tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-117499/articlesZaporizhzhia nuclear power plant – The Conversation2023-06-07T12:27:04Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2071922023-06-07T12:27:04Z2023-06-07T12:27:04ZKakhovka dam breach raises risk for Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant – receding waters narrow options for cooling<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530452/original/file-20230606-15-9gusbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5270%2C3502&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant seen across the Dnieper River, which was receding after a downstream dam was destroyed.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-europes-largest-nuclear-news-photo/1244319572">Photo by Carl Court/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>A blast on June 6, 2023, destroyed the Kakhovka dam on the Dnieper River in eastern Ukraine. The rupture lowered water levels in a reservoir upriver at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in the city of Enerhodar. The reservoir supplies water necessary for cooling the plant’s shutdown reactors and spent fuel, which is uranium that has been largely but not completely depleted by the fission reaction that drives nuclear power plants.</em></p>
<p><em>The International Atomic Energy Agency, which has inspectors on-site to monitor effects of the war at the plant, issued a statement saying that there was <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-director-general-statement-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors">no imminent danger</a>. Nevertheless, the destruction of the dam increases the risk of a disaster at the plant, a risk already heightened by ongoing combat in the area.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked <a href="https://sites.usc.edu/meshkati/">Najmedin Meshkati</a>, a professor and <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/thirty-three-years-catastrophe-chernobyl-universal-lesson-global-nuclear-power-industry">nuclear safety expert</a> at the University of Southern California, to explain what the dropping water level means for the safety of the nuclear power plant and the ongoing risks to the plant’s spent fuel.</em> </p>
<h2>Why are dropping water levels a threat to the power plant?</h2>
<p>The immediate situation is becoming very precarious. The dam is downstream from the plant, meaning that the flooding will not jeopardize the plant. But the plant draws water from a major reservoir on the river for its cooling system. This reservoir is draining because the downstream dam has been damaged.</p>
<p>The plant doesn’t need the massive amount of water it otherwise would because its six reactors are in cold shutdown. But the plant still needs water for three purposes: to reduce the residual heat from the shutdown reactors, to cool the spent fuel, and to cool the emergency diesel generators if the plant loses off-site power.</p>
<p>The plant’s operators pumped water from the reservoir into a cooling pond, which is why the IAEA said the plant <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zaporizhzhia-cooling-pond-is-full-has-enough-water-months-iaea-2023-06-06/">has enough water for several months</a>. But that’s the last resort, which is why the agency also said that it’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/after-dam-bursts-iaea-says-zaporizhzhias-cooling-pond-must-be-protected-2023-06-06/">vital that the cooling pond remains intact</a>. If the plant loses the cooling pond, the only hope would be to try something like they did at the Fukushima nuclear power plant after the earthquake and tsunami in Japan in 2011. They brought in huge water pumps to pump saltwater from the Pacific Ocean into the reactors to cool them down. The plant operators may need to try to pump water from the Dnieper River.</p>
<p>The two lifelines of any nuclear plant, whether operational or closed down, are water and electricity. The newly launched Ukrainian counteroffensive puts these two lifelines in further jeopardy. Since the Russian occupation, the plant has <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/ukraines-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-the-looming-specter-of-europes-most-serious-risk/">suffered a lot and lost off-site power seven times</a>. My immediate concern is that if the plant loses its last remaining power line, which powers the cooling pumps, then it needs to rely on emergency diesel generators. There are 20 generators with on-site storage of only 10 to 15 days of fuel supply. Getting fuel while the counteroffensive is going on is another major challenge.</p>
<h2>What does it mean to have a nuclear reactor in cold shutdown?</h2>
<p>The fission reaction that generates heat in a nuclear power plant is produced by positioning a number of uranium fuel rods in close proximity. Shutting down a nuclear reactor involves inserting control rods between the fuel rods to stop the fission reaction. </p>
<p>The reactor is then in cooldown mode as the temperature decreases. <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/full-text.html">According to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission</a>, once the temperature is below 200 degrees Fahrenheit (93 Celsius) and the reactor coolant system is at atmospheric pressure, the reactor is in cold shutdown.</p>
<p>When the reactor is operating, it requires cooling to absorb the heat and keep the fuel rods from melting together, which would set off a catastrophic chain reaction. When a reactor is in cold shutdown, it no longer needs the same level of circulation.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant uses pressurized water reactors.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>How does being in cold shutdown improve the plant’s safety?</h2>
<p>The shutdown has removed a huge element of risk. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is a <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/pwrs.html">pressurized water reactor</a>. These reactors need constant cooling, and the cooling pumps are gigantic, powerful electricity-guzzling machines. </p>
<p>Cold shutdown is the state in which you do not need to constantly run the primary cooling pumps at the same level to circulate the cooling water in the primary cooling loop. Now, at least if the plant loses offsite power, the operators won’t have to worry about trying to cool an operating reactor with cranky diesel generators.</p>
<p>And by shutting down all the reactors, the plant operators have been relieved of a considerable amount of their workload monitoring the reactors amid the ongoing uncertainties around the site. This substantially reduced the potential for human error.</p>
<p>The operators’ jobs are likely to be much less demanding and stressful now than before. However, they still need to constantly monitor the status of the shutdown reactors and the spent fuel pools.</p>
<h2>What are the risks from the spent fuel at the plant?</h2>
<p>The plant still needs a reliable source of electricity to cool the six huge spent fuel pools that are inside the containment structures and to remove residual heat from the shutdown reactors. The cooling pumps for the spent fuel pools need much less electricity than the cooling pumps on the reactor’s primary and secondary loops, and the spent fuel cooling system could tolerate a brief electricity outage.</p>
<p>One more important factor is that the spent fuel storage racks in the spent fuel pools at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant were compacted to increase capacity, according to a <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/national_report_of_ukraine_for_the_6th_review_meeting_-_english.pdf">2017 Ukrainian government report to the IAEA</a>. The greater number and more compacted the stored spent fuel rods, the more heat they generate and so more power is needed to cool them.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four large concrete cylinders on a concrete slab" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">These massive concrete cylinders store spent nuclear fuel rods. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant stores much of its spent fuel outdoors in casks like these.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nrcgov/6946374745">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission</a></span>
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<p>There is also a dry spent fuel storage facility at the plant. <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/dry-cask-storage.html">Dry spent fuel storage</a> involves packing spent fuel rods into massive cylinders, or casks, which require no water or other coolants. The casks are designed to keep the fuel rods contained for at least 50 years. However, the casks are not under the containment structures at the plant, and though they were designed to withstand being crashed into by an airliner, it’s not clear whether artillery shelling and aerial bombardment, particularly repeated attacks, could crack open the casks and release radiation into the grounds of the plant. </p>
<p>The closest analogy to this scenario could be a <a href="https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/11263/safety-and-security-of-commercial-spent-nuclear-fuel-storage-public">terrorist attack</a> that, according to a seminal study by the National Research Council, could breach a dry cask and potentially result in the release of radioactive material from the spent fuel. This could happen through the dispersion of fuel particles or fragments or the dispersion of radioactive aerosols. This would be similar to the detonation of a “dirty bomb,” which, depending on wind direction and dispersion radius, could result in radioactive contamination. This in turn could cause serious problems for access to and work in the plant.</p>
<h2>Next steps from the IAEA and UN</h2>
<p>Rafael Mariano Grossi, the head of the IAEA, <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15300.doc.htm">briefed the U.N. Security Council</a> on May 30, 2023, about the situation at the Zaporizhzhia plant. He called on Russia and Ukraine to ensure that the conflict <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15300.doc.htm">does not put the plant at risk</a>. Grossi has been to the Security Council several times. A week before the dam failed, he said it was the most important briefing that he had given to the council. To date, there has been no draft resolution from the Security Council.</p>
