit-the-paris-agreement-may-be-his-worst-business-deal-yet-78780">which Trump left</a>, providing optimism for more global momentum on climate action. </p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Balancing act.</strong> Biden’s campaign promised to introduce a US$2 trillion investment plan – though this may be difficult to get through Congress now control of the Senate hangs in the balance. Richard Beardsworth and Olaf Corry at the University of Leeds <a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-joe-biden-could-ride-a-wave-of-international-momentum-to-break-deadlock-in-us-149121">argue that</a>: “If Biden can link action on climate to economic regeneration, jobs, environmental justice, and a proactive foreign policy with both China and Europe, he could yet fulfil both his domestic and international agendas.”</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Feeling the heat.</strong> The Trump administration’s climate inaction has been “a boon for successive Australian governments as they have torn up climate policies and failed to implement new ones”, according to Christian Downie at the Australian National University. He warns that Australian diplomats and businesses are <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-says-the-us-will-rejoin-the-paris-climate-agreement-in-77-days-then-australia-will-really-feel-the-heat-149533">likely to feel the heat</a> over their government’s lack of climate action as soon as the Biden administration begins.</p></li>
</ul>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Smoke coming out of chimnies with sun emerging from the clouds above." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/368876/original/file-20201111-23-1lhciw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/368876/original/file-20201111-23-1lhciw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/368876/original/file-20201111-23-1lhciw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/368876/original/file-20201111-23-1lhciw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/368876/original/file-20201111-23-1lhciw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/368876/original/file-20201111-23-1lhciw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/368876/original/file-20201111-23-1lhciw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A ray of sunlight for the future of the climate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vladimir Salman/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Results autopsy</h2>
<p>The mail-in ballots continue to be counted across the US – and control of the US Senate still hangs in the balance ahead of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/georgias-political-shift-a-tale-of-urban-and-suburban-change-149596">run-off for two seats in Georgia</a> in early January. With electors of the electoral college <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-formally-declares-the-winner-of-the-us-presidential-election-145212">due to meet in their respective states on December 14</a> in the next step towards the formal declaration of the winner, attention is now turning to why Americans voted the way they did. </p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>No uniform “Latino vote”.</strong> Many analysts lumped 32 million eligible American voters under the name “Latino” and expressed surprise when Latino voters in Florida helped win the state for Trump. Lisa García Bedolla, at University of California, Berkeley, <a href="https://theconversation.com/so-called-latino-vote-is-32-million-americans-with-diverse-political-opinions-and-national-origins-149515">breaks down</a> the way those in this “racially, ethnically and geographically diverse group” across the country voted, and why both parties need more culturally competent campaigns to reach them. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Fossil fuel dynamics.</strong> Before the election, speculation mounted that Biden’s commitment to move away from dependence on fossil fuels may turn off voters in states such as Pennsylvania that depend heavily on the shale gas economy. But in his analysis of the overall results, Sibo Chen at Ryerson University <a href="https://theconversation.com/bidens-stance-against-fossil-fuels-didnt-turn-away-voters-in-pennsylvania-and-other-key-states-148891">says that did not materialise</a> – although the dynamics are more complicated when drilling down to the county level. He suggests: “Either Biden’s talk of fossil fuel divestment did not substantially change voters’ minds, or it led to larger voter turnouts of progressive young voters.”</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Pessimism – and hope.</strong> Trump received the second highest ever number of votes in a US election – only it’s Biden in the number one spot. So what does this mean for the Republican Party? Timothy Lynch at the University of Melbourne, points to <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-next-for-the-republicans-after-trump-here-are-5-reasons-for-pessimism-and-5-reasons-for-hope-149526">five reasons why conservatives should feel concerned</a> about Trump’s legacy. But he also says Republicans have reasons for hope – including that there still appears to be a “strong Republican vote among those who feel they’ve been ignored or forgotten by the Democratic Party” and that the “Biden win obscures how riven progressive politics have become”. </p></li>
</ul>
<p><em>You can continue to follow expert analysis of the aftermath of the US elections <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/2020-us-elections-68297">on The Conversation here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149550/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A round-up of expert analysis from across the world on Biden’s win.Gemma Ware, Head of AudioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1381802020-05-11T15:07:41Z2020-05-11T15:07:41ZUS-UK trade talks have begun – here’s what each side wants and what to expect<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/334018/original/file-20200511-31175-1pz6cnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/american-british-flags-flying-high-1607416">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Trade talks between the UK and US <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-52528821">have officially begun</a>. Both parties are working towards a free trade agreement – a full deal, as opposed to something like the recent China-US “mini deal” that focuses on certain export targets to <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/managed-trade-centerpiece-us-china-phase-one-deal">manage trade between the two countries</a>. Like a lot of relationships at the moment, this one is being negotiated over video.</p>
<p>There are doubts over the timeline of when these talks will come to a conclusion. As well as the coronavirus pandemic, the picture is further complicated by the ongoing EU-UK talks. But at the outset of this process there are some things we know about what each side is looking to get out of a deal.</p>
<h2>What the UK wants</h2>
<p>The US is already the UK’s biggest destination for goods, sending <a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx?lang=en">13% of its exports there in 2018</a>. The UK wants better access for these US-bound exports, particularly food and agricultural products, though those only account for 5% of its US exports overall. </p>
<p>Improving market access relies on an array of factors, starting with tariffs. For example, ceramics face a particularly high tariff of 28%, as do some categories of textiles, at 32%. </p>
<p>Agreement must also be reached on <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_e.htm">rules of origin</a>, where there is a joint understanding as to how the origin of each product will be decided. This is very important since <a href="https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/global-value-chains-and-trade/">70% of trade involves global value chains</a>, so most goods have value added by producers from more than one country. This means that deciding on a single origin for each product is tricky and may have an impact on the costs of trading, since various duties depend on the origin of the product. Further issues involve technical barriers to trade, standards, and agreements on testing procedures. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/334012/original/file-20200511-49565-1x4f2j2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/334012/original/file-20200511-49565-1x4f2j2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/334012/original/file-20200511-49565-1x4f2j2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=283&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/334012/original/file-20200511-49565-1x4f2j2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=283&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/334012/original/file-20200511-49565-1x4f2j2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=283&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/334012/original/file-20200511-49565-1x4f2j2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/334012/original/file-20200511-49565-1x4f2j2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/334012/original/file-20200511-49565-1x4f2j2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">UK exports to US.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore/stack?country=81&year=2017&startYear=1995&productClass=HS&product=undefined&target=Partner&partner=231">Atlas of Economic Complexity</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As well as goods, trade in services is also on the agenda. The UK is keen to see improved market access for UK services in accountancy, architecture and finance, as well as freedom of movement and mutual recognition of professional qualifications.</p>
<h2>What the US wants</h2>
<p>The US already has lower tariffs than the UK for most categories of goods, so it would expect more concessions from the UK side in this regard. For instance, US tariffs on imported cars <a href="http://tao.wto.org/">are 2.5%</a>, while UK tariffs are <a href="http://tao.wto.org/">10%</a>. </p>
<p>The UK currently meets EU regulations for environmental, fuel efficiency and safety standards for cars. A <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=751039">comparison</a> of EU and US regulations shows numerous differences: the US directly sets minimum fuel efficiency, while the EU does not; the EU and US have different emission standards. Even seatbelt regulations differ. This has important implications for how cars are built, making it more difficult and expensive to export cars to both markets. </p>
<p>The US team will also push for US products to be traded more freely in the UK market – hence, <a href="https://theconversation.com/chlorine-washed-chicken-qanda-food-safety-expert-explains-why-us-poultry-is-banned-in-the-eu-81921">chlorinated chickens</a> and other agricultural and food products produced according to US standards. </p>
<p>When it comes to services, the US will want to better access <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-protect-the-nhs-in-a-post-brexit-trade-deal-with-the-us-128020">for its healthcare and pharmaceutical companies</a>. So even though the UK government says that the NHS is not on the table, we can expect US negotiators to try and gain access to it.</p>
<h2>EU looms large</h2>
<p>These UK-US negotiations cannot be separated out from those between the EU and UK, since US demands are bound to clash with some EU rules and regulations. This will lead to a painful trade-off for the UK, which will have to choose between closer economic ties to either the EU or US. </p>
<p>The fact that the US is a much smaller trade partner than the EU means potential gains from the UK-US deal <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/liz-truss-kick-starts-uk-us-trade-talks?utm_source=30ab36bc-7e2b-4a87-b8b6-2dba0dfd8498&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_content=immediate">are quite small</a>. When you add the issue of regulations to this – the UK and EU are already much more closely aligned, whereas the US has a much more liberal policy environment – the UK has a lot to lose from worsened access to EU markets. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/334013/original/file-20200511-49565-rylyeb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/334013/original/file-20200511-49565-rylyeb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/334013/original/file-20200511-49565-rylyeb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/334013/original/file-20200511-49565-rylyeb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/334013/original/file-20200511-49565-rylyeb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/334013/original/file-20200511-49565-rylyeb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/334013/original/file-20200511-49565-rylyeb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/334013/original/file-20200511-49565-rylyeb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The UK exports far more to Europe than the US.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore/stack?country=81&year=2017&startYear=1995&productClass=HS&product=undefined&target=Partner&partner=undefined">Atlas of Economic Complexity</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S026499931730980X">show in our research</a> that even if the UK manages to secure preferential trade arrangements with the US and the Commonwealth countries combined, it will not offset the negative impact of Brexit. Because the EU is the UK’s biggest trade partner, the UK will benefit the most from securing a full free trade deal with the EU.</p>
<h2>Negotiating tactics</h2>
<p>The UK is using an interesting negotiating tactic of launching simultaneous trade talks with the EU and US. The idea is that if it achieves good progress in its trade talks with the US, it can use this as leverage to influence negotiations with the EU.</p>
<p>This approach has been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/220ff806-3c5c-11ea-a01a-bae547046735">criticised</a> by some trade experts because it spreads the UK negotiating capacities too thin and creates difficulties in coordinating these talks. The fact that the negotiations must now be carried out remotely makes it even more difficult due to the logistical constraints of talking over video.</p>
<p>The US-Japan Trade Agreement <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2019/september/fact-sheet-us-japan-trade-agreement">came into effect this year</a> after six months of negotiations and using a fast-track approvals process in the US. However, this was really only another mini-deal concentrating on tariffs and digital trade. This suggests that a comprehensive UK-US deal will take much longer and would need a vote in Congress. </p>
<p>In between dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak and the associated economic fallout, as well as the US elections, it may take a while before we see any results from these virtual negotiations. And we must remember that the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/760484/28_November_EU_Exit_-_Long-term_economic_analysis__1_.pdf">UK government’s own modelling</a> suggests that a deal will bring limited economic gains for the UK.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138180/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Like a lot of relationships at the moment, this one is being negotiated over video.Karen Jackson, Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of WestminsterOleksandr Shepotylo, Lecturer in Economics, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1287272019-12-19T10:45:01Z2019-12-19T10:45:01ZDonald Trump enthusiastic about Boris Johnson’s victory – but it won’t be smooth sailing for the ‘special relationship’<p>Boris Johnson has taken the scale of the Conservative Party’s election victory as an emphatic mandate to leave the European Union in 2020. But what of the implications of the vote for the UK-US relationship? Despite <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1205338255832555520?s=20">enthusiastic tweets</a> from President Donald Trump, the longer-term consequences of Johnson’s 80-seat majority for the “special relationship” may point in a different direction to the short-term lessons.</p>
<p>In the immediate aftermath of the election, the Trump White House will be relieved that it doesn’t have to deal with Jeremy Corbyn as prime minister, a man who has spent his life railing against American imperialism and <a href="https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/the-world-according-to-corbyn">opposing</a> US foreign and security policies on almost all issues. For the rest of his tenure, whether re-elected or not, Trump can look forward to dealing with Johnson. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/ukus-relations-after-the-three-bs--blair-brown-and-bush(38ac3a61-eb90-490e-8596-1ad8cf59a94d).html">researched the US-UK relationship</a> and how it has evolved under different presidencies. Although Corbyn was looked on with more suspicion by Trump, in practice, the UK’s departure from the EU is the more seismic disruption to transatlantic relations. </p>
<p>In the short term, Trump will see positive implications in the Conservative victory for his own re-election in November 2020. The defeat of big government socialism by populist nationalism will encourage Trump in the belief that he can repeat the success of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2019/jul/23/they-call-him-britains-trump-trump-on-boris-johnson-video">“Britain Trump”</a>. </p>
<p>Corbyn’s defeat has also been seized upon in the Democratic leadership contest with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/13/democrats-labour-biden-bernie-sanders-warren">presidential candidate Joe Biden warning</a>: “Look what happens when the Labour Party moves so, so far to the left.” There are lessons to be drawn for both parties about the importance of embracing a leadership candidate who appears credible and popular to swing voters.</p>
<h2>Deals brewing</h2>
<p>Trump will also be pleased that Britain will be leaving the EU, which he sees mainly as a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/15/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-helsinki-russia-indictments">competitor trading block</a> rather than a promoter of liberal values and rules-based international order. What weakens the EU and its progressive agenda will be welcomed by Trump. For the “America first” president, however, Brexit is <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1205368801438707713?s=20">mainly seen as an opportunity</a> to “strike a massive new trade deal” with “the potential to be far bigger and more lucrative than any deal that could be made with the EU”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1205368801438707713"}"></div></p>
