tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/weibo-3314/articlesWeibo – The Conversation2024-03-07T13:09:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2235862024-03-07T13:09:58Z2024-03-07T13:09:58ZTampon tax: Chinese women are breaking period taboos to campaign for lower prices<p>Menstrual health and sanitary towels have been <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3814221">taboo</a> subjects for hundreds of years in China. However, things are starting to change as women begin to feel more comfortable talking about this subject in public. </p>
<p>In recent months campaign groups have been springing up to rally opposition against high levels of tax on period-related products, such as tampons and sanitary towels, using social media. </p>
<p>Grassroots organisations, such as <a href="https://thechinaproject.com/2023/10/11/end-tax-on-menstrual-products-chinese-women-say/">Period Pride</a>, use public accounts on WeChat (a popular instant messaging app) to rally public support against high prices for goods that are traditionally sold to women. </p>
<p>Another sign of an uptick in campaigning was that the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/feminist-consumers-china-push-back-pink-tax-rcna124560">hashtag</a> #PinkTax went viral on social media in the winter of 2023, making the case that items that were pink and aimed at women tended to cost more than products aimed at men. This issue will be bubbling up again on International Women’s Day (IWD), which has recently become a busy shopping day in China.</p>
<p>Period Pride has compared China with nearly <a href="https://thechinaproject.com/2023/10/11/end-tax-on-menstrual-products-chinese-women-say/">20 countries</a> which have scrapped or reduced tampon taxes. It has highlighted the discrepancy in taxing tampons compared to <a href="https://www.163.com/dy/article/IGC9JMB205563QMT.html">other products</a> on sale in China, such as tax-exempt contraceptive methods like condoms and birth control medication. A few years ago this kind of public discussion about periods and menstruation would not have happened. </p>
<p>One of the most significant issues is the price of sanitary towels. In China, the VAT rate for sanitary napkins is 13%, the highest level of taxation and is on a par with the tax rate applied to imported goods. Other goods considered necessities are taxed at 11%. </p>
<p>During the 14th session of the 13th National People’s Congress in 2021, congress deputy <a href="https://sbs.mof.gov.cn/jytafwgk_8395/2021jytafwgk_1/rddbjyfwgk/202108/t20210820_3746776.htm">Wang Zuoying</a> put forward a proposal advocating for the provision of free menstrual products to targeted groups of women. In June 2021, the ministry of finance responded saying that the existing tax rate for sanitary napkins, which is 13%, already reflects a reduction <a href="https://sbs.mof.gov.cn/jytafwgk_8395/2021jytafwgk_1/rddbjyfwgk/202108/t20210820_3746776.htm">from previous years</a>.</p>
<p>In September 2023, China released an <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-value-added-tax-law-draft-legislation/">updated draft of its VAT law</a>, and asked for public feedback. Period Pride was one of the groups that publicly argued that the tax on sanitary towels and tampons was too high.</p>
<h2>History of taboos</h2>
<p>Period blood has long been falsely regarded as impure in China, with the potential to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3814221">contaminate</a> anyone who comes into contact with it. Menstruating women were traditionally prohibited from <a href="http://journal.julypress.com/index.php/ajsss/article/view/1263">entering temples</a>, even today women in some places <a href="https://radii.co/article/menstrual-period-poverty-shame-china">are banned from worship</a> during their periods. To avoid the social discomfort associated with uttering the word “menstruation”, women often used euphemisms such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616742.2021.1927134#:%7E:text=Resisting%20two%20invented%20characters%20and,to%20middle%2Dclass%20feminist%20activism.">“the big aunt” or “that”</a>. </p>
<p>From the early 2000s, Chinese feminists began to tackle shame and taboos around <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616742.2022.2155209">menstruation</a>, spurred on by the influence of western feminist movements. One notable example is the debut of the dance <a href="https://chinesefeminism.org/2021/04/21/%E3%80%8A%E9%98%B4%E9%81%93%E7%8B%AC%E7%99%BD%E3%80%8B%E5%9C%A8%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%A4%A7%E9%99%86%E7%9A%84%E6%97%85%E8%A1%8C-%E4%B8%8A%E7%AF%87/">“Menarche”</a> (named after the first menstrual cycle), which featured in the Chinese adaptation of The Vagina Monologues, in 2003.</p>
<p>A Chinese social media campaign in February 2020, during the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/12259276.2022.2098554">COVID pandemic</a>, drew attention to the desperate need for women doctors and nurses to have access to sanitary pads and period pants. Many female medical workers were not given time to change their sanitary pads during their long working hours at hospitals, or did not have access to supplies. A public campaign for <a href="https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1005190">donations</a> of sanitary towels or period pants drew support, but critics argued they were nonessential items.</p>
<p>Another issue is that high prices of sanitary items leave many girls unable to afford them. In August 2020, a Weibo user shared a screenshot of <a href="https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1006124">bulk sanitary napkins</a> purchased online. The post prompted a wider discussion about how many girls in rural areas didn’t have access to these products, partly because of cost but also because of taboos. According to one report, <a href="https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1006124">5% of girls in poorer</a> rural areas across China did not use sanitary products, while 13% felt ashamed about asking their parents for money to buy them. Many girls in rural areas were using <a href="https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_10039659">rough paper, old towels, or worn-out clothing</a>.</p>
<p>In September 2022, a complaint about the unavailability of menstruation products on <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-china-a-debate-over-sanitary-pads-on-trains-reflects-long-held-beliefs-about-women-and-menstruation-192069#:%7E:text=China%20Railway%20responded%20that%20feminine,food%20is%20served%20on%20train.">high-speed trains</a> prompted a wider public discussion about making such products accessible. </p>
<p>The fact that this debate has to happen at all reveals the long-term invisibility of women’s needs and the deeply ingrained stigma associated with period products. Some of those who opposed the selling of menstrual products on trains were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616742.2022.2155209">concerned</a> that they were unclean and unsuitable for placement alongside food items. The <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616742.2022.2155209">revelation</a> that some men do not even know that women cannot simply control their menstrual blood also reflects a shocking deficiency in sex education within Chinese schools, as well as a tendency among parents and educational providers to avoid discussing this topic.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>The strategy used by Period Pride highlights the political constraints in China. Facing the risk of being labelled as <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/434/article/848001/summary">agents of foreign influence</a>, feminist movements have tactfully chosen to work with the government rather than against it. Instead of resorting to protests, Period Pride encourages people to use the government-provided channels for political participation. While viewed as ineffective by some, these offer a less risky alternative to traditional protests.</p>
<p>Discussions regarding menstrual pads on high-speed trains were relatively untouched by severe censorship, as they did not directly challenge the state’s legitimacy. These conversations predominantly revolved around business interests.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether people’s submission of suggestions through government websites will result in any change to the tampon tax. However, even if it does not, the act of submitting suggestions and making voices heard can help to build momentum for incremental change. Public discussions on social media platforms are creating an environment in which attitudes to periods are starting to erode historical taboos.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research is conducted together with Ming Zhang of the UK-China Media and Cultural Studies Association, who made important contributions to this piece.</span></em></p>Chinese women are ignoring taboos around menstrual products to argue for fairer prices, using social media channels.Chi Zhang, Associate lecturer in international relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2117852023-10-04T12:33:32Z2023-10-04T12:33:32ZChina’s WeChat is all-encompassing but low-key − a Chinese media scholar explains the Taoist philosophy behind the everything app’s design<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550452/original/file-20230926-21-fsn084.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C8256%2C5499&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">WeChat aims to be everything to everyone but remain mostly in the background.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-customer-uses-his-mobile-to-pay-via-a-qr-code-with-news-photo/1228585197">Kevin Frayer/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Elon Musk’s vision of <a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1577428272056389633?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1577428272056389633%7Ctwgr%5E98798ba97e9df0d4da1bbfab8889c32d547b76a4%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.zdnet.com%2Farticle%2Fwhat-is-elon-musks-x-the-everything-app%2F">Twitter, now rebranded as X, as an
“everything app”</a> is no secret. When <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-dunkin-and-lego-rebrands-succeeded-but-x-missed-the-mark-210432">the X logo replaced Twitter’s blue bird</a>, the internet <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/elon-musk-x-twitter-everything-app-rcna96068">buzzed with heated discussions</a> about just what it would mean for X to be an everything app.</p>
<p>Musk promoted his super app project by referring to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2023/jul/29/elon-musk-wechat-twitter-rebranding-everything-app-for-west">Chinese all-in-one app WeChat</a>. But for many American users unfamiliar with WeChat, a train of questions followed. What’s it like to use WeChat? How has WeChat become “everything” in China? Would it be possible to replicate the app’s success <a href="https://theconversation.com/elon-musk-aims-to-turn-twitter-into-an-everything-app-a-social-media-and-marketing-scholar-explains-what-that-is-and-why-its-not-so-easy-to-do-211023">in the U.S.</a>?</p>
<p>I’m <a href="https://ealc.wustl.edu/people/jianqing-chen">a Chinese digital media scholar</a>, and I’ve used WeChat since 2012. But, in contrast to Musk’s enthusiasm, I don’t think WeChat is something to write home about. I believe it’s ordinary rather than special, lacking distinctive features compared with the other popular apps I studied for my current book project about Chinese touchscreen media. </p>
<p>WeChat’s inconspicuousness on my phone screen is no accident. Although WeChat is an everything app in the sense of being a digital hub for over a billion users, the app’s design is intentionally grounded in a more nuanced and philosophical meaning of the word “everything” than you might expect.</p>
<h2>WeChat is an all-inclusive media ecosystem</h2>
<p>Launched in 2011, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/01634437221128937">WeChat</a> has become an all-in-one app that offers services covering most aspects of everyday life, from instant messaging and mobile payments to photo- and video-sharing social networking. It has become a staple of daily activities for <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/255778/number-of-active-wechat-messenger-accounts/">1.3 billion Chinese mobile users</a>.</p>
<p>WeChat is also the app that China-bound travelers can download if they want to install only one app. WeChat can help you fill out customs declaration forms, call a taxi, pay for your hotel room and order food. Without WeChat, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3037446/foreigners-life-beijing-without-access-alipay-or-wechat">a traveler in China would be like a fish out of water</a>, since everything in China now runs through smartphone screens and mobile payment platforms.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550456/original/file-20230926-17-zx53w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A smart phone screen displaying a messaging app with Chinese text" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550456/original/file-20230926-17-zx53w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550456/original/file-20230926-17-zx53w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550456/original/file-20230926-17-zx53w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550456/original/file-20230926-17-zx53w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550456/original/file-20230926-17-zx53w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550456/original/file-20230926-17-zx53w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550456/original/file-20230926-17-zx53w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A smartphone displays WeChat’s group-messaging function.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/environmental-protection-volunteer-zhou-yuqing-organizes-a-news-photo/1244511282">Ou Dongqu/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In this sense, WeChat is indeed an everything app. Its “everythingness” refers to its near omnipresence and omnipotence in everyday life. The app creates an all-encompassing and ever-expanding media ecosystem that influences users’ daily activities. It forms a gigantic digital hub that, as German philosopher and media theorist <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/In+the+World+Interior+of+Capital%3A+Towards+a+Philosophical+Theory+of+Globalization-p-9780745647685">Peter Sloterdijk once described</a>, “has drawn inwards everything that was once on the outside.” </p>
<p>This “everythingness” leaves little room for rival companies to achieve similar dominance and turns every tap or swipe on a user’s smartphone into something a big tech company can profit from. This dream of an internet empire is perhaps what is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/27/technology/elon-musk-x-everything-app.html">so enticing for tech leaders like Musk</a>.</p>
<h2>A counterintuitive design philosophy</h2>
<p>Despite WeChat’s status as an everything app, it’s one of the least notable and attractive apps on my smartphone. WeChat rarely changes its logo to celebrate holidays or sends admin notifications to users. The app forms a relatively closed social space, since WeChat users can see only what their contacts post, unlike apps like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/19/fashion/china-social-media-weibo-wechat.html">Weibo</a> or <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2022/11/tiktok-instagram-video-feeds-ai-algorithm/672002/">TikTok</a>, where celebrities amass millions of followers. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550501/original/file-20230927-15-rfh3br.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="graphic of a small figure of a person against a large moon-like orb" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550501/original/file-20230927-15-rfh3br.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550501/original/file-20230927-15-rfh3br.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550501/original/file-20230927-15-rfh3br.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550501/original/file-20230927-15-rfh3br.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550501/original/file-20230927-15-rfh3br.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1205&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550501/original/file-20230927-15-rfh3br.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1205&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550501/original/file-20230927-15-rfh3br.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1205&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">WeChat’s splash screen is visually clean and has been unchanged for a decade.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screen capture by Jianqing Chen</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the lack of flashy, attention-grabbing features is actually one of WeChat’s intentional design philosophies, as WeChat’s founder and chief developer Allen Xiaolong Zhang made clear in his <a href="https://blog.wechat.com/2019/03/18/what-is-wechats-dream-wechat-founder-allen-zhang-explains/">annual public speeches in 2019 and 2020</a>. Zhang emphasized that one of WeChat’s design principles is to “get users out of the app as fast as possible,” meaning to reduce the amount of time users spend in WeChat.</p>
<p>This might seem paradoxical – if WeChat is trying to get its users to leave the app as fast as possible, how can it maintain its internet empire? Typically an app’s popularity is assessed based on how long users spend in the app, and users’ attention is the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/How-Do-Nothing-Resisting-Attention/dp/1612197493">scarce resource</a> various digital platforms fight for. </p>
<p>But Zhang claims that in order to sustain users’ daily engagement with the app in the long run, it’s important to let them leave the app as fast as possible. A low demand for time and effort is key to bringing users back into the app without exhausting them.</p>
<h2>A Taoist message behind WeChat’s design</h2>