<p>This situation is rapidly evolving. And if something happens and there is a radiation release, it’s going to spread around the world.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/cold-shutdown-reduces-risk-of-disaster-at-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-but-combat-around-spent-fuel-still-poses-a-threat-190516">an article</a> originally published on Sept. 13, 2022. The article has been updated to include news of the destruction of a dam downriver from the nuclear power plant and the IAEA’s report to the U.N. Security Council about reducing the risk that combat poses to the plant.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207192/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Najmedin Meshkati received research funding from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the mid-1990s.</span></em></p>The International Atomic Energy Agency says the plant has enough water to last for several months. What happens afterward or if the remaining water is lost to the war could lead to a disaster.Najmedin Meshkati, Professor of Engineering and International Relations, University of Southern CaliforniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2071822023-06-06T19:30:30Z2023-06-06T19:30:30ZKakhovka dam breach: 3 essential reads on what it means for Ukraine’s infrastructure, beleaguered nuclear plant and future war plans<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530429/original/file-20230606-18-ylhg3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C21%2C2834%2C1517&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The breach of the Kakhovka dam in Ukraine could have lasting ecological and health impacts.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineWar/e19fad339d4a403e863ca5ffd2ebe420/photo?Query=Kakhovka%20dam&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=49&currentItemNo=27">Ukrainian Presidential Office via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A dam that supplies drinking water to thousands of Ukrainians as well as cooling water for reactors at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station <a href="https://apnews.com/article/kakhovka-dam-ukraine-russia-war-whats-at-stake-a417dafefa79462bef5e4e63c0a94c8c">was ruptured on June 6, 2023</a>.</p>
<p>Kyiv blamed the destruction on Moscow, with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/06/06/world/russia-ukraine-news">President Volodymyr Zelenskyy slamming “Russian terrorists</a>” for destroying the Kakhovka dam and the adjacent hydroelectric power station on the Dnieper River. Meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/6/ukraine-says-russian-forces-blew-up-nova-kakhovka-dam-in-kherson">Kremlin accused Ukraine of “deliberate sabotage</a>,” noting that the reservoir is a crucial resource for the people of Crimea, a Ukrainian region <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/17/crimea-six-years-after-illegal-annexation/">illegally annexed by Russia</a> in 2014.</p>
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<p>Either way, the destruction of the dam is a worrying development. It has the potential for lasting ecological damage and harm to human health in a country already ravaged by more than a year of warfare. It also evokes concerns flagged by The Conversation’s authors in past articles looking at how the conflict has put infrastructure and nuclear power on the front lines. </p>
<h2>1) Risk of nuclear accidents</h2>
<p>This isn’t the first time during the Ukraine war that concerns have been raised over the fate of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station. The plant is the largest nuclear facility in Europe. But ongoing fighting has put it in a uniquely vulnerable position.</p>
<p>In an interview back in August 2022 after the plant was damaged by shelling, <a href="https://viterbi.usc.edu/directory/faculty/Meshkati/Najmedin">Najmedin Meshkati</a>, a nuclear safety expert at the University of Southern California, <a href="https://theconversation.com/un-nuclear-agency-calls-for-protection-zone-around-imperiled-ukrainian-power-plant-a-safety-expert-explains-why-that-could-be-crucial-189429">laid out the concerns</a>, including a worst-case scenario in which a missile damages the nuclear reactor, releasing radiation into the atmosphere. “It could be another Chernobyl,” he said.</p>
<p>More pertinent to the destruction of the dam is the potential disruption to the flow of cooling water. </p>
<p>As Meshkati pointed out in August 2022: “Even if you shut down the reactors, the plant will need off-site power to run the huge cooling system to remove the residual heat in the reactor and bring it to what is called a cold shutdown. Water circulation is always needed to make sure the spent fuel doesn’t overheat. Spent fuel pools also need constant water circulation to keep them cool, and they need cooling for several years before they can be put in dry casks.”</p>
<p>The International Atomic Energy Agency has said in the aftermath of the dam rupture that there are <a href="https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/IAEA-No-immediate-risk-to-Zaporizhzhia-from-dam-da?feed=feed">no immediate risks</a> to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station. It noted that five of the six reactors there have already been put in cold shutdown, which require relatively little water. The sixth reactor is cooled with water from a nearby pond. The danger would be if the pond became depleted.</p>
<p>These concerns may prompt renewed calls for a demilitarized zone to be set up around the nuclear plant. </p>
<p>“War,” Meshkati noted, “is the worst enemy of nuclear safety.”</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-nuclear-agency-calls-for-protection-zone-around-imperiled-ukrainian-power-plant-a-safety-expert-explains-why-that-could-be-crucial-189429">UN nuclear agency calls for protection zone around imperiled Ukrainian power plant – a safety expert explains why that could be crucial</a>
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<h2>2. Risk to civilian infrastructure</h2>
<p>Russia has denied causing the damage to the dam. But in October 2022, <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/jensen.cfm">Benjamin Jensen</a>, a defense strategist at American University’s School of International Service, was <a href="https://theconversation.com/crippling-civilian-infrastructure-has-long-been-part-of-russian-generals-playbook-putin-is-merely-expanding-that-approach-192226">warning of the danger of increased targeting of civilian infrastructure</a> as the war progressed.</p>
<p>In response to setbacks on the battlefield, “Russia has increased its attacks in Ukraine on everything from power plants and dams to railways, pipelines and ports,” he noted, adding, “These attacks against civilian infrastructure are not random. Rather, they reflect an insidious calculus integral to modern Russian military theory. For more than 20 years, Russian military journals have emphasized the need to conduct noncontact warfare and target critical infrastructure.”</p>
<p>It forms part of a “coercive strategy” by which Russia attempts to manipulate the enemy through a mix of political, economic and military pressure.</p>
<p>After it became apparent that Russia’s initial war plan was sufficiently countered by Western-backed Ukrainian resistance, Moscow upped its attacks on infrastructure in line with this coercive strategy.</p>
<p>“While military campaigns historically target transportation infrastructure, Russia went further. In response to the ongoing counteroffensive – which has seen Ukrainian forces retake formerly Russian occupied land in the east and south of the country – coercive measures by Russia have escalated to include targeting major dams. In mid-September 2022, Russia tried to destroy the dam outside of Kryvyi Rih, a city of half a million people,” wrote Jensen.</p>
<p>If the Ukrainian interpretation of what happened at the Kakhovka dam is accepted, this time, Russia succeeded.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/crippling-civilian-infrastructure-has-long-been-part-of-russian-generals-playbook-putin-is-merely-expanding-that-approach-192226">Crippling civilian infrastructure has long been part of Russian generals' playbook – Putin is merely expanding that approach</a>
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<h2>3. Risk to Ukraine’s war plans</h2>
<p>Regardless of who is to blame over the dam’s rupture, the incident will affect the war. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/gov/wolff-stefan.aspx">Stefan Wolff</a> and <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/gov/dunn-david.aspx#staffdetails">David Hastings Dunn</a>, from the University of Birmingham in the U.K., <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-we-know-about-the-nova-kakhovka-dam-and-who-gains-from-its-destruction-207130">noted the timing of the destruction</a>: just as Ukraine seemed poised to launch a major counteroffensive.</p>
<p>“The enormous flood that it has triggered is likely to devastate vast areas on both banks of the Dnieper south toward Crimea. This will make offensive operations by Ukrainian ground forces in this area difficult, probably for months to come, and without similarly weakening Russian defensive lines,” they wrote, adding: “Moreover, it will also make it more difficult for Ukrainian forces to advance further toward Crimea, the peninsula that Russia has illegally occupied since 2014.” </p>
<p>If this was the intended purpose then it would mark “a new phase in this war,” Wolff and Hastings Dunn wrote. “It demonstrates Moscow’s effort to control the narrative as to who is responsible for the most heinous acts in the conflict after many months of negative coverage of the Russian conduct of the war.” And in sacrificing hydroelectric power and drinking water to Crimea, the move would suggest “a callous disregard for the inhabitants [of Crimea], many of them ethnic Russians.”</p>
<p>“Despite the Kremlin’s rhetoric, what this episode suggests is that Russia is less interested in liberating Ukraine from its present leadership than it is in destroying its ability to function as a sovereign nation,” Wolff and Hastings Dunn wrote.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-we-know-about-the-nova-kakhovka-dam-and-who-gains-from-its-destruction-207130">Ukraine war: what we know about the Nova Kakhovka dam and who gains from its destruction</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207182/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Russia and Ukraine have blamed each other for the attack on crucial civilian infrastructure. Experts explain what the incident means for future war plans, and for the safety of the affected region.Matt Williams, Senior International EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2025052023-03-27T00:50:05Z2023-03-27T00:50:05ZThe environmental impact of Russia’s invasion goes beyond Ukraine – how do we deal with ‘problems without passports’?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517523/original/file-20230326-26-fnkwc4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C0%2C3164%2C2085&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appears to be a defining moment in the evolution of the post-Cold War world. In particular, it is highlighting problems that do not respect borders, such as the environmental damage caused by war. These are raising important questions about international security.</p>
<p>Can a form of rules-based international co-operation – rather than great power aspirations – become the preferred diplomatic response?</p>
<p>Traditionally, a key driver of international relations has been the so-called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westphalian_system#">Westphalian doctrine</a> of absolute state sovereignty. This is based on the belief that there is no higher authority than the state for defining national economic, security and diplomatic interests in the international arena.</p>
<p>But the end of the Cold War and deepening globalisation have challenged that approach to global politics. </p>