<p>With the UK sending <a href="https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7851">45% of its exports</a> of goods and services to the EU in 2018 as opposed to 19% to the US, this would represent quite a change in trade policy. For such a change to occur, a “clean break Brexit” is necessary where regulatory alignment with the EU ends so <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-election-trump/trump-wades-again-into-uk-politics-tells-johnson-farage-to-unite-idUKKBN1XD0H8">that trade policy could come into line</a> with US food and manufacturing standards. This is the line that Nigel Farage and his Brexit Party <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49688420">advocate</a> to accelerate the transition to such a US trade deal. </p>
<p>The scale of Johnson’s victory, however, means that he can <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-kind-of-brexit-will-britain-now-get-done-after-boris-johnsons-thumping-election-win-128719">now choose the Brexit he wants</a>, unbeholden to the more extreme wing of his party represented by MPs from the European Research Group. Eager to hang on to the new coalition of working-class voters in the north and Midlands, Johnson may seek a Brexit deal with the EU that is less disruptive and damaging to existing trade policies than that advocated by Farage and Trump. Certainly, the extent to which any aspect of the health sector is opened up to the US market will be greatly scrutinised by the opposition and press. Under these circumstances, Trump may not get the deal he wants.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-drug-prices-rise-following-a-uk-us-trade-deal-126473">Will drug prices rise following a UK-US trade deal?</a>
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<h2>Questions of power</h2>
<p>After the UK leaves the EU, the US will also miss its main source of influence in Brussels. The US embassy in London is the largest in Europe because the UK is seen as the best way of persuading the EU to act in concert with Washington. It is through this link, for example, that the US has historically orchestrated common positions on sanctions policies and relations with Russia. With the UK out of the EU, the US will have less influence in Brussels and the UK will correspondingly be of less value to Washington. </p>
<p>Without the <a href="https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-uk-the-european-union-and-nato-brexits-unintended-consequences(85296a63-045d-457f-aae3-100a58e78f5e).html?_ga=2.212951188.1483756723.1576490553-884168932.1575893537">dissenting and cautionary voice</a> of the UK in the EU, the block will also be free to pursue greater integration on defence and security and a more independent European voice in foreign and trade policies. The bridging role that London played in persuading the EU to take a common line with Washington on arms sales to China, or sanctions on Russia will not be easily replaced.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The UK will need to justify its permanent seat at the UN Security Council.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">lev radin/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The role that the UK formerly played within Europe as a voice for liberal internationalism has now also been replaced with a government that is seen as a role model for populist nationalism in Europe. Rather than fulfilling a unifying role, post-Brexit Britain will add to the divisions within the west.</p>
<p>The UK’s ability to maintain its place as a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council will also be questioned once it leaves the EU. Having justified this position for the last 20 years because it represents, along with fellow permanent member France, 500 million Europeans, it will now be difficult to argue that its seat should be maintained to speak for Britain alone. </p>
<p>Trump can probably expect a more obsequious disposition from the UK towards the US as it pursues a new trading relationship with Washington. But future US administrations may come to regret the consequences of this election result and the Brexit that follows on their influence in Europe and the unity of the west in general.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128727/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Hastings Dunn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What Boris Johnson’s victory means for US-UK relations.David Hastings Dunn, Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1276512019-12-04T10:40:29Z2019-12-04T10:40:29ZDonald Trump goes to Watford: what happens when US presidents enter British elections<p>Foreign affairs rarely play a role in British elections. The exception, of course, is Europe: both Labour in <a href="http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1974/feb/1974-feb-labour-manifesto.shtml">1974</a> and the Conservatives in <a href="http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/ukmanifestos2015/localpdf/Conservatives.pdf">2015</a> won a narrow parliamentary majority after promising a referendum on UK membership. </p>
<p>For reasons of practicality and protocol, elections are usually scheduled to avoid summits, or the visits of foreign leaders. But nothing is normal any more and 2019’s rushed general election features the first visit of a US president to Watford, an unprepossessing commuter town north of London. Donald Trump flew into the UK on December 2 for a two-day visit to attend a meeting of NATO leaders marking the 70th anniversary of the alliance. </p>
<p>One of the many curiosities of our age is that this most <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/two-three-britons-feel-unfavourable-towards-donald-trump">unpopular</a> US president for the British should come so <a href="http://theconversation.com/donald-trump-in-the-uk-a-state-visit-offered-in-haste-and-regretted-at-leisure-118192">often</a>. Another is that Boris Johnson, a US-born, Atlanticist prime minister, earnestly <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/12/02/boris-johnson-have-minimal-contact-donald-trump-uk-visit-amid/">wishes</a> the leader of the free world was not in the UK. At the same time, Jeremy Corbyn, a very-far-from Atlanticist leader of the opposition, is <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/uk-election-why-jeremy-corbyn-surging-against-boris-johnson-100527">delighted</a> that he should be.</p>
<h2>Using the special relationship</h2>
<p>The Foreign Office may be the second most prestigious office of state, but in elections, foreign secretaries or their shadows from the opposition seldom find themselves much called on. Defence has had an impact though, such as in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/17/labour-party-manifesto-1983-michael-foot">1983</a> and <a href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/newspaper-advertisement-for-the-british-conservative-party-news-photo/92142235">1987</a> when Labour was portrayed as too pacifistic, and in <a href="http://content.time.com/time/covers/europe/0,16641,20050509,00.html">2005</a>, when the party wished they had been so.</p>
<p>Those episodes revolved around the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/dec/25/special-relationship-how-a-century-of-us-presidential-visits-tells-the-temperature">special relationship</a> between the US and UK – and prime ministers have not been averse to the blandishments of presidents on pre-election visits to the US, such as Harold Macmillan in <a href="https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/camp-david/macmillan.pdf">1959</a>, and David Cameron in <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/16/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-united-kingdom-joint-">2015</a>. </p>
<p>Presidents have been prepared to assist in other ways, as I’ve been examining in my research on the historical relationships <a href="https://www.baas.ac.uk/usso/review-presidents-and-premiers-workshop-newcastle-university-26-27-may-2017/">between US presidents and British premiers</a>. Ronald Reagan’s humiliation of Labour leader Neil Kinnock in <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0330/akin.html">1987</a> calculatedly bolstered the then prime minister Margaret Thatcher. But there has never been a presidential visit during a general election before now.</p>
<p>Part of the appeal of the Leave campaign in the EU referendum was Britain going out into the world and making more of its historic ties with what Winston Churchill called “<a href="https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour/finest-hour-173/english-speaking-peoples/">English-speaking peoples</a>”. This overlooked the fact that every American president since Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s has <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/05/11/explaining-obamas-intervention-why-an-eu-without-britain-would-be-the-worst-of-all-worlds-for-the-united-states/">wanted Britain to lead in Europe</a> because it enhanced US interests to have its closest ally at the centre of what became the world’s largest trading bloc. The exception, as ever, is President Trump.</p>
<p>The special relationship has weakened in the topsy-turvy political world since 2015 – the year Corbyn became Labour leader, Trump announced his presidential candidacy and the British parliament passed <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/36/contents/enacted">legislation</a> to hold a referendum on EU membership. In April <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/22/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-joint-press">2016</a> Barack Obama – the <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/explore/public_figure/Barack_Obama">most popular</a> recent American president for the British public – visited the UK at the invitation of the prime minister, David Cameron, to assist with the increasingly panicked Remain campaign.</p>
<p>At the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/cameron-personally-requested-obamas-back-of-the-queue-brexit-warning-11423669">personal request of Cameron</a>, Obama told the world that in the event of Brexit, Britain would be at “the back of the queue” for a trade deal. His intervention backfired, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36117907">reinforcing</a> the Leave narrative of a remote and condescending elite – and Remain never recovered.</p>
<p>Always keen to present himself in opposition to Obama, Trump has pushed his own anti-establishment narrative, which extended to condemnation of transnational institutions including NATO and the EU. In offering the promise of a free trade agreement to the UK, Trump has presented himself as a champion of self-government and so of Brexit, responsibility for which he characteristically <a href="https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/766246213079498752?lang=en">ascribed to himself</a>. </p>
<p>As if that were not a sufficient transgression of diplomatic norms, Trump also <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/800887087780294656">suggested</a> in 2016 that Brexit Party leader, Nigel Farage, should be appointed British ambassador to the US. </p>
<p>More seriously, his relationship with Johnson’s predecessor, Theresa May, was quite unlike that of any other president and prime minister, as I’ve examined in <a href="https://www.ncl.ac.uk/hca/staff/profile/martinfarr.html#publications">forthcoming research</a>. Standing alongside May in <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-may-united-kingdom-joint-press-conference/">2018</a> and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-may-joint-press-conference/">2019</a>, Trump embarrassed her, and breaking with any sense of protocol or propriety, also praised the person clearly positioning himself to replace her – who, shortly thereafter, did just that.</p>
<p>US presidents have attended NATO summits in the UK before – Jimmy Carter in <a href="https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-london-uk-uk-10th-may-1977-us-president-jimmy-carter-pours-water-for-73751623.html">1977</a>, George HW Bush in <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/116133.htm">1990</a>, and Obama in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-south-east-wales-29036492">2014</a>. But Trump’s attitudes towards NATO were originally <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/10/donald-trump-britain-greatest-fear-isolationist-president">the principal source</a> of British consternation at his election. </p>
<p>It wasn’t known then that he wasn’t a man of settled policies. In three years he has moved from being NATO’s most prominent <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-38635181">critic</a>, to its staunchest <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-50641403">defender</a> in the face of criticism of the <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead">alliance by the French president, Emmanuel Macron</a>. </p>
<h2>A liability for Johnson</h2>
<p>It would never have been necessary with any other president, but on this December visit Trump has done as requested – he has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-50632385">observed convention</a> and said he would “stay out of the election”. Except that, insofar as he flagrantly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-50647945/nhs-donald-trump-on-the-uk-s-national-health-service">contradicted</a> something he said the last time he was in the UK in the express interest of the prime minister, <a href="https://www.cityam.com/punters-flock-to-tories-after-donald-trumps-nhs-backdown/">he has not</a> stayed out of British politics. </p>
<p>Significantly, the impact of Trump’s visit to the UK is on a domestic policy area that is, by contrast, always central to elections: the National Health Service. In a <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-election-2019-a-choice-between-low-tax-individualism-or-generous-state-with-unknown-price-tag-127738">campaign characterised</a> on all sides by millions of this, billions of that, and trillions of the other, Labour has persistently claimed there will be a US-imposed increase in the NHS drugs bill of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-50295231">£500m a week</a>. NHS staff <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/dec/03/nhs-medics-reject-ideology-of-trump-in-rally-against-visit">duly joined</a> the now-traditional public protests that mark a Trump visit.</p>
<p>If Trump was ever an asset for Johnson, he’s now deemed a liability. The president sees something of himself in man he’s called “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-us-canada-49090804/trump-on-johnson-they-call-him-britain-trump">Britain Trump</a>”, not least perhaps their at times disarming <a href="https://www.boredpanda.com/boris-johnson-donald-trump-comparison/?utm_source=google&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=organic">physical resemblance</a>. But given British public attitudes to Trump, it’s prudent for Johnson to maintain <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/01/politics/ip-forecast-why-trump-wont-meet-johnson/index.html">distance</a> during the last week of a tight election. Trump’s toxicity has the potential to poison Johnson’s hitherto effective campaign.</p>
<p>So after much speculation as to whether they would meet – itself extraordinary – Johnson and Trump <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50653296">did</a>, but, equally extraordinarily, there were <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50653296">no photographs</a> of the host and his guest at that meeting at Number 10 or at a Buckingham Palace reception. The two were eventually photographed together arriving at The Grove, the venue for the NATO leaders summit in Watford. </p>
<p>By contrast, Corbyn has wanted nothing more than the chance to be photographed <a href="https://metro.co.uk/video/jeremy-corbyn-happy-meet-trump-2061254/">challenging Trump on the NHS</a> – though it emerged they did not meet at the palace. But not on NATO. On which they agree. A voter could be forgiven for being confused.</p>
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKGE2019&utm_content=GEBannerA">Click here to subscribe to our newsletter if you believe this election should be all about the facts.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127651/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Farr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US president, Donald Trump, has arrived in the UK for a summit of NATO leaders – but it’s awkward timing for the British prime minister, Boris Johnson.Martin Farr, Senior Lecturer in Modern and Contemporary British History, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1217902019-08-14T11:08:43Z2019-08-14T11:08:43ZWhat US wants from UK on security after Brexit – and why this puts Britain in a tricky position<p>Even before Boris Johnson became prime minister, the Trump administration has been on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jul/23/trump-boris-johnson-britain-trump-uk-prime-minister">a charm offensive</a> towards the UK and him in particular. When Britain’s Johnson met US National Security Advisor John Bolton on August 12 in London, <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-britain/trump-adviser-bolton-u-s-would-enthusiastically-support-a-uk-choice-for-no-deal-brexit-idUKKCN1V20W3">they discussed</a> the UK-US trading relationship, including a proposed post-Brexit free trade agreement, alongside the critical security interests that the two nations have in common.</p>
<p>The UK now has to make difficult choices in terms of its national interest and relations with its closest strategic partners. Both narrow national and wider international conditions and events have made this particularly tricky for the UK, especially given the overarching difficulties of Brexit and the recent change in leadership. Recent events in the Straits of Hormuz and the overall trajectory of the Iranian nuclear agreement are a case in point.</p>
<p>On July 4, the Iranian oil tanker Grace 1 was detained by British Royal Marines off the coast of Gibraltar on suspicion of violating EU sanctions by taking oil to Syria. On July 19, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards then seized the British-flagged ship the Stena Impero. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-what-the-law-of-the-sea-says-about-detaining-foreign-ships-in-transit-120816">Iran: what the law of the sea says about detaining foreign ships in transit</a>
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<p>These incidents and the ratcheting up of tension in the Gulf have compelled the UK to look for additional strategic partners to help safeguard shipping in that region. This is where the rubber has hit the road in terms of the nexus between the UK’s interests and strategic partnerships with both the US and its European allies. </p>
