tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/united-democratic-movement-28878/articlesUnited Democratic Movement – The Conversation2018-09-13T15:27:43Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1026712018-09-13T15:27:43Z2018-09-13T15:27:43ZSouth Africans come off second best as politicians play havoc with coalitions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236229/original/file-20180913-177947-pqhb86.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For the past two years political party coalitions have become the <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/product/leon-schreiber-coalition-country/kmjj-5380-g430?PPC=Y&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI9qfZ4My33QIVxbztCh1bSwxCEAAYASAAEgKT5vD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds">“new normal”</a> in South African politics. They became a key feature in 2016 after the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), wrested power from the governing African National Congress (ANC) by forming coalitions in three key metropolitan – Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/133536/da-announces-coalitions-with-smaller-parties/">Johannesburg</a>. </p>
<p>But the coalitions have proven to be volatile and unstable, most notably in <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/da-locks-down-mandela-bay-with-multi-party-coalition-20160817">Nelson Mandela Bay</a>. The metropolitan municipality council has found it difficult to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/nelson-mandela-bay-budget-still-not-approved-20180606">pass budgets</a>, <a href="https://www.rnews.co.za/video/200/political-impasse-sees-nmb-councillors-failing-to-agree-on-metro-s-r12-billion-budget">approve</a> and <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/city-of-johannesburg-will-fight-ancs-attempt-to-undo-change-12164279">agree</a> on a long-term strategic <a href="http://www.nelsonmandelabay.gov.za/datarepository/documents/nmbm-integrated-development-plan-idp-second-edition-2018-19.pdf">development plan for the city</a>. </p>
<p>After a series of crises, the coalition which had been cobbled together between the DA and three smaller parties finally collapsed in August. Another <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/trollip-confident-that-fourth-motion-of-no-confidence-will-fail-16560854">motion of no confidence</a> – the fifth in two years – was tabled against the DA’s executive mayor <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-08-27-athol-trollip-ousted-as-nelson-mandela-mayor/">Athol Trollip</a>. A slim majority of councillors voted in favour and he was ousted. Trollip has challenged the decision <a href="https://www.jacarandafm.com/news/news/another-blow-da-nelson-mandela-bay/">in court</a>. For now the city has a mayor from the United Democratic Movement which has <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/news/da-led-coalition-for-mandela-bay-a-step-closer-20160807">2% of the vote</a> in the council. </p>
<p>The coalition in South Africa’s second largest city <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/no-eff-deal-but-da-confirms-multi-party-coalition-20160818">Tshwane</a> is also on shaky ground. The executive mayor <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/08/30/da-backs-solly-msimanga-as-no-confidence-motion-looms">Solly Msimanga</a>, also from the DA, faced a motion of no confidence a mere three days after Trollip was ousted. But Msimanga survived to fight another day due to a <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-08-30-breaking--tshwane-mayor-solly-msimanga-survives-no-confidence-vote/">technical</a> glitch in the voting procedures. </p>
<p>The coalition in Johannesburg <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-03-16-da-draws-line-for-mashaba-over-eff-pandering/">seems to be holding</a> – for now.</p>
<p>But the troubles in Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane are raising real concerns that the political chess games are affecting accountability, <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/08/28/tshwane-nmb-political-instability-impacts-governance-service-delivery">governance stability and service delivery</a> in the cities.</p>
<p>This is a serious state of affairs. If political parties can’t work together, passing resolutions and agreeing on developmental priorities becomes difficult. Once governance stagnates, a municipality cannot function effectively. This in turn affects its ability to provide services. When councils become political theatres, ordinary citizens suffer. This much has <a href="http://www.africansunmedia.co.za/Sun-e-Shop/Product-Details/tabid/78/ProductID/535/Default.aspx">been evident</a> in Nelson Mandela Bay.</p>
<h2>Political expediency</h2>
<p>Coalitions are usually formed on the basis of political expediency. The political marriages of convenience come about when political parties can’t get an outright majority. To secure power, parties scramble to find partners, at times without considering ideological, policy, or historical differences. As African political and governance scholar <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/8003/biegon.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">W. O. Oyugi</a> cited by African human rights expert Dr Japheth Biegnon has noted:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>coalitions are a necessary evil – an evil in the sense that normally no party ever coalesces except in circumstances in which not to do so would deprive it of a chance to exercise power</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This certainly holds true for the coalitions formed in South Africa since 2016. The cooperation forged among opposition parties was designed solely to get the ANC out of power. </p>
<p>What emerged were <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2017/12/06/da-coalition-partners-determined-to-make-power-sharing-agreement-work">uncomfortable coalition</a> governments led by the DA. It promised to root out corruption and improve the delivery of basic services, such as water and electricity, to communities. But it lacked the required majority to govern on its own so turned to building coalitions.</p>
<p>It partnered with a number of smaller parties. One of them, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), helped the DA take over governments in Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/133536/da-announces-coalitions-with-smaller-parties/">Johannesburg</a>.</p>
<p>The EFF, <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/eff-holds-the-strings-in-trollip-no-confidence-vote">acutely aware</a> of the power it wields in all these arrangements, has used the fragile political situation at local government level for its own political agenda. This has included promoting its radical stance on land expropriation and nationalisation with an eye on improving its performance in next year’s elections.</p>
<p>The EFF <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-08-17-malema-says-the-eff-wont-form-coalitions-but-will-support-da-in-hung-metros">declined</a> to formally join any coalition government, but effectively holds the position of <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/four-years-on-eff-is-the-kingmaker-of-sa-politics-10558288">political kingmaker</a>, especially in <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/news/who-won-what-in-which-metro-20160806">hung councils</a>. </p>