<p>Today, there appears to be a significant divide. On one side, “realist” observers claim reinvigorated great power rivalry has ended the globalisation “project”. On the other, “liberals” argue globalisation is an irreversible structural change that encourages international co-operation to deal with “problems without passports”.</p>
<p>Clearly this disagreement has not been resolved. But the <a href="https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/toxic-legacy-ukraine-war">environmental impacts</a> of Russia’s Ukraine invasion could tilt the debate in favour of those arguing for a more multilateral approach to security.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/liberal-hawks-versus-realist-doves-who-is-winning-the-ideological-war-over-the-future-of-ukraine-198652">Liberal hawks versus realist doves: who is winning the ideological war over the future of Ukraine?</a>
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<h2>‘Ecocide’ in Ukraine</h2>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.parliament.nz/mi/get-involved/features/ukrainian-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy-to-address-new-zealand-parliament/">address to the New Zealand parliament</a> in December 2022, Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky made a distinction between the impact of the Russian invasion on the country’s environment and its effects on the economy and infrastructure. The latter, he said, could be reconstructed with huge investment once the conflict was over.</p>
<p>The invasion, he observed, involved a policy of “ecocide”. That is, it has involved the destruction of Ukraine’s natural environment by deliberate or negligent Russian actions. These are widespread, long-term and severe in their effects.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-leaves-a-toxic-legacy-that-lasts-long-after-the-guns-go-quiet-can-we-stop-it-197051">War leaves a toxic legacy that lasts long after the guns go quiet. Can we stop it?</a>
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<p>To date, around 174,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory have been <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russian-landmines-ukraine-psychological-warfare/">contaminated with mines</a> and unexploded ordnance. Large areas of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoz have been polluted due to military action. It is estimated hundreds of thousands of fish and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/may/10/ukraine-war-rise-dolphin-deaths-strandings-black-sea">other creatures</a> in these waters have died as a result.</p>
<p>The invasion has degraded vast tracts of agricultural land and could jeopardise Ukraine’s position as one of the world’s major food producers. It has also destroyed large areas of forest, as well as many national parks. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia’s campaign of intensive shelling has targeted Ukraine’s industrial facilities, a tactic that has caused significant air, water and soil contamination. It has also put the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/mar/09/russia-ukraine-war-live-news-russian-missile-strikes-blackouts-odesa-kharkiv-latest-updates">Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant</a>, the largest in Europe, at risk of a major nuclear accident.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517524/original/file-20230326-14-74lff8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517524/original/file-20230326-14-74lff8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517524/original/file-20230326-14-74lff8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517524/original/file-20230326-14-74lff8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517524/original/file-20230326-14-74lff8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517524/original/file-20230326-14-74lff8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517524/original/file-20230326-14-74lff8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Ukrainian technician works to remove land mines in the Kharkiv region, March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span>
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<h2>Damage beyond borders</h2>
<p>As Zelensky emphasised in his address to the New Zealand parliament, however, Russia’s ecocidal policy is not just a problem for Ukraine, but also for much of the world. The international environmental consequences of this conflict are becoming clearer.</p>
<p>For one thing, the contamination of Ukraine’s groundwater in the wake of the Russian invasion could severely affect the ecosystems of several neighbouring states.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-war-has-nearly-doubled-household-energy-costs-worldwide-new-study-200104">Russia–Ukraine war has nearly doubled household energy costs worldwide – new study</a>
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<p>In addition, the conflict is reshaping global food and fertiliser markets. A number of countries are planning to increase grain production and develop fertiliser production, a potential threat to ecosystems and biodiversity.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the war has potential climate-related impacts. While a number of states have reduced their reliance on Russian oil and gas imports, some are <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/21/ukraine-war-europe-turns-to-coal-as-russia-squeezes-gas-supplies.html">relaunching coal stations</a>, extending the lifespan of nuclear power stations and investing in new fossil fuel projects. </p>
<p>Taken together, the national and international environmental repercussions of the invasion confirm what has been plain for much of the post-Cold War era: the widely held idea of national security based almost exclusively on the perception of military threat is both limited and dangerous.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/other-casualties-of-putins-war-in-ukraine-russias-climate-goals-and-science-182995">Other casualties of Putin's war in Ukraine: Russia's climate goals and science</a>
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<h2>Reform at the UN</h2>
<p>In the 21st century, there are pressures to broaden the concept of security to recognise that threats to a state’s wellbeing can often emanate from environmental degradation. Progress towards acknowledging environmental security, however, depends on two conditions. </p>
<p>The first is that Vladimir Putin’s illegal invasion and attempted annexation of Ukraine – a flagrant violation of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter">United Nations Charter</a> – must be squarely defeated if a rules-based order, conducive to international co-operation, is to be sustained.</p>
<p>Second, the UN Security Council – a global body that has the primary responsibility for addressing threats to international security – must be reformed to ensure it is a more reliable barrier to war and its environmental impacts.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/cold-shutdown-reduces-risk-of-disaster-at-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-but-combat-around-spent-fuel-still-poses-a-threat-190516">Cold shutdown reduces risk of disaster at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant – but combat around spent fuel still poses a threat</a>
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<p>In an address to the Security Council in April 2022, Zelensky said Russia’s invasion was the latest example of how the right of veto enjoyed by the council’s five permanent members had undermined an effective system of international security – and had effectively failed Ukraine. </p>
<p>Zelensky was right. Until those member states lose the privilege of their right of veto, the path towards recognising the wider importance of environmental security in an increasingly interdependent world is likely to be more protracted than it should be.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the New Zealand government should publicly back Kyiv’s efforts to win international support for the notion of environmental security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202505/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert G. Patman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ecological damage, risk of nuclear accident and the economic fallout from war all affect countries well beyond the conflict zone. How should the world deal with these borderless threats?Robert G. Patman, Professor of International Relations, University of OtagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1969552022-12-21T15:09:06Z2022-12-21T15:09:06ZUkraine war: Moscow and Kyiv are talking – just not about peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502360/original/file-20221221-22-c4lsor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C7%2C4897%2C3058&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Common ground: back-channel negotiations have succeeded in brokering deals including over grain exports.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">vchal via Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the G20 summit in Bali in November, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky announced a new <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-zavzhdi-bula-liderom-mirotvorchih-zusil-yaksho-rosi-79141">ten-point plan</a> to end hostilities. He demands nothing less than the withdrawal of Russian troops from all of Ukraine, including Crimea and other areas of the country occupied by the Russians since 2014. And the latest <a href="https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/v_dbudova_ukra_ni_ta_m_zhnarodna_dopomoga_20-21_listopada_2022.html?fbclid=IwAR323UcPid-Q2oswvjApSiA3iSHPc_8QdOjF0m-xb0bfwaIRrOAfKzjRH38">polls</a> show 85% of Ukrainians support his uncompromising stand.</p>
<p>But Russia’s position is as unyielding. Vladimir Putin is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/09/putin-shelling-ukraine-power-grid-russia-president-strikes-energy-infrastructure">adamant</a> that any political settlement will be based on “the realities that are taking shape on the ground”. Moscow wants to force Ukraine to recognise Russia’s occupation of nearly 20% of its territory. </p>
<p>Far from any peace talks, Ukrainian generals are <a href="https://www.economist.com/ukraines-fateful-winter">worried</a> about a new Russian offensive. But this doesn’t mean the two sides are not talking.</p>
<p>There have been back-channel talks on a whole range of issues, brokered by mediators from Turkey, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Oligarchs such as Roman Abramovich have been playing an unofficial role. Abu Dhabi and Ankara are the Helsinki and Vienna of this new cold war – cities where Russian, Ukrainian and western diplomats, businesspeople and spies can easily meet away from media scrutiny. </p>
<h2>Nuclear security</h2>
<p>The toughest negotiation has been over nuclear security. Rafael Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has been mediating talks to establish a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-iaea-russia-idAFR4N32S01N">protection zone</a>” around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Russia occupied the plant early in the war and has attempted to annexe the whole region after a sham referendum in September. Ukraine rejects these claims – as does most of the Ukrainian workforce at the plant. </p>