<p>In May 2018, the Trump administration announced that the US <a href="http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/05/us-withdrawal-iran-nuclear-deal-one-year/">would pull out</a> of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which sets limits on Iran’s nuclear programme to ensure that it cannot produce nuclear weapons. Until recently, the UK remained committed, along with the EU, to the JCPOA. However, Bolton’s visit to the UK was, in part, aimed at trying to persuade the UK to rethink that commitment to the nuclear deal as well as to substantiate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/aug/05/uk-joins-us-in-mission-to-protect-oil-tankers-in-gulf">Johnson’s recent decision</a> to join the US naval mission Operation Sentinel to protect oil tankers in the Gulf. </p>
<h2>Policing the Gulf</h2>
<p>In one of his last acts as British foreign secretary, Jeremy Hunt indicated that the UK should pursue a European-led maritime security force in the Gulf. However, this was subsequently <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-joins-international-maritime-security-mission-in-the-gulf">rejected by Johnson</a> in favour of cooperation with the Americans. </p>
<p>To date, the Europeans, as well other US allies, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/23/jeremy-hunt-sides-with-eu-over-us-in-plan-to-address-gulf-crisis">remain uncommitted to joining the new task force</a> despite recent overtures from both the US and the UK. The UK now finds itself in a difficult position between not wanting to completely renounce its commitment to the JCPOA and its post-Brexit security interests with the EU, while also looking for partners that will actually deliver on its requirement to bulk-up protection of shipping in the straits.</p>
<p>As expected in the current politically polarised UK context, there are varying attitudes and opinions on how the UK should navigate this challenge. There are those who argue that both the UK and the EU (and <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/08/bill-for-america-first">even the US</a>) are all in weaker international positions and this is just one example that exposes that reality. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/79567">analysts have argued</a> that Britain’s weakness and preoccupation with Brexit, Europe’s lack of strategic foresight and defense capabilities, and a transatlantic relationship struggling to find common ground are all exposing frailties in the wider US-UK relationship. Others have <a href="https://britishinterest.org/how-should-british-policy-change-in-the-gulf/">proposed a two-track approach</a> for the UK to boost the Royal Navy and move towards the US position on Iran – and the JCPOA in particular. </p>
<h2>Naval strength</h2>
<p>What’s clear is that the UK will still have to invest in its own naval capabilities if it wants to safeguard shipping in the Gulf whether independently or through multilateral missions. In July, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/07/25/in-a-naval-confrontation-with-iran-great-britain-can-find-neither-ships-nor-friends/">warned the UK</a> that the responsibility falls to the UK to take care of its ships. </p>
<p>So what is the UK’s capacity to do this? Currently, the Royal Navy has fewer than 80 ships and is at about <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/06/21/cuts-britains-military-mean-no-longer-rule-waves-fleet-halved/">half of the capacity</a> it was during the Falklands War. This is partly because the Royal Navy pursued a strategy of replacing capacity with high-end capability; the US Navy has taken a similar path, though it started from a much stronger position. However, for the UK, this has <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/07/25/in-a-naval-confrontation-with-iran-great-britain-can-find-neither-ships-nor-friends/">led to a need to strike a balance</a> between those capacities necessary to win wars and to preserve peace. Protecting routine maritime shipping very much falls into the latter category. </p>
<p>The UK approach is purposefully designed to plug into US operational capacity in times of crisis management operations or great power conflicts. The force is set up to support a carrier strike-group and not to patrol global shipping routes. </p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether Johnson will be open to investing the required capital to grow the Royal Navy substantially. He certainly seems ready to work more closely with the Americans in the Gulf. However, the long-term shape of the UK-EU security partnership as well as UK bilateral cooperation with the larger European military powers will reveal itself in time.</p>
<p>This will only be determined by the circumstances and attitudes surrounding Brexit and the ability to repair the current fractures in the wider transatlantic relationship – and not just on what particular maritime task force the UK decides to contribute.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121790/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon J Smith receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for research on the Drivers of Military Strategic Reform.</span></em></p>Tensions in the Gulf are a stark reminder of the choices ahead for the UK on security cooperation after Brexit.Simon J Smith, Associate Professor of Security and International Relations, Staffordshire UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1201062019-07-10T10:41:05Z2019-07-10T10:41:05ZUK ambassador leaks: Donald Trump’s reaction to Kim Darroch’s criticism reeks of double standards<p>Kim Darroch, the UK’s ambassador to the US, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2019/jul/10/tory-leadership-latest-news-john-major-threatens-to-take-boris-johnson-to-court-to-stop-him-proroguing-parliament-for-no-deal-brexit-live-news">has resigned</a> following the tensions caused by the leak of highly critical diplomatic cables about the White House and the president.</p>
<p>Donald Trump hit out again at Darroch on July 8, in another Twitter outburst, <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1148298496140820480">Trump criticised</a> the UK’s handling of Brexit, adding: “I do not know the Ambassador, but he is not well liked or well thought of within the US. We will no longer deal with him.”</p>
<p>In <a href="https://twitter.com/hendopolis/status/1148910500719267841">comments about his resignation</a>, Darroch wrote: “The current situation is making it impossible for me to carry out my role as I would like.”</p>
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<p>The latest turn in the UK-US “special relationship” is a useful reminder that transatlantic relations between Theresa May’s government and the Trump administration remain rocky, even after Trump’s <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/06/06/roaring-success-trumps-state-visit-proves-special-relationship/">successful state visit</a> to the UK in June.</p>
<p>This new spat in US-UK relations came after sensitive diplomatic cables were leaked to the Mail on Sunday newspaper, in which Darroch warned senior diplomats that Trump was “inept”, “insecure” and “incompetent”, and that his White House was “uniquely dysfunctional”. In one of the <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-britain/leak-of-ambassadors-memos-about-trump-could-harm-uk-u-s-relations-fox-idUKKCN1U30P1">most sensitive documents</a>, Darroch admitted: </p>
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<p>We don’t really believe this administration is going to become substantially more normal; less dysfunctional; less unpredictable; less faction riven; less diplomatically clumsy and inept.</p>
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<p>The leak of confidential cables – now subject to an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/jul/08/who-could-be-prosecuted-leaked-diplomatic-emails-official-secrets-act-kim-darroch">internal investigation</a> – is damaging for Britain’s diplomatic relationship with Washington, putting the British government in an awkward position.</p>
<p>The British foreign secretary, Jeremy Hunt, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2019/jul/08/jeremy-hunt-says-trump-administration-is-highly-effective-video">said it was important</a> for diplomats to share frank views, even if he disagreed with Darroch’s assessment, adding <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-hunt-trump-uk-ambassador-kim-darroch-next-prime-minister-no-10-a8997546.html">that he would keep</a> Darroch in post. Boris Johnson, Hunt’s predecessor as foreign secretary, and rival for the Conservative leadership, has declared his “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2019/jul/09/boris-johnson-i-have-a-good-relationship-with-the-white-house-video">good relationship</a>” with Trump – though remained silent on whether he would keep Darroch <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0b57ad82-a212-11e9-974c-ad1c6ab5efd1">in place</a>. </p>
<p>Former head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Peter Ricketts, rightly observed that the real scandal isn’t Darroch’s reading of the situation, but <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/08/embassy-leak-kim-darroch-foreign-office?CMP=share_btn_tw">the fact that</a>: “Someone inside the British system deliberately amassed a stash of his assessments, then chose the moment of maximum impact to leak it.”</p>
<p>In diplomacy, speaking truth to power is vital. Ambassadors and officials around the globe share their frank assessments about their host countries, but few are leaked resulting in diplomatic faux pas. But for all the hype – and suggestions that Darroch should be removed early – US diplomats have been just as critical of the UK.</p>
<h2>Double standards</h2>
<p>Among the 250,000 classified US diplomatic cables released by the whistleblowing website Wikileaks in 2010 were criticisms of UK foreign and defence policy, and even gossip about British MPs. US commanders noted that UK forces <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/dec/02/wikileaks-cables-afghan-british-military">had failed to secure</a> Sangin, Afghanistan, while a one-time Labour minister <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/8166754/WikiLeaks-Labour-minister-was-a-hound-dog-with-women.html">was described as</a> a “bit of a hound dog where women are concerned”. </p>
<p>The leaks also showed that US ambassador Louis Susman <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8172277/WikiLeaks-Bank-chiefs-great-concerns-for-David-Cameron-and-George-Osborne.html">told the State Department about private remarks</a> made by then-governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, that Conservative Party leader David Cameron and shadow chancellor George Osborne had a “lack of depth”. Susman said both relied on a small circle of advisors and thought of issues “only in terms of politics, and how they might affect Tory electorability (sic)”. US president Barack Obama even thought Cameron was “<a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/8169382/WikiLeaks-Barack-Obama-regarded-David-Cameron-as-lightweight.html">lightweight</a>”. </p>
<p>But the most critical comments were reserved for Gordon Brown’s troubled premiership. In a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/144015">cable in March 2008</a>, following Labour’s spring conference in Birmingham, Susman’s predecessor, Robert Tuttle, reported that Brown’s vision of an economy for the future fell flat. Activists had little “enthusiasm” with a general “lack of energy”. According to Tuttle, the only excitement was when David Miliband, then foreign secretary, appeared as hundreds of Labour students “clearly idolized him”. </p>
<p>In July, following a surprise by-election defeat to the Scottish National Party in Glasgow East, Tuttle <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8178109/WikiLeaks-Gordon-Brown-lurched-from-disaster-to-disaster.html">cabled Washington</a>: “As Gordon Brown lurches from political disaster to disaster, Westminster is abuzz with speculation about whether he will be replaced as prime minister and Labour party leader.” He went on: “Brown’s leadership of the party, and his premiership, may now be beyond repair.”</p>
<p>While relations between the UK and US improved in the short term, within months, US assessments of Brown’s premiership quickly went downhill. By April 2009, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/dec/02/wikileaks-gordon-brown-abysmal-prime-minister">the embassy believed</a>: “That any Labour politician with his or her eye on the future would be willing to take on the sinking ship that is the current Labour Party”, which needed a “process of rebulding”.</p>
<h2>The long run</h2>
<p>Response to these Wikileaks revelations in London were relatively muted compared to the furore over the latest story – partially, as Labour was no longer in power. Cameron, now prime minister, was also eager not to rock the boat – later describing US-UK ties as “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/13/barack-obama-david-cameron-essential-relationship">essential</a>”. Downing Street officials condemned the leaks, citing national security, but refused to comment on particular examples.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/d-day-75-years-on-special-relationship-forged-on-the-beaches-of-france-now-poised-to-enter-a-new-era-118215">D-Day 75 years on: 'special relationship' forged on the beaches of France now poised to enter a new era</a>
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<p>While certainly embarrassing, revealing what US diplomats really thought about their allies, strong US-UK ties remained following the publication of the Wikileaks cables. As former UK ambassador to Washington Christopher Meyer wisely observed in 2010, shortly after the story broke, the leaks made little “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11859333">difference at all</a>” in day-to-day relations – a comment that has some validity today.</p>
<p>In diplomacy, being honest matters. While the “special relationship” is important, it shouldn’t restrict criticism of Trump or the White House. After all, what Darroch said was probably true – the problem is he was caught saying it. For all Washington’s upset at the comments, US diplomats have been critical of the UK, too. Frankness is what makes the relationship special.</p>
<p><em>This article has been amended to reflect Kim Darroch’s resignation as UK ambassador to the US on Wednesday July 10.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120106/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Lomas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The leak of US dipomatic cables by Wikileaks revealed some equally frank assessments of British politicians.Dan Lomas, Programme Leader, MA Intelligence and Security Studies, University of SalfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1182152019-06-04T15:07:37Z2019-06-04T15:07:37ZD-Day 75 years on: ‘special relationship’ forged on the beaches of France now poised to enter a new era<p>In 1944 the blimps above London were barrage balloons – in 2019 the blimp above the capital is a giant caricature of the US president, <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-in-the-uk-a-state-visit-offered-in-haste-and-regretted-at-leisure-118192">Donald Trump</a>, as a petulant baby. In 1944, British and American troops went into battle as firm allies against a common enemy while in 2019 Trump chafes against NATO and gets into a Twitter battle with the mayor of London. As the world marks the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-48478849">75th anniversary of the D-Day landings</a>, how healthy is the Anglo-American alliance that made them possible?</p>
<p>The US president certainly does not sit easily with war heroes. During his extraordinary spat with the late Senator John McCain, a Vietnam War veteran who was captured and tortured by the North Vietnamese, Trump commented sarcastically that he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/22/im-not-a-fan-trumps-grudge-against-john-mccain-continues-even-in-death">preferred his war heroes not to get captured</a>. </p>
<p>Perhaps he did not realise that that would have excluded Winston Churchill – a man <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10417854/Winston-Churchill-an-all-American-hero.htmlhttps://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10417854/Winston-Churchill-an-all-American-hero.html">even more revered</a> for his wartime role by Americans than he is in the UK. He was captured during the Boer War and became a national hero when he escaped from his PoW camp. It’s a sobering thought as Trump travels to France for the D-Day ceremony. </p>
<p>The D-Day landings have developed something of a mythology of their own, as a moment of heroic Anglo-American endeavour, sealing the wartime alliance and forging a transatlantic partnership that would see the world safely through the World War II and the Cold War that followed. </p>
<p>The truth is more complex. The fighting on the day was much harder than many people realised, at least until the appearance in 1998 of the Stephen Spielberg movie <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/pop-culture/movies/steven-spielberg-tom-hanks-legacy-saving-private-ryan-n1012166">Saving Private Ryan</a>, with its graphic portrayal of the fighting on Omaha beach. The fighting in the Normandy countryside in the days after D-Day similarly proved much harder and costlier than anything the allied commanders had anticipated. Recent research suggests that even the <a href="https://www.historyextra.com/period/second-world-war/d-day-why-the-training-was-deadlier-than-the-assault/">training for D-Day actually caused more casualties</a> than the invasion itself. </p>
<p>Moreover, the Allied High Command was far from the ideal of Anglo-American brotherhood the popular mythology would have us believe. The British commander, Field Marshal Viscount Bernard Montgomery, took little trouble to conceal his contempt for the American commanders, <a href="https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/george-patton-bernard-montgomery-operation-huskey/">General George S Patton</a> and especially General Dwight D Eisenhower, the Allied Supreme Commander, to whom “Monty” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/28/books/the-man-who-didn-t-like-ike.htmlhttps://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/28/books/the-man-who-didn-t-like-ike.html">showed unforgivable insubordination</a>.</p>
<h2>Special relationship</h2>