<p>Both the DA and the ANC realise that, potentially, they might need to work with the EFF in future. It is therefore not surprising that following the Tshwane motion of no confidence, Msimanga announced he would <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/msimanga-to-reach-out-to-eff-after-motions-of-no-confidence-fails-20180830">“reach out”</a> to the EFF.</p>
<h2>Lessons for the future</h2>
<p>There are two key lessons that political parties should take away from the current political turmoil if they want to bring about a semblance of bureaucratic stability. </p>
<p>Firstly, using local coalition politics to advance political agendas can severely hamper service delivery. Secondly, this undermines public trust in local government, creating fertile ground for political unrest.</p>
<p>Political parties will need to heed these lessons to ensure effective governance and political stability in the country. This is particularly important in view of the 2019 national and provincial elections, which are expected to result in even more <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/8003/biegon.pdf;sequence=1">coalition governments</a>.</p>
<p>If they don’t, ordinary citizens will suffer while politicians engage in a game of chess to secure power. As it is,
South Africans are <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/media-briefs/sasas/trends-democracy-satisfaction">increasingly dissatisfied</a> with democracy. This is due to a number of factors, including poor <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno71_south_africa_perceptions_of_democracy.pdf">service delivery</a> and a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2017-03-01-erosion-of-trust-in-main-pillars-of-sa-society-reaches-critical-levels/">lack of societal trust</a> in government.</p>
<p>Ultimately, coalitions need to work for the citizenry, and not politicians. </p>
<p><em>The author’s has just published a new book, <a href="http://www.africansunmedia.co.za/Sun-e-Shop/Product-Details/tabid/78/ProductID/535/Default.aspx">Delivering an Elusive Dream of Democracy: Lessons from Nelson Mandela Bay</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102671/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joleen Steyn Kotze receives funding from the National Research Foundation and the Konrad Audenauer Stiftung . </span></em></p>Troubles in South Africa’s coalition-led local governments are affecting accountability, governance stability and service delivery.Joleen Steyn Kotze, Senior Research Specialist in Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery at the Human Science Research Council and a Research Fellow Centre for African Studies, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/964832018-05-13T08:36:15Z2018-05-13T08:36:15ZSouth Africa is learning the ropes of coalition politics – and its inherent instability<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218611/original/file-20180511-34018-jbf0ln.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Solly Msimanga, centre, the mayor of Tshwane, with Democratic Alliance national leader, Mmusi Maimane, right, celebrate winning the city in 2016. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s politics has entered largely uncharted terrain. Following the municipal elections in <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/lgedashboard2016/leaderboard.aspx">2016</a> several political parties swiftly coalesced to elect Democratic Alliance (DA) mayors in three hung metropolitan councils that had <a href="https://theconversation.com/are-south-africas-opposition-led-coalition-metros-flexing-their-muscles-82091">emerged as a result</a>. It appeared that there was a firm intention on behalf of these former opposition parties to unite under the objective of ensuring that the common enemy, the African National Congress, would no longer govern.</p>
<p>But international experience of coalition politics shows that instability is never far away. Political parties in South Africa are clearly struggling to cope with the delicate demands and dilemmas of coalition politics.</p>
<p>The recent shenanigans in Nelson Mandela Bay are testimony of what can go wrong. What began as a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/das-coalition-in-danger-as-battles-ensue-20170902">rift</a> between the United Democratic Movement (UDM) and the Democratic Alliance (DA) over the now-axed UDM deputy mayor Mongameli Bobani, spilled over to threaten the whole of the original five-party coalition. Like a formula one car, if something small but significant fails, the whole complex machine can fall apart and come off the road.</p>
<p>Worldwide experience shows that parties of opposing ideological views <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/JAE13.1Kadima.pdf">can work together</a>. But there is a clear danger for coalition partners surrendering the uniqueness of their identity. They are forced to compromise to accommodate the policies of others indispensable to the numerical ability of the coalition to govern.</p>
<p>Coalitions can result in significant electoral gains. But several parties that have been involved in coalition arrangements in South Africa and abroad have admitted to a backlash from their electorates. That’s because they have been seen as siding with their traditional enemies. </p>
<p>Coalitions are also inherently adversarial. It’s a necessary condition that parties work together. But empirical evidence from across the world shows that the primary rationale for coalition formation is the <a href="http://aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/parties-and-candidates/mauritius.pdf">acquisition of political power</a>.</p>
<p>There is nothing inherently objectionable to this. The best intentions for positive change are of little consequence unless coupled with the power to implement them. The acquisition of power through legal means is therefore a legitimate and fundamental objective of any political party that has the best intentions for the people that it seeks to serve.</p>
<p>But this inevitably generates conflict as coalition partners continuously manoeuvre themselves to ensure that they get the best return for their investment in political compromise. While each must work together, the end goal for each party is its own success. And sometimes fights among friends can lead to more destructive and enduring fallouts than fights among foes.</p>
<h2>Compromise and consensus</h2>
<p>At a recent inaugural, ground-breaking symposium in Cape Town, six political leaders from across the German political spectrum conducted a dialogue with senior representatives from eight of South Africa’s nine largest parties.</p>
<p>One of the lessons from Germany is that successful coalitions have been founded on written agreements that create formal structures for engagement among partners. These include management, decision-making and dispute resolution procedures.</p>
<p>Foreign experience shows a clear and direct relationship between well written coalition agreements and the stability of the coalition. But they’re not easily enforceable. That’s because they’re political agreements rather than legal agreements.</p>
<p>Therefore, the only way to ensure that coalition partners stick to a deal is to offer each partner enough benefits to ensure that it derives more political advantage by staying in the coalition, than if it were ‘go it alone’ or offer its allegiances elsewhere.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/141d/b2a907eadab74db9f78c80a43dcf9c1e50b5.pdf">academic literature</a>, supported by the German experience, suggests that any attempt by the largest coalition partner to control the coalition outright, and pass off any success as its own, is a coalition doomed to fail.</p>