<p>But they are now on the frontline of the war. In November, Grossi called an outbreak of shelling around the plant “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/21/un-calls-for-end-to-madness-of-attacks-on-zaporizhzhia-plant">madness</a>”. Russia claims that Ukraine has been firing recklessly on the plant and mounting raids to try to recapture it. Ukraine claims that Russia uses the plant as cover to fire on Ukrainian forces. </p>
<p>In early December, there were <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/12/03/packing-their-bags">rumours</a> of a potential deal – but the two sides differ on what a “protective zone” means. Ukraine wants a full withdrawal of Russian forces and personnel. The G7 backed this position in a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/g7-calls-for-return-of-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-to-ukraine-control/">statement</a> in October. But Russia fears that any further retreat will provoke nationalist ire at home and give Ukraine a platform for a new counteroffensive.</p>
<p>In early December, Grossi <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/iaea-chief-hopes-find-solution-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-by-year-end-2022-12-02/">told the press</a> that he hoped to negotiate a deal by the end of the year, but since then there has been little sign of progress. </p>
<h2>Fertiliser deals</h2>
<p>A second backroom discussion has been held on the <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/fertilizer-diplomacy-how-ammonia-could-hobble-black-sea-grain-deal-104134">fertiliser trade</a>, a critical problem for global food security. Russia is a major exporter of ammonia, the key ingredient in fertiliser. Prior to the war, the bulk of Russia’s exports travelled along an ageing Soviet-era pipeline from Tolyatti in central Russia to the Ukrainian port of Odesa.</p>
<p>The pipeline was <a href="https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2307380-ammonia-most-exposed-fertilizer-to-ukraine-conflict">closed</a> in February 2022 when the war broke out. But under a deal negotiated in July by Turkey and the UN, Russia agreed to allow exports of grain to resume from Ukrainian ports. As part of the deal, Russian ammonia exports were also to restart – but Ukraine refused to allow the pipeline to reopen. </p>
<p>The UN has held several meetings with both sides, and persuaded Russian and Ukrainian delegations to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-russians-ukrainians-met-uae-discuss-prisoner-swap-ammonia-sources-say-2022-11-24/">meet</a> on November 17 in Abu Dhabi. </p>
<p>The deal on the table is <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c617b4a1-3750-47cc-b4e6-fa963b572f1b">complicated</a>. It would involve a US company buying ammonia from the Russians at the Russian-Ukrainian border before reselling it on international markets. The stumbling block seems to be Ukraine’s demand for a major prisoner swap as the price to get the pipeline running again.</p>
<p>The EU did <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/fertilizer-row-holds-up-eu-latest-russia-ukraine-war-sanctions-package-famine-food-supplies/">relax</a> some sanctions against Russian fertiliser producers on December 15 to allow shipments to leave European ports. The move sparked protests from Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania, and shows the difficult balance between a tight sanctions regime and global food security. But the Russian-Ukraine ammonia pipeline remains blocked.</p>
<h2>Prisoner swaps</h2>
<p>Talks on prisoner exchanges have been more successful. Turkey and Saudi Arabia were both involved in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-prisoner-swaps-have-been-going-on-for-centuries-heres-how-they-work-191880">negotiating a major exchange</a> of 300 POWs in September. Despite the political rhetoric on both sides, ideology is largely absent from the prisoner swaps. </p>
<p>Instead, there is ruthless bargaining. In the September deal, 215 Ukrainian soldiers returned home compared with just 55 Russians. But the Ukrainians had an ace card: Putin’s Ukrainian crony <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/ukrainian-putin-ally-viktor-medvedchuk-exchanged-for-200-azov-battalion-fighters-zelenskiy-says">Viktor Medvedchuk</a>, who was facing treason charges after being captured early in the war. And there were some smart compromises: commanders from Ukraine’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azov_Regiment">Azov regiment</a> were released on condition that they sit out the war in Turkey. </p>
<p>Since then, there have been regular swaps. By December 7, Ukraine <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/07/ukraine-russia-pows-exchange-prisoners/">reported</a> that 817 Ukrainian prisoners had been released since September. A further <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-12-14-22/h_ab22b98b8d6010dfce17796c3b48e5b3">65 Ukrainians and a US citizen</a> returned home on December 15. </p>
<p>Some see this as hope for wider talks. The head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Mirjana Spoljaric Egger, has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/red-cross-chief-major-prisoner-swap-deal-is-option-russia-ukraine-war-2022-12-14/">pointed out</a> that such exchanges sometimes lead to wider agreements. But there are more prosaic reasons driving the exchanges too. Prisoner swaps save money for both sides, and give them leverage for talks on other issues. </p>
<p>None of these backroom deals suggest that peace talks will come any time soon. While Putin continues to seek the destruction of the Ukrainian state, there is little prospect of a genuine peace deal. But they do show that both sides have informal channels for negotiations. These might be the best hope for now to avoid dangerous escalation, and to mitigate some of the worst impacts of the war on ordinary people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lewis has received funding from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the Economic and Social Research Council and the George Marshall European Center for Security Studies. He is a Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. </span></em></p>For now there is little hope of a peace deal, but back-channel agreements show that Ukraine and Russia are at least talking.David Lewis, Professor, International Politics, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1953382022-11-24T18:34:56Z2022-11-24T18:34:56ZUkraine recap: targeting power supply earns Russia new title of ‘state sponsor of terror’ as winter begins to bite<p>Temperatures are falling steadily across Ukraine. The UK’s Met Office forecasts light (but pretty cold) rain in Kyiv for the next day or two followed by snow, snow, snow, as the mercury drops steadily into minus numbers next week. </p>
<p>Large areas of Ukraine, including the capital, are now without power much of the time. And still Moscow persists with its strategy of targeting Ukraine’s power supply. It’s hard to argue – as the Kremlin continues to insist – that these are military targets.</p>
<p>Yesterday a two-day old baby was killed when what have been reported to be Russian missiles hit a maternity ward in Zaporizhzhia. The region is home to Europe’s largest nuclear power plant and has come under particularly bombardment recently. </p>
<p>The plant itself has been under Russian occupation since March, but the surrounding area is bitterly contested. It is one of four regions annexed by Russia at the end of September, but significant areas have been wrested back by Ukraine’s counteroffensive. </p>
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<p>It is, of course, a war crime to deliberately target civilians or civilian infrastructure. But power facilities are a grey area as they could be seen as legitimate military targets. And, to be fair, this has been a tactic used time and time again during wars in the 20th and 21st century. German Zeppelins targeted electricity supplies in the first world war and the Germans also targeted the Soviet grid in a bid to regain the initiative after Stalingrad in world war two. The US has done the same in both Vietnam and, more recently, Iraq.</p>
<p>But the EU parliament has used Russia’s attacks on power stations, schools and hospitals to justify its decision this week to designate Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism – a distinction hitherto only afforded to Cuba, North Korea, Iran and Syria. </p>
<p>“Today, the European parliament recognised Russia as a terrorist state,” the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky declared in response, adding; “And then Russia proved that all this is true by using 67 missiles against our infrastructure, our energy grid, and ordinary people.” </p>
<p>Scott Lucas, an expert in international security at University College Dublin, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-eu-parliament-names-russia-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-but-it-wont-stop-the-missiles-195309">believes that</a> the EU’s move will have few real-world consequences. Russia is already subject to a harsh regime of sanctions, which is one of the penalties that comes with the European parliament’s decision. But the move will lend weight to the arguments of western governments when it comes to continuing to provide huge packages of military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the face of a cost-of-living crisis biting pretty much everywhere.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-eu-parliament-names-russia-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-but-it-wont-stop-the-missiles-195309">Ukraine war: EU parliament names Russia a 'state sponsor of terrorism' – but it won't stop the missiles</a>
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<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
<em>The Conversation, a not-for-profit newsgroup, works with a wide range of academics across its global network to produce evidence-based analysis. Get these recaps in your inbox every Thursday. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapTop">Subscribe here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Russia’s bombardment of Ukrainian infrastructure appears to have become Moscow’s default strategy in the face of significant military setbacks over the past two months or so. We recently reported that Ukraine had reoccupied the city of Kherson, important both strategically and in terms of morale. It’s the capital of one of four regions annexed by Russia in September. </p>
<p>Military strategist, Frank Ledwidge of the University of Portsmouth, says the victory in Kherson opens the way up for an eventual advance on Crimea, which – <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-after-recapture-of-kherson-the-conflict-is-poised-at-the-gates-of-crimea-195025">he writes</a> – is seen by both sides as Russia’s “centre of gravity”, the key to the war.</p>