<p>Nor was the Anglo-American political relationship as harmonious as is often supposed. Churchill and Roosevelt certainly had a good relationship and a shared loathing of Nazism – but Roosevelt was deeply suspicious of Churchill’s moves to maintain the British Empire after the war and by 1945 he was drawing away from Churchill and <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/Books/Book-Reviews/2015/0305/Roosevelt-and-Stalin-details-the-surprisingly-warm-relationship-of-an-unlikely-duo">towards Stalin</a>. His successor as president, Harry Truman, <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/truman-records-impressions-of-stalin">put a stop to that move</a> but never enjoyed the warm relationship with Britain that Roosevelt had nurtured.</p>
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<span class="caption">Close, but no cigar: statue of Franklin D Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in London.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">chrisdorney via Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>Nevertheless, in the years after 1945 a “special relationship” did develop between Britain and the United States – even if the term was always more important in London than it ever was in Washington. Faced with the imposing might of the Soviet Union, the Western allies drew closer together after 1945, sharing the occupation of Germany and Austria and forming a series of alliances. The best known of these was – and is – NATO, which was formed in order to “contain” Soviet Communism, which each saw as a threat to western values that could spread in much the same way as a virus. </p>
<p>To this end, Britain tied its defence policy closely to the United States, depending not only on the deployment of American military weaponry and personnel, but even on American nuclear weaponry for Britain’s supposedly independent nuclear capability. In fact, Britain cannot use its nuclear weapons <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-trident-nuclear-program/">without the go-ahead from Washington</a>, so if there is a special relationship, it is certainly not one of equals.</p>
<h2>Old friends, new tensions</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, the 75th anniversary of D-Day therefore provides a moment when the political realities of today can be put aside (Theresa May must be delighted to have a day without Brexit). Thoughts can instead turn nostalgically to the events of 1944, when there was at least the appearance of parity between the two allies.</p>
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<p>It is tempting to contrast Trump’s boorish behaviour and his petulant tweet-spat with Sadiq Khan with the urbane charm and tactful diplomacy shown by Eisenhower, the Allied Supreme Commander and himself a future Republican president. He managed to keep Patton and Montgomery from each other’s throats while also maintaining good relations with Churchill, the king, the British public and his own president – a delicate balancing act.</p>
<p>More worrying, perhaps, is the contrast between Eisenhower’s commitment to the wartime alliance – even if it meant giving precedence to Montgomery’s ultimately unsuccessful Operation Market Garden (the “Bridge Too Far” campaign at Arnhem in the Netherlands) over Patton’s proposal for an American-led drive directly into Germany. </p>
<p>Eisenhower was no sentimentalist about his allies: anglophile though he was, in 1956 he took <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6494165.pdfhttps://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6494165.pdf">decisive action against sterling</a> to put a halt to Anthony Eden’s Suez invasion. But if allies sometimes needed to be reined in, Eisenhower also knew how to work with them in order to hold firm against a common enemy.</p>
<p>By contrast, Trump has shown impatience with his allies and enthusiasm for his opponents. Even leaving aside the claims of Russian interference with his election in 2016, Trump has given every sign of getting on better with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, than he does with European leaders. </p>
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<p>He has denounced his NATO allies for not committing to the alliance enough and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-03/trump-visit-uk-why-the-president-loves-brexit-so-much">welcomed Britain’s exit from the European Union</a>. The contrast with Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower – all of whom knew how to maintain American interests while still working with allies – could hardly be more stark.</p>
<p>So what lessons could Trump learn from D-Day? He will certainly learn its value in terms of news coverage – showing himself and his family in suitably dignified poses – but the main message will probably pass him by. D-Day’s success arose from international cooperation among allies – and its setbacks and failures arose when that cooperation weakened.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118215/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sean Lang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Relations between the UK and the US haven’t always been that “special”.Sean Lang, Senior Lecturer in History, Anglia Ruskin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1130772019-03-12T12:07:25Z2019-03-12T12:07:25ZBrexit Britain’s weakness exposed in US trade deal documents<p>The US has <a href="https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Summary_of_U.S.-UK_Negotiating_Objectives.pdf">published</a> its objectives for a proposed trade agreement with the UK – and its thinking highlights just how weak Britain’s bargaining position will be in the post-Brexit global economy.</p>
<p>The US trade representative outlines many of the usual ways to increase trade between the two countries – namely, reducing tariffs and ensuring both sides share the same standards and regulations. But the emphasis is very much on the UK aligning itself with US standards. This will have major implications. It will move the UK away from the EU standards it currently has, which will harm trade with its most important trading partner and generate potential hurdles in a future trade deal with the EU.</p>
<p>The US is taking a tough line from the outset on a number of issues. With a population of 66m and GDP of roughly US$3 trillion, the UK is dwarfed by the bloc it is leaving – the EU’s population is 500m and has a combined GDP of US$20 trillion. Plus, the UK has a transparent need to both replace existing EU trade agreements and create new ones.</p>
<p>In Britain, concerns over food safety have been at the heart of debate over a potential US-UK trade agreement. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/29/britain-us-trade-deal-gm-food-eu-rules">expectation</a> of American chlorine-washed chicken entering British markets as part of a deal quickly became <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/29/hormonal-beef-chlorine-chicken-could-coming-uk-trade-deal-us/">politically</a> contentious, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/26/cabinet-split-michael-gove-says-britain-will-not-accept-us-chlorinated/">splitting</a> Theresa May’s cabinet <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/01/liam-fox-reopens-cabinet-rift-michael-gove-chlorinated-chicken/">twice</a> in 2017. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/chlorine-washed-chicken-qanda-food-safety-expert-explains-why-us-poultry-is-banned-in-the-eu-81921">Chlorine-washed chicken Q&A: food safety expert explains why US poultry is banned in the EU</a>
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<p>But the quandary facing the British government extends well beyond concerns over the consumer safety implications of US mass production methods. With US agricultural imports would also come US agricultural and sanitary and phytosanitary standards, which are in place to protect against diseases. This will create hurdles for British agricultural exports heading to the EU, as it will no longer meet EU standards.</p>
<p>For British farmers, the wholesale removal of trade barriers with the US may also come at a time when the industry is particularly vulnerable. Following Brexit, British agriculture will lose access to the EU subsidies it receives through the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-eu-common-agricultural-policy-56329">Common Agricultural Policy</a>. While the UK government has promised to replace these, questions about its ability to fund its many post-Brexit promises remain.</p>
<h2>Beyond agriculture</h2>
<p>British manufacturers face the same demands to harmonise their regulations from the US trade representative, creating similar difficulties for exporters targeting the EU. Then, when it comes to services, US demands are much more dramatic. </p>
<p>Britain’s service sector brings in a substantial trade surplus – something the US will be loath to add to its growing trade deficit. Central to US plans will be to privatise and deregulate British services, such as healthcare provision or utilities and infrastructure, to enable easy market access for internationally-engaged American enterprises. These same corporations are <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2105262">actively</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831800005X">engaged</a> in the trade agreement process on the US side.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263358/original/file-20190312-86690-f3rll4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263358/original/file-20190312-86690-f3rll4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263358/original/file-20190312-86690-f3rll4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263358/original/file-20190312-86690-f3rll4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263358/original/file-20190312-86690-f3rll4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263358/original/file-20190312-86690-f3rll4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263358/original/file-20190312-86690-f3rll4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">There’s a lot more than just chickens at stake in a US-UK trade deal.</span>
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<p>American ambitions for bringing UK regulations in line with its own also extends to trade of digital goods and services, potentially causing a tremendous shift away from EU regulations, which concern everything from intellectual property rights to data protection and digital privacy.</p>
<h2>Beyond trade</h2>
<p>As part of the deep integration objectives, the US-UK trade agreement will cover additional non-trade issues. These include labour standards, environmental protection and anti-corruption measures – all areas where the UK arguably is currently tougher than the US. </p>
<p>It is telling that the wording of the <a href="https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Summary_of_U.S.-UK_Negotiating_Objectives.pdf">US objectives</a> focuses explicitly on the UK obligations in upholding these kinds of standards. In contrast, <a href="https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018.12.21_Summary_of_U.S.-Japan_Negotiating_Objectives.pdf">US objectives for negotiations with Japan</a> refer to both “parties”, rather than specifically Japanese obligations.</p>
<p>Perhaps the differences in wording is a result of different teams writing the documents. But it could also reveal the extent to which the UK is viewed by the US team as the weaker party to their deal, which will likely have extensive effects on the concessions the UK negotiating team can manage to extract from the US opening position.</p>
<h2>Relinquishing control, not taking it back</h2>
<p>Rather than taking back control, the starting point for US-UK trade negotiations is one where the British government cedes sovereignty over a wide range of issues. Britain’s size and detachment from the EU single market limits its bargaining power with large trade partners, whose governments will have no concern for the effects on the British public.</p>
<p>While harmonising standards with the US will pose a barrier to future trade with the EU, the deal could also increase limitations on British foreign policy more broadly. The US is also pursuing a clause that allows it to withdraw from a US-UK agreement if the UK agrees to an agreement with certain countries such as China. Similar terms are included in the <a href="https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018.12.21_Summary_of_U.S.-Japan_Negotiating_Objectives.pdf">US-Japan trade agreement objectives</a>, as the Trump administration tries to limit China’s economic influence across the globe. There is also a section in the US objectives that is designed to limit Britain’s independence over its Middle East foreign policy.</p>
<p>The hard line taken by the US, along with the wide range of concessions demanded of the UK clearly point to the UK’s weakened bargaining position outside the EU. And the US is not the only trading partner seeking significant concessions in exchange for a deal. India, Japan, and South Korea have all signalled similar expectations in preparations for their own deals. All of this sits in stark contrast to the Brexit campaign’s promise to “take back control”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113077/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Plouffe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>America’s objectives for a trade agreement with Britain spell out a stark Brexit future.Michael Plouffe, Lecturer in International Political Economy, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/994812018-07-13T13:47:37Z2018-07-13T13:47:37ZTrump’s visit has thrown the special relationship into unprecedented turmoil<p>One of the few conventions Donald Trump has observed as president has been to venerate <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/20/politics/trump-churchill-oval-office/index.html">Winston Churchill</a>. The intention was obvious therefore when on the evening of his arrival in the UK he was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-44815347/mays-welcome-trumps-at-blenheim-palace">feted</a> at Churchill’s birthplace, Blenheim Palace. Indeed, in the whole of his three days in Britain, the only time Trump was allocated to spend outside of a palace, a castle, or a golf course was be in a helicopter going between them – an arrangement not unlike the visit of the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/18/newsid_4141000/4141126.stm">hitherto most unpopular American president</a>, George W Bush.</p>
<p>Trump arrived in the UK at an extraordinarily sensitive moment. Britain is detaching itself from one of its two geo-strategic moorings, the EU, the other being the US. The importance of that relationship sent the prime minister, Theresa May, <a href="https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/trump-hosts-first-foreign-leader-as-may-visits-white-house">flying in haste</a> (and to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/theresa-may-jokes-about-donald-trumps-hands-white-house/">some ridicule</a>) across the Atlantic to meet Trump as soon as he became president. She has now welcomed him in the midst of her latest, most serious, <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/how-the-world-reacted-to-theresa-mays-brexit-crisis-11431919">Brexit crisis</a> – seeking support from the “special relationship”.</p>
<p>With massive protests planned weeks in advance, the plan was to keep the visit as tight and cloistered as possible. Given the guest, there were high expectations of the unexpected. But Trump has actually exceeded them.</p>
<p>In an <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/6766531/trump-may-brexit-us-deal-off/">interview with The Sun</a> on July 12, Trump said May’s Brexit policy would “probably kill” a US-UK trade deal – a key ambition of Brexiters – the problem being, typically, that “she didn’t listen to me”. He then praised her recently departed foreign secretary as likely to “make a great prime minister”. The pageantry of the palace appears to have counted for little, and Theresa May has been placed in an impossible position like no prime minister before her.</p>
<p>Evidently enjoying the chaos he had created, in their joint meeting at <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-chequers-history-the-country-palace-of-british-prime-ministers-99428">Chequers</a> Trump, by turns contradictory and incoherent, blamed “fake news” for stories of disagreement, and was at pains to state that their relationship was “very, very strong”, and that his visit was “really something”. At a joint press conference after their meeting, he clouded his original meaning: “Once the Brexit process is concluded and maybe the UK has left the EU … I don’t know what you’re gonna do, just make sure we can trade together, that’s all that matters.” To settle matters he assured the world that the special relationship was “the highest level of special”.</p>
<p>Trump’s earlier transgressions had become so well-known as to be a litany. He has retweeted <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42829555">Britain First</a>, endorsed <a href="https://twitter.com/i/moments/800892125780938752?lang=en">Nigel Farage</a> for US ambassador, insulted <a href="https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/871725780535062528?lang=en">the mayor of London</a> and derided the location of America’s new <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43939442">London embassy</a>. His latest interventions are nothing less than a calculated insult to the prime minister – a humiliation. One runs out of superlatives. Nothing like this has ever happened before.</p>
<p>To add to the general air of unreality, this was the first time the itinerary of a presidential visit has been published alongside a list of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/11/donald-trump-could-meet-boris-johnson-says-us-ambassador">protests</a> one can choose from. Still, the visit has its precedents.</p>
<h2>Convention and choreography</h2>
<p>Trump is the 12th US president to visit the UK while in office. Of the two-termers, Bill Clinton came six times, George W Bush five, Barack Obama and Ronald Reagan four, Richard Nixon three, and Dwight Eisenhower two. One-termers Jimmy Carter and George Bush each came once, though John F Kennedy managed two visits in his single foreshortened term. Before Kennedy, only two presidents had visited, both after shared victories in world war: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCv_AHW0XAE">Harry Truman</a> on his way to Potsdam in August 1945, and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZXEDbxe07eM">Woodrow Wilson</a> on his way to the Paris Peace Conference in December 1918.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-38750419/richard-nixon-meets-harold-wilson-in-1969">Nixon’s</a> first visit in 1969 was subject to protests against Vietnam – an American war a Labour prime minister <a href="http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/sixties-britain/wilson-vietnam/">had kept Britain out of</a> (partly in consequence, Lyndon Johnson never came).