<p>The design of <a href="https://chozan.co/blog/wechat-mini-programs/">WeChat miniprograms</a> makes Zhang’s idea clear. Miniprograms are embedded into WeChat as third-party developed sub-applications, and they provide users with easy access to a large range of services – like hailing a taxi, ordering food, buying train tickets and playing games – without leaving WeChat. Users can simply search in the app or scan a QR code to open a miniprogram, skipping the cumbersome processes of installing and uninstalling new apps. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546042/original/file-20230903-23-ebj1at.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A screenshot of a smartphone homepage, with round circular apps and text in Chinese" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546042/original/file-20230903-23-ebj1at.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546042/original/file-20230903-23-ebj1at.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1298&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546042/original/file-20230903-23-ebj1at.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1298&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546042/original/file-20230903-23-ebj1at.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1298&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546042/original/file-20230903-23-ebj1at.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1632&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546042/original/file-20230903-23-ebj1at.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1632&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546042/original/file-20230903-23-ebj1at.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1632&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">WeChat has a panel of miniprograms that users pull down from the top of the screen.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screen capture by Jianqing Chen</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Miniprograms are stored in a hidden panel at the top of the screen. They can be opened by swiping down the screen. These miniprograms appear to be ephemeral, diffusive and almost atmospheric. They give users the feeling that WeChat has disappeared or merged into the environment. </p>
<p>WeChat is what media scholars call “<a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/M/bo20069392.html">elemental</a>”: inconspicuous and nonintrusive, yet pervasive and as fundamental as the natural elements, just like air, water and clouds. </p>
<p>This environment of pervasiveness and unobtrusiveness resonates with the ancient Chinese Taoist philosophy that understands nothing (wu 无, or “not-being”) as that which forms the basis of all things (wanwu 万物 or “ten thousand things”). As <a href="https://terebess.hu/english/tao/Addiss-Lombardo-Watson.pdf">Tao Te Ching states</a>, “Dao begets One (or nothingness), One begets Two (yin and yang), Two begets Three (Heaven, Earth and Man; or yin, yang and breath qi), Three begets all things.” For Taoist thinkers, not-being determines how all things within the cosmos come into being, evolve and disappear.</p>
<p>Although the depth of these sagely texts is unfathomable, the Taoist thoughts from the past help people appreciate the interplay of everything and nothing. This perspective adds another layer of meaning to “everything” and opens up alternative visions of what an everything app can be. </p>
<p>Perhaps WeChat’s interpretation of the word “everything” – as simultaneously pervasive and inconspicuous – is the secret to its success over the past 10 years. I believe many tech leaders could benefit from a more sophisticated understanding of “everything” when envisioning the everything app, and not just equate “everything” simply with big and comprehensive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211785/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jianqing Chen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The design philosophy of the everything app WeChat may seem paradoxical, being simultaneously pervasive and inconspicuous. But this idea of “everythingness” goes back to ancient Taoist philosophy.Jianqing Chen, Assistant Professor of East Asian Languages and Cultures and of Film and Media Studies, Arts & Sciences at Washington University in St. LouisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2010582023-03-23T13:17:06Z2023-03-23T13:17:06ZChina: the rise of TikTok sister app Douyin as a powerful consumer tool<p>Chinese people are increasingly using TikTok’s sister app as a way to complain about products and are finding it a powerful asset.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051231157603">research</a> shows that Douyin, which is produced by ByteDance the same company that owns TikTok, has become influential in offering Chinese people a way of putting consumer pressure on companies.</p>
<p>This short-video platform has the <a href="https://www.moonfox.cn/insight/report/1243">largest number of users in China</a> (over 730 million at the end of 2022). According to <a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/WuWkIakYPNqZQzoNWIpmgA">Douyin</a>, its users range from teachers based in rural China who record the impoverished living conditions that many local children face, to laid-off Chinese workers making a living live streaming. </p>
<p>Douyin and TikTok are essentially the same app. They allow users to create, share, and view short videos. However, they operate on different servers to comply with China’s internet laws, such as the <a href="https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/translation-cybersecurity-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-effective-june-1-2017/">cybersecurity law</a>, which came into effect on June 1 2017.</p>
<p>For our research, we interviewed 56 people living in mainland China who were familiar with online consumer protests. We also followed an online protest and tracked relevant hashtags to gather more information, searching specific Chinese words on Douyin, such as “<em>xiaofeizhe</em>” (consumer; 消费者), “<em>weiquan</em>” (safeguard legal rights; 维权), “<em>jianshang</em>” (profiteer; 奸商).</p>
<p>Over half of our interviewees believed that speaking out about unsatisfactory consumer experiences through media, especially social media, was the only way to protest against corporations. For instance, Liu (a consumer activist) observed that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Social media helps Chinese consumers resolve problems faster than other formal ways suggested by the government. It is very difficult to get a timely response when seeking help from government departments or directly negotiating with the businesses. Although social media platforms are not responsible for my financial loss, they allow and help me to spread my unfortunate stories. Our problems are resolved much faster when we post these complaints on Sina Weibo.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Interviewees told us that they see short videos as a powerful medium to communicate substandard consumer experiences. Douyin is easy to use and therefore appeals to users who are older or not tech-savvy. Many of our interviewees highlighted that for the older generation, posting short videos on Douyin is a better way to express dissatisfaction than microblogging sites because the process is straightforward. For instance, Bing, an interviewee, said: “My parents know nothing about the internet, but they are able to record a short video with their phones and post it online.”</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/1hHheeWBVkc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A user on Douyin.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Douyin offers a platform for consumer activism using <em>naoda</em> (to make a fuss over; 闹大), which refers to Chinese consumers’ strategic practices to achieve greater public visibility of their complaints. Bringing attention and visibility to a problem makes it more likely a company will respond. </p>
<p>In China, consumers are more likely to use social media platforms such as Sina Weibo (similar to Twitter) <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2020.1871390">to express dissatisfaction</a> with companies and boycott them, than to complain to a journalist. Because of censorship of the <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/177388/media%20censorship%20in%20china.pdf">mainstream media in China</a>, social media arguably allows more freedom of expression.</p>
<h2>China’s consumer power</h2>
<p>In China, consumer activism has a long history. As early as 1905, middle-class people in urban China boycotted American goods and protested on the streets against the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Exclusion_Act">Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882</a>, a US federal law prohibiting immigration of Chinese labourers. This is considered one of the earliest consumer activism movements in modern Chinese history, teaching Chinese consumers for the first time that their buying power mattered.</p>
<p>The concept of a “consumer” was <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781315488172-14/state-open-door-policy-chinese-state-jay-white">reborn in 1978</a>, the year of China’s economic reform, often called the “open door policy”. More products started to appear on the shelves. Between 1994 and 2003, mainland China was the world’s <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2013/12/02/china-fastest-growing-consumer-market-in-the-world">fastest-growing consumer market</a>, and the buying power of Chinese consumers progressively increased. Corresponding laws and regulations to protect consumers began to be introduced by the government.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.consumersinternational.org/members/members/china-consumers-association-cca/">Chinese Consumers Association</a> (CCA) was founded in 1984 by the Chinese government to protect consumers’ rights and interests. It is important to note that it is not independent. The CCA is supported and regulated by the Chinese government, through which the government can exert control over consumer issues and policies. Therefore, unlike western consumer organisations, it cannot confront the government or initiate a collective boycott or protest.</p>
<p>With the emergence of video social media platforms, such as Douyin and Kuaishou, Chinese consumers have found new ways to speak up for themselves, attract media attention, and consequently, pressure businesses to give them their money back. These short videos have become a significant force.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-experience-with-mobile-payments-highlights-the-pros-and-cons-of-a-cashless-society-201177">China's experience with mobile payments highlights the pros and cons of a cashless society</a>
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<p>Qiang, a professional photographer, told us that short videos on Douyin are more authentic than plain text and pictures on microblogging sites, and more importantly, they can be used as legal proof. <a href="https://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-212721.html">According to China’s supreme people’s court</a>, original unedited electronic files such as videos can serve as evidence.</p>
<p>Tan, a graduate student, argued that protesting online is more effective than doing it offline as the consumers’ stories can be seen by other consumers and the company in question: “Once your story is successfully spread on the platform, the company that violates your rights will notice you, and they will resolve your problem as soon as they can to protect their brand image.”</p>
<p>Chinese companies hunt for consumer complaints on Douyin to address them as quickly as possible. In the PR company where Kai (a brand manager) works, a team searches consumer complaints on Douyin 24 hours a day, and “once they discover a complaint, they will make every effort to solve it and then earnestly request the consumer to delete the video”, she told us.</p>
<p>As Douyin becomes an essential part of the everyday culture <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443720939452">of many Chinese people</a>, it has become a far more powerful tool than might have been expected when it was first launched.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201058/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zizheng Yu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese shoppers find a TikTok-style app is helpful for complaining.Zizheng Yu, Lecturer in Advertising and Marketing Communications, University of GreenwichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1903082022-09-26T12:30:57Z2022-09-26T12:30:57ZHow Chinese celebrities are amplifying official policy on Taiwan, pushing ‘One China’ messages to millions of fans online<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486370/original/file-20220924-35590-ahh3cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C24%2C2752%2C1815&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese stars Xie Na, far right, and Huang Xiaoming, second from left, were among those reposting the 'One China' message.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/actress-vicky-zhao-wei-performs-on-stage-during-a-gala-held-news-photo/1186890528?adppopup=true">VCG via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Chinese government has a new ally when it comes to pushing its official line on Taiwan: celebrities.</p>
<p>Tension over the status of the island, which is claimed by Beijing as part of its “<a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter">One China” principle</a>, have been exacerbated by a series of recent incidents, including a high-profile visit to the island by U.S. House speaker Nancy Pelosi and <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-again-indicates-that-us-will-defend-taiwan-militarily-does-this-constitute-a-change-in-policy-190946">comments by President Joe Biden</a> suggesting the U.S. would be prepared to defend Taiwan “militarily.”</p>
<p>It has led to an <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-biden-taiwan-remarks-angry-reaction/">angry response from officials in Beijing</a>, who have accused the U.S. of violating its long-standing commitment to abide by its One China policy. But it has also seen a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/chinas-changing-disinformation-and-propaganda-targeting-taiwan/">renewed propaganda push</a> aimed at getting the message of unification to the Chinese and Taiwanese public.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://polisci.richmond.edu/faculty/dchen/">experts in Chinese</a> <a href="https://llc.richmond.edu/faculty/ggao/">cultural politics</a>, we have noted how the highly contentious series of events not only reshaped the regional dynamics around Taiwan but also permeated into popular culture in China – with celebrities being utilized to circulate One China messaging to fans and social media followers.</p>
<p>It forms part of a wider trend that we have researched and forms the basis of a forthcoming article published in China Quarterly on Chinese celebrities’ political signaling. By our analysis, 85% of the top 218 celebrities in China reposted official government messages on their social media account at least once over a six-month period we observed in the second half of 2021.</p>
<h2>The power of Weibo</h2>
<p>This phenomena has continued into 2022 and was seen during and after the Pelosi visit. On Aug. 2, the day that the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/08/02/1114852740/pelosi-is-about-to-land-in-taiwan-heres-why-thats-a-big-deal">House speaker landed in Taiwan</a>, the state media outlet China Central Television, or CCTV, <a href="https://weibo.com/2656274875/LFb9BfeYG">sent out a post</a> on Weibo, a Chinese-owned Twitter-like social media platform, with the message “there is only one China in the World.”</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Chinese characters on a red background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486365/original/file-20220924-28623-rb428h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486365/original/file-20220924-28623-rb428h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1067&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486365/original/file-20220924-28623-rb428h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1067&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486365/original/file-20220924-28623-rb428h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1067&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486365/original/file-20220924-28623-rb428h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1340&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486365/original/file-20220924-28623-rb428h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1340&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486365/original/file-20220924-28623-rb428h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1340&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Since originally being posted, the ‘One China’ message has been promoted by Chinese celebrities.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://weibo.com/2656274875/LFb9BfeYG?layerid=4798143273632498">Weibo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Within hours, Chinese celebrities started to repost this message to their extensive networks of followers. Those doing so <a href="https://weibo.com/1192329374/LFc6svq3f?pagetype=profilefeed">included Xie Na</a>, a 41-year-old popular TV host and actress with 128 million followers on Weibo, and <a href="https://weibo.com/3623353053/LFbKcAI9c?pagetype=profilefeed">Jackson Yee</a>, a 22-year-old singer, dancer and actor ranked the No.1 celebrity in <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbeschina/2021/08/23/jackson-yee-repeats-atop-2021-forbes-china-celebrity-list/?sh=3152b84d5dac">Forbes’ 2021 Chinese Celebrity List</a>. Likewise, Taiwan celebrities such as <a href="https://weibo.com/1712539910/LFh612Z1I?pagetype=profilefeed">Chen Qiaoen</a> and <a href="https://weibo.com/1266286555/LFgysukS7?pagetype=profilefeed">Wu Qilong</a> also retweeted this message, though about a day later. </p>
<p>Taiwan celebrities who reposted the message were lauded by Chinese media and fans for taking a clear political stance. An <a href="https://taiwan.huanqiu.com/article/495z0qucRbe">article in the Chinese tabloid Global Times</a> quoted an online fan’s praise for Taiwan celebrities who reposted the One China message: “Well done! Daring to show support at this moment must be sincere.”</p>
<p>One celebrity news outlet went as far to post an article that <a href="https://www.163.com/dy/article/HDRSGDK80537B1I5.html">listed more than 20 Taiwan celebrities</a> who reposted “One China” and praised them for “fulfilling the responsibility to voice political support.”</p>
<p>The article also listed 11 Taiwan celebrities who did not retweet the One China message, suggesting that fans will judge them accordingly.</p>