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<p>This will be a far cry from Kyiv’s counteroffensives so far. As Ledwidge notes, unlike the rest of the occupied territories in Ukraine, most Russians agree that Crimea – with its majority Russian population – is legitimately a Russian territory. It has also, over several centuries and various conflicts including the second world war, proved a hard nut to crack. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-after-recapture-of-kherson-the-conflict-is-poised-at-the-gates-of-crimea-195025">Ukraine war: after recapture of Kherson the conflict is poised at the gates of Crimea</a>
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<h2>Wartime economies</h2>
<p>One aspect of the war we haven’t focused on specifically up to now has been how Ukraine’s economy has held up after nine months of conflict (something gently pointed out to us by a reader a couple of weeks ago). Like pretty much everywhere else, Ukraine found the COVID-19 pandemic very challenging, but bounced back strongly in 2021 recording GDP growth of 3.2%. But the war has dropped the economy off a cliff. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bar chart showing effect war on Ukraine's economy." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Bar chart showing effect war on Ukraine’s economy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">State Statistics Service of Ukraine</span></span>
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<p>Ukrainian scholar, Dmitriy Sergeyev – a professor of economics at Bocconi University in Milan – highlights the way the war has affected some sectors more than others. Some industries are relatively easy to relocate. For example, Ukraine’s burgeoning IT sector has endured relatively well, but steel production and other heavy industry have taken an enormous hit. For Ukraine’s massively important agricultural sector, the decision to renew the grain deal will bring in welcome export revenues, which – <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-the-economy-has-kept-running-at-a-time-of-bitter-conflict-195312">he says</a> – may even be enough to plant for the next season. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-the-economy-has-kept-running-at-a-time-of-bitter-conflict-195312">Ukraine war: how the economy has kept running at a time of bitter conflict</a>
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<p>The outlook for the Russian economy, meanwhile, “bodes poorly for Vladimir Putin’s ability to fund Russia’s war in Ukraine,” according to a recent report in the Wall Street Journal, which adds that “mobilisation, sanctions and falling energy prices” are hurting Russia badly. </p>
<p>Alexander Hill, a Canada-based scholar with a particular interest in Russian affairs, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-russian-economy-is-defying-and-withstanding-western-sanctions-194119">reports in The Conversation that</a> mobilisation has hit Russian industry pretty hard, causing labour shortages in key areas. </p>
<p>But, writes Hill, a bumper harvest has allowed Russia to export huge amounts of grain, while the replacement of western companies which pulled out of Russia after the start of the war with new Russian enterprises. (McDonald’s, for example, has been replaced with a burger chain called <em>Vkusno i tochka</em> – “Tasty, full stop”). Inflation is falling and pensions, salaries and the minimum wage are reportedly keeping pace. Hill believes the west may have underestimated Russia’s ability to cope with sanctions.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-russian-economy-is-defying-and-withstanding-western-sanctions-194119">How the Russian economy is defying and withstanding western sanctions</a>
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<h2>Banksy in Ukraine</h2>
<p>One of the themes that has run through reporting from Ukraine since the invasion began in February is the buoyant morale among Ukrainians, whether civilians or military. On the home front, particularly, this has been underpinned by an explosion of artwork drawing attention to, and reinforcing, the resilience of Ukrainian people and culture.</p>
<p>Now it seems that Banksy, the Scarlet Pimpernel of graffiti artists, has been doing his bit to help. Earlier this month, Banksy posted a picture to his Instagram of a gymnast doing a handstand, painted on the side of a building devastated by shelling in Borodyanka in the Kyiv region.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/Ck1bqL6MsMu","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<p>He later confirmed that he was responsible for six other artworks in Kyiv and other cities across Ukraine, including one which depicted Vladimir Putin being thrown by a child in a judo match. War historian Rachel Kerr of King’s College London <a href="https://theconversation.com/banksy-in-ukraine-how-his-defiant-new-works-offer-hope-194952">has the story</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/banksy-in-ukraine-how-his-defiant-new-works-offer-hope-194952">Banksy in Ukraine: how his defiant new works offer hope</a>
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Some of the key articles from our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past week.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1953122022-11-24T15:29:53Z2022-11-24T15:29:53ZUkraine war: how the economy has kept running at a time of bitter conflict<p>November 24 marks nine months since the Russian <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">invasion of Ukraine</a> began. Despite the expectation of the Kremlin – and many international analysts – Ukraine did not fall within days. It repelled Russia’s advance on the capital Kyiv, turned the tide on the battlefields and has now retaken half of territory captured in Russia’s initial push. Ukraine’s military now has initiative and momentum on the battlefield.</p>
<p>But the human cost of this resistance has been enormous. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians have lost their lives. The recent <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/11/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-21-november-2022">UN Human Rights report</a> confirmed the death of 6,595 civilians and warned that there are many more likely to come. One-third of the 44 million population has been displaced: 6.5 million within Ukraine and almost 8 million as refugees in other European countries.</p>
<p>Having failed to complete its mission on the battlefield, Russian forces have resorted to terrorising the civilian population with missiles and drone attacks. These have resulted in many civilian casualties and severe damage to critical infrastructure. </p>
<p>The blockade of Black Sea ports is preventing vital exports and starving the Ukrainian economy of the foreign currency it needs to buy critical imports. This, and the fact that the government has been forced to divert public money for military use, has put tremendous pressure on the economy. </p>
<p>So how has the Ukrainian economy adapted to the new wartime reality?</p>
<h2>Economic consequences of the invasion</h2>
<p>After losing a relatively modest 4% of GDP to the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/eurasia/competitiveness-programme/eastern-partners/COVID-19-CRISIS-IN-UKRAINE.pdf">COVID-19 pandemic in 2020</a>, the Ukrainian economy grew at a healthy 3.2% in 2021 and was expected to grow at the same pace in 2022. The sudden Russian invasion upset this forecast. The initial stage of the invasion hit the capital Kyiv and ten regions, which jointly account for 55% of pre-war GDP. </p>
<p>Ukraine’s GDP shrank by 15.1% in the first quarter of 2022 – the year-on-year decline recorded in March 2022 was a massive 45%. In the second quarter, GDP fell by a staggering 37.2%. </p>
<p>Today, the fighting continues in the regions that account for less than 15% of pre-war GDP. But even so, the World Bank estimates that the Ukrainian economy will shrink by one-third in 2022, a far higher number than the <a href="https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3208215/Barro_RareDisasters.pdf">typical threshold of 15%</a> that economists us to start referring to a severe economic recession as an economic disaster.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497221/original/file-20221124-21-orxml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bar chart showing effect war on Ukraine's economy." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497221/original/file-20221124-21-orxml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497221/original/file-20221124-21-orxml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497221/original/file-20221124-21-orxml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497221/original/file-20221124-21-orxml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497221/original/file-20221124-21-orxml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497221/original/file-20221124-21-orxml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497221/original/file-20221124-21-orxml.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukraine’s economy was recovering, until Russia invaded.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">State Statistics Service of Ukraine</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What makes the economic consequences of the war even more dramatic is that the aggregate numbers above have unequal distribution across the country and socioeconomic groups. One way to illustrate this is to look at the extreme poverty rate, defined here as living on less than US$5.5 (£4.54) per person per day. </p>
<p>Before the war, only 2.5% of Ukrainians lived in extreme poverty, similar to Italy and Spain. The war abruptly changed this. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/world-bank-says-ukraine-has-tenfold-increase-poverty-due-war-2022-10-15/">World Bank estimates</a> that the number of Ukrainians in extreme poverty will likely increase tenfold in 2022 and will continue to grow in 2023. The poverty rates will be higher still in the regions closer to the front line, due to shortages. </p>
<p>This will <a href="https://bank.gov.ua/en/news/all/komentar-natsionalnogo-banku-schodo-rivnya-inflyatsiyi-u-veresni-2022-roku#:%7E:text=In%20September%202022%2C%20consumer%20inflation,State%20Statistics%20Service%20of%20Ukraine.">accelerate the inflation rate</a> and erode purchasing power. Government support for the low and middle-income parts of the population is crucial in this situation.</p>
<h2>Doing business during the war</h2>
<p>Despite the constant shelling risk, the massive destruction of buildings and equipment, and the loss of workers due to relocation, most Ukrainian firms continue operations. How do they do it? Businesses that are more mobile have relocated to safer parts of the country, leading to bursts of regional growth. For example, three central and western Ukrainian regions which have been untouched by the war grew by more than 8% in March 2022 compared to a year before. </p>
<p>The IT sector, with minimal requirement of capital input, barely stopped operating. Sectors far away from the active battlefields, such as retail, almost returned to their pre-war activity level by September. </p>
<p>Sectors disproportionately represented in the heavy fighting regions or with high capital intensity – such as metal production – have had to scale down substantially. Metinvest, the biggest steel producer in Ukraine, lost two plants in Mariupol but continues operations at other plants near Zaporizhzhia in southern Ukraine and Kamianske in the centre of the country, with the overall output reduced by 50-70%. </p>