<a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3279179.stm">George W. Bush</a> visited in 2003 during another American war which had elicited a <a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123122728/http:/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/243761/2002-07-28-note-blair-to-bush-note-on-iraq.pdf">contrasting response</a> from a different Labour prime minister. </p>
<p>It’s a reflection of the orientation of the respective political cultures that it’s only ever Republican presidents who are unpopular in Britain. The worst it got for a Democrat was the awkwardness of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-38746575/bill-clinton-meets-john-major-in-1993">Clinton’s</a> visit in February 1993 – and only then because of the John Major government’s rather injudicious preference for <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/12/07/critics-blast-major-on-file-search/54fb7d37-1eed-4ffa-a9fd-f62ddc831bd2/?utm_term=.f88ca3f40369">his opponent</a>.</p>
<p>What united all of these visits was convention. Even when there were Anglo-American disagreements, there was at least diplomatic language and due process. Indeed, Trump’s behaviour is a challenge to norms of diplomacy, manners, even <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-44783208">grammar</a>: no previous president would have publicly described somewhere he was about to visit – much less a close ally – as “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-44783208">a situation with turmoil</a>”. Such iconoclasm is of course, central to his appeal; his purpose.</p>
<p>Choreography has always been applied to add value to these visits: Reagan stayed at Windsor Castle, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hOixafdiJpY">rode with the Queen</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uCu7-Ka_zbY">addressed both houses of Parliament</a>, as did <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fp85zRg2cwg">Obama</a> and <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?68594-1/presidential-address-british-parliament">Clinton</a> – who also <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-35258180">attended a Cabinet meeting</a>. The present president is a test of any choreographer. </p>
<h2>Tearing up the rulebook</h2>
<p>When one party to a diplomatic encounter appears to delight in subverting the norms of due process, personal diplomacy assumes greater significance – but Trump’s capriciousness presents another challenge when set against May’s <a href="http://thehill.com/policy/international/370486-theresa-may-cant-get-her-points-across-before-trump-interrupts-her-in">uncommonly ordered personality</a>. Yet however fashionable it is to deny it – and however <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/amp/entry/trump-uk-visit-theresa-may-what-its-like_uk_5b477a1de4b022fdcc5719ff/">confused or stilted</a> Trump and May’s relationship might be – these two countries really do share a <a href="https://uk.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/special-relationship-anniversary-1946-2016/">special relationship</a>.</p>
<p>Britain and America’s commonalities – language, commerce, defence, foreign policy, intelligence, customs, culture – mean that, as close Obama adviser <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/witnessing-the-obama-presidency-from-start-to-finish">Ben Rhodes</a> said this month, the UK and US <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-red-box-podcast-38sjl3sp5">never meet to negotiate</a>, because the start and end points are the same: “That makes it a unique relationship that you don’t have with any other country.”</p>
<p>This is, perhaps, the greatest challenge for the prime minister: it’s no longer clear what start or end points the US and UK share. Indeed, as Trump has demonstrated since arriving, nobody knew what her guest would say on any given subject – possibly not even the guest himself.</p>
<p>It is an axiom of diplomacy to deal with the world as it is rather as one might like it to be, and it follows that the visit of any American president needs to be a welcoming one. But protesters have more power than they may realise: Trump had already <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42657954">cancelled</a> one visit for fear of a humiliating reception, and no other president is so likely to feel slighted – even if, as a native New Yorker, Trump will be familiar with <a href="https://www.macys.com/social/parade/">personalised blimps</a>.</p>
<p>It seems an age since an American president - still living - <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v2Y1_gmFtn8">visited the UK</a> with minimal security, and was met by thousands of members of the public, cheering and waving. In rare continuity, this president has also attracted thousands of members of the public, with their <a href="https://twitter.com/m_santana/status/1017340614202068992">hand gestures</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99481/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Farr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Efforts to keep Trump’s itinerary as tight and cloistered as possible failed to avoid a classic diplomatic calamity.Martin Farr, Senior Lecturer in Modern and Contemporary British History, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/980232018-07-03T10:28:37Z2018-07-03T10:28:37ZIndependence Day: July 4 means something very different when it’s celebrated in Britain<p>This year’s July 4 celebrations will come freighted with rather more complexity than usual, and on both sides of the Atlantic too. 2018’s commemoration of independence from British rule will take place just nine days before Donald Trump <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/donald-trump-uk-visit-melania-queen-theresa-may-nato-windsor-castle-scotland-a8426831.html">crosses the Atlantic</a> for talks with his British counterpart, Theresa May. The two will follow the annual celebration of severance with a performance of togetherness: as Independence Day makes way for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-love-is-lost-why-its-time-to-drop-the-romance-from-the-special-relationship-72025">special relationship</a>.</p>
<p>Given Trump’s remarkably poor grasp of history – this is a man who recently asked if the Canadians had <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-44394156">burned down the White House</a> in 1814 – he’ll quite probably be oblivious to any such tensions between the upcoming events of July 4 and those of July 13 (the date of his visit to London). But if his advisers take a glance at the history books to think through this coincidence of timing, they might be pleasantly surprised. While many Americans unambiguously celebrate July 4 as a national event marking independence from the “mother country”, in Britain the day has long been a chance to celebrate Anglo-American ties. How can it be both?</p>
<p>It all comes down to exactly how you understand the origins and cause of the American Revolution. For many Americans, the War of Independence was a righteous conflict against a tyrannical and perfidious enemy, the narrative of independence famously celebrated in films such as <a href="https://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/1098149_patriot?">The Patriot</a>. In this view, the founding fathers were exceptional and exemplary Americans, leading heroic yeoman farmers in the cause of national independence from the British Empire.</p>
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<p>The problem with this idea is that it wasn’t until relatively late in the day, towards the middle of the 1770s, that colonial American leaders actually set themselves firmly on the cause of full independence. And even when they did, many still found it difficult to shed completely their identities as “Englishmen” overseas, while a significant proportion of the American population remained either loyal to the crown throughout, or tried to avoid choosing a side for as long as possible.</p>
<p>Hence why those leading the revolution were initially so keen to claim that they fought for the legitimate rights of “Englishmen”: not to be taxed without consent, the right to rule by elected representatives. Even George Washington, commander-in-chief of the Continental Army and later the first president, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=HFkZ5RBeuKoC&pg=PA40&lpg=PA40&dq=george+washington+considered+himself+an+englishman&source=bl&ots=Lkj2A3hLTy&sig=LYYXzpiZAoWwTLGQb-x0CTiLpQg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwigrZLz1ILcAhVKJMAKHY9YCZYQ6AEwB3oECAEQXA#v=onepage&q=george%20washington%20considered%20himself%20an%20englishman&f=false">thought himself a loyal Englishman</a> until well into the 1770s.</p>
<p>In later years, such ideas faded from view. Washington was elevated to the status of American demi-god, and during the 19th century, July 4 developed its modern form and function: an assertive national ritual which celebrated American difference and distinction. Even so, the older idea that independence was originally an “English” cause lingered here and there, embedded in the much celebrated language used by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence (which suggested his schooling in certain ideals of “Anglo-Saxon” rights), in the structures of the US Constitution (including the two-house political system), and in the judicial system’s roots in English Common Law.</p>
<p>This all meant that when the US and Great Britain later developed increasingly close diplomatic connections, July 4 was ripe for re-interpretation.</p>
<h2>The best of friends</h2>
<p>The key moment came on July 4 1918, as Americans and Britons fought as allies on the Western Front. In London, various influential figures took the opportunity to revisit the history of American independence. For instance, Winston Churchill, later the most famous advocate for a “special relationship”, delighted in telling an audience of Anglo-American dignitaries that Britons were now “glad to know that an English colony declared itself independent under a German king”. As he gave this speech, government buildings across London and the British Empire proudly flew the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-stars-and-stripes-at-200-why-the-american-flag-is-uniquely-powerful-90662">Stars and Stripes</a>.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225913/original/file-20180703-116132-cpgxw5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225913/original/file-20180703-116132-cpgxw5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225913/original/file-20180703-116132-cpgxw5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225913/original/file-20180703-116132-cpgxw5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225913/original/file-20180703-116132-cpgxw5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=626&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225913/original/file-20180703-116132-cpgxw5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=626&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225913/original/file-20180703-116132-cpgxw5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=626&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">George Washington in residence in Trafalgar Square.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Statue_of_George_Washington,_Trafalgar_Square_02.JPG">Ham via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>British claims on American independence continued in the years that followed. In 1921, Lord Curzon, the foreign secretary, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1964/05/10/archives/americana-in-uk-tributes-to-us-presidents-others-are-found-on-all.html">happily proclaimed</a> Washington a “great Englishman” while dedicating a statue of the first president in Trafalgar Square. Much the same sentiment was heard a few days earlier when a gathering of politicians and diplomats opened Washington’s ancestral home in Northamptonshire, <a href="https://www.sulgravemanor.org.uk/">Sulgrave Manor</a>, as an Anglo-American shrine.</p>
<p>By the time of the bicentennial of American independence in 1976, the British political elite were well prepared to meet the challenge of celebrating July 4. In a masterstroke of political symbolism, the government gifted to the US a copy of the <a href="https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/modern-america-and-magna-carta">Magna Carta</a>. The message was clear: while Jefferson’s famous text appeared to mark a moment of transatlantic severance, in actual fact it revealed the deep history of the Anglo-American bond. The Declaration of Independence stood with the document signed at Runnymede in 1215 in the pantheon of English constitutional history.</p>
<p>Will a similar claim on American independence surface in the pronouncements and performances linked to Trump’s visit to Britain this July? May will surely follow precedent and celebrate the ties of the “special relationship”; Trump will likely bluster, reciprocate, and talk about his Scottish roots. But Trump’s brand of nativism has little time or space for expansive Anglophilia, and he and May have yet to find an ideological or personal affinity of the sort enjoyed by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. This Independence Day, the special relationship may lose out.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98023/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Edwards has previously received funding from the ESRC, the United States Army Military History Institute, and the US-UK Fulbright Commission. </span></em></p>The alignment of Independence Day and a presidential visit to Britain makes more sense than you might think.Sam Edwards, Senior Lecturer in History, Manchester Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/991162018-06-29T11:24:49Z2018-06-29T11:24:49ZThe stain of Britain’s part in torture and rendition will never wash away<p>The <a href="http://isc.independent.gov.uk/committee-reports/special-reports">long-awaited reports</a> of the investigation by the UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) into Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition between 2001 and 2010 have finally been published. We ourselves have been researching the UK’s part in rendition and torture for years and gave evidence to the committee – and these reports are much harder hitting than we had expected.</p>
<p>Chaired by MP and QC Dominic Grieve, the ISC’s investigation has revealed that the extent of UK involvement in prisoner abuse was even greater than <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066116653455">we had previously documented</a>. The reports also highlight serious weaknesses relating to the training of security personnel, and governance and oversight of their conduct. Many of the ISC’s conclusions corroborate our own research findings, and we were pleased to see a number of issues we raised when we gave evidence to the ISC in January 2017.</p>
<p>As we have argued for years now – and as we told the ISC – British complicity in torture was <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066116653455">deep, wide and sustained</a>. Government ministers have always denied this – the former foreign secretary, Jack Straw <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmfaff/uc768-i/uc76802.htm">famously stated</a> that only conspiracy theorists should believe the UK was involved in rendition. That position is now more untenable than ever. It is clear from the ISC reports that UK officials knew about the US programme immediately after 9/11 and worked to support their allies in ways which enabled continued “plausible deniability”.</p>
<p>The report’s findings are unambiguous. In more than 70 cases – far more than have ever been identified before now – British intelligence knew of, suggested, planned, agreed to, or paid for others to conduct rendition operations. Some of the details are excruciating – one MI6 officer was present while a prisoner was transferred in a coffin-sized box. In literally hundreds of further cases, UK officials were aware of detainees being mistreated by their allies, continued to supply questions to be asked of detainees under torture, and received intelligence from those who had been tortured.</p>
<p>While names and locations have been redacted in these reports, our own <a href="https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/">years of investigation</a> enable us to fit new facts into our broader picture of post-9/11 torture. It is likely that we will be able to identify some of the important detail left out by the reports. In many cases, these omissions resulted from the government refusing to allow the ISC to interview intelligence officers with knowledge of British involvement. In the absence of a full judge-led inquiry, our fact-finding work remains crucial, and we are committed to doing what we can.</p>
<p>We also know enough from the victims themselves, in their own words, about the human toll of this form of state violence. If you are being beaten up, electrocuted, <a href="https://theconversation.com/rectal-feeding-is-rape-but-dont-expect-the-cia-to-admit-it-35437">raped</a>, or subjected to mock execution, you tend to say whatever it takes to make it stop. Small wonder that intelligence received under torture is notoriously of <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-claims-torture-works-but-what-does-the-science-say-70236">limited value</a>.</p>
<p>The fact that the UK attempted to keep its hands clean by involvement from afar makes the situation no better. When the reports were released, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-written-statement-isc-detainee-reports">Theresa May</a> stated that “intelligence and Armed Forces personnel are now much better placed” to deal with detainee-related work and that the necessary lessons have been learned. But in our evidence to the ISC, we also raised a number of concerns about the adequacy of today’s training and the strength of current guidance, which ostensibly prevents a return to the early years of the “War on Terror” – and we are not convinced.</p>
<h2>No stone unturned</h2>
<p>In our testimony to the ISC, we pointed to flaws in the so-called “<a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62632/Consolidated_Guidance_November_2011.pdf">Consolidated Guidance</a>” issued to all security agencies and the military from 2010. The ISC has taken this seriously. In their conclusions, it concludes that the guidance is by no means “consolidated”, and that “it is misleading to present it as such”. The ISC points to “dangerous ambiguities in the guidance”, noting that “individual ministers have entirely different understandings of what they can and cannot, and would and would not, authorise”.</p>
<p>We encouraged the ISC to examine how frequently agency or Ministry of Defence personnel had followed the guidance, and to establish how frequently concerns about prisoner abuse were reported up the chain of command. This the ISC has done. Frustratingly, corresponding data is redacted from the final release. Nevertheless, the ISC’s conclusions indicate that record keeping on these matters is weak, and that there are considerable risks that cases which should be reported upwards are not. </p>
<p>This is exacerbated by the fact that “there is no clear policy and not even agreement as to who has responsibility for preventing UK complicity in unlawful rendition”. And as the ISC reports, the government “has failed to introduce any policy or process that will ensure that allies will not use UK territory for rendition purposes”.</p>
<p>We have long argued that the Consolidated Guidance does little more than provide a rhetorical, legal and policy scaffold, enabling the UK government to demonstrate a minimum procedural adherence to human rights commitments. As the ISC quite rightly concludes, there is an urgent need for review and fundamental reform of the Consolidated Guidance. The government must also establish much more robust oversight, training and accountability mechanisms.</p>