<p>Both abroad and in South Africa, there are accounts of the largest party in the coalition acting unilaterally to the strong disapproval of its partners. While it is natural and legitimate for the larger coalition partner to get a greater share of the spoils, especially in a legislature where the numbers game is tight, a strategy of unilateral action by the largest partner will destabilise its ability to exercise power. </p>
<p>In such legislatures, where the size of the coalition is only just sufficient to obtain a legislative majority, each coalition partner is indispensable to the other’s ability to govern. Therefore, it is striking that in Germany’s coalitions, especially its “grand” coalitions of recent years, decisions are sought to be made by consensus.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218663/original/file-20180512-34027-swiwu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218663/original/file-20180512-34027-swiwu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218663/original/file-20180512-34027-swiwu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218663/original/file-20180512-34027-swiwu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218663/original/file-20180512-34027-swiwu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218663/original/file-20180512-34027-swiwu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218663/original/file-20180512-34027-swiwu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jackson Mthembu, chief whip of the governing ANC, at the symposium.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This necessitates compromise – something one of the leaders of a smaller South African party said was unfortunately seen as a sign of weakness by the public. Hence, it is understandable that after decades of being in opposition, the country’s largest opposition parties are seeking to wield as much power in their coalitions as possible. This, as they endeavour to show South Africans that they were being more than noisemakers when they promised that they could deliver a better country to its citizens.</p>
<p>But, as a fundamental, defining characteristic, coalitions do not grant a political party power, but merely the opportunity to share in it. And share they must.</p>
<h2>Why sharing is so key</h2>
<p>If South Africa’s parties can get this right, the benefits may be far greater than just sharing in the spoils of power. When it comes to politics, the country is still deeply divided along racial, cultural and ideological grounds. But a handshake between political enemies from across the floor could lead to a handshake between personal enemies from across the street.</p>
<p>To achieve this in South Africa, political leaders are going to have to reshape political culture. Parties should regard their rivals as opponents, and not enemies. </p>
<p>Coalition research shows the clear potential of party collaboration to be an instrument to <a href="https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfulsocieties/files/LS_Kenya_Powersharing_FINAL.pdf">enhance national unity</a> . India, Kenya and Mauritius are all good examples. Parties of differing ethnicities, cultures and religions came together in these countries and restored peace in times of strife.</p>
<p>This is another notable aspect of coalition formation. Parties have united from across the full ideological spectrum, showing that there is no combination of South African political parties for whom it is impossible to form an alliance.</p>
<p>That fact was clear to see at the Cape Town symposium as traditional adversaries from across the ideological spectrum came together to discuss potential means of working together.</p>
<p>As the day unfolded ANC chief whip, Jackson Mthembu tweeted:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[w]hat an eye opener! Six political parties from <a href="https://twitter.com/FederalGermany">@FederalGermany</a> are participating in a <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Symposium?src=hash">#Symposium</a> on <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Coalitions?src=hash">#Coalitions</a> Politics with twelve parties in <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/SouthAfrica?src=hash">#SouthAfrica</a>. This high level exchange in <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/CapeTown?src=hash">#CapeTown</a> on the <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/German?src=hash">#German</a> Coalition Politics experience is very helpful for our country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Bantu Holomisa, leader of the United Democratic Movement, added his own distinctive voice on social media: </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/CoalitionsforSA?src=hash">#CoalitionsforSA</a>… at a high level exchange between some SA & German politicians. Looking at 2019 & beyond.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is clear that South African parties recognise that coalition politics is now part of the political landscape and that it is here to stay.</p>
<p><em>Mike Law wrote the <a href="http://michel-irs.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Background-Paper-7-May-Symposium-Political-Party-Cooperation-and-the-Building-and-Sustaining-of-Coalitions-1.pdf">background paper</a> from which this article draws substantially. The Cape Town Symposium was convened in partnership with the German Embassy in South Africa, and organised by Michel International Relations and Services.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Calland is a Founding Partner of The Paternoster Group: African Political Insight, an Associate Advisor to Michel International Relations and Services (MIRS), a member of the Advisory Council of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC) and a member of the Board of the Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC). As a part of his current sabbatical from UCT, he has convened the Building and Sustaining Coalition Initiative, which hosted the 7 May 2018 Symposium in Cape Town which was supported by the Heinrich Boell Foundation, the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and the Hanns Seidel Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mike Law receives funding from Heinrich Boell Foundation</span></em></p>South African parties are recognising that coalition politics is now part of the political landscape and is here to stay.Richard Calland, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape TownMike Law, Senior legal researcher in Public Law, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/835392017-09-06T18:51:21Z2017-09-06T18:51:21ZCyril Ramaphosa’s leaked emails: echoes of apartheid-era dirty tricks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184880/original/file-20170906-9871-19somya.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A routine smear. This is the view of the overwhelming majority of commentators and analysts about last weekend’s <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/ramaphosa-in-womanising-e-mail-shock-11056138">“revelations”</a> in the <em>Sunday Independent</em> that Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa was a serial womaniser.</p>