<p>The grain deal negotiated in July with the help of the UN and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ed3abed9-5ae9-4014-8616-c0faf3800f65">recently extended</a> by another 120 days has allowed partial grain exports – which has been beneficial to the agricultural economy. The export revenues may even be enough to plant for the next season. All these margins of adjustments helped the economy stabilise in early autumn.</p>
<p>But since the beginning of October, Russia has intensified attacks on critical infrastructure, destroying an estimated 40% of the Ukrainian power grid. As I write there is news of another Russian attack. Vitali Klitschko, the mayor of Kyiv, reports that 80% of the capital <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/80-percent-kyiv-resident-without-water-supply-russia-missile-strikes-vitali-klitschko/">has no electricity or water supply</a>. The government responded by rationing electricity, allowing key sectors – such as health care and public transportation – to receive enough or at least some power. </p>
<p>Some businesses are able to partially adjust to temporary power outages, for example dentists – who can set their visits according to the electricity rationing schedule. Similarly, some producers – such as the KMZ factory in Poltava, a manufacturer of grain handling equipment – run their production at night. Coffee shops have switched from selling electricity-intensive espresso to simpler filter coffee. Those who can afford it stock up on electric generators. </p>
<p>Anticipating electricity, water and heating supply disruptions, the government prepared thousands of shelters, “<a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/po-vsij-krayini-rozgortayemo-novij-proekt-pidtrimki-lyudej-p-79361">points of invincibility</a>” where Ukrainians can receive all essential services free of charge 24 hours a day, seven days a week.</p>
<h2>Emergency help</h2>
<p>While Ukrainians and Ukrainian businesses constantly adapt, Ukraine needs to repair damaged civilian infrastructure to allow people to earn a living and to save the most vulnerable Ukrainians from the consequences of extreme poverty. But it also needs to supply the military to enable it to continue fighting. </p>
<p>Speaking at meetings of the World Bank and IMF in October the president, Volodymyr Zelensky, announced that Ukraine required <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221025-zelensky-asks-donors-for-38-bn-as-russia-shells-bakhmut">US$38 billion</a> to cover the estimated budget deficit in 2023 and further $17 billion to start rebuilding infrastructure that has been damaged or destroyed. </p>
<p>If Ukraine receives this support it should enable the country to avoid economic collapse and help it to continue fighting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195312/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dmitriy Sergeyev does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine seemed to have recovered well from COVID and its economy was forecast to grow strongly. But then Russia invaded.Dmitriy Sergeyev, Associate Professor, Department of Eoncomics, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1914822022-09-29T12:32:09Z2022-09-29T12:32:09ZRussia plans to annex parts of Eastern Ukraine – an Eastern European expert explains 3 key things to know about the regions at stake<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487158/original/file-20220928-22-wck8q5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman votes in the controversial referendum in Donetsk, Ukraine on Sept. 27, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/people-cast-their-votes-in-controversial-referendums-in-donetsk-on-picture-id1243546788">Stringer/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia is set to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/entire-villages-empty-out-ukrainians-flee-russian-annexation-refugees-say-2022-09-28/">formally annex</a> four occupied territories in eastern Ukraine, claiming the region as its own more than six months after it first invaded its neighboring country. </p>
<p>Russia announced on Sept. 27, 2022, that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moscows-proxies-occupied-ukraine-regions-report-big-votes-join-russia-2022-09-27/">more than 85%</a> of people in the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic, as well as parts of two other occupied regions in Ukraine – Kherson and Zaporizhshia – voted to become part of Russia.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/so-called-referenda-during-armed-conflict-ukraine-illegal-not-expression-popular-will-united-nations-political-affairs-chief-tells-security-council">the United Nations</a>, the United States and <a href="https://english.nv.ua/nation/population-drain-in-occupied-zaporizhzhia-oblast-renders-sham-vote-even-more-fraudulent-ukraine-wa-50272302.html">Ukrainian officials</a> have all decried the process as a <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/09/28/russia-ukraine-referendum-sham-results-putin-un">“sham”</a> and illegal. </p>
<p>The Group of Seven, an international political coalition with Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the U.S. as members, also <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-09-23/g7-condemns-russias-scam-ukraine-referendums">condemned Russia’s referendums</a> as “illegitimate.” The G7 leaders have promised to impose sanctions on Russia if it proceeds with the annexation.</p>
<p>There <a href="https://twitter.com/sumlenny/status/1573473284884115456">are reports</a> that Russian and Chechen soldiers <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63013356">have pressured</a> people at their homes and at voting sites to align with Russia. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.usf.edu/arts-sciences/departments/school-of-interdisciplinary-global-studies/people/tkulakevich.aspx">a researcher</a> of Eastern Europe, I think it’s important to understand that people in these four regions are not a single political bloc, even though most of the people in these territories do not want to join Russia.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of older looking people sit on a train, looking distressed." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People board an evacuation train from the Donbas region heading to western Ukraine in August 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/people-board-on-an-evacuation-train-from-donbas-region-to-the-west-of-picture-id1242543446">Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The four Ukrainian regions have distinct relationships with Russia</h2>
<p>Russian forces first occupied parts of Kherson, a port city, and Zaporizhzhia, a city that’s home to the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/why-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-mattersfor-whole-world">largest nuclear facility</a> in Europe, earlier in 2022. </p>
<p>But even before Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it also controlled parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. The Kremlin has supported and armed two <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/21/donetsk-and-lugansk-heres-what-we-know-about-rebel-regions">puppet separatist governments</a> in this region, known as Donbas, since 2014.</p>
<p>In May 2014, breakaway Ukrainian politicians <a href="https://theprint.in/world/why-donetsk-luhansk-ukraines-rebel-territories-recognised-by-russia-matter/842664/">proclaimed</a> that Donetsk and Luhansk were not part of Ukraine, but actually were independent “republics.” </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map shows the region of Donbas in Ukraine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The two self-proclaimed republics in the Donbas region, as well as the regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, voted in controversial referendums to be annexed by Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/00/Map_of_Donbas_region.svg/1214px-Map_of_Donbas_region.svg.png?20220313190341">Goran_tek-en/Creative Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Kremlin did not officially recognize these <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/05/12/311808832/separatists-vote-to-split-from-ukraine-russia-respects-decision">newly proclaimed republics</a> until February 2022, when Russian President Vladimir Putin launched its invasion of Ukraine days later.</p>
<p>As Russia turned to <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/02/27/stay-hidden-or-get-drafted">conscript fighters in these breakaway regions</a> to fill front lines, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/6/ukraine-partisans-wont-win-war-but-can-wreak-havoc-analysts">fighting against</a> Russia since the start of the war.</p>
<p>In March 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky awarded the honorary title of <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/zelensky-gives-the-honorary-title-hero-city-to-kharkiv-chernihiv-mariupol-kherson-hostomel-and-volnovakha">“Hero City” to Kherson</a> for its <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/09/ukraine-counteroffensive-battle-of-kherson/671364/">fierce defense</a> against Russian forces during the early days of the war. </p>
<p>Russia still does not fully control any of the four regions. <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-talks-referendums-zelensky/31977628.html">Zelensky vowed</a> in August 2022 to not hold any peace talks if the Kremlin proceeded with the referendums in the occupied areas.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large mural on the side of a run-down looking building shows the side of a woman holding a baby to the sky, with both baby and woman wearing wreath garlands on their heads." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A mural is shown on a residential building in Bakhmut, Donetsk, in September 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/this-picture-shows-a-mural-on-a-residential-building-in-bakhmut-on-picture-id1243505235">Juan Barreto/AFP via Getty images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Demographics in eastern Ukraine have shifted during the war</h2>
<p>Most Ukrainians who live in the Donbas region speak Russian. But before the full-scale war in 2022, many of these people still preferred to identify as having <a href="https://theconversation.com/most-people-in-separatist-held-areas-of-donbas-prefer-reintegration-with-ukraine-new-survey-124849">mixed Ukrainian and Russian identities</a> – or, otherwise, as a person from the Donbas or a Ukrainian citizen. </p>
<p>The Donbas region was home to about <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/eastern-donbas/freedom-world/2022">6.5 million</a> people before the 2022 invasion, out of a total <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ukraine-population/">43 million</a> in Ukraine. </p>
<p>The region was once known for its <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-is-the-donbas-so-important-for-russia/a-61547512">industrial output</a> and coal mines, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/05/04/donbas-coal-mines-are-the-sinews-of-the-war-in-ukraine_5982385_4.html">some of which</a> Russia has seized control of during the war.</p>