<p>We would also argue, in the strongest possible terms, that only a judge-led inquiry with full powers of subpoena will enable the public to know what was done in their name. Without this it will be even harder to achieve full accountability and to identify current forms of UK complicity in human rights abuses. With the anti-torture norm being eroded at the very top of the US government once again, these risks are very present and real.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99116/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Raphael received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for his work on secret detention, rendition and torture in the 'war on terror'</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ruth Blakeley received funding from the UK's Economic and Social Research Council for her work on the CIA's rendition, detention and interrogation programme. She gave evidence to the UK Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee in closed session in January 2017, alongside Dr Sam Raphael. </span></em></p>Twin reports from a UK Parliament committee go further than ever in condemning Britain’s complicity in the worst of the War on Terror.Sam Raphael, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of WestminsterRuth Blakeley, Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/907072018-01-29T09:17:00Z2018-01-29T09:17:00ZTrump and Brexit have triggered two deep constitutional crises<p>Two years ago, a Trump presidency and a vote for Brexit were considered all but unthinkable. Now, two of the world’s oldest democracies are struggling to live with them, and their struggles are even more profound than they seem. The depth of these crises is masked by what might be termed “mere politics”: beneath the dissonance of day-to-day politicking, the constitutions of two representative democracies are being fundamentally challenged.</p>
<p>Americans talk much, but understand less, about their “Founding Fathers”. The US’s constitutional settlement was essentially forged between 1776 and 1794, and it envisaged a very different political culture from that which now prevails. Its points of reference were classical, senatorial, discursive, and balanced. At its core was a simple premise: with the right people debating the right issues in the right way, checked by a constitution that balanced the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, the Founding Fathers believed they would create a virtuous Republic.</p>
<p>It is reported that Trump might not have read all the articles of the constitution, still less its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/11/opinion/editorials/President-Trump-Please-Read-the-Constitution.html">27 amendments</a> (though he ominously <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/10/politics/trump-second-amendment/index.html">invoked the second</a> – the right to keep and bear arms – on the campaign trail). No matter, because America is trying to accommodate itself to a style of government quite different from that envisioned by the Founding Fathers and enshrined in the constitution and its processes.</p>
<p>Government now is government by opinion – opinion expressed not in the glorious prose of the Founding Fathers’ <a href="https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html">Federalist Papers</a>, but in the peremptory and explosive sub-prose of <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-this-climate-you-have-to-take-donald-trumps-tweets-with-a-pinch-of-covfefe-78713">tweets</a>. It is the politics of expostulation, not consideration. </p>
<p>Given the White House’s well chronicled and sometimes almost comical dysfunction, not to mention the constant drip of allegations that might have sunk presidencies past, one wonders how this presidential vessel is still afloat. What’s protected Trump so far is a curious elision of a new mode of politics and a venerable political structure.</p>
<p>The checks and balances of the US constitution that were designed to prevent the abuse of power now themselves check one another. With the same party controlling Congress and the White House – and nominating justices to the Supreme Court – the wheels of the constitutional machine turn slowly. All the while, the judicial wing of the constitutional machinery is playing its part too via <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/us/politics/trump-mueller-special-counsel-russia.html">Robert Mueller’s investigation</a> into the Trump team’s Russian ties, steadily accumulating evidence, cutting deals, and selectively releasing information into the public domain. Even with Trump yet to be interviewed for the inquiry, much of what’s already come out would have been much more immediately and more obviously fatal to presidencies past.</p>
<p>Here Trump is protected by both prosecutorial protocols and the disabling pluralism of social media. The reality is that everyone can now pick and choose their own news. Whereas the fallout from Watergate was a classic example of the “fourth estate” forcing accountability to a public opinion that it helped to shape, the new world of social media means presidential tweets can deflect, dispute, and flagrantly deny to remarkable effect. </p>
<p>If Trump’s endurance up until this point demonstrates anything, it may be that the US’s constitutional settlement was simply not designed for such times. And if the constitutional crisis in the US is acute, the crisis in the UK might yet prove more profound.</p>
<h2>Unscrambling the egg</h2>
<p>Since <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/reformation-500-45049">the Reformation</a>, broadly speaking, Britain’s parliament has been sovereign. Over time, that sovereignty of parliament has been contested, and in recent years has been eroded. The challenge to parliament’s authority has come not from popular protest, but from the rise of the Executive and the onward march of judicial review. Nevertheless, until the Brexit vote, the broad parameters of the constitution – <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2010/05/bagehot/">as described by Walter Bagehot</a> in the 1860s – have prevailed.</p>
<p>The result of the Brexit referendum shattered that constitutional settlement. Referenda have of course happened before, but from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-for-david-cameron-from-the-european-referendum-of-1975-42365">1975 referendum</a> onward, the results have always aligned with what might be termed “the will of parliament” – in short, had they been voted on in parliament, the result would have been same. That is why the crisis precipitated by the 2016 Brexit referendum is so profound. </p>
<p>The electorate chose – albeit narrowly – a course of action opposed by all the major parties and a large majority of MPs. It seems David Cameron’s decision to use a non-parliamentary means (a referendum) to solve a parliamentary problem (a divided Conservative party) unwittingly created a new kind of politics, where a single issue – and <a href="https://theconversation.com/may-wanted-a-brexit-mandate-but-voters-want-a-strong-welfare-state-79210">not necessarily the one voters care most about</a> – brought down a prime minister and realigned politics around a policy that <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35616946">the majority of MPs opposed during the referendum campaign</a>.</p>
<p>Normal politics is on hold, and will remain on hold until Brexit is determined. Much of the Brexit process involves a further <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-to-expect-when-the-brexit-bill-hits-the-house-of-lords-ten-predictions-90414">extension of executive power</a>, only recently and weakly checked by parliament. What remains unclear is when and whether normal parliamentary politics will be resumed. Both major parties have become more beholden to their more extreme wings; the much-vaunted “centre ground” of politics is depopulated, and the machinery of government is overheating as it struggles to shape a Brexit deal and plan for a future outside the EU.</p>
<p>But deeper than that, it’s time to seriously consider the possibility that the UK nor the US will never return to their old constitutional equilibria. Both now have to adapt to a more sharply divided politics, a populism that finds its expression in social media rather than formal political action, and a style of leadership where old assumptions about collective or cabinet responsibility have given way to immediate and public dissent. Political trust, a hard earned currency at the best of times, is now dangerously devalued.</p>
<p>It may yet be that the US’s legislature, judiciary and traditional media will present a public indictment of Donald Trump so severe that he leaves office. It may yet be that Theresa May can unite the country and parliament around a consensual Brexit deal. But more likely, for better or worse, the strange forces at work will continue to erode the foundations on which British and American politics are built.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90707/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Eastwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s quite possible that neither the US nor the UK will ever return to normal when it comes to political and constitutional balance.David Eastwood, Vice Chancellor, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/715802017-01-27T15:31:51Z2017-01-27T15:31:51ZTrade deals are difficult to negotiate and Britain lacks the skills for the job<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154541/original/image-20170127-30401-a7iidq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Troubled waters ahead.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paul J Martin / Shutterstock, Inc.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Britain’s prime minister is the first foreign leader to visit the new American president, Donald Trump. They have <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38766781">lots to discuss</a> – international security, immigration, “the special relationship”. There is also much talk of laying the ground for a US-UK trade deal.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-latest-theresa-may-donald-trump-trade-deal-european-union-eu-us-a7548511.html">Much of the talk</a> of a trade deal, however, misses some of the fundamentals of what trade deals actually are and what they involve. They are agreements over the extent to which countries will agree the scale and scope of access to each other’s markets. These may be reciprocal: “We agree to trade in cars in both directions with a 10% tariff.” Or they can be quotas, limiting the quantity or value of certain goods that can be traded.</p>
<p>Alternatively they can be multi-faceted: “We agree to have no restrictions on you exporting gin to us if we can export bourbon to you on the same terms.” They are not, as most politicians seem to think: “We agree to buy £100m worth of stuff from you if you buy £100m worth of stuff from us.” </p>
<p>So why does the UK need these deals at all? It could simply have free trade with everyone – <a href="http://brexitcentral.com/patrick-minford-unilateral-free-trade-far-attractive-membership-single-market/">and some people have made the case for this</a>. In practice, this would mean offering other countries free access to its markets and hoping that they would reciprocate. Countries would only agree to this where they think it is in their interests – where they assume they will sell more to us than we will to them.</p>
<p>In this situation, comparative advantage dominates. This means that production (all those manufacturing jobs) gravitates to the location with the lowest costs. This is often politically unacceptable, as governments generally look to protect jobs and tax revenues, as well as to protect activities that fund innovation. </p>
<h2>The difficult bit</h2>
<p>This is why there is so much talk of trade deals going on. But the difficult part of a trade deal is not the negotiation itself; it’s figuring out which industries will gain or lose from a given deal, and what the overall outcome will be, given the knock-on effect for various sectors of the economy. Equally, they must take into account how businesses will respond to a given agreement and what lobbying they will they do in advance.</p>
<p>Negotiators are essentially like barristers that put forward arguments based on the analysis that they are given.</p>
<p>A closer look at how the much vaunted UK-US “trade deal” would work shows what’s really involved. In order to ascertain whether this will be “good” for the UK, you have to start with an understanding of what the nature of comparative advantage is between the UK and US – what is the UK better at than the US, and what is the US better at than the UK. Then you have to work out how this relates to goods and services that each wishes to trade. </p>
<p>For example, one could argue that the UK has comparative advantage in whisky, and the US in bourbon. But just because the imported products become cheaper after a reduction in tariffs, does that mean that the UK will actually import more bourbon and, if so, might that actually be bad for the Scotch whisky industry?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154540/original/image-20170127-30419-1wmpnkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154540/original/image-20170127-30419-1wmpnkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154540/original/image-20170127-30419-1wmpnkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154540/original/image-20170127-30419-1wmpnkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154540/original/image-20170127-30419-1wmpnkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154540/original/image-20170127-30419-1wmpnkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154540/original/image-20170127-30419-1wmpnkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Whisky or bourbon?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Then it’s necessary to work out the overall effect on each economy – by combining the comparative advantage for all sectors (from agriculture to pharmaceuticals), and work out if the deal is a good one. </p>
<h2>A lack of experts</h2>
<p>The UK used to have “sector experts” who knew everything about their sector to figure this out. But it hasn’t needed them for 25 years, as the EU has performed this role on the UK’s behalf. As a result, the civil service has neither the capacity or the skills <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-civil-service-must-keep-calm-and-carry-on-with-brexit-but-can-it-65506">to fill this gap</a>. Equally, many private sector firms had economics departments – Unilever, British American Tobacco, Ford among them – whose job it was to figure out what would happen to their sector if certain tariffs were agreed (or not). But neither the private nor public sectors have had those skills for a generation because they have not been needed.</p>
<p>The large professional service firms are circling to do the job – at <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/29/planning-for-brexit-could-cost-the-government-65-million-a-year/">£2,000 per person per day</a> – but they are generalists. They don’t know any more whether we will import statins and export heart pills under a given deal with the US any more than the editor of the Daily Mail or the prime minister.</p>
<p>Without an in-depth analysis of relative production costs, spillovers between sectors and the multiplier effects associated with sectors expanding or contracting, this is all simply conjecture – which is essentially what has been happening since this debate over Brexit started.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71580/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nigel Driffield receives funding from ESRC, Leverhulme Trust, OECD, UNCTAD, European Commission DG Region. He is an inactive member of the labour party and a member of the UCU.</span></em></p>Much of the debate around trade deals misses some of the fundamentals of what they actually are and involve.Nigel Driffield, Professor of international business, Warwick Business School, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/713562017-01-16T15:58:03Z2017-01-16T15:58:03ZWhy a speedy US-UK trade deal is easier said than done<p>When Donald Trump <a href="http://metro.co.uk/2017/01/07/donald-trump-to-return-winston-churchill-bust-to-oval-office-6367819/">promised</a> to return the bust of Winston Churchill to the Oval Office, upon moving into the White House, it was a sure sign of good things to come in US-UK relations. Now he has offered <a href="http://www.itv.com/news/2017-01-15/donald-trump-wants-fair-uk-trade-deal-very-quickly/">a quick trade deal</a> to the UK.</p>
<p>This marks a significant departure from the more pan-European approach of his predecessor. Barack Obama’s closet ally across the Atlantic was <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/03/obama-goldberg-world-leaders/473367/">Angela Merkel</a> and before the Brexit vote said the UK would be at the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/22/barack-obama-brexit-uk-back-of-queue-for-trade-talks">back of the queue</a> when it came to trade talks. But, however nice Trump’s promise might sound to Theresa May’s government, there are a number of obstacles that could make a trade deal in the near future a difficult prospect. </p>
<p>First, there is the little problem that the UK is still a member of the EU and will be for at least another two years, even if the separation process is initiated in March, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-eus-ides-of-march-article-50-timing-could-spell-disaster-for-european-unity-66610">as planned</a>. So long as it is a member of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/should-the-uk-remain-in-the-eu-customs-union-after-brexit-63179">EU’s customs union</a>, the UK is legally not allowed to negotiate any trade agreements. </p>
<p>Of course, two years will pass very quickly and that time could be used to unofficially iron out some of the details of the agreement. The broad points of a deal such as reducing barriers to cross-border trade in services and possibly even financial regulation could, for example, be agreed upon. But there are other issues that could be more contentious and stand in the way of a smooth deal.</p>
<p>Trump has spoken loudly about imposing tariff barriers and border taxes on <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-bmw-idUSKBN14Z0XY">cars made in Mexico</a> and it is uncertain how he feels about cars made in Britain. The UK exports about <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/298970/destination-of-cars-exported-from-the-united-kingdom/">10% of its cars to the US</a> and high tariffs on these would be a tough pill to swallow. </p>
<p>But given that the UK is the US’ <a href="https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1611yr.html">seventh largest trading partner</a> it seems that trade barriers like this are unlikely as the US has bigger priorities on its hands. For example, if the US imposes tariffs on China, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-donald-trumps-china-policy-is-a-trade-war-in-the-making-70723">as Trump has threatened</a>, it is less likely to lower barriers to trade with countries like the UK. </p>
<p>More problematically though, from the UK’s perspective, it is unclear what British farmers would think about being exposed to competition from US agricultural giants, particularly when their sizeable EU subsidies are taken away. Remember that it was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-walloons-and-why-are-they-blocking-europes-free-trade-deal-with-canada-67718">Walloon farmers</a> who held up the EU’s trade deal with Canada recently. </p>
<h2>Labyrinthine regulations</h2>
<p>Modern trade agreements tend to include extensive material on the harmonisation of regulations. These are designed to ensure that red tape is not duplicated in a manner that makes it hard for products (and services) to cross borders. Fitting these things into trade agreements is one of the hardest tasks for negotiators. </p>