<p>The commentariat can expect more such smears. They will come against more than one candidate running for the presidency of the governing ANC - and subsequently of the country. It’s not hard to predict that this slapstick routine will continue all the way to voting at the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">ANC’s national conference</a> in December.</p>
<p>This was at least the second anti-Ramaphosa smear, following an earlier damp squib that alleged that he <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1612116/malema-alleges-ramaphosa-is-the-worse-member-who-beat-his-wife/">abused his ex-wife</a>, a claim she firmly <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/16/ramaphosa-s-ex-wife-abuse-claims-seek-to-prevent-him-from-becoming-president">refuted</a>.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa has alleged that rogue elements in the country’s intelligence services hacked into his private emails and doctored them before handing them to the newspaper <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-09-02-intelligence-resources-hacked-my-email-ramaphosa/">to smear him</a>. This, he said, was intended to scupper his campaign to become president of the governing ANC and the country. He predicted that it would get worse ahead of the governing party’s elective conference.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa is in a virtual <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-07-22-poll-has-ramaphosa-beating-dlamini-zuma/">two-horse race</a> with former head of the African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, for the presidency of the ANC. Her former husband President Jacob Zuma has <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/dlamini-zuma-indicates-she-is-ready-for-presidency">endorsed her</a> as his preferred successor.</p>
<p>ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe has since urged factions within the governing party to desist from using state resources to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-09-05-keep-state-resources-out-of-party-wars-says-mantashe/">discredit</a> those competing for the presidency.</p>
<h2>Then and now</h2>
<p>Several dimensions of this are worth unpacking. </p>
<p>Police states, unlike democracies, by definition abuse their secret services to spy on peaceful, lawful opponents. But to find a case where the secret services are also abused to spy on factions and rivals within the governing party, one has to go back all the way to the 1960s.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-hendrik-van-den-bergh-1246509.html">General Hendrik van den Bergh</a>, who set up the Bureau for State Security <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/south-african-bureau-state-security-boss-established">(BOSS)</a>, to spy on the apartheid regime’s leftist and liberal opponents, also founded the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=gmzFBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT60&lpg=PT60&dq=republican+intelligence+services&source=bl&ots=aFTKywMWyA&sig=2MqkJSQe8ANrKKoPaLIdqlsMW1k&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi4h4bdpY7WAhUEvBQKHTfQCOYQ6AEIRzAE#v=onepage&q=republican%20intelligence%20services&f=false">Republikeinse Intelligensie Diens</a> to spy on the then governing National Party’s right-wing faction. These <em>verkramptes</em> (conservatives) broke away in 1969 to form the <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv03446/05lv03472.htm">Herstigte Nasionale Party</a>. </p>
<p>It’s painful to make comparisons between the apartheid police state and post-apartheid South Africa’s Westminster-style democracy. But secret service abuse of phone tapping and letter opening leaves analysts no choice.</p>
<p>While it’s now over a decade since a horrified former Intelligence minister <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/ronald-ronnie-kasrils">Ronnie Kasrils</a> discovered that some of his subordinates and phone tappers in the National Intelligence Service (NIS) strayed beyond their brief. They <a href="http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/771.1">took opposite sides</a> in the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/mbeki-zuma-fight-it-out-in-damaging-anc-race-379445">acrimonious split</a> between President Thabo Mbeki and his fired deputy Jacob Zuma.</p>
<p>What we now seem to have again are rival cliques within the <a href="http://www.ssa.gov.za/AboutUs.aspx">State Security Agency</a>. Each clique sucks up to a rival politician. One clique made available a selection of Ramaphosa’s emails for others to doctor and leak to the <em>Sunday Independent</em>. Another, different clique, was presumably involved in the earlier <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/gupta-leakscom-everything-you-ever-need-to-know-about-guptaleaks-in-one-place-20170721">Gupta email cache</a>. The <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Gupta-leaks">“#Guptaleaks”</a> exposed the extent of the alleged corrupt relationship between the powerful <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-24-00-the-gupta-owned-state-enterprises">Gupta family</a> and state officials, parastatals, as well as its influence on Zuma’s government. </p>
<p>A second dimension of the latest smear against Ramaphosa is equally fascinating. The smear organisers, no doubt after some debate between themselves, made the deliberate choice that their smear should be leaked to the <em>Sunday Independent</em> – instead of to <a href="http://www.thenewage.co.za/"><em>The New Age</em></a> and <a href="http://www.ann7.com/">ANN7</a>. The later was established by Zuma’s friends, the Guptas. With their television station, <em>The New Age</em> are at the heart of <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">state capture </a> allegations and rabidly pro-Zuma and his faction. </p>
<p>This must reflect the spooks’ considered judgement that <em>The New Age</em> and ANN7 are so completely tainted as Gupta business outlets as to be discredited. So, their smear’s only chances of credibility lay with placing their bait in some alternative media go-between. It does help that Steven Motale, the editor of the <em>Sunday Independent</em>, who wrote the story on the leaked emails, is also perceived to be in the pro-Zuma camp, having written an impassioned <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/letter-im-sorry-president-zuma-1899205">open letter</a> in 2015 expressing his regret that he was part of a “sinister” campaign against the president. </p>
<p>Motale also praised ordinary members of the ANC members who “consistently supported Zuma despite the sustained barrage of propaganda against him”. He followed it with another this year in which he condemns former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan as being an impediment to Zuma’s idea of <a href="https://blackopinion.co.za/2017/03/27/steve-motale-writes-open-letter-president-zuma/">radical economic transformation</a>.</p>
<p>Presumably this leaking and smearing will continue. There will always be one media outlet desperate enough for an exclusive scoop from the secret services. That, also, has not changed since the apartheid decades. Remember <em>The Star</em> newspaper alleging that thorn in the apartheid government’s side, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/joe-slovo">Joe Slovo</a>, who was general secretary of the South African Communist Party during the liberation struggle, <a href="http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft4p3006kc&chunk.id=d0e5784&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress">killed his activist wife</a> Ruth First? That was of course a total fabrication by the apartheid regime’s agents.</p>