<p>Today, all four of the occupied regions are active war zones that many residents have fled. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">over 11 million Ukrainians</a> have left the country since February 2022. </p>
<p>There are also up to 7 million Ukrainians who have been uprooted from their homes but still live in Ukraine, making them internally displaced. More than <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/95314">60% of the internally displaced Ukrainians</a> are from the eastern regions. </p>
<p>As a result, the Russian referendum votes were conducted without accounting for the opinion of half – or even the majority – of the population in these territories.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The back of a solider carrying a gun is shown, while a woman in the background appears to vote in a plain room with blue and white walls." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Residents cast their votes in the referendum to join Russia in Donetsk, Ukraine, on Sept. 23, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/residents-cast-their-votes-in-controversial-referendums-in-donetsk-picture-id1243452349">Stringer/Andalou Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Most Ukrainians in the occupied territories don’t want to be part of Russia</h2>
<p>In 2014, when Luhansk and Donetsk first proclaimed their independence, the majority of the people there said they preferred to be part of their own republic, rather than becoming a part of Russia. Approximately <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1138&page=1">52% of people in these regions</a> at the time said they were against joining Russia, while 28% in Donetsk and 30% in Luhansk supported it, according to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, a private research group in Ukraine that conducts sociological and marketing research. </p>
<p>At the same time, both Kherson and Zaporizhzhia were overwhelmingly against joining Russia. Approximately <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1138&page=1">85% of people in Kherson</a> and 82% in Zaporizhzhia said they wanted to remain separate, according to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.</p>
<p>After eight years of fighting, which has led to destruction of houses and infrastructure, as well as <a href="https://tass.com/world/1289095">thousands of civilian deaths</a> in eastern Ukraine, the number of Russian sympathizers in the Donbas decreased. </p>
<p>The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1138&page=1">reported that</a> in late 2021 and early 2022, less than 22% of people in the Donbas region and less than 12% in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia wanted to become part of Russia. </p>
<p>Over 52% of Donbas residents, meanwhile, said in separate surveys conducted by American polling experts in early 2022 that they <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/17/russia-wants-recognize-independence-two-eastern-ukraine-republics-what-do-people-there-think/">were apathetic</a> about where to live, whether in Russia or in Ukraine. What most people cared about was their financial stability and family’s overall well-being. </p>
<p>Since the 2022 invasion, <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1133&page=2">92% of polled residents in the Donbas</a> said that there should be no territorial concessions for the earliest possible end of the war, according to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. </p>
<p>These figures contradict Putin’s justification to launch the so-called “special military operation” to <a href="https://www.vox.com/2022/2/23/22948534/russia-ukraine-war-putin-explosions-invasion-explained">defend a Russian-speaking population</a> that Ukraine is allegedly persecuting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191482/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatsiana Kulakevich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While some parts of eastern Ukraine have been under partial Russian control since 2014, other sections continue to fight back. Most residents overall have said they don’t want to be part of Russia.Tatsiana Kulakevich, Assistant Professor of Instruction at School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, Affiliate Professor at the Institute on Russia, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1905162022-09-13T12:32:23Z2022-09-13T12:32:23ZCold shutdown reduces risk of disaster at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant – but combat around spent fuel still poses a threat<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484145/original/file-20220912-1734-jinnwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5808%2C3103&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The last operating reactor at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, reactor No. 6, has been safely shut down.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/photo-taken-on-aug-4-2022-shows-the-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-news-photo/1242418488">Xinhua News Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>An updated version of this article was published on June 6, 2023. <a href="https://theconversation.com/kakhovka-dam-breach-raises-risk-for-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-receding-waters-narrow-options-for-cooling-207192">Read it here</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Energoatom, operator of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in the Ukrainian city of Enerhodar, <a href="https://www.energoatom.com.ua/app-eng/eng-1109221.html">announced</a> on Sept. 11, 2022, that it was <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/engineers-shut-down-last-reactor-at-ukraines-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant">shutting down the last operating reactor</a> of the plant’s six reactors, reactor No. 6. The operators <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-101-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine">have put the reactor in cold shutdown</a> to minimize the risk of a radiation leak from combat in the area around the nuclear power plant.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked <a href="https://sites.usc.edu/meshkati/">Najmedin Meshkati</a>, a professor and <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/thirty-three-years-catastrophe-chernobyl-universal-lesson-global-nuclear-power-industry">nuclear safety expert</a> at the University of Southern California, to explain cold shutdown, what it means for the safety of the nuclear power plant, and the ongoing risks to the plant’s spent fuel, which is uranium that has been largely but not completely depleted by the fission reaction that drives nuclear power plants.</em> </p>
<h2>What does it mean to have a nuclear reactor in cold shutdown?</h2>
<p>The fission reaction that generates heat in a nuclear power plant is produced by positioning a number of uranium fuel rods in close proximity. Shutting down a nuclear reactor involves inserting control rods between the fuel rods to stop the fission reaction. </p>
<p>The reactor is then in cooldown mode as the temperature decreases. <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/full-text.html">According to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission</a>, once the temperature is below 200 degrees Fahrenheit (93 Celsius) and the reactor coolant system is at atmospheric pressure, the reactor is in cold shutdown.</p>
<p>When the reactor is operating, it requires cooling to absorb the heat and keep the fuel rods from melting together, which would set off a catastrophic chain reaction. When a reactor is in cold shutdown, it no longer needs the same level of circulation.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Qthg5xE196w?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant uses pressurized water reactors.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How does being in cold shutdown improve the plant’s safety?</h2>
<p>The shutdown has removed a huge element of risk. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is a <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/pwrs.html">pressurized water reactor</a>. These reactors need constant cooling, and the cooling pumps are gigantic, powerful, electricity-guzzling machines. </p>
<p>Cold shutdown is the state in which you do not need to constantly run the primary cooling pumps at the same level to circulate the cooling water in the primary cooling loop. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-101-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine">has reported</a> that reactor No. 6 is now in a cold shutdown state like the facility’s five other reactors, and will require less power for cooling. Now, at least if the plant loses offsite power, the operators won’t have to worry about cooling an operating reactor with cranky diesel generators.</p>
<p>And by shutting down reactor No. 6, the plant operators can be relieved of a considerable amount of their workload monitoring the reactors amid the ongoing uncertainties around the site. This substantially reduced the potential for human error.</p>
<p>The operators’ jobs are likely to be much less demanding and stressful now than before. However, they still need to constantly monitor the status of the shutdown reactors and the spent fuel pools.</p>
<h2>What are the risks from the spent fuel at the plant?</h2>
<p>The plant still needs a reliable source of electricity to cool the six huge spent fuel pools that are inside the containment structures and to remove residual heat from the shutdown reactors. The cooling pumps for the spent fuel pools need much less electricity than the cooling pumps on the reactor’s primary and secondary loops, and the spent fuel cooling system could tolerate a brief electricity outage.</p>
<p>One more important factor is that the spent fuel storage racks in the spent fuel pools at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant were compacted to increase capacity, according to a <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/national_report_of_ukraine_for_the_6th_review_meeting_-_english.pdf">2017 Ukrainian government report to the IAEA</a>. The greater number and more compacted the stored spent fuel rods, the more heat they generate and so more power is needed to cool them.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four large concrete cylinders on a concrete slab" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484151/original/file-20220912-6373-iank1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">These massive concrete cylinders store spent nuclear fuel rods. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant stores much of its spent fuel outdoors in casks like these.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nrcgov/6946374745">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There is also a dry spent fuel storage facility at the plant. <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/dry-cask-storage.html">Dry spent fuel storage</a> involves packing spent fuel rods into massive cylinders, or casks, which require no water or other coolants. The casks are designed to keep the fuel rods contained for at least 50 years. However, the casks are not under the containment structures at the plant, and, though they were designed to withstand being crashed into by an airliner, it’s not clear whether artillery shelling and aerial bombardment, particularly repeated attacks, could crack open the casks and release radiation into the grounds of the plant. </p>