<p>Indeed, celebrities who did not repost the message were called out for their silence, with fans demanding that they show support for the government. Hebe Tien, a well-known Taiwan singer with 13 million followers on Weibo, was among those targeted by angry Chinese fans and media for not reposting the One China message.</p>
<h2>Posts get political</h2>
<p>Chinese celebrities haven’t always been so politically active on social media when it comes to issues like Taiwan.</p>
<p>Actors, singers and TV personalities use Weibo, which came into existence in 2009 and has <a href="http://ir.weibo.com/node/8621/pdf">close to 600 million active monthly users</a>, to share snippets about their personal lives, promote work, endorse commercial products and connect with fans. But until the mid-2010s, they rarely engaged in politics.</p>
<p>But since the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-xi-jinping-gets-another-5-year-term-chinese-wonder-if-hell-be-another-putin/2017/10/13/b0620be0-af5e-11e7-99c6-46bdf7f6f8ba_story.html">start of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s second term</a> in 2017, more and more celebrities have used their accounts to repost official state messages.</p>
<p>This is especially true on important political anniversaries, such as the founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Republic of China. For instance, on July 1, 2021, Yang Mi, an actress with 112 million followers on Weibo, reposted CCTV’s quotation from Xi marking the centennial of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party: “When a people have ideals, their country will have strength, and their nation will have a bright future.” </p>
<p>These celebrity reposts often receive hundreds of thousands of user engagements, including reposts, comments and likes.</p>
<p>This effectively promotes official messages to an exponentially larger social media network. CCTV’s Weibo account, which sent out the One China message to coincide with Pelosi’s visit, has 130 million followers. Xie Na, a leading pro-Beijing celebrity, alone has 128 million followers – and she is one of many who reposted the message.</p>
<p>As we argue in our forthcoming article “Chinese Celebrities’ Political Signaling on Weibo,” Chinese celebrities started to repost official messages when it became important for their career prospects to do so.</p>
<p>As the entertainment industry <a href="https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/lights-china-action-how-china-is-getting-into-the-global-entertainment-business">rapidly grew in the 2000s</a>, the Chinese government began to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-sissy-men-became-the-latest-front-in-chinas-campaign-against-big-tech-167328">develop explicit policies</a> to regulate and control celebrities, their cultural products, media platforms, fan groups and professional associations.</p>
<h2>Calling out ‘tainted artists’</h2>
<p>In 2014, the <a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/state_council/2014/09/09/content_281474986284063.htm">State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television</a> issued a <a href="https://zh.m.wikisource.org/zh-hans/%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E5%8A%A0%E5%BC%BA%E6%9C%89%E5%85%B3%E5%B9%BF%E6%92%AD%E7%94%B5%E8%A7%86%E8%8A%82%E7%9B%AE%E3%80%81%E5%BD%B1%E8%A7%86%E5%89%A7%E5%92%8C%E7%BD%91%E7%BB%9C%E8%A7%86%E5%90%AC%E8%8A%82%E7%9B%AE%E5%88%B6%E4%BD%9C%E4%BC%A0%E6%92%AD%E7%AE%A1%E7%90%86%E7%9A%84%E9%80%9A%E7%9F%A5">notice</a> to require all broadcasting platforms to block “tainted artists” – celebrities who engage in illegal behavior or actions deemed by the government to be problematic, such as drug use, prostitution, tax evasion, extramarital affairs and political incorrectness. This last category includes supporting Hong Kong or Taiwan independence.</p>
<p>Since then, the phrase “tainted artists” has entered public discourse and is used by people online to criticize celebrities. </p>
<p>Under tightening political control, Chinese celebrities have fostered what scholars Jian Xu and Ling Yang have described as “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/19392397.2021.1912109">a neoliberal subjectivity with Chinese characteristics</a>.” In other words, Chinese celebrities see pleasing the state as an effective way to reach a market.</p>
<p>Celebrities endorsed by the state are offered rare opportunities to perform on state television, star in state-sponsored <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/saramerican/2021/11/29/battle-at-lake-changjin-is-chinas-all-time-highest-grossing-film/?sh=54622f4a3bf7">films</a> and <a href="https://variety.com/2017/tv/asia/chinese-corruption-series-in-the-name-of-the-people-rules-1202391219/">TV dramas</a>, serve <a href="https://gx.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202010/26/WS5f963ed4a3101e7ce972b39e.html#:%7E:text=10%E6%9C%8822%E6%97%A5%EF%BC%8C2020,%E6%96%87%E5%8C%96%E6%97%85%E6%B8%B8%E5%BD%A2%E8%B1%A1%E5%A4%A7%E4%BD%BF%E8%AF%81%E4%B9%A6%E3%80%82">ambassadorial roles for government agencies</a> and <a href="https://news.163.com/photoview/00AN0001/2300234.html">attend important national conferences</a>.</p>
<p>As such, celebrities have strong incentives to satisfy state demands in pursuit of career, fame and wealth. It is important to acknowledge also that some celebrities may sincerely support the government and want to promote its policies.</p>
<p>Either way, the majority of celebrities on Weibo are echoing government positions such as the One China message. Our analysis found that just 15% of the top 218 celebrities – a list we compiled by reviewing both the Forbes China Celebrities Annual List from 2004 to 2020 and the size of online following – failed to repost any official government message in the six months we analyzed from June to November 2021.</p>
<p>Among those who reposted, the frequency of reposts varied from just one to 33 times during the six months.</p>
<p>Our analysis found that younger celebrities with more followers tend to repost official messages more. This finding challenges the conventional wisdom that young people tend to be more politically critical and rebellious. It also chimes with a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ssqu.12898">recent study</a> of Chinese public opinion that found that the Xi generation – those who came of age in the past decade – are more oriented toward authoritarianism than preceding generations.</p>
<h2>Legitimizing state positions</h2>
<p>The reposting of official state messages by celebrities could have far-reaching ramifications. </p>
<p>When politically sensitive events occur, Chinese citizens often go to celebrities’ Weibo accounts to discern their stance. On the issue of Taiwan, the heightened nationalist sentiments seemingly prompted users to monitor celebrities and expect them to express support for the Chinese government.</p>
<p>Moreover, the reposting of official messages by celebrities serves to transform popular culture into a key instrument by which the Chinese government can legitimize its position on sensitive issues.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190308/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese celebrities have become increasingly politically active on social media over the years – in part to help advance their careers.Dan Chen, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of RichmondGengsong Gao, Associate Professor of Chinese Studies, University of RichmondLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1723752021-11-24T13:41:23Z2021-11-24T13:41:23ZWhat the Peng Shuai saga tells us about Beijing’s grip on power and desire to crush a #MeToo moment<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433556/original/file-20211123-19-1v6two5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C88%2C4217%2C2719&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Forced into the darkness?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/shuai-peng-of-china-serves-during-her-ladies-singles-second-news-photo/964537912?adppopup=true">Cameron Spencer/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese tennis star <a href="https://www.espn.com/tennis/story/_/id/32671331/photos-missing-chinese-tennis-star-peng-shuai-posted-online">Peng Shuai’s apparent disappearance</a> may have ended with a <a href="https://www.espn.com/tennis/story/_/id/32671331/photos-missing-chinese-tennis-star-peng-shuai-posted-online">smattering of public events</a>, which were <a href="https://www.insider.com/videos-peng-shuai-missing-chinese-tennis-star-questions-remain-2021-11">carefully curated</a> by state-run media and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/china/peng-shuai-video-china-tennis-b1961474.html">circulated</a> in online clips. But many <a href="https://www.insider.com/videos-peng-shuai-missing-chinese-tennis-star-questions-remain-2021-11">questions remain</a> about the three weeks in which she was missing, and concerns linger over her well-being.</p>
<p>Peng, a former Wimbledon and French Open doubles champion, had been out of the public eye since Nov. 2. 2021 when she penned <a href="https://nypost.com/2021/11/04/peng-shuai-accuses-zhang-gaoli-of-sexual-assault-in-deleted-post/">a since-deleted social media post</a> accusing former Chinese Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli of sexual misconduct.</p>
<p>In the U.S. and Europe, such moments of courage from high-profile women have built momentum to out perpetrators of sexual harassment and assault and give a voice to those wronged. But in the political context of today’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) – a country that tightly controls political narratives within and outside its borders – something else happened. Peng was seemingly silenced; her #MeToo allegation was censored almost as soon as it was made. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://ccc.princeton.edu/people/yan-bennett">scholars of</a> <a href="https://www.cdu.edu.au/staff/john-garrick">Chinese legal culture</a> who have watched as the nation has become increasingly repressive under the premiership of Xi Jinping, we believe the mysterious disappearance – and brief reappearance – of Peng should be viewed within a broader sociolegal context. The episode shows that when presented with a potential pivotal #MeToo moment, Beijing is prepared to violate its own legal principles and respond with a state-media controlled operation aimed to chill any challenge to CCP authority.</p>
<h2>Claim of a sexual assault</h2>
<p>Peng’s Nov. 2 post on Weibo, the popular Chinese social media platform, reads like an open letter to Zhang, a retired but still powerful member of China’s Communist Party elite. </p>
<p>In it, the tennis star alleges coercion, duress and sexual assault. <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/03/china/china-metoo-peng-shuai-zhang-gaoli-intl-hnk/index.html">Peng wrote</a> to the 75-year-old Zhang:
“Why did you have to come back to me, took me to your home to force me to have sex with you? … I couldn’t describe how disgusted I was, and how many times I asked myself am I still a human? I feel like a walking corpse.”</p>
<p>The post was quickly taken down and Peng disappeared. But it sparked widespread international outrage. <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/peng-shuai-tennis-stars-leaders-demand-boycotts-serena-williams-naomi-osaka">Current</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/BillieJeanKing/status/1459985672715046913">former athletes</a> expressed <a href="https://twitter.com/ChrissieEvert/status/1459848382307086342">concern</a> over Peng’s safety, including <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2021/11/17/shocked-tennis-star-osaka-posts-where-is-peng-shuai">Naomi Osaka</a> and <a href="https://people.com/crime/serena-williams-joins-athletes-speaking-out-about-missing-chinese-tennis-player-as-un-asks-for-proof-of-whereabouts/">Serena Williams</a>. The hashtag #WhereIsPengShuai started trending.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1460723353174433793"}"></div></p>
<p>Chinese state media responded by publishing a message purportedly from Peng, stating that “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59325399">everything is fine</a>.” But it was met with <a href="https://nypost.com/2021/11/17/china-state-media-release-supposed-message-from-peng-shuai/">deep skepticism</a> across the international community. Even with her reemergence at public events, concerns over her safety remain.</p>
<p>Behind the saga, however, is a clear message: It is dangerous to publicly criticize even a former senior Chinese Communist Party official. The party does not want any American-style <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/11/china/sexual-assault-mic-intl-hnk/index.html">#MeToo movement in China</a>, as it is hostile to any grassroots movements that challenge its authority.</p>
<h2>Being ‘disappeared’</h2>
<p>Peng’s disappearance also shows how authoritarian instruments of control are triggered by politically sensitive matters that contradict Communist Party narratives.</p>
<p>Such control of any sensitive narrative in China is commonplace with the CCP. Just ask <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-56448688">Jack Ma</a>, the former head of Alibaba, or movie star <a href="https://global.tuidang.org/2021/09/14/who-was-behind-the-mysterious-disappearance-and-reappearance-of-international-star-fan-bingbing/">Fan Bingbing</a>. Ma, who was the richest man in China and a worldwide celebrity, criticized the Chinese financial industry. This criticism led to his <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgecalhoun/2021/06/24/what-really-happened-to-jack-ma/?sh=40f4ced47c7e">quick disappearance from public view</a>. Thereafter, his <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgecalhoun/2021/06/07/the-sad-end-of-jack-ma-inc/?sh=653e68e7123a">ANT Group IPO was quashed and assets disassembled and appropriated by government-controlled entities</a>. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/film/2018/oct/04/fan-bingbing-mysterious-disappearance-chinese-film-star-elite">Fan also disappeared</a> from public view and eventually resurfaced, only to be fined for tax evasion. It appeared that the Communist Party considered her conduct may have had a <a href="https://www.vogue.com/article/,fan-bing-bing-missing-chinese-government-social-responsibility-hollywood">corrupting influence on socialist values</a> with displays of wealth and glamour out of sync with Xi’s revival of Maoist concepts such as “<a href="https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/11/22/chin-n22.html">common prosperity</a>.” </p>
<p>In Peng’s case, her story directly contradicted the Communist Party’s <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/reconsidering-the-history-of-the-chinese-communist-party">official narrative</a> of harmonious relations between people and Party. In particular, her allegations contradict the narrative that women, who <a href="https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-1/ol-women.htm">purportedly “hold up half the sky in China”</a>, enjoy <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/feminist-activism-china-social-death-amid-clampdown-women-speaking-out-1307000">gender equality under this government</a>.</p>
<p>Peng, for challenging this view, was given a taste of being canceled from China’s history and stripped of her rights under the Chinese constitution to seek justice in relation to her serious allegations. Indeed, the Chinese government has a history of unjustly detaining people involved in contentious cases, limiting their capacity to talk freely, and <a href="https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/china/after-wta-us-rights-group-questions-chinese-media-claiming-peng-shuais-safety.html">forcing statements</a>. </p>
<p>Under Xi, China enjoys a self-described “<a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/18/c_136688445.htm">socialist democracy with 'Chinese characteristics’</a>,” in which “<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cegv//eng/bjzl/t225536.htm">the citizens’ basic rights are respected and guaranteed</a>.”</p>
<p>But the response to Peng, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-01-14/china-control-covid-origin-message-detention-zhang-zhan/13056420">amongst others</a>, shows that rule of law has become a ruthless, blunt force instrument wielded by party leadership. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.hoover.org/press-releases/hoover-institution-releases-essay-former-chinese-communist-party-insider-about">Cai Xia</a>, former professor at the Central Party School of the CCP, argued in June 2021: “the regime has degenerated further into a political oligarchy bent on holding on to power through brutality and ruthlessness [and] has grown ever more repressive and dictatorial.”</p>
<p>Cai continued: “A personality cult now surrounds Xi, who has tightened the Party’s grip on ideology and eliminated what little space there was for political speech and civil society.”</p>
<p>In Peng’s case, her “being disappeared” appears to be an attempt to kill several birds with one arrow: crush dissent, stem any Chinese #MeToo momentum and instill fear about criticizing CCP officials because, as the vanguard of the Communist Party under <a href="https://www.visiontimes.com/2021/09/01/in-china-xi-jinping-thought-now-compulsory-learning-for-students-in-primary-schools-to-graduate-programs.html">Xi Jinping Thought</a>, they must always be seen as virtuous. In short, “Xi Jinping Thought” is a set of policies and ideas taken from the various writings and speeches of General Secretary <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202111/24/WS619d6b6da310cdd39bc7715e.html">Xi</a>. </p>
<h2>‘Fight to the end’</h2>
<p>Peng’s allegations came at a particularly sensitive time for the CCP. It came just as Xi was preparing to deliver a <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2021/11/12/china-ruling-party-leaders-pass-historic-xi-resolution/">historical resolution</a> aimed at further cementing his grip on power.</p>
<p>“The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has entered a key phase, and risks and challenges we face are conspicuously increasing,” <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-xl/news/other/don-t-expect-an-easy-life-and-be-ready-to-struggle-chinese-president-xi-jinping-warns-officials/ar-AAO1Dbb?ocid=uxbndlbing">Xi remarked</a>, while vowing to “fight to the end” with any forces that attempt to subvert the party’s leadership.</p>
<p>“Any forces” apparently includes anyone who criticizes or challenges the Communist Party – even one of its own international sports stars making serious allegations against a former party official.</p>