<iframe src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/59GQa/1/" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen" webkitallowfullscreen="webkitallowfullscreen" mozallowfullscreen="mozallowfullscreen" oallowfullscreen="oallowfullscreen" msallowfullscreen="msallowfullscreen" width="100%" height="322"></iframe>
<p>Just as one of the main arguments in favour of Brexit was <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-economic-case-for-brexit-58389">to escape the EU’s labyrinthine regulations</a>, it is worth remembering that weaker regulations in the US were <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-us-eu-trade-talks-devolve-into-game-of-chicken-over-regulatory-ruffles-40614">one of the reasons</a> that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and the EU has been unpopular. In this sense one might expect more common ground between the US and the UK on regulatory matters, a sort of Anglo-American soft touch which is in the best interest of business rather than nanny-state bureaucracy. </p>
<p>But under Trump the US might take this further than the UK is willing to go. It is not difficult to imagine a British government shrinking back from genetically modified foods or hormone-fed beef, two US exports <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-europe-and-the-us-are-locked-in-a-food-fight-over-ttip-45279">which rubbed Europeans the wrong way</a>. The UK would almost certainly resist the <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-nhs-under-threat-from-free-trade-43857">inclusion of health services</a> from the agreement, protecting the hallowed NHS from foreign competition. But this could be met with resistance from the US, likely in the form of pull backs on areas of interest to the UK like financial services. </p>
<p>Betraying his lack of genuine experience in either politics or government, Trump seems to think that he can approach international treaty-making as if it were a real estate deal – simply agree on a price and then let the lawyers take care of the details. But complex laws are at the heart of international trade deals. So while there may in principal be a willingness to set up a trade agreement the UK in the future, and this is unquestionably a positive development which we should not take lightly, the precise terms and timescale of such an undertaking are far from resolved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71356/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Collins does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President-elect Donald Trump has offered the UK a quick post-Brexit trade deal but he’ll face some legal hurdles to make it happen.David Collins, Professor of International Economic Law, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/608332016-07-18T16:01:08Z2016-07-18T16:01:08ZBritain’s part in torture and rendition is still kept hidden 15 years after 9/11<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129876/original/image-20160708-24060-v3dbms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/gallery-3775892p1.html?cr=00&pl=edit-00">Artyom Anikeev</a> / <a href="http://www.shutterstock.com/editorial?cr=00&pl=edit-00">Artyom Anikeev/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Even as the Chilcot Report lays bare the sad story of the UK’s decision to join in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a veil is still drawn over another dark aspect of Britain’s partnership with George W Bush’s administration.</p>
<p>For years now, the British state has barely acknowledged its alleged deep involvement in the abuse of terror suspects, and there has been very little in the way of justice for the victims of torture and “rendition” – the practice of abducting suspects without due legal process and transferring them to other countries or territories for interrogation. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, <a href="http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/05/26/1354066116653455.full.pdf">my colleague Ruth Blakeley and I have found</a> that this involvement was direct, deep and longstanding. Moreover, most official channels have been closed to keep the extent of the UK’s co-operation from coming to light. </p>
<p>An <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/jan/18/gibson-inquiry-torture-collusion-abandoned">aborted judge-led inquiry</a> into British involvement in prisoner mistreatment uncovered more than 200 separate allegations of abuse, at least 40 of which were significant enough to warrant detailed investigation. Some of these cases have led to civil action against the British government in the UK courts, others have led to police investigations and criminal inquiry. </p>
<p>In response, however, the government has maintained its innocence in every individual case while simultaneously working to block the release of relevant information. There have been attempts to withhold publication of key documents in open court, such as those which demonstrate that British intelligence knew about the torture of prisoners by the CIA before participating directly in their interrogation. </p>
<p>Where British courts have refused to accept government attempts to hold hearings in camera, the government has offered substantial payouts without any admission of liability. Indeed, the 2013 <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/contents/enacted">Justice and Security Act</a>, which introduced so-called “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/sep/25/secret-courts-the-essential-guide">closed material procedures</a>” into the main civil courts, gave the state the legal ability to keep details of British involvement in torture out of the public record.</p>
<p>Outside the UK court system, government officials have made regular representations to the US Senate to ensure that any mention of the UK was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/09/cia-torture-report-released">redacted</a> from its report into CIA torture. Likewise, my Freedom of Information Act requests for official records have been met with <a href="http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/05/26/1354066116653455.full.pdf">a range of techniques</a> to deny the release of information regarding British involvement in torture. </p>
<p>Individual cases, meanwhile, are not finding resolution. It was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/09/mi6-officers-not-charges-rendition-of-libyan-families-abdel-hakim-belhaj">recently announced</a> that the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) will not press charges against an unnamed intelligence official for involvement in the rendition of Libyan dissidents and their families to Colonel Gaddafi’s torture chambers as there was insufficient evidence to proceed. However, the CPS said that there was sufficient evidence to support the claim that the official in question had been in communication with individuals from the foreign countries responsible for torture and rendition, and that he’d sought informal political authority to do so.</p>
<p>The official wasn’t named explicitly, but it is widely understood to be Sir Mark Allen, a former director of counter-terrorism at MI6. </p>
<p>This decision is simply the latest instalment in the government’s attempt to hide its hand. But to be clear, despite all the obfuscation and murk, there is now a huge weight of evidence which points, undeniably, towards British complicity in these crimes, including renditions to Gaddafi’s Libya. </p>
<h2>A matter of record</h2>
<p>Alongside a number of investigative journalists, human rights investigators and legal teams, we at <a href="https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/">The Rendition Project</a> have spent years documenting this evidence. Having gathered and reviewed what’s available, <a href="http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/05/26/1354066116653455.full.pdf">our conclusions are clear</a>: Britain’s involvement in rendition and torture during the “war on terror” was deep, direct, multifaceted, and should now be considered a matter of historical record. </p>
<p>British intelligence and security agencies have worked hand-in-glove with counter-terrorism partners to identify and apprehend suspects and disappear them into secret detention where torture was endemic. Once suspects were in secret detention, British intelligence and security agencies were, in many cases, intimately involved in the torture which took place, either by participating in the interrogations, providing the intelligence which formed the basis of the torture, or receiving intelligence gained through torture. </p>
<p>In addition, British territory was used as a key logistical hub for the global network of secret detention and torture, with the UK facilitating the movement of suspects between secret prisons.</p>
<p>The evidence of this complicity is nowhere clearer than in the rendition of Libyan dissidents and their families back to the Gaddafi government. <a href="https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/documents/RDI/040323-CIA-Fax-Libyan-Intelligence-Madhir-Rendition.pdf">One memo from the CIA to its Libyan counterpart</a> made clear that the agency was “aware that your service had been cooperating with the British to effect [Sami al-Saadi’s] removal to Tripoli”, and offered to step in to “render [him] and his family into your custody”. </p>
<p>Similarly, a <a href="http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/documents/RDI/040318-MI6-Memo-Blair-Trip-and-Belhadj-Rendition.pdf">memo from Allen</a> to his counterpart in Libya, Musa Kusa – obtained by Human Rights Watch after the fall of Tripoli <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/19/submission-united-nations-committee-against-torture-united-kingdom">and submitted</a> to the UN Committee against Torture – explicitly congratulated Kusa on the “safe arrival” of Libyan rebel commander Abu ‘Abd Allah Sadiq Belhadj and discussed direct British access to the detainee’s interrogations:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Most importantly, I congratulate you on the safe arrival of Abu 'Abd Allah Sadiq [Belhadj]. This was the least we could do for you and for Libya to demonstrate the remarkable relationship we have built over the years. I am so glad … Amusingly, we got a request from the Americans to channel requests for information from Abu 'Abd Allah through the Americans. I have no intention of doing any such thing. The intelligence on Abu ‘Abd Allah was British. I know I did not pay for the air cargo. But I feel I have the right to deal with you direct on this and am very grateful for the help you are giving us.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Both <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20715507">al-Saadi</a> and Belhadj have testified that they were interrogated by British intelligence officers once in Libyan custody, with further evidence that intelligence agencies sent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/22/cooperation-british-spies-gaddafi-libya-revealed-official-papers">more than 1,600 questions</a> to their Libyan counterparts. </p>
<p>Al-Saadi, his wife and their four children were subsequently rendered and detained for six years. The dissident himself was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/09/how-mi6-family-gaddafi-jail">beaten and subjected to electric shocks</a>.</p>
<p>The UK’s involvement may have been one step removed, focused on supporting counter-terrorism allies in ways which would hide the British hand, but justice has nonetheless been evaded. It remains to be seen how and when the full truth of Britain’s complicity in torture and illegal detention during the War on Terror will come out.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Raphael receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p>The War on Terror-era programme of clandestine abductions and detentions wasn’t just an American initiative.Sam Raphael, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/616882016-07-01T09:40:00Z2016-07-01T09:40:00ZBrexit is not the beginning of a global security crisis<p>Now its people have decided to back out of the EU, Britain’s future place in the world order is more unclear than it has been for decades – but that still doesn’t mean that the world is less safe because of the British electorate’s decision. </p>
<p>To read some reactions to the result, you might think the opposite. The journalist Charles Kaiser <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/25/opinions/brexit-step-backward-charles-kaiser">suggested</a> that the UK’s vote to leave was “the worst step backward for Europe – and for Western civilisation – since the end of World War II”, implying that peace on mainland Europe was under threat, while during the campaign itself, David Cameron explicitly attributed lasting peace in Europe to the European Union project, invoking <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/08/cameron-brexit-will-increase-risk-of-europe-descending-into-war">images of British war graves</a>. </p>
<p>There are clear, historic links between the EU and peace on the European mainland. The union’s forerunner, the <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/CS/TXT/?uri=uriserv:xy0022">European Coal and Steel Community</a>, was set up in 1951 to organise free movement of coal and steel and free access to sources of production precisely because these were the foundations of modern war-making capabilities. </p>
<p>By sharing these, the rationale went, the six signatories would be <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%253Axy0022">less likely to go to war with each other</a> – in particular France and Germany. </p>
<p>That project has worked. The continent has enjoyed a period of peace, stability and co-operation unprecedented in its history for at least the last 250 years. So even if the entire EU structure somehow crumbled as a result of the British vote – an extremely pessimistic vision in itself – it’s hard to imagine that its members will take up arms against each other again.</p>
<h2>Cooler heads prevail</h2>
<p>But what about the wider security implications beyond Europe? The UN Security Council for one, is hardly expected to change. Unless some long-discussed but never advanced reform happens, the five permanent members will retain their seats and their vetoes, including Britain. The only obvious change is that the EU will go from having two representatives among the permanent five powers to having one, namely France.</p>
<p>On paper, that looks like a major loss of influence. But given that two seats for the EU was arguably an inappropriate degree of power for just one region, that Britain and France would vote primarily in their national self-interest (albeit that these invariably coincided) and that both countries will continue to vote in a manner that upholds European ideals, we should expect little change. </p>
<p>In any event, you have to go back to 1989 to find an example of Britain or France both using their vetoes (over Panama, when both countries backed the US), and back to 1987 to find one using its veto in isolation (the UK, in that case <a href="http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/18705">over apartheid South Africa</a>). </p>
<p>Equally, while the British vote could change the EU’s latent military security ambitions – there has been intermittent talk of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-eu-anywhere-near-getting-its-own-army-59188">EU Military Force</a> – the impact on NATO is likely to be, in practical terms, negligible. It is highly unlikely, for example, that France would withdraw its troops from the alliance as it did in 1966.</p>
<h2>Moscow calling</h2>
<p>There will be, of course, other implications, and some of the most pressing depend on how all this is viewed in the Kremlin.</p>
<p>There has been plenty of speculation that Brexit will make maintaining or renewing sanctions against Russia for its actions in Ukraine harder and that Germany in particular will be harder to persuade to hold a harsh line with Moscow, not least because Germany so relies on Russia for energy. The Washington Post suggested in January that this reliance <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-unseemly-energy-deal-between-germany-and-russia/2016/01/01/1e96c2b8-afd9-11e5-b711-1998289ffcea_story.html">could damage European unity</a>, a prediction <a href="http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Russia-German-Pipeline-May-Break-Europes-Energy-Union.html">other commentators</a> have made too. </p>
<p>But in reality, it’s just too soon for such claims to be confirmed. Whatever they need from Russia, the leaders of the other 27 member states don’t wish to encourage their looming neighbour’s expansion plans, and the UK will remain a heavyweight partner in their efforts to deter it. Even now, Britain is engaged in a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36465268">significant military exercise in Poland</a> and <a href="http://news.sky.com/story/1711230/nato-sends-4000-troops-to-baltic-over-russia">deterring actions against the Baltic States</a> in particular.</p>
<p>More broadly, by refocusing on NATO and the transatlantic partnership, Britain might have inadvertently kicked off a <a href="http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-06-24/how-the-brexit-vote-could-impact-nato-and-defense-policy">long-overdue</a> reconsideration of Europe-wide defence commitments and spending. While the US-UK relationship (“special” or otherwise) may never look the same, its security dimension will most likely endure. As will the defence business, for that matter: Britain’s <a href="http://www.baesystems.com/en-us/our-company">BAE Systems</a> is a very significant player in the US defence market, and is currently one of the top international sellers to the US government – <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=55Mh4Dy3lX0C&pg=PA248&lpg=PA248&dq=BAE+sells+more+to+us+government+than+MOD+does&source=bl&ots=sd63tev5Hg&sig=ipMN9Ubq652FVf0XLz3mX_5oD_U&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj37ofU-tHNAhVHKMAKHbNbCrsQ6AEIMjAD#v=onepage&q=BAE%20sells%20more%20to%20us%20government%20than%20MOD%20does&f=false">selling more to the Pentagon</a> than it does to the UK’s own Ministry of Defence.</p>
<p>So even as the direction and integrity of both the UK and the EU are called into question as never before, there’s just no real reason to expect new direct security threats in the short and medium-term. The coming adjustments and realignments will have implications for Europe and beyond, but doomy predictions of global or regional insecurity are (for now at least) gross exaggerations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61688/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Shields does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Forecasts that Britain’s withdrawal from the EU will send the world into a state of war are wildly overblown.Ian Shields, Associate Lecturer in International Relations, Anglia Ruskin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/613992016-06-24T07:39:07Z2016-06-24T07:39:07ZBrexit: global reaction to Britain’s vote to leave the EU<p>The United Kingdom <a href="https://theconversation.com/britain-votes-to-leave-the-eu-heres-what-happens-next-61420">has voted</a> by a close margin to leave the European Union. Here, experts from around the world react to the news which has sent shockwaves around the world and what it means for their country.</p>
<hr>
<h2>France</h2>
<p><strong>Frédérique Berrod, professor of public law, Sciences Po Strasbourg and Antoine Ullestad, PhD candidate in European law, University of Strasbourg</strong></p>