<p>Here in 2017 though, democracy relies on a politically savvy public of informed voters who will respond to smears not with credulity, but amusement, cartoons, and sarcasm.</p>
<h2>Campaigns, slates and splits</h2>
<p>The remaining months of the formal ANC election campaign between now and the party’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">national elective conference in December</a> recall to mind Helen Zille’s comment when she suddenly sprung her <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/zille-resigns-as-da-leader-1843970">surprise resignation</a> as national leader of the main opposition Democratic Alliance (DA). She commented that any internal DA campaigning longer than a few brief weeks would <a href="http://www.knysnakeep.org/helen-zilles-resignation-explanation/">harm her party</a>.</p>
<p>By contrast, ANC internal campaigning resembles primary years in the United States, stretching over pretty much at least 12 months. The ANC needs to develop mechanisms to manage this without splits - such as those that led to the formation of the <a href="http://udm.org.za/history/">United Democratic Movement</a>, the <a href="http://www.congressofthepeople.org.za/content/page/History-of-cope">Congress of the People</a>, and <a href="http://www.effonline.org/">Economic Freedom Fighters</a> - in its past.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-pleads-for-one-anc-slate-20170512">“Slates”</a> have plagued ANC politics during its 2007 and 2012 conferences. With the slate system, delegates to the national conferences are lobbied to vote for a prescribed list (or slate) of candidates linked to a specific presidential candidate. Such a list then automatically becomes the party’s highest decision making body, its national executive committee.</p>
<p>One solution is for the ANC to change its voting procedures for its national and provincial executive committees. This will ensure that the maximum number of candidates any delegate may vote for should be significantly less than the number of seats contested. This would ensure that while the winning slate still wins, the losing slate gets some representation. So it is neither purged nor splits off to form yet another breakaway party.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC, but writes this analysis in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>South Africa’s Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa, claims the intelligence services are being used to discredit him and prevent him becoming the country’s next leader.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/823222017-08-10T17:24:47Z2017-08-10T17:24:47ZOpposition parties have found the ANC’s Achilles heel: Jacob Zuma<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181667/original/file-20170810-27688-ho88uv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma celebrates winning the eighth vote of no confidence against him.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just when many thought that President Jacob Zuma’s fate was sealed, he emerged victorious against a motion of no confidence in him - for the eighth time. The fanfare associated with his expected loss was largely in sync with the increasing public discontent with his leadership.</p>
<p>On the day of the no confidence vote political parties slugged it out: the ANC was on the defensive, barraged with the opposition parties’ critique of Zuma, who is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-20/jacob-zuma-blamed-for-south-africa-s-woes">blamed for the morass</a> the country finds itself in.</p>
<p>Cautiously couched, and with an eye on winning over ANC MPs who hold the majority of seats in parliament, the opposition’s fusillade sought to <a href="https://www.jacarandafm.com/news/news/no-confidence-debate-top-10-quotes/">delink Zuma from the party</a>. This made sense as a strategy: after all the ANC has abdicated the responsibility of holding Zuma to account for far too long. In tabling yet another motion of no confidence the opposition appropriated this duty. </p>
<p>The latest motion offered the ANC a chance to make a distinction between itself and its ethically compromised president, and to reclaim its position as a leader of society. It created – albeit unwittingly – the opportunity for the ANC to repackage its sullied image. </p>
<p>But it failed to seize the moment. Instead, it settled for a Pyrrhic victory. Those faithful to Zuma took turns in their deification histrionics of political showmanship and demagoguery fixated on imagined “enemies of the state” and the illusion of <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/news/2017-08-08-zumavote-a-regime-change-agenda--anc-mps-launch-vigorous-defence-of-zuma/">“regime change” </a>. These falsehoods are peddled to deflect attention from the real dangers to the country’s democracy: a dearth of <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-moral-leaders-not-those-in-pursuit-of-selfish-gain-76244">ethical leadership</a> and the <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">capture of the state</a> under Zuma.</p>
<p>Opposition parties took advantage of this. They might not have won the vote of no confidence. But they came away emboldened for trying.</p>
<h2>Opposition parties gaining the upper hand</h2>
<p>The opposition parties are getting smarter in exploiting the ANC’s vacuous leadership. In the latest motion of no confidence debate, they managed to frame the narrative in a way that reminded ANC members about the nobility of the historical foundation of the party, and the reason for its existence. In other words, the opposition parties were teaching the ANC about the ANC.</p>
<p>This featured prominently in the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/news/2017-08-08-zumavote-a-regime-change-agenda--anc-mps-launch-vigorous-defence-of-zuma/">speeches</a> of Democratic Alliance’s Mmusi Maimane, Economic Freedom Fighters’ Julius Malema, and United Democratic Movement leader Bantu Holomisa. </p>
<p>The danger for the ANC in not being decisive about Zuma is that, over time, the opposition parties may usurp its political capital and project themselves as genuine custodians of its foundational values. In fact, this appears to be their strategy. Some in the ANC are aware of this which probably explains why 26 of them put the public interest first and voted for the motion. </p>
<p>This is what’s required if the party is going to survive in the long term. Acting in the public interest is a strategic political investment. </p>
<p>Despite the fact that some ANC broke ranks, the motion failed to pass. Of the 384 MPs who voted, 177 said they do not have confidence in Zuma – 46% of the total votes. In all 198 (52%) maintained their confidence in Zuma, <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/08/zuma-survives-no-confidence-vote">while 9 (2%) abstained</a>. Statistically, the motion was lost by 6%. When abstentions are factored in, by 4%. </p>
<p>Immediately after Speaker of National Assembly Baleka Mbete ,announced the results, Zuma couldn’t wait to ascend the podium in a style reminiscent of his ascension to the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president">ANC’s throne in 2007</a> after President Thabo Mbeki had earlier <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/president-thabo-mbeki-sacks-deputy-president-jacob-zuma">sacked him</a> as the Deputy President of the Republic. </p>