<p>[<em>Science, politics, religion or just plain interesting articles:</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-checkoutweekly">Check out The Conversation’s weekly newsletters</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What happens when a Chinese #MeToo moment meets authoritarian legality?Yan Bennett, Assistant Director for the Paul and Marcia Wythes Center on Contemporary China, Princeton UniversityJohn Garrick, University Fellow in Law, Charles Darwin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1693412021-10-12T18:03:54Z2021-10-12T18:03:54ZFeminist responses on Weibo aim to fight the misrepresentation of women during COVID-19 in China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425329/original/file-20211007-25-1gychr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C0%2C4197%2C2800&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">On Weibo, a Twitter-like social media website in China, feminists created hashtags such as "#她能" (#SheCan), "#看见女性劳动者" (#SeeingWomenWorkers) with the aim of helping women feel empowered.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has caused political, economic and social impacts globally, with <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/covid-19-and-gender-equality-countering-the-regressive-effects">women being affected disproportionately across the world</a>. </p>
<p>In China, the gendered impacts of COVID-19 have manifested in various ways. In mainstream media — like on TV shows and state-run media — women and women front-line workers in particular were underrepresented or misrepresented. These depictions were <a href="http://doi.org/10.52854/cchrr.45">highly controversial and provoked backlash</a> led by feminists on social media. </p>
<h2>Misrepresentation of women front-line workers</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202009/14/WS5f5f3cd6a3101ccd0bee0490.html"><em>Heroes in Harm’s Way</em></a> was the first TV series about front-line workers fighting the outbreak in China that aired during September 2020. Although claiming to be “<a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-09-17/China-s-1st-TV-drama-about-its-COVID-19-battle-premieres-on-CCTV-TQJo1yfuqQ/index.html">based on real-life stories</a>” of front-line workers in Wuhan — where the outbreak was first reported — it sparked severe criticism for portraying women medical workers as subordinate and showcased them as reluctant to head to the front lines.</p>
<p>In addition to portraying women as subordinate, the lack of basic supplies such as sanitary products, making their jobs even harder, was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/business/coronavirus-china-nurse-menstruation.html">often neglected across dominant narratives</a>. To avoid talking about these everyday problems, <a href="http://news.xhby.net/zt/zzccfkyq/zmnxz/202002/t20200216_6513896.shtml">state media called women medical workers who shaved their heads “the most beautiful warriors”</a> praising them for their devotion. </p>
<p>This under- and misrepresentation of women triggered waves of backlash led by feminists across social media. </p>
<h2>Re-writing history by making visible ‘herstory’</h2>
<p>My recent research has been examining how feminists took advantage of social media to respond to gender inequality and injustice during the COVID-19 outbreak in China. The research reveals that Sina Weibo has become an essential site for women fighting against stereotypical media representations.</p>
<p>On Weibo, a Twitter-like social media website in China, feminists created hashtags such as “#她能” (#SheCan), “#看见女性劳动者” (#SeeingWomenWorkers), “#逆行中的她们” (#HeroinesinHarmsWay) with the aim of helping women feel empowered. The <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-social-media-changing-the-feminist-movement-msna556971">hashtags worked as a counter-narrative</a> to what was happening in the mainstream — a narrative that neglects and degrades women’s contributions in fighting COVID-19. </p>
<p>Their hashtags are meant to serve as <a href="https://doi.org/10.5250/fronjwomestud.39.1.0093">a rally cry that invites users to share their personal stories</a> and feelings. They are also a means to rewrite <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/herstory">herstory</a> and showcase the role women played in fighting the pandemic.</p>
<p>Under a post that criticized the TV series <em>Heroes in Harm’s Way</em>, there were two comments, each of which got over 3,000 likes. These comments read:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“During the most serious time of the epidemic, when the community needed volunteers, no one was willing to go, and finally my mother took the initiative to sign up, the trash screenwriter has no heart.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“#SeeingWomenWorkers I am angry I went to Hubei to support a local hospital, and the vast majority of medical staff are women. I witnessed them cut their hair, hug for farewell, I cannot accept this kind of drama.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Weibo allows each comment to open a sub-thread, where other users can respond to a specific comment. Under the two comments listed above, other commenters posted multiple testimonies that endorsed the original comments and posts. This work <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/690811">contributed to re-constructing the misrepresentation of women</a>. </p>
<h2>Archiving feelings against “correct collective memory”</h2>
<p>Feminist responses to the dominant narrative are loaded and social media posts are full of of anger. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olx024">Emotion has long been taken seriously in feminist studies</a>. </p>
<p>Anger in the collective sharing of testimonies highlights women’s contributions during the outbreak and functions as a means to connect individuals with similar experiences and feelings. </p>
<p>Emotive expressions and terms such as memory (“记忆”), mesmerizing (“记住”), documenting (“记录”), correct memory (“正确记忆”) and collective memory (“集体记忆”) frequently appeared in Weibo posts that clawed back against the mainstream narrative. This suggests that women are using Weibo as a means to archive feelings, and to problematize how collective memories are being created about who is involved in fighting COVID-19.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Women look at a computer" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425521/original/file-20211008-15535-otuvuf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425521/original/file-20211008-15535-otuvuf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425521/original/file-20211008-15535-otuvuf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425521/original/file-20211008-15535-otuvuf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425521/original/file-20211008-15535-otuvuf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425521/original/file-20211008-15535-otuvuf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425521/original/file-20211008-15535-otuvuf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This under- and misrepresentation of Chinese women triggered waves of backlash led by feminists across social media.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Mimi Thian/Unsplash)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A shift of media attitude</h2>
<p>Since the COVID-19 outbreak passed its peak its peak in China, state-run media outlets in the country have begun <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-03/08/c_1125679333.html">picturing women as an essential force</a> in confronting the virus. If and to what extent the feminist counter-narratives on social media influenced mainstream media’s agenda are worth further study. </p>
<p>These counter-narratives did play an important role in raising awareness of the stereotypical media representation of women during COVID-19. And the interconnection and interaction, commenting in particular, enabled by Weibo, helped facilitate the process.</p>
<p>By bringing a variety of users together, Weibo helped solicit feelings of belonging and community, or as political theorist Jodi Dean terms “<a href="https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9715.003.0008">community without community</a>.” </p>
<p>We should not assume social media determined the way for the emergence of affective solidarity among women misrepresented in the dominant narratives. Nonetheless, social media has become an important site where fragmented voices can come together and find a voice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169341/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jinman Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Feminists across China came together on Weibo to fight back against under- and misrepresentation of them during the early days of COVID-19.Jinman Zhang, PhD candidate, Media Studies, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1507182021-01-28T15:48:20Z2021-01-28T15:48:20ZCOVID-19 misinformation on Chinese social media – lessons for countering conspiracy theories<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377272/original/file-20210105-19-pm9ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=52%2C0%2C5850%2C3853&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Influencers and women without huge numbers of followers are more effective than others at debunking conspiracy theories on Chinese social media.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/VirusOutbreakChinaCommemoratingVictims/954fbf709c4741949d55810c44c0c03f/photo">AP Photo/Ng Han Guan</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Conspiracy theories about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic from the beginning. Crucial to managing the pandemic is <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/23-09-2020-managing-the-covid-19-infodemic-promoting-healthy-behaviours-and-mitigating-the-harm-from-misinformation-and-disinformation">mitigating the effects of misinformation</a>, which the World Health Organization dubbed an “infodemic.”</p>
<p>Conspiracy theories and misinformation are global phenomena that affect people’s perceptions of other countries, yet little is understood about which COVID-19 conspiracy theories are popular on Chinese social media, how this differs from misinformation on U.S. social media and what lessons this holds for countering global misinformation. </p>
<p>As researchers who <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=SLJWhV0AAAAJ&hl=en">study online media and public discourse</a>, my colleagues and I examined conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19 and narratives that debunk them on <a href="https://www.dragonsocial.net/blog/chinese-social-media-weibo-and-twitter-comparison/">Sina Weibo</a>, the Chinese equivalent of Twitter and one of the major Chinese social media platforms. </p>
<p>We found that popular conspiracies on Weibo about the origins of COVID-19 <a href="https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/conspiracy-and-debunking-narratives-about-covid-19-origins-on-chinese-social-media-how-it-started-and-who-is-to-blame/">differ substantially from those in the U.S.</a>, with many claiming that a national government deliberately constructed the coronavirus. Conspiracy posts and posts attributing responsibility to the U.S. surged during Sino-U.S. confrontations. </p>
<p>Surveys show that many Americans also <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/24/a-look-at-the-americans-who-believe-there-is-some-truth-to-the-conspiracy-theory-that-covid-19-was-planned/">believe COVID-19 conspiracy theories</a>, however most of those conspiracy theories involved personalities such as Bill Gates and Anthony Fauci or unfounded alternative explanations for the illness, such as 5G, the new high-speed wireless network technology. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman looks at her phone while standing in a tradeshow booth that has a display in Chinese." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Weibo is one of China’s largest social media platforms, with over 500 million users active monthly.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ChinaNewsControl/a2e13b78340446bf8725e28692291134/photo?Query=Weibo&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=35&currentItemNo=12">AP Photo/Andy Wong</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We also found in our analysis of Chinese social media that debunking posts can be more effective when they come from women and influencers, who are people with large followings on social media. Debunking posts are also more effective when they cite scientists as the source. We believe these techniques could be effective not only in China but in other countries as well.</p>
<h2>Nationalism and international conflict</h2>
<p>We collected and analyzed <a href="https://doi.org/10.2196/19421">COVID-19 posts from a pool of 250 million Weibo users</a> from Jan. 1 to April 30, 2020. Although conspiracy theories related to 5G, the bogus documentary “Plandemic” and Bill Gates were prevalent in the U.S., these conspiracy narratives were not popular on Weibo (4.95%). Prevalent conspiracy theories on Weibo centered around whether COVID-19 was deliberately made as a bioweapon by the U.S., China, Japan or another country. </p>
<p>The volume of conspiracy theories and debunking narratives surged during times of Chinese-U.S. conflict from January to April 2020. These include when President Donald Trump first referred to the coronavirus as the “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-51928011">Chinese Virus</a>” on March 16; during several diplomatic conflicts around March 25, on April 21 when Trump announced <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-immigration-ban.html">a green card ban</a> to prevent people from immigrating to the U.S.; and when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced the <a href="https://share.america.gov/defending-america-s-cyberfrontier-with-5g-clean-path/">5G Clean Path</a> on April 29, which required that wireless communications entering and exiting U.S. diplomatic facilities bypass the equipment of “untrustworthy” communications companies like China’s Huawei.</p>
<p>During these Chinese-U.S. confrontations, we also observed a surge in posts that focused on blaming the U.S. as the original source of COVID-19. </p>
<p>The pandemic has <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/rising-nationalism-in-europe-and-asia-in-the-age-of-covid19-72587/">exacerbated a global trend toward nationalism</a>. These two forces have given rise to <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/07/vaccine-nationalism-threatens-global-plan-distribute-covid-19-shots-fairly">vaccine nationalism</a>, which could threaten the plan for global access to COVID-19 vaccines. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, about <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/07/30/americans-fault-china-for-its-role-in-the-spread-of-covid-19/">78% of Americans faulted China for its handling of the COVID-19 outbreak</a>, according to a Pew Research Center survey. </p>
<p>COVID-19 is an example of how science can be distorted to divide people within a country and across nations. To understand how to effectively communicate about the pandemic, it’s important to take into account the political contexts in which science and health communication occur.</p>
<p><iframe id="2h6KQ" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/2h6KQ/5/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Lessons for countering the COVID-19 infodemic</h2>
<p>Fighting conspiracy theories is a difficult battle. Scholars of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1317516111">communication</a> and <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2973067">psychology</a> point out the psychological mechanisms that cause people to reject factual information if it challenges their worldview or sense of themselves.</p>
<p>My colleagues and I offer three strategies for countering misinformation that can overcome these political and psychological hurdles. </p>
<p>First, create a constructive media environment to inoculate the public. </p>
<p>We suggest that political parties and media should avoid using nationalistic and politically motivated narratives when communicating about the pandemic. They should produce more messages that advocate for common interests and values for fighting the pandemic and the infodemic. </p>
<p>We also recommend that public agencies, scholars and social media companies conduct more experiments to explore effective <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2018.1443491">misinformation inoculation strategies</a> that can help the public recognize and reject politically driven conspiracy theories. To help the public become more sophisticated in processing messages, researchers and communicators could give the public a small dose of conspiracy narratives and explicitly warn about the <a href="https://issues.org/covid-19-communication-war/">political motives</a> behind these conspiracy theories. </p>
<p>Second, improve public awareness through deliberation.</p>
<p>We recommend that a long-term solution to fight misinformation is to develop opportunities for conversations between people of different political orientations in order to have constructive dialogues that develop mutual understanding and to form thoughtful opinions. People with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.01005.x">deeply divided views</a> can have constructive conversations with each other. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0963662520966742">Vulnerable populations</a> can be empowered to have thoughtful engagement with each other. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Third, choose effective message senders and sources to correct misinformation.</p>
<p>We suggest that social media companies and public agencies consider actively seeking help from credible influencers, and women who don’t have large followings, to disseminate debunking information. Information on social media competes for public attention. Our research found that posts that came from influencers, as well as women without enormous numbers of followers, and that cited scientists or other scholars, received more likes, comments, retweets and hashtags. </p>
<p>The right messenger and the right information source are critical for increasing public engagement and understanding of science.</p>