<p>It’s no surprise that a sense of disaster dominated the French media’s reaction to news that the UK had voted for a Brexit, with many underlying the “<a href="http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2016/06/24/brexit-vent-de-panique-sur-les-marches-asiatiques_1461664">winds of panic</a>” and the “<a href="http://video.lefigaro.fr/figaro/video/brexit-c-est-le-debut-d-un-vrai-cataclysme/4981669319001/">start of a real cataclysm</a>” in the markets. While some papers spoke of the shock of the decision, others were not surprised, talking instead about how it marked a defeat for the European Union, described <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2016/06/24/une-revolte-populaire-et-une-cinglante-defaite_1461674">as “complete”</a> by the columnist Laurent Joffin in the left-leaning <em>Liberation</em> newspaper.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"746257983470899200"}"></div></p>
<p>The independent website Médiapart used a brilliant oxymoron, describing the decision as a “<a href="https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/240616/brexit-une-catastrophe-bienvenue">welcome catastrophe</a>” and arguing that Brexit offers a unique opportunity for reform of the long-criticised EU. The result highlighted how the political class in France <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/2016/06/24/25001-20160624ARTFIG00047-brexit-la-victoire-du-leave-divise-la-classe-politique-francaise.php">remains very divided</a> over Europe. On one hand the Eurosceptics, led by the Front National’s Marine le Pen, have saluted the UK’s “clear lesson in democracy” and called for a similar referendum in France. On the other side, those politicians on the left who are in power, such as French foreign minister Jean-Marc Ayrault, <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2016/06/24/97001-20160624FILWWW00069-l-europe-doit-retrouver-la-confiance-des-peuples-ayrault.php">want Europe to</a> “react and find the confidence of its people”.</p>
<p>President François Hollande, after a cabinet meeting and talks with European Commission President Donald Tusk and his German counterpart Angela Merket, said the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-24/hollande-says-u-k-exit-shouldn-t-be-delayed-as-eu-needs-renewal">decision was</a> “severely testing the European Union”. </p>
<p>The secretary of state for reform <a href="http://lelab.europe1.fr/thierry-mandon-annonce-la-tenue-dun-referendum-sur-leurope-en-france-la-presidentielle-2017-2781172">Thierry Mandon said</a>: “The referendum [in France] is scheduled, it’s the presidential elections.” The European project will be at the heart of the 2017 race. </p>
<p>Questions dominate the coverage in the regional press – with papers wondering what the impact will be on <a href="http://www.republicain-lorrain.fr/france-monde/2016/06/24/brexit-quel-impact-sur-la-politique-francaise">French politics</a>, whether the <a href="http://www.ouest-france.fr/europe/brexit/lunion-europeenne-pourra-t-elle-survivre-au-brexit-4322529">EU can survive a Brexit</a>, and <a href="http://www.ledauphine.com/france-monde/2016/06/24/brexit-que-va-t-il-se-passer-maintenant">what will happen next</a> – reflecting the gamble on which the future on the EU now lies.</p>
<p><em>Clément Louis Kolopp contributed to this section.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>United States</h2>
<p><strong>Scott Lucas, professor of international politics, University of Birmingham</strong></p>
<p>One consequence of Britain’s vote to leave the European Union will be damage to the US-UK “special relationship” that has been a pillar of Britain’s political, economic, and military strategy since 1945.</p>
<p>Brexit campaigners have insisted that the UK can easily replace its economic position within the EU with the primacy of links with the US. That assertion – whether from genuine belief or political manoeuvring – <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-would-brexit-mean-for-the-special-relationship-nothing-good-61390">is misguided</a>.</p>
<p>From the interlinked creation of NATO and the EU’s ancestors, such as the European Economic Community, to the support of Western Europe as a bulwark against Soviet Communism, America’s economic and political strategists have built their approach on a UK inside Europe, not detached from it.</p>
<p>The current US leadership has not been shy about reasserting this. To the contrary, the US president, Barack Obama, made clear in March that the UK <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/22/barack-obama-brexit-uk-back-of-queue-for-trade-talks">would be at the “back of the queue”</a> for trade deals if Brexit triumphed. Former high-level officials – used as channels for the views of those who now hold their positions – spoke of the negative effects not only on Britain’s economic future but on relationships within diplomatic, military, and intelligence partnerships.</p>
<p>The US-UK relationship rests on institutions which prefer security and certainty. Given that the UK – which may not be “united” in the near future <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-shock-leaves-snp-with-major-dilemma-in-scotland-61457">if Scotland departs</a> – is entering a period of protracted insecurity and uncertainty, Washington will not be looking at “Independence Day” in England and Wales as an asset, but as a problem.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Daniel Chirot, Herbert J. Ellison professor of Russian and Eurasian studies, University of Washington</strong></p>
<p>After the referendum, British opinion remains badly split. The typical “Leave” voter is similar to supporters of Donald Trump in the US and National Front voters in France. Xenophobic, angry nationalist and isolationist parties have been rising all over Europe.</p>
<p>This is the revolt of the losers who feel marginalised by globalisation. Perceptions of economic insecurity, unwelcome cultural change, intrusion of untraditional, foreign ideas, and a sense of national decline have <a href="https://theintercept.com/2016/01/21/the-seven-stages-of-establishment-backlash-corbynsanders-edition/">produced a massive backlash</a> against ruling establishments. </p>
<p>Sadly, the closure to the outside world they demand, if carried out, would plunge much of the world into economic depression and cause immense international conflict. We <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/american-isolationism">would be back</a> in the 1930s, heading for disaster.</p>
<p>Alarmingly, the losers’ anger is also a revolt against the liberal Enlightenment values of tolerance and openness to progressive ideas that seemed, only 25 years ago, to finally have prevailed. <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Contentious_Identities.html?id=-fw_dGeC8u4C&redir_esc=y">Similar threats</a> in the 20th century were ultimately reversed by the defeat of first fascism and then communism, but are now back.</p>
<p>Only reinvigorated economic growth, better protection for the inevitable losers of globalisation and greater sympathy for their frustrations can ease their anger. Establishment parties of the moderate right and left have failed to help. Unless they do, the crisis will continue to worsen. The referendum’s results solve nothing.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Germany</h2>
<p><strong>Isabelle Hertner, lecturer in German and European politics and society, University of Birmingham</strong></p>
<p>In the early hours of June 24, when the results of the referendum were announced, German politicians maintained the same approach. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel, <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/brexit-merkel-spricht-von-einschnitt-fuer-europa-a-1099592.html">made only a short statement</a>, calling the result a watershed moment for the process of European unification, and one that she personally regrets. At the same time, she warned against a kneejerk response to the referendum result, calling for calm and prudence in the EU’s dealings with the UK.</p>
<p>She acknowledged that across the whole of the EU, many citizens have doubts about greater European integration. “Therefore”, Merkel said, “we must ensure that the citizens feel that the EU can improve their lives. The EU is strong enough to find the right responses to today’s problems.” She added that it was now important for the 27 other member states to stand together and make sure that the EU finds a common solution.</p>
<p>There were few signs of complacency in German politicians’ reactions towards the vote. Many fear a domino effect, citing the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-france-front-idUSKCN0ZA0JP">example of Marine LePen</a>, the leader of the French far-right <em>Front National</em>, who has now called for France to hold its own “Frexit” referendum. </p>
<p>In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a Eurosceptic far-right populist party, is on the rise and predicted to win over five per cent of the votes and enter the Bundestag in the 2017 federal elections. Many German commentators fear the AfD and other similar parties across Europe will repeat UKIP’s electoral appeal, which is based on bundling up opposition to the EU with <a href="http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/brexit-diese-fragen-muss-berlin-zum-brexit-beantworten-1.3049307">a strong anti-immigration stance</a>.</p>
<p><em>For more on Germany’s reaction, <a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-reaction-to-brexit-a-catastrophe-but-well-cope-61459">click here</a>.</em> </p>
<hr>
<h2>Russia</h2>
<p><strong>Alexander Titov, lecturer in modern European history, Queen’s University Belfast</strong></p>
<p>The reaction to the Leave victory in Russia, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/fact-check-does-vladimir-putin-really-want-a-brexit-from-the-european-union-60831">was alleged</a> to be in favour of Brexit, centred on the likely impact on its relations with the EU and the possible economic fallout.</p>
<p>The finance minister Anton Siluanov <a href="https://rg.ru/2016/06/24/siluanov-vliianie-brexit-na-ekonomiku-rf-budet-ogranichennym.html">said</a> that Brexit was likely to be less significant for Russia’s economy than shocks it has experienced over the past two years. Aleksei Kudrin, an ex-finance minister and influential adviser to President Vladimir Putin, <a href="https://twitter.com/Aleksei_Kudrin/status/746249818771709953">tweeted</a> that there won’t be an economic catastrophe, but both the EU and UK would be weaker economically in the long run.</p>
<p>Other Russian politicians have been less reserved in their <a href="https://rg.ru/2016/06/24/v-gosdume-nazvali-sleduiushchih-kandidatov-na-vyhod-iz-es.html">reaction</a>, with the nationalist-minded among them predicting that Brexit is only a start of the EU dissolution.</p>
<p>Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a firebrand leader of the main nationalist party in the Russian Duma, <a href="https://twitter.com/Zhirinovskiy/status/746232409109069824">praised</a> the Leave vote. “The people of Britain made the right choice – the rural, the working class of Britain said "no” to the union created by the financial mafia, the globalists and all others.“ He added: "Now we hope that Trump will win.”</p>
<p>Moderate politicians were more cautious in their <a href="http://izvestia.ru/news/619364">reaction</a>. Konstantin Kosachev, an influential chairman of the Federation Council’s (the upper chamber) committee for international affairs, said he hoped that Brexit would spur reforms to make the EU less politicised, more flexible and open to cooperation with international partners, including Russia. He also expressed concerns over possible economic fallout:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have interest in the EU as a stable inter-generational project, because it’s still one of our biggest trade partners. 49% of Russia’s foreign trade is with the EU, and even under the sanctions regime it’s still significant. Any shock in such an important trade partner will impact our relations in a negative way.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<h2>Poland</h2>
<p><strong>Aleks Szczerbiak, professor of politics and contemporary European studies, University of Sussex</strong></p>
<p>The British EU referendum result has raised a number of concerns in Poland. There is uncertainty about what will happen to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-31442230">800,000 Poles</a> currently working in the UK. There are concerns about what impact the UK’s exit will have on the EU budget, as Poland is <a href="https://www.funduszeeuropejskie.gov.pl/en/site/learn-more-about-european-funds/discover-how-the-funds-work/european-funds-in-poland/">currently the largest beneficiary</a> of the EU’s regional funding. More broadly, there are concerns that the departure of the largest non-Eurozone member of the EU could marginalise Poland if power is increasingly concentrated among the states that are part of the single currency.</p>
<p>The current Polish government, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/25/poland-lurches-to-right-with-election-of-law-and-justice-party">led since autumn 2015</a> by the right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS), will also lose its key ally among the large EU states. The government has shifted away from the previous administration’s prioritisation of relations with Germany and has been trying to develop a strategic partnership with the UK. PiS sits in the same European Parliament group as the British Conservatives. It saw the UK as a natural ally given its shared stance on anti-federalism in the EU, and on particular issues of concern to Poland such as the EU’s relations with Russia.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Australia</h2>
<p><strong>Mark Beeson, professor of international politics, Murdoch University</strong> </p>
<p>As the world reacts to the UK’s decision to leave the EU, the significant and long-lasting economic damage that is likely to ensue will inevitably get most attention in the short term. </p>
<p>The rest of the EU will want to make life as difficult as possible for Britain to deter others from following in its wake. Young Britons looking to escape their insular, parochial and incredibly short-sighted and badly led homeland may need to look further afield than Europe.</p>
<p>The good news is that Australia might get a flood of applications from talented prospective citizens. The bad news is that Britain will be a diminished international force with limited capacity to play the sort of role some conservative commentators in this country fondly imagine. It is hardly a coincidence that those in Australia who want the country to become a republic have a renewed spring in their step as they consider political folly on an epic scale.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Greece</h2>
<p><strong>Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, College Associate Dean, Brunel University London</strong></p>
<p>Shock, disbelief and fear. This has been the initial Greek reaction to Brexit. This time a year ago the Greek referendum was being announced and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/grexit">threat of “Grexit”</a> loomed over Europe. The banks closed, capital controls were introduced and the socio-economic and political trauma continues to haunt people today.</p>
<p>The country was, however, beginning to have glimmers of hope that a period of stability lay ahead. Brexit will prove them wrong. It has opened a Pandora’s box, for Greece and for Europe. The impact on the Greek economy will be disastrous: between the 2009 global economic crisis and the post-Brexit crisis that is about to unleash its full force, the Greek economy <a href="https://theconversation.com/snap-election-and-market-collapse-show-greece-is-still-crippled-by-crisis-35347">has suffered terrible blows</a>. To believe it will survive a protracted period of economic uncertainty in Europe is wishful thinking.</p>
<p>At least this time Greek politicians do not have any illusions. “The forecasts have been proven wrong. Hope has been denied. A great adventure begins,” <a href="http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=810207">said Giorgos Koumoutsakos</a>, spokesperson for the Greek conservative party, New Democracy. </p>
<p>On a dark day like this, we can rejoice at least that not everyone has given up on Europe. MPs from many political parties in Greece are speaking with one voice, about the need to stop the march of populism, create barriers to nationalism and build new bridges to stop isolationism in Europe. They call for a new vision for Europe, and want to be part of it.</p>
<p>But a <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/209867/article/ekathimerini/news/golden-dawn-welcomes-brave-decision-of-british-people">spokesperson</a> for Greece’s right-wing fascist Golden Dawn party, congratulated the British people for saying no to the “German rulers of Europe” and “Brussels’ scavengers”.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Belgium</h2>
<p><strong>Clément Jadot, PhD candidate, department of political science, Université Libre de Bruxelles</strong></p>
<p>As fervent federalists, some Belgians may have occasionally dreamed that a Brexit would open a new window of opportunity for deeper and faster integration within Europe without the UK dragging its heels, but the truth is that all the major political parties were strongly supportive of Bremain. From a Belgian perspective, Brexit is bad news, both economically and politically.</p>
<p>Economically speaking, Belgium is an open economy, strongly bonded to the UK, and political elites fear stress on the banking market as well as a deterioration of the national trade balance as a consequence. </p>
<p>The referendum’s political consequences for Belgium are not straightforward. On the one hand, most of the country’s political parties will probably call for a common front in order to go beyond the shock and to push European integration forward, as did the prime minister Charles Michel this morning.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"746223772462522369"}"></div></p>
<p>On the other hand, regional ambitions and populism in the north of the country will certainly be nourished by the Brexit vote, as well as in the rest of the EU. On a short term basis, the Flemish nationalists of the N-VA, will be the first to be impacted by the Brexit. With the departure of the British Conservatives from the EU bloc, they lose a strategic ally and an ideological model.</p>
<p>In the past, Belgium and the UK always looked very differently at the EU. Yet, because they are historical, political, strategic and economic allies, it is in their mutual interest that this friendship never ends.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61399/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos is founder and firector of the Brunel-University based Britain in Europe think tank.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aleks Szczerbiak, Alexander Titov, Antoine Ullestad, Clément Jadot, Daniel Chirot, Frédérique Berrod, Isabelle Hertner, Mark Beeson, and Scott Lucas do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rolling reaction from the US, Russia, France, Poland, Greece, Australia and Belgium to the UK’s decision.Antoine Ullestad, Doctorant en droit de l'Union européenne, Université de StrasbourgAleks Szczerbiak, Professor of Politics and Contemporary European Studies, University of SussexAlexander Titov, Lecturer in Modern European History, Queen's University BelfastClément Jadot, PhD candidate, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)Daniel Chirot, Professor of Russian and Eurasian Studies, University of WashingtonDimitrios Giannoulopoulos, Senior Lecturer in Law, Brunel University LondonFrédérique Berrod, Professeure de droit public, Sciences Po Strasbourg – Université de StrasbourgIsabelle Hertner, Lecturer in German and European Politics and Society, Deputy Director of the Institute for German Studies, University of BirminghamMark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, The University of Western AustraliaScott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.