<h2>A victory, but at what cost</h2>
<p>It is all celebrations in the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-08-08-zuma-supporters-celebrate-his-win-outa-considers-legal-action/">Zuma coterie</a>. The vote means that the network of his kindred spirits – those at the centre of the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">capture of the state</a> and profiting from the public purse handsomely – is protected.</p>
<p>But aren’t these celebrations about a trifle? A closer look at the votes reveals something interesting: at least 26 ANC MPs agreed with the opposition parties that Zuma should step down as the president of the Republic. The celebrations are therefore more likely to be a requiem for the possible atrophy of the ANC, whose indecisiveness makes it complicit in creating this peril.</p>
<p>Indeed, as leader of the governing party and of the country Zuma should be worried about the outcome. His legitimacy in his own party has plummeted. Coupled with the negative sentiments about him in broader society, the picture is now gloomier for the ANC. He won the vote and secured the throne. But, at what cost? </p>
<p>The outcome of the no confidence vote has laid bare a fractured ANC. Each time Zuma survives, the ANC loses the battle of regaining people’s trust. </p>
<p>The opposition parties are aware of this, and are exploiting it. Their strategic political gaze hasn’t simply been about reaching the required threshold to oust the president – after all they don’t have sufficient numbers in parliament.</p>
<p>Instead, their motions of no confidence are about obliterating the political credibility of the ANC, using Zuma’s disastrous leadership as a means to this end. They exploit, to their strategic political advantage, the increasing perception that the people of the country are being ignored and are misunderstood by the ANC government. This, in a democracy that came about as a result of the sacrifices of the people, some of whom paid the ultimate price during the liberation struggle.</p>
<p>What emerged in the debate wasn’t about the public interest. Rather it was about protecting the oligarchy. This is surreal. Parliament as the legislative authority is supposed to represent the interest of the people. Hasn’t it sunk into the political conscience of the ANC, after 23 years of its governing the country, that leadership of public affairs should always be driven by the public interest?</p>
<p>In a democracy public discontent is understood as an opportunity to listen closely to what the people want. The ANC will be punished severely at the polls if it continues to fail to understand this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82322/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding from National Research Funding(NRF). He is affiliated with the South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM).</span></em></p>South African President Jacob Zuma, should be worried about the outcome of the no confidence vote in him. His legitimacy in the ANC and the country has plummeted.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/781282017-05-23T14:41:23Z2017-05-23T14:41:23ZConstitutional Court judges face much more than legal questions in Zuma case<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170388/original/file-20170522-7354-30t1s7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Jacob Zuma faces a vote of no confidence.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has been treated to an overdose of legal arguments as its Constitutional Court grapples with whether or not a parliamentary vote of no confidence in President Jacob Zuma should be conducted by <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-05-16-no-confidence-motion-secret-ballot-gains-ground-in-concourt/">secret or open ballot</a>.</p>
<p>The country’s opposition parties are trying to get Zuma <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/05/15/UDM-asks-court-to-impose-secret-ballot-for-motion-of-no-confidence-in-president">removed</a>. Their latest attempt was triggered by his irresponsible decision to <a href="https://theconversation.com/jacob-zumas-brazen-venality-may-be-exhausting-even-his-anc-allies-75629">sack</a> Pravin Gordhan, the widely respected finance minister.</p>
<p>I sat and listened as lawyers for both parties argued their cases before the constitutional court judges. I’m a political scientist, not a lawyer. I therefore deserve the label “layman” and my understanding of what’s at stake should be understood within that framework.</p>
<p>I take this liberty because, while the matter is patently legal, its origin is political. This is obvious from the fact that some political parties and civil society groups have declared their wish that Zuma be removed from office. And, whatever the court decides, the reaction by interested parties and the public is bound to be political.</p>
<h2>The case</h2>
<p>Following numerous failed attempts at securing a vote of no confidence against the president in parliament, the United Democratic Movement (UDM) and others decided to approach the court. They hope to secure an order instructing the Speaker of the National Assembly to let parliamentarians cast their votes in secret.</p>
<p>The UDM took this route after the Speaker turned down its request for a secret ballot. The Speaker’s <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/05/15/mbete-i-have-no-obligation-to-hold-a-secret-ballot">position</a> is that she is neither obliged by the Constitution, nor permitted by parliamentary rules, to allow MPs to vote in secret.</p>
<p>In a nutshell, the UDM wants the Court to declare that the Speaker is constitutionally obliged to allow a vote of no confidence by <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2017/05/16/Secret-ballot-is-law-UDM-argues-no-confidence-vote-can%E2%80%99t-be-open">secret ballot</a>. Alternatively, it wants the court to say the Speaker is permitted by parliamentary rules to do so.</p>
<p>Understandably, lawyers for Zuma have opposed both sides of the UDM’s argument.</p>
<p>The trouble here is that the <a href="http://www.gov.za/DOCUMENTS/CONSTITUTION/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1">Constitution</a> states categorically – in Part A of Schedule 3(6)(a) – that a President must be elected by secret ballot. But there is no equally explicit provision that says a vote of no confidence in the President must be decided by secret ballot. This has created a lacuna to be exploited by various parties.</p>
<p>Those calling for a secret ballot contend that the Constitution enjoins MPs to hold members of the Executive to account. Therefore, they argue, it goes without saying that a vote of no confidence – the highest form of holding a President to account– must be conducted in a way that ensures the highest form of protection from negative consequences. </p>
<p>The secret ballot, the UDM argues, would give MPs, especially those from the ANC, maximum protection against retribution by the President and the governing ANC if they chose to vote with the opposition.</p>
<p>This is what is termed “purposive” interpretation of the Constitution. It says that the purpose of the drafters of the Constitution was to ensure maximum accountability of members of the executive. </p>
<p>The UDM contends that any form of oversight by MPs that leaves room for possible punishment by members of the Executive would not be in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution.</p>
<h2>A philosophical case</h2>