<p><em>Cuihua Shen and Jingwen Zhang of the University of California, Davis; Anfan Chen of the University of Science and Technology of China; and Jingbo Meng of Michigan State University contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kaiping Chen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The type and amount of misinformation closely tracks tensions in US-China relations. Effectively countering the misinformation comes down to who does the debunking.Kaiping Chen, Assistant Professor of Science Communication, University of Wisconsin-MadisonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1529512021-01-12T19:09:22Z2021-01-12T19:09:22ZHow can America heal from the Trump era? Lessons from Germany’s transformation into a prosperous democracy after Nazi rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378297/original/file-20210112-21-1m1nob1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C7%2C4868%2C3216&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Trump supporters clash with police and security forces as people try to storm the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 61. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/trump-supporters-clash-with-police-and-security-forces-as-news-photo/1230454153?adppopup=true">Joseph Prezioso/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Comparisons between the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/10/us/politics/arnold-schwarzenegger-video.html">United States under Trump and Germany during the Hitler era </a> are once again being made following the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/01/06/dc-protests-trump-rally-live-updates/">storming of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6</a>.</p>
<p>Even in the eyes of German history scholars like myself, <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-hitler-comparisons-too-easy-and-ignore-the-murderous-history-92394">who had earlier warned of the troubling nature of such analogies</a>, Trump’s strategy to remain in power has undeniably proved that he has fascist traits. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/09/06/910320018/fascism-scholar-says-u-s-is-losing-its-democratic-status">True to the fascist playbook</a>, which includes hypernationalism, the glorification of violence and a fealty to anti-democratic leaders that is cultlike, Trump launched a conspiracy theory that the recent election was rigged and incited violence against democratically elected representatives of the American people. </p>
<p>This is not to say that Trump has suddenly emerged as a new Hitler. The German dictator’s lust for power was inextricably linked to his <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/victims-of-the-nazi-era-nazi-racial-ideology">racist ideology</a>, which unleashed a global, genocidal war. For Trump, the need to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/the-mind-of-donald-trump/480771/">satisfy his own ego</a> seems to be the major motivation of his politics. </p>
<p>But that doesn’t change the fact that Trump is just as much of a mortal danger to American democracy as Hitler was to the Weimar Republic. The first democracy on German soil <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/the-mind-of-donald-trump/480771/">did not survive the onslaught of the Nazis</a>. </p>
<p>If America is to survive the attacks of Trump and his supporters, its citizens would do well to look to the fate of Germany and the lessons it offers Americans looking to save, heal and unite their republic.</p>
<h2>From Nazi ideology to democracy</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Weimar-Republic">Weimar Republic, the first democracy on German soil</a>, was a short-lived one. Founded in 1918, it managed to survive the political turmoil of the early 1920s, but succumbed to the crisis brought about by the Great Depression. It is therefore not the history of the failed Weimar Republic but rather that of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/Formation-of-the-Federal-Republic-of-Germany">Federal Republic, founded in 1949</a>, that provides important clues. </p>
<p>Just like Weimar, the West German Federal Republic was founded in the aftermath of a devastating war, World War II. And, just like Weimar, the new German state found itself confronted with large numbers of citizens who were deeply anti-democratic. Even worse, many of them had been involved in the Holocaust and other heinous crimes against humanity. </p>
<p>During the first postwar decade, a majority of Germans still believed that Nazism <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Postwar/10oPnprPjcgC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=%22Nazism+was+a+good+idea,+badly+applied%22&pg=PA58&printsec=frontcover">had been a good idea, only badly put into practice</a>. This was a sobering starting point, but Germany’s second democracy managed not just to survive but even to flourish, and it ultimately developed into one of the most stable democracies worldwide. </p>
<p>How?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378311/original/file-20210112-15-w95x5j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="German war crimes defendants sitting in a courtroom at the Nuremberg trials." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378311/original/file-20210112-15-w95x5j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378311/original/file-20210112-15-w95x5j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378311/original/file-20210112-15-w95x5j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378311/original/file-20210112-15-w95x5j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378311/original/file-20210112-15-w95x5j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=589&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378311/original/file-20210112-15-w95x5j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=589&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378311/original/file-20210112-15-w95x5j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=589&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">German war crimes defendants sitting in a courtroom at the Nuremberg trials in November 1945. Among them are Hermann Goering, Rudolf Hess and Joachim Von Ribbentrop.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/german-war-crimes-defendants-sitting-in-a-courtroom-of-the-news-photo/158743770?adppopup=true">Mondadori Portfolio by Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Denazification: ‘Painful and amoral process’</h2>
<p>For one, there was a legal reckoning with the past, beginning with the trial and prosecution of some Nazi elites and war criminals. That happened first at <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/dec/18/landmarks-in-law-the-first-trial-where-the-word-genocide-was-spoken">the Nuremberg Trials</a>, organized by the Allies in 1945 and 1946, in which leading Nazis were tried for genocide and crimes against humanity. A further significant reckoning happened during the <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/collections/the-museums-collections/collections-highlights/auschwitz-ssalbum/frankfurt-trial">Frankfurt Auschwitz trials</a> of the mid-1960s, in which 22 officials of the SS, the elite paramilitary organization of the Nazi Party, were tried for the roles they played at the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp. </p>
<p>To protect the new German democracy from the political divisions that had plagued parliamentary government during the Weimar period, an electoral law was introduced that aimed to prevent the proliferation of small extremist parties. This was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/how-does-the-german-general-election-work/a-37805756">the “5 percent” clause</a>, which stipulated that a party must win a minimum of 5% of the national vote to receive any representation in parliament.</p>
<p>In a similar vein, <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html">Article 130 of the German Criminal Code</a> made “incitement of the masses” a criminal offense to stop the spread of extremist thought, hate speech and calls for political violence.</p>
<p>Yet as important and admirable as these efforts were in exorcising Germany’s Nazi demons, they alone are not what kept Germans on a democratic footing after 1945. So, too, did the successful integration of anti-democratic forces into the new state.</p>
<p>This was a painful and amoral process. In January 1945, the Nazi Party had <a href="https://www.crl.edu/collections/topics/germany">some 8.5 million members</a> – that is, significantly more than 10% of the entire population. After the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany, many of them claimed that they <a href="http://www.alliiertenmuseum.de/en/topics/denazification.html">had been only nominal members</a>.</p>
<p>Such attempts to get off scot-free did not work for the Nazi luminaries tried at Nuremberg, but it certainly did work for many lower-level Nazis involved in countless crimes. And with the advent of the Cold War, <a href="https://ips-dc.org/the_cias_worst-kept_secret_newly_declassified_files_confirm_united_states_collaboration_with_nazis/">even people outside of Germany were willing to look past these offenses</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=article&did=History.Denazi.i0003&id=History.Denazi&isize=M">Denazification, the Allies’ attempt to purge German society, culture and politics</a>, as well as the press, economy and judiciary, of Nazism, petered out quickly and was officially abandoned in 1951. As a result, many Nazis were absorbed into an emerging new society that officially committed itself to democracy and human rights.</p>
<p>Konrad Adenauer, the first West German chancellor, said in 1952 that it was time <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/from-dictatorship-to-democracy-the-role-ex-nazis-played-in-early-west-germany-a-810207.html">“to finish with this sniffing out of Nazis.”</a> He did not say this lightheartedly; after all, he had been an opponent of the Nazis. To him, this <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=wNd9Zp1A1a4C&pg=PA240&lpg=PA240&dq=hermann+l%C3%BCbbe+communicative+silencing&source=bl&ots=g5dLTJ6zYy&sig=ACfU3U0aXiIxejpQVKvX4vVsiImuFRi9sQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjxxfzg_JTuAhUFYawKHdmiCM0Q6AEwB3oECAgQAg#v=onepage&q=hermann%20l%C3%BCbbe%20communicative%20silencing&f=false">“communicative silencing”</a> of the Nazi past – a term coined by the German philosopher Hermann Lübbe – was necessary during these early years to integrate former Nazis into the democratic state. </p>
<p>Where one was going, advocates of this approach argued, was more important than where one had been.</p>
<h2>A dignified life</h2>
<p>For many, this failure to achieve justice was too heavy of a price to pay for democratic stability. But the strategy ultimately bore fruit. Despite the recent <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/06/shockwaves-in-berlin-as-far-right-afd-lends-support-to-mainstream.html">growth of the far right and nationalist “Alternative for Germany” party</a>, Germany has remained democratic and has not yet become a threat to world peace. </p>
<p>At the same time, there were increasing efforts to confront the Nazi past, especially after the upheaval of 1968, when a new generation of young Germans challenged the older generation <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/68-movement-brought-lasting-changes-to-german-society/a-3257581">about their behavior during the Third Reich</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378314/original/file-20210112-19-mz23ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Young people at a demonstration in Nuremberg, Germany, in 1968." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378314/original/file-20210112-19-mz23ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378314/original/file-20210112-19-mz23ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378314/original/file-20210112-19-mz23ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378314/original/file-20210112-19-mz23ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378314/original/file-20210112-19-mz23ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378314/original/file-20210112-19-mz23ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378314/original/file-20210112-19-mz23ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 1968, young Germans demonstrated against the older generation about many concerns, including their behavior during the Third Reich.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-with-banners-on-sunday-in-front-of-the-news-photo/1074504810?adppopup=true">Karl Schnörrer/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Another crucial factor helped make Germany’s democratic transition a success: <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/Political-consolidation-and-economic-growth-1949-69#ref297761">an extraordinary period of economic growth in the postwar period</a>. Most ordinary Germans benefited from this prosperity, and the new state even created <a href="https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/75/10/Postwar_Oct1975.pdf">a generous welfare system</a> to cushion them against the harsh forces of the free market. </p>
<p>In short, more and more Germans embraced democracy because it offered them a dignified life. As a result, philosopher <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2008-05-03/constitutional-patriotism">Jürgen Habermas’ concept of “constitutional patriotism” – as one interpreter put it</a>, that citizens’ political attachment to their country “ought to center on the norms, the values and, more indirectly, the procedures of a liberal democratic constitution” – eventually came to replace older, more rabid forms of nationalism.</p>
<p>[<em>Get our most insightful politics stories.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-most">Sign up for The Conversation’s Politics Weekly</a>.]</p>
<p>In the coming weeks and months, Americans will debate the most effective ways to punish those who instigated the recent political violence. They will also consider how to restore the trust in democracy of the many millions who have given their support to <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-field-guide-to-trumps-dangerous-rhetoric-139531">Donald Trump and still believe the lies of this demagogue</a>.</p>
<p>Defenders of American democracy would do well to study carefully the painful but ultimately successful approach of the Federal Republic of Germany to move beyond fascism. </p>
<p>The United States finds itself in a different place and time than postwar Germany, but the challenge is similar: how to reject, punish and delegitimize the powerful enemies of democracy, pursue an honest reckoning with the violent racism of the past, and enact political and socioeconomic policies that will allow all to lead a dignified life.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152951/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sylvia Taschka is not a member of the Democratic party, but has volunteered for them during election periods.</span></em></p>The US faces many of the same problems Germans faced after World War II: how to reject, punish and delegitimize the enemies of democracy. There are lessons in how Germany handled that challenge.Sylvia Taschka, Senior Lecturer of History, Wayne State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/643642016-08-31T02:24:40Z2016-08-31T02:24:40ZDo moves against Hangzhou G20 ‘rumours’ help show China at its best or worst?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135884/original/image-20160830-28230-7rx77e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese are starting to question government control of the terms of public debate, as conveyed by this propoganda banner in Hangzhou in 2010.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/philiproeland/4770190119/in/album-72157624441284070/">Philip Roeland</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>While Hangzhou has begun counting down to the arrival of G20 delegates from around the world, #g20blue – a hashtag locals use to post about the smog-free sky – is trending on social media. The beautiful sky that is exciting residents is the result of <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-06/22/content_25797965.htm">the Chinese government’s year-long efforts</a> to clean up air pollution in the vicinity of the city. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=775&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=775&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=775&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pictures on Instagram with the #g20blue hashtag.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Instagram</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>China’s “cleaning agenda” for the coming <a href="http://www.g20.org/English/">G20 summit</a> is not restricted to environmental problems, but has recently been expanded to the country’s online space. A search for “G20” on <a href="http://weiboscope.jmsc.hku.hk/">WeiboScope</a>, a censorship monitoring website, reveals a large number of posts criticising the event have been removed from Weibo, China’s Twitter-like microblogging site. </p>
<p>While some Chinese netizens who complain about the G20 have had their posts removed from the system, others may have paid a heavier price for their criticism. On July 15, blogger “Pingzi”, who was later identified as Guo Enping, was <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/996263.shtml">arrested for “spreading rumours”</a> about G20 preparations. </p>
<p>It was Guo’s viral blog post, “Hangzhou, shame on you”, that brought trouble upon this public servant. In his post, Guo criticised local authorities in Hangzhou for over-spending in preparation for the G20 summit and for causing unnecessary inconvenience to residents and businesses. </p>
<p>China has strict laws to <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/949407.shtml">regulate online rumours</a>. Under these laws, Guo was fired and detained for “groundless” claims he made in the post, which included Hangzhou’s budget for the city’s G20 preparations. It isn’t feasible to assess the validity of actual figures in this post, because there is little official information or documentation that can be used to verify or discredit Guo’s claims. </p>
<p>As one online forum user <a href="http://lt.cjdby.net/thread-2268118-1-1.html">argues</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>How do we know what Guo said in the post is wrong? Does the government dare to release its record of spending on this event?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This comment points out an important factor that leads to rumour-mongering: lack of trustworthy information. Little information is available on the local government’s budget for hosting this event. When officials <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1956377/hangzhous-g20-facelift-part-citys-long-term-planning">refuse to reveal</a> information about issues of public concern, rumour emerges to fill the gap. </p>
<p>In the absence of transparency, and to discredit undesirable comments, authorities rely on the assumption that they are the arbiters of “truth”. </p>
<h2>Hangzhou ‘trying too hard’?</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Police patrol Hangzhou in preparation for the G20 summit.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ding_jia_ming/28717449182/">HDBNorth/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most of Guo’s criticism about Hangzhou “trying too hard” to impress foreign guests is not groundless. Based on information from the Hangzhou government’s <a href="http://english.gov.cn/news/video/2016/08/07/content_281475411230703.htm">official website</a>, the city has conducted more than 700 renovation projects and declared a week-long holiday for its residents. Also, <a href="http://english.gov.cn/news/video/2016/08/07/content_281475411230703.htm">$US1.5 billion</a> has been spent on travel vouchers to encourage citizens to leave the town. </p>
<p>However, not all residents are happy about the bonus holidays. According to a recent report, local business owners <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2009392/hangzhou-residents-prepare-holiday-exodus-courtesy-g20">complained</a>. It is also reported that more than <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-industry-pollution-idUSKCN0Z3145">250 industrial facilities</a> in the region were temporarily shut down and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/22/china-shut-churches-g20-summit-city-hangzhou-hangzhou">religious gatherings</a> may be banned in Hangzhou during the G20 week. </p>
<h2>Response to Guo’s arrest</h2>
<p>In response to official media reporting of Guo’s case on Weibo, a large number of Weibo users expressed sympathy for Guo. </p>
<p>The official report offers no systematic explanation of the “falsity” of Guo’s claims. In order to deny Guo’s criticism, officials simply use another “official” figure: 96.8% of local residents are happy about hosting the G20. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=202&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=202&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=202&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Zhenjiang Communist Youth League‘s official Weibo post about Guo’s case – the same message issued by mainstream media.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">weibo.com screen capture</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, this official message has backfired. As shown in the following screen capture, most comments challenge the official survey result. Also, as some of the comments suggest, certain posts criticising the government have already been removed from the system. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=109&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=109&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=109&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=137&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=137&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=137&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Screen capture of Weibo users’ comments on Guo’s case, with author’s translation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Weibo.com, author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Controlling rumour or suppressing free speech?</h2>
<p>In a post-Snowden era, it is no secret that governments in both democratic and authoritarian states conduct online surveillance. However, as discussed by various scholars, the sociopolitical circumstances of China determine that internet control is driven by a <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-007-9199-0">different motivation</a> and can have detrimental impacts on <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KdiaCwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=info:GcKULJadKbMJ:scholar.google.com&ots=qvsfSXVjRf&sig=PAmWuasYPonYoWC6A2V-QjaVvV8&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">China’s civil society</a>. </p>
<p>From paid <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/blog/china%E2%80%99s-growing-army-paid-internet-commentators">pro-government commentators</a> on online forums to vigorous content-censoring strategies on social media, the government’s approach to regulating public opinion online is evolving with China’s media dynamics. </p>
<p>Recently, crackdowns on social media “rumour-spreading” have become increasingly frequent. As China has very limited alternative information channels, such anti-rumour policies on social media have raised concern among both <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324807704579082940411106988">commentators</a> and <a href="http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=10006515&fileId=S2057019815000048">scholars</a> about Chinese people’s freedom of speech.</p>
<p>China is now the world’s second-biggest economy. However, the country’s reputation for suppressing its citizens’ freedom of speech is an obstacle to becoming a real leader on the world stage. Rather than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/06/china-human-rights-activist-convictions-us-criticism">constantly rejecting</a> the widespread condemnation of its approach, perhaps it is time to show the world a more mature China that can take and respond to criticism. </p>
<p>The upcoming G20 summit shines a spotlight on China again. With its rich history and natural beauty, there is no better way for Hangzhou to showcase “beautiful China” than by presenting a <a href="http://en.people.cn/90002/92169/92211/6274603.html">genuinely harmonious</a> relationship between the government and civil society. </p>
<p>Without this foundation, the blue sky, newly painted houses or seemingly harmonious internet may all be perceived as nothing but an unconvincing facade. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=123&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=123&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=123&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=155&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=155&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=155&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">West Lake, Hangzhou.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/norsez/8688058327/in/album-72157633354866537/">norsez Oh/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64364/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jing Zeng does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hangzhou is hosting the G20 summit and China is anxious to present a positive picture of the country to the world, but the official attitude to non-compliant citizens isn’t helping.Jing Zeng, PhD Candidate, Queensland University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/464012015-08-24T23:41:59Z2015-08-24T23:41:59ZTianjin disaster takes social news sharing to new levels in China<p>The tragic explosion in the Chinese city of Tianjin, which has so far claimed the lives of 114 people including 19 firefighters, triggered a nationwide online conversation in China. </p>
<p>The widespread social sharing of video and chatter prompted various public and official responses. Among the most shared tweets, a <a href="http://www.cctv-america.com/2015/08/13/this-text-exchange-from-a-fireman-at-tianjin-explosion-will-bring-you-to-tears">screenshot of a tear-shedding conversation</a> between two firefighters on WeChat, the country’s most popular instant messaging tool.</p>
<p>Also popular was a <a href="http://weibo.com/2185608961/CvB9xbq0O?type=comment#_loginLayer_1440120018897">cartoon named the “world’s coolest retrograding”</a>. It was retweeted more than 700,000 times on the micro-blogging site Sina Weibo, attracting more then 57,000 comments and 300,000 likes within hours.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/92650/original/image-20150821-15942-12dtbq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/92650/original/image-20150821-15942-12dtbq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92650/original/image-20150821-15942-12dtbq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92650/original/image-20150821-15942-12dtbq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92650/original/image-20150821-15942-12dtbq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92650/original/image-20150821-15942-12dtbq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92650/original/image-20150821-15942-12dtbq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The fireman cartoon that went viral.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Weibo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The disaster has become the most viewed news event on a social media platform. The hashtag #Tianjin Tanggu massive explosion has so far had 3.32 billion views on Sina Weibo, 3.62 million comments and 420,000 followers (weibo.com).</p>
<h2>Controlling the information flow</h2>
<p>With the surge in sharing, China’s internet regulators have busied themselves monitoring “unhealthy” tweets on social media platforms including both Weibo and WeChat. Shortly after the disaster, rumours including tweets referring to, “terrorist attacks”, “shops looted”, “no survivor within 1 kilometre of the site” and “sodium cyanide leaking into city’s sewage”, were widely dispersed. </p>
<p>Chinese officials have displayed “zero tolerance” towards online rumours after the Tianjin events, according to China’s internet watchdog, the <a href="http://www.cac.gov.cn/english/">Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)</a>. More than 360 social media accounts on Weibo and WeChat have been investigated, resulting in 160 being permanently shut down and 200 more suspended. Fifty “rumour-mongering” sites were investigated in further detail, leading to 18 of these accounts being revoked.</p>
<p>The WeChat account of Zhengzhou Evening News, a municipal level local newspaper, was forced to close for a week after the account circulated information that the leadership of Tianjin government would reshuffle.</p>
<p>The open access of social media platforms has rendered the production and dissemination of “speculative” content both free and instantaneous, while the exponential growth in access to social media has allowed content to go viral. </p>
<p>Some of the messaging has created panic and fear among online users affected by the disaster. </p>
<p>However, the problematic proliferation of rumours has led to a push for more transparency and timely release of information from the government and state-run media. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Rumours will fly if authorities do not release enough up-to-date information.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He requested that the rumours stop, and that government agencies not fail to disclose any information.</p>
<h2>Social media trends in China</h2>
<p>China’s news industry, like many others, is experiencing rapid change as <a href="http://share-wars.com/about/">social media rewrites the patterns of communication</a> that have been in existence for hundreds of years. The <a href="http://www.cnnic.cn">China Internet Network Information Center</a> predicts that increasingly online news will be algorithmically recommended to users in a more individualistic way, exploiting data collection and mining techniques to push popular news to a user via a model that combines social network links, and digital browsing traces. </p>
<p>China has the world’s largest internet community and the most mobile users.
The widespread use of mobile phones and web use has developed with the expansion of the middle class in China, which includes the new, old, marginal and “entrepreneurial” middle classes, as discussed in David Goodman’s book <a href="http://www.e-elgar.com/shop/middle-class-china?___website=uk_warehouse">“Middle Class China”</a>. While traditional media is simultaneously under attack and reinventing itself, new media enterprises are often the most nimble, strategic and innovative in this space. </p>
<p>By June 2015 the country’s online population had reached 668 million, around half of its total population. Expanding 4G mobile network use has further facilitated the use of social media networks. Growth in social media platforms and markets is central to this change – these powerful intermediaries are reconfiguring how we produce, distribute, promote and consume news. </p>
<p>More than 90.8% of China’s internet users have taken up instant messaging services including WeChat. More than 200 million people - almost 10 times the population of Australia - are registered on micro-blogging services including Sina Weibo.</p>
<p>The tension between innovative social media distribution businesses and a government with no intention of giving up control is forging the new mass-scale connective news culture in China.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46401/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Dwyer receives funding from the Australian Research Council for a project investigating online news sharing.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Weiwei Xu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Social media is rewriting patterns of communication in China.Tim Dwyer, Associate Professor, University of SydneyWeiwei Xu, PhD Candidate, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/237222014-03-03T04:12:29Z2014-03-03T04:12:29ZWeibo’s US listing: tweeting the end of the Hong Kong IPO?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/42789/original/4jj7qtxb-1393735608.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sina Weibo, China's Twitter-like internet giant, is going public, but wants to list in New York, not China.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/jonrussell/6993649975/">Flickr/Jon Russell</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With news that <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d596fe74-9d02-11e3-b535-00144feab7de.html">another Chinese tech giant is headed to Wall Street</a>, Hong Kong appears to have again missed out on another lucrative IPO. </p>
<p>Valued at a phenomenal US$7-8 billion and boasting more than 600 million users in the world’s largest and rapidly growing internet market, Sina Weibo (China’s Twitter-style microblogging platform) is significant enough to make any investment banker drool. </p>
<p>So why has Weibo chosen New York and what are the implications of this decision on Asia’s competitive IPO landscape? </p>
<p>This is part of a new trend of mainland companies bypassing the traditional Hong Kong listing option in favour of more advantageous terms on offer in New York.</p>
<h2>Wall Street calling</h2>
<p>Negotiations between e-commerce behemoth Ali Baba and the Hong Kong Exchange collapsed in October last year with Ali Baba taking its business to New York, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/25/alibaba-ipo-idUSL4N0HL10H20130925">costing HKEx an estimated US $25 million in revenue and significant prestige. </a></p>
<p>Analysts attributed the breakdown to HKEx’s refusal to budge on key corporate governance issues and Ali Baba’s insistence on maintaining control of several board appointments. </p>
<p>There is no doubt Hong Kong has been a significant beneficiary of China’s “go global” expansion and that the former British colony has been a platform to facilitate Chinese investment overseas. </p>
<p>Hong Kong’s independent judiciary and rule of law provides an attractive firewall for international companies wanting to engage with Chinese capital with less exposure to risk. </p>
<p>But Hong Kong is increasingly being overlooked by mainland companies attracted by liberal US regulations like the possibility of dual-class share structures, more flexibility around board appointments and the ability to list without demonstrating profitability. </p>
<p>So has Hong Kong lost its competitive edge? </p>
<p>The answer is a beautifully straightforward yes and no. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-past-doomsday-rhetoric-chinas-free-trade-zones-22474">written previously</a> that social, political and economic tensions between the special administrative region and the mainland are increasingly the <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/02/21/it-could-take-a-law-to-force-hong-kongers-to-be-nice-to-mainland-chinese/">norm</a>. </p>
<p>As Beijing continues to roll out its free trade zones and reforms around interest rate liberalisation and currency convertibility, Hong Kong will begin to lose much of its historic appeal.</p>
<h2>Safe haven no more?</h2>
<p>Hong Kong’s rule of law and transparency is a significant value proposition for foreign companies seeking safer exposure to China, although the attractiveness of this to mainland companies is perhaps less clear. </p>
<p>Hong Kong cannot afford to lose out on any more lucrative technology listings. China’s internet and e-commerce industry is the space to be in – the e-commerce sector racked up an astonishing <a href="http://www.digitimes.com/news/a20140227VL202.html">US$2.76 billion</a> in trades last year alone. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/1207234/signs-new-life-ipo-market">Much of the energy in Hong Kong’s recent mainland IPO activity</a> has been clustered around what are often state-owned Chinese banks, securities firms and developers pursuing stock listings in the territory. </p>
<p>These transactions often underwhelm investors who are simply unable to gaze beyond the smog currently looming over China’s economy and are perhaps understandably spooked by rumours of a credit crunch sparked by China’s <a href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-china-plays-high-stakes-game-with-its-money-2014-02-26">potentially gargantuan shadow banking system</a>. </p>
<p>The returns on a number of these transactions have been <a href="http://www.scmp.com/business/money/markets-investing/article/1387146/china-everbrights-not-so-bright-trading-debut">consequently disappointing</a>. </p>
<p>These lacklustre debuts stand in stark contrast to the success of a number of Chinese e-commerce and technology IPOs, which seem to be consistently generating solid returns for investors – the value of last year’s Chinese listings on the <a href="http://www.scmp.com/business/money/markets-investing/article/1425932/chinese-companies-head-us-listings">two large US exchanges have increased by 53% on the NYSE and 28% on the NASDAQ respectively</a>. </p>