<p>It would seem that the Constitutional Court is dealing less with a clear-cut matter of legal facts, but more with a philosophical (jurisprudential) question. The Court is being called on to infer the intention of the drafters of the Constitution, or to interpret the Constitution in way that would, unavoidably, reveal the judges’ philosophical inclination on a morally fraught matter.</p>
<p>The question is a moral one because fundamentally it’s about the conduct of a President who has been flagrantly injuring the interests of the country. While the justices of the Constitutional Court are men and women of law, they are learned and conscious enough to appreciate the contextual weight and social implications of their judgments.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170386/original/file-20170522-7337-19gd12y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170386/original/file-20170522-7337-19gd12y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170386/original/file-20170522-7337-19gd12y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170386/original/file-20170522-7337-19gd12y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170386/original/file-20170522-7337-19gd12y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170386/original/file-20170522-7337-19gd12y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170386/original/file-20170522-7337-19gd12y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is not to drag judges out of the neutral province of law into the entangled web of politics. It is to sharpen the question they are confronted with, and to crystallise the philosophical call to be made. Confronted with the spectre of a rogue president, would the drafters of the Constitution have chosen to grant MPs the maximum protection, enabling them to decide whether or not to rescue their country?</p>
<p>If the judges can’t establish how the drafters of the Constitution would resolve this conundrum, they should put themselves in the shoes of a morally sound person who must choose between saving their country or letting it go up in smoke.</p>
<p>This, essentially, is the moral dilemma confronting the Court. </p>
<p>Do the judges craft a jurisprudential judgment that will protect their own country from a president who is on the rampage, or do they wash their hands and deliver a judgment cloaked in legal technicalities that would facilitate the ultimate ruin of the Republic?</p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>As the consciences of our judges continue to be haunted by the moral dilemma placed before them, it’s useful to recall <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=YDaOmMhFBAQC&pg=PA24&lpg=PA24&dq=Roberto+Mangabeira+Unger,++Law+in+a+Modern+Society:+%E2%80%9CNo+amount+of+factual+inquiry+seems+sufficient+to+prove+the+truth+of+a+general+conception+of+social+order.%E2%80%9D&source=bl&ots=d6QmGLKzU_&sig=TtgMFW1xlQ-XijgFZajh75yhG9I&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiztojTtYPUAhUKJcAKHc20CiQQ6AEIITAA#v=onepage&q=Roberto%20Mangabeira%20Unger%2C%20%20Law%20in%20a%20Modern%20Society%3A%20%E2%80%9CNo%20amount%20of%20factual%20inquiry%20seems%20sufficient%20to%20prove%20the%20truth%20of%20a%20general%20conception%20of%20social%20order.%E2%80%9D&f=false">the words</a> of Harvard University law Professor Roberto Mangabeira Unger: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>No amount of factual inquiry seems sufficient to prove the truth of a general conception of social order.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Indeed, South Africa’s judges are not dealing with facts about truth. They have been called on to resolve a conceptual question about the best social order for posterity in South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78128/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prince Mashele is affiliated with the University of Pretoria's Centre for Governance Innovation. He is also a member of the Freedom Movement, a forum seeking to protect South Africa's Constitution. </span></em></p>South Africa’s Constitutional Court has the difficult task of deciding whether MPs can have the protection of a secret ballot when voting whether to fire President Zuma or not.Prince Mashele, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/616862016-06-30T13:11:02Z2016-06-30T13:11:02ZThe link between public violence and xenophobia in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128495/original/image-20160628-7836-askdkb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rioters threw stones and looted shops during a recent protest at the Phomolong informal settlement outside Pretoria. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Striger</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African media last year published an unsettling interview with Mandla Matikinya, a branch leader of the African National Congress (ANC) Youth League. In it he advocated looting <a href="http://www.thedailyvox.co.za/ancyl-chairperson-mawika-zone-calls-foreign-shops-looted-tshwaneunrest/">foreign-owned shops </a> over schools and public buildings. This was in the wake of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/violence-in-south-africas-capital-leaves-anc-vulnerable-at-the-polls-61534">violence</a> that followed the governing ANC’s choice of a <a href="http://anc.org.za/show.php?id=12062">mayoral candidate</a> for the <a href="http://www.tshwane.gov.za/Pages/default.aspx">Tshwane metropole</a>.</p>
<p>Over the past decade South Africa has seen a strong connection between political protests and the looting of foreign-owned business. The question is: why?</p>
<p>The simple answer is that local leaders need protests to maintain their power and legitimacy. And the protesters need to be fed. Looting is the way to fill their stomachs. </p>
<p>The frequent connection between public protest and attacks on foreign-owned shops nationwide should be understood against the backdrop of the fragmented, patrimonial politics characterising many South African townships. In some instances it may stem from opposition party action, but there is no evidence of a “third force”, as government officials have <a href="http://citizen.co.za/1170641/gwede-says-it-could-be-the-opposition/">occasionally suggested</a>. </p>
<p>Local political aspirants and office holders often organise violent protests to attract attention and resources from the local, provincial and national <a href="http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/thesmokethatcalls.pdf">government</a>. </p>
<p>If we understand protesters as infantry working for local leaders, looting sustains a mercenary army. Given the reluctance of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwi7hcf4uc3NAhVkBcAKHcuXAx8QFggeMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.issafrica.org%2Fuploads%2FCQ15MASUKU.PDF&usg=AFQjCNHEeAwKeTrM9mZJnulB6ymon19gRQ&sig2=SCDOfanO0ugpurJ5z_1tBQ&cad=rja">police</a> or <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=FXE3DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA91&lpg=PA91&dq=foreigners+vulnerable+south+africa&source=bl&ots=NyRTb_UbLp&sig=3HjAtUvmRniEnEYA1oGRHE7x0iw&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=foreigners%20vulnerable%20south%20africa&f=false">citizens</a> to aid foreign shop keepers, they are easy targets. </p>
<p>This puts investment in the economy, personal safety and the democratic political process at risk. </p>
<h2>Informal and indirect township rule</h2>