<p>Indeed, Tencent (another big name in China’s booming e-commerce world), which listed in Hong Kong a decade ago, still trades in massive volumes and accounts for an estimated <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-09-25/business/sns-rt-us-alibaba-ipo-20130925_1_alibaba-ipo-alibaba-group-holding-ltd-tencent-holdings/2">2-3% of HKEx’s daily turnover</a>. </p>
<p>These are fundamental questions that strike at the heart of the debate on Hong Kong’s economic future – the territory can no longer wine and dine on its historic status as a gateway to China. </p>
<p>Major Chinese players in the new economy are voting with their feet and Hong Kong will not break away from the status quo by wooing poorly performing mainland banking and financial services firms. This will not deliver returns to investors while China’s economy remains in transition and chatter persists on the newswires about unsustainable mainland debt. </p>
<p>Inevitably the <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2013-11/01/content_17072780.htm">debate has commenced</a> within the Hong Kong community about whether regulators should compromise on corporate governance and listing standards in the interest of snaring a greater share of high profile transactions. </p>
<p>Hong Kong should be rightfully proud of its status as a major global financial hub and as a financial gateway to Asia. </p>
<p>But its challenge lies in deciding its interest in emerging as a future enabler of the expansion of the new Chinese economy underwritten by its strong transparency and the rule of law. </p>
<p>Hong Kong’s choice is by no means simple but its future prosperity cannot afford too many more tweets in New York’s direction. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/23722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laurie Pearcey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With news that another Chinese tech giant is headed to Wall Street, Hong Kong appears to have again missed out on another lucrative IPO. Valued at a phenomenal US$7-8 billion and boasting more than 600…Laurie Pearcey, Director - China Strategy & Development, UNSW Australia, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/115392013-01-14T03:39:00Z2013-01-14T03:39:00ZThe Southern Weekly and censorship in China: a nation fights back<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/19144/original/5pqty47y-1357866339.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China's new government has to decide if its economic and social agenda can progress without political liberalisation</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Fan Siding</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese newspaper the Southern Weekly has gone back to print after a public standoff about censorship, leading to wider scrutiny of the Chinese government’s hold over press freedom. </p>
<p>Optimism about more open discussion on Chinese social media, and expectations that China’s new leaders would ease its stringent media censorship followed the <a href="http://theconversation.com/the-secret-to-the-chinese-communist-partys-success-10675">18th National Congress of Communist Party of China (NCCPC)</a> last November.</p>
<p>China’s most popular microblogging platform, <a href="http://weibo.com/">Sina Weibo</a>, began to allow users to search names of the government leaders, which were previously blocked.</p>
<p>The authorities accepted criticisms of corrupt officials on the internet, and just recently investigated several highly ranked members of the 18th NCCPC Committee, based on tips from ordinary internet users. Several officials were subsequently <a href="http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2012/1207/237105.shtml">removed from office</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, as some <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/15/us-china-congress-reform-idUSBRE8AE1RB20121115">commentators have observed</a>, these changes are cosmetic. And several national media published editorials in <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/journalists-confront-china-censors-editorial-18129404">defence of government censorship</a> in late December last year, led to fears the new regime would strengthen and not liberalise censorship.</p>
<p>Such fears are seemingly confirmed by the <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/beijing-ordered-editorials-denying-censorship/story-e6frg6so-1226549828361">Southern Weekly’s recent experience</a>. Described by The New York Times as “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/24/world/under-pressure-chinese-newspaper-pulls-expose-on-a-charity.html">China’s most influential liberal newspaper</a>,” this Guangzhou-based weekly was forced to run a provided commentary glorifying the Party in place of the paper’s 2013 New Year editorial, which had been titled “<a href="http://ntdtv.org/en/news/china/china-focus/2013-01-07/southern-weekly-s-china-dream-becomes-nightmare-for-officials.html">China’s Dream, the Dream of Constitutionalism</a>”.</p>
<p>Once revealed by the paper’s outspoken journalists on Sina Weibo, this censorship provoked a strong response from media peers, public intellectuals, celebrities and ordinary citizens. On January 7, journalists staged one of the first newspaper strikes in China. All kinds of protests denouncing censorship and supporting the weekly have been emerging both in China and abroad since, including <a href="http://www.alliance.org.au/australian-journalists-support-striking-southern-weekend-journalists-in-their-protest-over-censorship">a petition in Australia initiated by Media, Entertainment & Art Alliance (MEAA)</a> to support the striking Chinese peers of Southern Weekly.</p>
<p>The journalists have since returned to work, but the discussion about censorship is still ongoing.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/19145/original/dtd52mfr-1357866341.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/19145/original/dtd52mfr-1357866341.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/19145/original/dtd52mfr-1357866341.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/19145/original/dtd52mfr-1357866341.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/19145/original/dtd52mfr-1357866341.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/19145/original/dtd52mfr-1357866341.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/19145/original/dtd52mfr-1357866341.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Copies of the Southern Weekly have reappeared after being shut down during the censorship debate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/How Hwee Young</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Social media’s gains and losses</h2>
<p>In the past few days, Sina Weibo has shown the power it wields to facilitate public opinion and mobilise online and offline activities.</p>
<p>The fomentation of this issue on the platform caused an outcry from internet users, and the wave quickly spread from the online sphere to offline reality. For Southern Weekly, Weibo became the most important channel for uncovering the truth and voicing resistance, given the pressure from both the central and local propaganda authorities. It has attracted extensive attention worldwide even after its weibos were rapidly deleted and its Weibo accounts <a href="http://www.scmp.com/comment/blogs/article/1121880/southern-weeklys-moment-reckoning">confiscated by the propaganda authority</a> as well.</p>
<p>The Chinese government has been wary of Weibo’s potential subversive power since the day it was born. Constant censorship has been applied to this new media, realised by automatic filtering of blacklisted words and manual deletion. A more stringent censorship is applied to some politically sensitive issues, which is exactly the case in this incident. The Weibo accounts of 15 journalists are blocked. The newspaper’s name disappeared quickly on Weibo; the abbreviation, nickname, homophone and even some popular codes of its name cannot be searched due to the increasing inspecting personnel.</p>
<p>Another popular Chinese microblogging platform <a href="http://t.qq.com/">Tencent Weibo</a> was not spared from the censorship. Fortunately, some posts including the codes or nicknames of the paper’s name still exist. But how long they last relies on the authorities’ attitude to this issue and the appeasing of boiling public opinion.</p>
<h2>An evolving resistance culture</h2>
<p>The culture of resistance has been a longstanding characteristic of the internet in China. Chinese citizens don’t challenge state power directly, but try to push boundaries of authority by using the versatile Chinese language and memetic images that can avoid filtering and censorship. Metaphor, allusion, allegory and image are the central features of this discourse.</p>
<p>In the Southern Weekly incident, Chinese media confronted a more difficult situation: the new government forced the media nationwide to publish glorifying editorials as well as critiques of Southern Weekly. Legacy media and news portals had to adopt some new tactics to express their different stance.</p>
<p>Some, for example, decided to print the critique of Southern Weekly but with an ending announcement “To publish this article doesn’t mean our paper agrees with or verify its statement”. Some chose to keep silent as a wordless resistance. Oddly but creatively, <a href="http://www.bjnews.com.cn/">The Beijing News</a>, whose journalists mostly come from the Southern Media Group, published an article on January 9 about food - The Southern Porridge, a homophone and metaphor of Southern Weekly, to express its position. </p>
<p>But such resistance came at a price: the chief editor of the Beijing News was invited to “drink tea” with the municipal propaganda officer and later <a href="http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130109/china-censorship-beijing-news-publisher-resigns-southern-weekly">announced his resignation</a>.</p>
<p>News portals and social media widely used acrostic headlines, metaphors and innuendo by citing famous quotations about freedom, truth and democracy, such as Russian author Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s “One word of truth shall outweigh the whole world”.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/19147/original/td3xb884-1357866635.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/19147/original/td3xb884-1357866635.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/19147/original/td3xb884-1357866635.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/19147/original/td3xb884-1357866635.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/19147/original/td3xb884-1357866635.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/19147/original/td3xb884-1357866635.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/19147/original/td3xb884-1357866635.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/19147/original/td3xb884-1357866635.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A news portal’s acrostic headlines form a strong statement: Southern Weekly, Keep Fighting!</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sina Weibo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A complicated prospect</h2>
<p>As affirmed in the 18th NCCPC, China’s new leadership has so far shown a clear intention to push forward with reform and open up policy in many fields. But recent action shows how complicated their approach towards censorship is in the digital age.</p>
<p>On one hand, a severe setback could be predicted. The upcoming <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7ab3e9d4-50d4-11e2-b287-00144feab49a.html#axzz2HdZgWzsu">internet regulations</a>, which have been forewarned by a series of commentaries from the party’s mouthpieces, would be a vital tool for the new leadership to maintain a centralised single-party rule, but a death knell to the revitalisation of a more democratic Chinese civil society.</p>
<p>On the other, the answer to whether censors will keep a tight reign over the increasingly dynamic public sphere is uncertain given Chinese people’s rising awareness of freedom of speech and civil rights. New resistance, both online and offline will come into being and consequently pose potential social instability, or even threat to the polity.</p>
<p>Ultimately, it is up to the new leadership to choose whether its reformist agenda extends to the political sphere; and whether its economic and social agenda can progress without political liberalisation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/11539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese newspaper the Southern Weekly has gone back to print after a public standoff about censorship, leading to wider scrutiny of the Chinese government’s hold over press freedom. Optimism about more…Yanshuang Zhang, Ph.D Candidate, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/83102012-07-20T03:23:04Z2012-07-20T03:23:04ZChinese internet censorship? Seeking the ‘truth’ on Weibo<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/13170/original/4h8h73nh-1342678814.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Does Western media jump on Chinese "censorship" stories with a little too much zeal?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thomas Hawk</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last week, Chinese internet users noticed the two Mandarin characters for “<a href="http://mandarin.about.com/od/dailymandarin/a/shihua.htm">truth</a>” could not be searched on <a href="http://weibo.com/">Sina Weibo</a>, the most popular microblogging platform in China. </p>
<p>On July 12,<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/tom-phillips/">Tom Philips</a>, Shanghai correspondent for The Telegraph, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9394684/The-truth-deleted-from-internet-in-China.html">cited one Hong Kong Weibo user’s claims</a> that the “truth” was first found to be missing in late June. This article circulated quickly online, especially in Western media.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/13116/original/pdfgzmr5-1342611201.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/13116/original/pdfgzmr5-1342611201.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/13116/original/pdfgzmr5-1342611201.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/13116/original/pdfgzmr5-1342611201.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/13116/original/pdfgzmr5-1342611201.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/13116/original/pdfgzmr5-1342611201.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/13116/original/pdfgzmr5-1342611201.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/13116/original/pdfgzmr5-1342611201.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Search results for “truth” could not be displayed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sina Weibo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By July 16, the search results for “truth” were again displayed as normal. No-one, it seems, can explain if this was a temporary censorship aimed at some unknown negative news, or just a technical problem.</p>
<h2>An illusory problem?</h2>
<p>It may surprise Western observers that there has been little discussion of this ironic situation inside China. But a couple of points are worth noting here:</p>
<p>1) Only <em>searching</em> for the term “truth” was temporarily blocked, not <em>posting</em> the term. </p>
<p>2) While “truth” is a common term in Mandarin, people rarely search for the term itself. Rather, they search for specific events, even if the truth is potentially at issue. They would not search for “the truth about <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chen_Guangcheng">Chen Guangcheng</a>”: they would simply search for “Chen Guangcheng”. </p>
<p>Given these two factors, it might be quite easy not to notice the word “truth” missing from searches. </p>
<p>Western searchers would likely be in the same situation. How often do we search for “the truth about <a href="http://theshiretv.com.au/">The Shire</a>?” Nevertheless, Western media were – and are – very keen to report this type of news, and in this case have been somewhat careless in reporting the word “truth” was “blocked” on Weibo. </p>
<p>That narrative implies Weibo users could not post any content with the Mandarin characters “truth” – in it’s own way, and somewhat ironically, a lie.</p>
<h2>The ambivalence of Chinese internet censorship</h2>
<p>The Chinese government has received wide criticism for its internet censorship from western commentators. According to <a href="http://en.rsf.org/">Reporters Without Borders</a>, China is listed as one of those countries that are “<a href="http://march12.rsf.org/i/Report_EnemiesoftheInternet_2012.pdf">Enemies of the internet</a>” and “under surveillance”.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/13117/original/9jmd4bq8-1342613644.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/13117/original/9jmd4bq8-1342613644.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/13117/original/9jmd4bq8-1342613644.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/13117/original/9jmd4bq8-1342613644.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/13117/original/9jmd4bq8-1342613644.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/13117/original/9jmd4bq8-1342613644.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/13117/original/9jmd4bq8-1342613644.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/13117/original/9jmd4bq8-1342613644.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Internet Censorship World Map.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the last two decades China has continued to open itself up to the world, developing an information industry while trying to maintain strict control over information flows. </p>
<p>This is confusing to those who have never used the Chinese internet. Google’s policy advisor Lokman Tsui <a href="http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=400">has argued</a> Western understanding of the Chinese internet is inevitably constructed through a “selective process of powerful acts of imagination” – and this blurs the facts of Chinese internet-related issues.</p>
<p>The Chinese government considers the internet as economically advantageous but politically disadvantageous. As in many other developing countries, the rights to economic development are treated as overriding the rights of individuals. </p>
<p>Indeed, <a href="http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/xiaoping/activities/040818-3.htm">this guideline</a> was once clearly stated in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda. </p>
<p>So in one sense China enjoys benefits from the booming information industry as the government has full jurisdiction over all IT-related issues. But it keeps a close eye on the potential threats that new technologies may bring to the one-party rule regime.</p>
<p>This ambivalent attitude is also reflected in its internet censorship. Sometimes the censorship is consistent but more often than not it is anticlimactic and ineffective. <a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h6xLzW9vQePrrOxo-PUHkl3EPLBQ">Bill Gates</a> has <a href="http://blogs.computerworld.com/15466/bill_gates_chinese_censorship_is_very_limited">said</a> Chinese efforts to censor the internet are “very limited”, because “it’s easy to go around it”. </p>
<p>Practically, the degree of censorship also differs greatly by websites or content. Small general-interest online communities with less traffic suffer less censorship and enjoy much freer speech. </p>
<p>In contrast, those with large numbers of users and active interactions (such as Sina Weibo, which has <a href="http://www.zdnet.com/sina-weibo-hits-300-million-users-but-costs-rise-2062304817/">more than 300m users</a>) are more likely to be censored. Even so, people can still comfortably discuss cultural, social, nationalistic, and political issues that do not directly challenge state/party authority.</p>
<h2>The value of resistance</h2>
<p>It’s worth noting that in some nationalistic events, the Chinese government even covertly indulges online public opinion and leverages patriotism to diplomatic ends.</p>
<p>Many contentious activities also thrive online because contention increases traffic and as a result is profitable for the websites. Chinese portals often encourage users to participate in contentious behaviour, albeit within limits.</p>
<p>Another uniqueness of the Chinese internet is its culture of resistance. Chinese <a href="http://www.columbia.edu/%7Ehauben/text/WhatIsNetizen.html">netizens</a> do try to stay within bounds and refrain from directly challenging state power, but they also know how to skillfully use the versatility of Chinese language to create codes, homophones, and satires that can avoid filtering and censorship. </p>
<p>Users cannot visit Facebook or Twitter, but there are many Chinese counterparts to choose from. Those who want to obtain information from outside can always find a way – for instance, using anti-censorship software such as <a href="http://www.internetfreedom.org/FreeGate">Freegate</a>.</p>
<p>This is a progressive and cumulative situation, because more and more Chinese people are being transformed by the internet – especially by social media such as Weibo – and are raising awareness of democracy, freedom of speech, and civil rights.</p>
<h2>Leviathan(s)</h2>
<p>We should also acknowledge that internet censorship is not just a Chinese practice. Many countries, <a href="http://www.news.com.au/technology/internet-filter/enemy-of-the-internet-australia-under-surveillance-for-violating-online-freedoms/story-fn5j66db-1226298203269">including Australia</a> have, or are considering, setting up varied degrees of internet censorship to counter unpredictable cyberthreats. </p>
<p>Australian arguments <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_in_Australia">for and against</a> censorship are still going on. Civil liberties groups such as <a href="https://www.efa.org.au/">Electronic Frontiers Australia</a> run campaigns advocating for increased personal online freedom even while the Australian government argues for the need for <a href="http://aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=pjcis/nsl2012/">increased surveillance</a>.</p>
<p>This is not intended as a straw-man argument, or an excuse for the Chinese government carrying out immoderate online censorship. Such efforts will ultimately fail. For now it’s hard for the Chinese government to answer if the internet should be totally open or not.</p>
<p>But I believe, as civil society develops in China, the internet will ultimately play a critical role in democratisation.</p>
<p><strong>Further reading:</strong> <br>
<a href="https://theconversation.com/no-no-on-weibo-china-challenges-the-new-york-times-7964">No-no on Weibo: China challenges the New York Times</a></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/8310/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sean Rintel is a board member of Electronic Frontiers Australia.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yanshuang Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Last week, Chinese internet users noticed the two Mandarin characters for “truth” could not be searched on Sina Weibo, the most popular microblogging platform in China. On July 12,Tom Philips, Shanghai…Yanshuang Zhang, Ph.D Candidate, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/79642012-06-29T03:34:17Z2012-06-29T03:34:17ZNo-no on Weibo: China challenges the New York Times<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12376/original/n38xxnfs-1340929875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2%2C7%2C777%2C454&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Within hours of launching, the New York Times Sina Weibo account was suspended.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">cn.nytimes.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The New York Times’ (NYT) entry into the Chinese media market is off to a seemingly rocky start. Two days ago, the company launched <a href="http://cn.nytimes.com/">its Chinese website</a> – cn.nytimes.com – and a corresponding <a href="http://www.weibo.com/nytchinese">Sina Weibo microblogging account</a> (China’s domestic version of Twitter).</p>
<p>But just hours later, the paper’s <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/china/index.html">nytchinese</a> Weibo account was <a href="http://www.techinasia.com/new-york-times-weibo-account-suspended/">suspended</a>. The first things to disappear were the accounts “forward” and “comment” functions – which were disabled for several hours before vanishing. </p>
<p>The missing account resurfaced four hours later, with several new posts and a new page design; and no explanation for the suspension has yet been provided by the NYT, China Weibo or the Chinese Government. </p>
<h2>False start</h2>
<p>Before it was suspended, the nytchinese account had more than 12,000 followers and was growing rapidly. The following message gives a flavour of many of the initial messages from fans: </p>
<p><em>“First, welcome; second, looking forward to your true news.”</em></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12359/original/7wrpd2g9-1340862560.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12359/original/7wrpd2g9-1340862560.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12359/original/7wrpd2g9-1340862560.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12359/original/7wrpd2g9-1340862560.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12359/original/7wrpd2g9-1340862560.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12359/original/7wrpd2g9-1340862560.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12359/original/7wrpd2g9-1340862560.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12359/original/7wrpd2g9-1340862560.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">weibo.com/nytchinese original account page prior to suspension.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bill Bishop </span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But new followers were already wondering about the longevity of the account:</p>
<p><em>“Hope you will not be blocked.”</em></p>
<p><em>“How do you climb over the Great Firewall of China?”</em></p>
<p><em>“You will be labeled as ‘imperialist cultural invasion’ sooner or later.”</em></p>
<p><em>“I wonder whether you can survive in mainland if you don’t follow Chinese authorities’ orders to sing the praises of China.”</em></p>
<p>Many Chinese users were concerned about the famed masthead becoming a mere figurehead, a representation of acceptable Western journalism but lacking real journalistic teeth:</p>
<p><em>“I am afraid you cannot report what we want to see, and what you can report can be seen everywhere in our media.”</em></p>
<p><em>“Can you report Chinese negative news neutrally? Save it if you cannot.”</em></p>
<p><em>“Only one request: tell the truth! Don’t fool readers like China’s media do, which make themselves the biggest fool in the world.”</em></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12357/original/vwwjhxrq-1340862404.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12357/original/vwwjhxrq-1340862404.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12357/original/vwwjhxrq-1340862404.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12357/original/vwwjhxrq-1340862404.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12357/original/vwwjhxrq-1340862404.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12357/original/vwwjhxrq-1340862404.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12357/original/vwwjhxrq-1340862404.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12357/original/vwwjhxrq-1340862404.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Account missing for weibo.com/nytchinese (translated).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sina Weibo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Weibo usually suspends accounts that violate the rules in <a href="http://thenextweb.com/asia/2012/05/09/sina-weibo-to-introduce-user-contract-on-may-28-as-chinas-microblog-crackdown-continues/">Weibo’s New User Contract</a>. But nytchinese was newly established and contained only one welcome post from the company itself. By the end of the day there were more than 1,400 posts to Weibo speculating about the situation:</p>
<p><em>“If people cannot forward or comment, can we still call it Weibo?”</em></p>
<p><em>“The content can cater to the taste of Chinese government, seems censored, but still a good start. It can give new impetus to the competition of quality in Chinese media market.”</em></p>
<h2>History repeating?</h2>
<p>Before the NYT, other major news portals such as the <a href="http://cn.wsj.com">Wall Street Journal</a> and the <a href="http://www.ftchinese.com/">Financial Times</a> launched Chinese editions and linked Weibo accounts, which now have millions of followers.</p>
<p>As the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/16/business/global/16blogs.html">NYT observed a year ago</a>, Weibo is considered by many to be “a real-time polling system to find out what’s going on in China”. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12356/original/b99hgqz8-1340862351.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12356/original/b99hgqz8-1340862351.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12356/original/b99hgqz8-1340862351.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12356/original/b99hgqz8-1340862351.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12356/original/b99hgqz8-1340862351.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12356/original/b99hgqz8-1340862351.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12356/original/b99hgqz8-1340862351.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12356/original/b99hgqz8-1340862351.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">NYT China edition: editor’s note on launch day.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">cn.nytimes.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite <a href="http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/03/weibo-comments-suspended-in-coup-rumour-aftermath/">regular government censorship</a>, Weibo is still considered the freest space for public opinion and even political dissidence in mainland China. It has also accommodated overseas users, media groups and organisations, which is highly unusual for a mainland Chinese media company.</p>
<h2>Tight government control</h2>
<p>The primary challenge for the NYT will be how to deal with ubiquitous internet censorship in China. One of <a href="http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2010/02/03/real-lessons-from-google-china-spat/cyt">Google’s Chinese lessons</a> was that, in an encounter with a politically vengeful authoritarian government, direct confrontational tactics are unwise because the Chinese government will impose tighter restrictions on the flow of information. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12358/original/z3ndsp7v-1340862533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12358/original/z3ndsp7v-1340862533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12358/original/z3ndsp7v-1340862533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=760&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12358/original/z3ndsp7v-1340862533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=760&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12358/original/z3ndsp7v-1340862533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=760&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12358/original/z3ndsp7v-1340862533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=955&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12358/original/z3ndsp7v-1340862533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=955&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12358/original/z3ndsp7v-1340862533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=955&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">NYT China edition, front page.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">cn.nytimes.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The current Chinese editions of Western mastheads are cautious when reporting Chinese political affairs, deploying domestic editors to deal with sensitive reports that might invite scrutiny.</p>
<p>Even so, they are often caught off-guard. On October 15 2010, posts on cn.WSJ.com and FTchinese Weibo accounts were among those censored for an <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703673604575549324179050034.html">article</a> about senior Communist Party members signing a letter calling for freedom of speech. </p>
<h2>Western or local content?</h2>
<p>The second challenge is that of Western versus local Chinese content. At first glance NYT China ushers in a specifically Chinese content section. But some of the reports are borrowed from the company’s English website and are outdated.</p>
<p>One article – <a href="http://cn.nytimes.com/article/china/2012/06/26/c26appletwo/en/?pagemode=print">In China, Human Costs Are Built into an iPad</a> – was listed at the top of the Chinese content section of NYT China, and was seemingly up-to-date. But that article was <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html?pagewanted=all">first published</a> six months ago on the company’s main website. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12382/original/hpf76cpx-1340930722.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12382/original/hpf76cpx-1340930722.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12382/original/hpf76cpx-1340930722.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=730&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12382/original/hpf76cpx-1340930722.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=730&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12382/original/hpf76cpx-1340930722.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=730&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12382/original/hpf76cpx-1340930722.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12382/original/hpf76cpx-1340930722.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12382/original/hpf76cpx-1340930722.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">NYT China edition: Chinese version of the iPad story published on June 26 2012.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">cn.nytimes.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12383/original/v7w84bbw-1340930872.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12383/original/v7w84bbw-1340930872.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/12383/original/v7w84bbw-1340930872.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=717&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12383/original/v7w84bbw-1340930872.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=717&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12383/original/v7w84bbw-1340930872.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=717&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12383/original/v7w84bbw-1340930872.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12383/original/v7w84bbw-1340930872.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/12383/original/v7w84bbw-1340930872.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">NYT English edition: original iPad story published on January 25 2012.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">nytimes.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If this practice is simply part of bootstrapping the Chinese edition, Chinese users may consider NYT China not as an archive of quality but of outdated reports from the company’s English website. The NYT will need to learn from cn.WSJ.com and FTchinese, both of which now have a series of attractive Chinese sections, as well as well-known local columnists and business experts. </p>
<p>That being said, in contrast to the WSJ and FT pay-for-content strategies in Western countries, the WSJ and FT Chinese services still remain free for registered users. Chinese users still feel there’s not enough local content, and thus while readership is increasing, revenue feasibility is still weak.</p>
<p>The NYT has entered China in a period of more openness. But to survive, it may need to learn how to discreetly express its own values and interests.</p>
<p><strong>What do you think of the New York Times’ chances in China? Have your say in the comments section below.</strong></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/7964/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yanshuang Zhang does not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article and has no relevant affiliations.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yanshuang Zhang receives funding from the China Scholarship Council.</span></em></p>The New York Times’ (NYT) entry into the Chinese media market is off to a seemingly rocky start. Two days ago, the company launched its Chinese website – cn.nytimes.com – and a corresponding Sina Weibo…Yanshuang Zhang, Ph.D Candidate, The University of QueenslandSean Rintel, Lecturer in Strategic Communication, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.