<p>The violence speaks to broader concerns about how South Africa’s townships are governed. While ward councillors and officials have their place, many spaces are effectively controlled by an alternative, informal politics. </p>
<p>Some structures descend from the violent struggle against apartheid. These include civic associations, hostels, or other community “safety groups” that are well established as <em>de facto</em> administrators and governors. </p>
<p>Other structures are led by politicians <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/n2-reopens-following-outrage-over-anc-candidate-list">excluded from party lists</a> or electoral success. To negotiate their way back into the fold or simply to access the benefits of office, informal political actors create parallel regimes, often with the complicity of officials, police and <a href="http://www.academia.edu/19535260/%20Disorder_in_a_Changing_Society_Authority_and_the_Micro-Politics_of_Violence">elected politicians</a>. </p>
<p>Our research, whose findings are set to be released later this year, shows that, recognising the power such people hold, the ANC has in many instances institutionalised a system of indirect rule in which it attempts to co-opt and contain these informal authority systems and rogue appointees. </p>
<h2>The Mamelodi case study</h2>
<p>In recent months, researchers from the African Centre for <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/acms/">Migration and Society</a> have been visiting townships to study this phenomenon.</p>
<p>In Mamelodi, the site of some of the most recent violent protests, we came across the Phomolong Residents’ Association, a group loosely affiliated with the United Democratic Movement, one of the country’s smaller opposition parties.</p>
<p>This association is the <em>de facto</em> community leadership structure in the <a href="https://www.google.co.za/search?q=Phomolong+informal+settlement&sa=N&rlz=1C1CHWA_enZA634ZA634&biw=1366&bih=643&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&ved=0ahUKEwiW9LKKscrNAhUlJsAKHY90DFwQsAQITA">Phomolong informal settlement</a>, where <a href="http://reliefweb.int/report/south-africa/unhcr-and-south-african-police-coordinate-protect-refugees">violent attacks</a> on foreign nationals usually start before spreading to other areas.</p>
<p>As is the case with similar bodies across the country, the association has largely supplanted local leadership and authority. Its activities include providing residents with the documentary proof of residence they need to access services at local institutions. It also provides varied conflict resolution interventions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128489/original/image-20160628-7825-1ysrkx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128489/original/image-20160628-7825-1ysrkx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128489/original/image-20160628-7825-1ysrkx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128489/original/image-20160628-7825-1ysrkx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128489/original/image-20160628-7825-1ysrkx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128489/original/image-20160628-7825-1ysrkx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128489/original/image-20160628-7825-1ysrkx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brazen looters carry a fridge stolen from a shop during rioting in Tshwane.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In interviews with researchers, the association representatives admitted they are the ones who organise violent service delivery protests that usually end with attacks on foreign-owned businesses. </p>
<p>One of the interviewees told us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We need the protesters to make our point, but when they are hungry they go and get food from shops to eat or take home to cook; and if shops here are closed they go to shops in other locations. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>As many of the small township shops are foreign owned, this translates into what is now widely called “<a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/xenophobic-violence-democratic-south-africa">xenophobic violence</a>”. When local shops have already been looted or there are more vulnerable ones nearby, such attacks can spread from one neighbourhood or township to another. Protests may not immediately bring results to leaders or citizens, but looting does. The benefits of pillage can rapidly become an end in itself. </p>
<h2>The politics of violence</h2>
<p>Public protest and xenophobic violence are the means for self-appointed “community leaders” already in charge, or those hoping to be, to build the legitimacy and resources they need to rule. Leaders must provide, and protest and looting are ways of doing so. Much as the police have long treated foreigners as “<a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/immigrants-are-getting-a-raw-deal-244225">mobile ATMs</a> [cash machines]”, local “leaders” use foreign shops as a continual campaign fund. </p>
<p>While <a href="http://www.thedailyvox.co.za/ancyl-chairperson-mawika-zone-calls-foreign-shops-looted-tshwaneunrest/">Matikinya’s</a> endorsement of attacks on foreign-owned shops is outrageous, he is not an aberration. He and the Phomolong Residents’ Association are indicative of the kind of micro-politics and political economy that helps drive community-based violence and violent xenophobic <a href="http://www.academia.edu/19535260/%20Disorder_in_a_Changing_Society_Authority_and_the_Micro-Politics_of_Violence">attacks nationally</a>.</p>
<p>As Minister of Small Business Development Lindiwe Zulu recently acknowledged, community leaders mobilise communities to attack foreign-owned businesses for their <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/business-looting-wont-be-tolerated-minister-20160626?isapp=true">own interests</a>. </p>
<p>Violent protest is used to claim or consolidate power and authority while furthering political and economic interests. There are many nested political orders in South Africa. As <a href="http://www.upgradingsupport.org/content/page/part-1-understanding-your-informal-settlements">informal settlements</a> grow and their informal leaders gain relative power, they have become an increasingly potent political force. They may not be running in the August local government elections, but they are the <em>de facto</em> local government for millions of people, and they are fighting to maintain the benefits of office.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61686/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Loren B Landau is the South African Research Chair in Mobility and the Politics of Difference with the African Centre for Migration & Society at Wits University. His work is supported by the National Research Foundation and other national and international bodies. He also serves as a board member with the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jean Pierre Misago is a member of Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) Southern Africa Council</span></em></p>The past decade has shown a strong connection between political protests and the looting of foreign-owned shops in South Africa. Research shows that local leaders use protests to maintain their power.Loren B Landau, Research Chair on Mobility & the Politics of Diversity. Migration; Urbanisation; Refugees; Xenophobia, University of the WitwatersrandJean Pierre Misago, Researcher, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.