<p>The closest analogy to this scenario could be a <a href="https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/11263/safety-and-security-of-commercial-spent-nuclear-fuel-storage-public">terrorist attack</a> that, according to a seminal study by the National Research Council, could breach a dry cask and potentially result in the release of radioactive material from the spent fuel. This could happen through the dispersion of fuel particles or fragments or the dispersion of radioactive aerosols. This would be similar to the detonation of a “dirty bomb,” which, depending on wind direction and dispersion radius, could result in radioactive contamination. This in turn could cause serious problems for access to and work in the plant.</p>
<h2>Next steps from the IAEA and UN</h2>
<p>The IAEA has called on Russia and Ukraine to <a href="https://theconversation.com/un-nuclear-agency-calls-for-protection-zone-around-imperiled-ukrainian-power-plant-a-safety-expert-explains-why-that-could-be-crucial-189429">set up a “safety and security protection zone” around the plant</a>. However, the IAEA is a science and engineering inspectorate and technical assistance agency. Negotiating and establishing a protection zone at a nuclear power plant in a war zone is entirely unprecedented and totally different from all past IAEA efforts.</p>
<p>Establishing a protection zone requires negotiations and approvals at the highest political and military levels in Kyiv and Moscow. It could be accomplished through backchannel, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/20/track-ii-diplomacy-a-short-history/">Track II-type diplomacy</a>, specifically nuclear safety-focused <a href="https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/sites/default/files/engineering_diplomacy_science__diplomacy.pdf">engineering diplomacy</a>. In the meantime, the IAEA needs strong support from the United Nations Security Council in the form of a resolution, mandate or the creation of a special commission.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190516/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Najmedin Meshkati received research funding from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the mid-1990s.</span></em></p>The power plant’s sixth reactor has been shut down, all but eliminating the risk of a nuclear meltdown. But fighting at the site could still release radioactive material.Najmedin Meshkati, Professor of Engineering and International Relations, University of Southern CaliforniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1900462022-09-12T20:27:57Z2022-09-12T20:27:57ZWith his army on the back foot, is escalation over Ukraine Vladimir Putin’s only real option?<p>Vladmir Putin has a new problem. His invasion of Ukraine is not just bogged down. It’s going rapidly backwards.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s armed forces have launched two stunningly successful counteroffensives around Kharkiv in the nation’s east, and in the south near the Russian-occupied city of Kherson. Kyiv is now claiming to have recaptured some <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2022/9/10/russia-ukraine-live-news-2">2,000 square kilometres</a> of its territory, with the potential to <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7">cut off and trap</a> a sizeable portion of the Russian invasion force.</p>
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<p>By the Kremlin’s own standards, this is hardly winning. Realising Russia’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62231936">war aims</a> – including <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/3186482/russia-seeking-regime-change-ukraine-lavrov-says-moscow-expands">regime change</a> and the establishment of a “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/20/is-ukraines-endgame-a-russian-land-bridge/">Crimean corridor</a>” that denies Ukraine access to the Black Sea – would require nothing short of a dramatic reversal of its fortunes.</p>
<p>Putin now essentially has <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/putins-choices-in-ukraine-retreat-attrition-or-escalation/">three options</a>.</p>
<p>First, he can seek a political solution, hoping to hold onto the territory Kremlin proxies captured in the eight years prior to his 2022 invasion. That’s an unattractive choice, especially since a bullish Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is hardly <a href="https://twitter.com/KyivPost/status/1569049610756280320?s=20&t=0fDwPan-PplqwasKfXAGyw">in the mood</a> to negotiate favourable terms for Moscow. Internationally, it would be a humiliating blow to Russian prestige: a smaller state defeating a top-tier nuclear power in a major land war.</p>
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<p>Domestically, and more worrying for Putin, it would sharply call his leadership into question. Mounting signs of domestic discontent now even include St Petersburg regional deputies publicly calling for Putin to be <a href="https://theins.ru/news/254850">tried for treason</a>, another group from Moscow calling for him to <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/moscow-municipal-lawmakers-demand-putin-resignation/32027762.html">step down</a>, and even <a href="https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1569070513909022720?s=20&t=K7rUK26jF0rEm4vKyVq3pg">state media</a> questioning the conflict.</p>
<p>Option two for Putin is to try to reimpose a long and grinding campaign. But even if his forces can blunt the Ukrainian advance, Russia can achieve only a stalemate if the war returns to static artillery duels. That would buy time. It would wear down Ukrainian forces and allow him to test whether <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-using-energy-weapon-white-house-says-about-nord-stream-shutdown-2022-09-02/">using energy as a weapon</a> fragments the European Union’s resolve over the winter. </p>
<p>However, at Russia’s current <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/08/russia-ukraine-deaths-casualties-rises/">rate of losses</a> its conventional forces will be exhausted beyond about 12 months. Both NATO and Ukraine would be well aware of that.</p>
<p>Putin’s third option is to escalate: to send a message to both the West and Ukraine that he means business. Given the dubious nature of his other choices, that may be increasingly likely. But where? And, of equal importance, how?</p>
<h2>Invade Moldova</h2>
<p>Numerous experts have claimed Moscow might <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-next-war-how-russian-hybrid-aggression-could-threaten-moldova/">seek to annexe</a> Moldova’s breakaway region of Transdniestria, plus further chunks of Moldovan territory. And in early September, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-warns-moldova-not-threaten-its-troops-breakaway-region-2022-09-01/">warned of armed conflict</a> if Moldova threatened the 2,000 Russian troops guarding Transdniestria’s large ammunition dump at Cobasna.</p>
<p>An actual invasion would be difficult, because it would require Russian control over the Ukrainian city of Odesa for land access. But an airborne reinforcement of its Transdniestrian garrison might be tempting, or launching a hybrid warfare campaign to justify doing so.</p>
<p>In April 2022, there were several “<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/08/02/transdniestria-moldova-and-russia-s-war-in-ukraine-pub-87609">terrorist incidents</a>”, including the bombing of Transdniestria’s Ministry of State Security, as potential pretexts for such a move.</p>
<p>That said, invading would arguably be counterproductive, not least because it may prompt Moldova’s close partner Romania – a member of NATO – to become involved.</p>
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<h2>Send a ‘stabilisation force’ to Kazakhstan</h2>
<p>Although unlikely, a Russian incursion into Northern Kazakhstan to “protect ethnic Russians” was commonly nominated by Russia-watchers playing grim games of “where does Putin invade next?”. Or, at least, they did before Ukraine.</p>
<p>Russian forces under the banner of the “Collective Security Treaty Organization” (<a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/how-the-intervention-in-kazakhstan-revitalized-the-russian-led-csto/">CSTO</a>), comprising some of the former Soviet states, actually intervened as recently as January 2022 at the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/csto-deployment-in-kazakhstan-strategic-shift-or-political-consolidation/">request of Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev</a>.</p>
<p>However, that was soon exposed as a ploy to help Tokayev defeat his enemies. Since then, he has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/24/whats-behind-kazakhstan-not-recognizing-ukraines-separatists">drifted towards neutrality</a> on the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>A new Russian intervention would certainly reinforce to restive Central Asian states that the Kremlin sees the region as its privileged sphere of influence. Indeed, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/87652">hinted</a> that northern Kazakhstan was next on Russia’s invasion list. Yet, with many of its forces already tied up in Ukraine, it’s questionable whether doing so would really be worth the effort.</p>
<h2>Full mobilisation</h2>
<p>The significant losses suffered by Russian forces might be covered by putting the nation on a war footing. A general mobilisation would direct the economy towards military production, and provide an unending stream of personnel.</p>
<p>Putin has avoided this so far, choosing a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-war-north-caucasus-recruitment/31915842.html">shadow approach</a> instead, which has called up an extra <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/25/world/europe/putin-russia-military-expansion.html">137,000 Russians</a>.</p>
<p>It does remain a live option, although it would mean admitting the conflict is a war (not a “Special Military Operation”), which would be domestically unpopular and result in untrained and ill-equipped conscripts flooding the front line.</p>
<h2>Draw NATO in</h2>
<p>Apart from the Moldovan scenario, Putin might elect to stage a “provocation” against a NATO state like Estonia. That would be a risky gambit indeed: given what we have seen of the performance of Russia’s conventional forces, even a limited war with NATO would hasten Russia’s defeat, and thus far Putin has assiduously avoided such provocations, apart from bluster and rhetoric.</p>
<p>Perversely, that might allow Putin to salvage some domestic pride by claiming he lost to NATO rather than Ukraine.</p>
<p>Yet his <a href="https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/08/24/six-months-into-the-war-in-ukraine-russian-media-has-a-new-message-either-we-win-or-world-war-iii-begins/">propaganda machine</a> has already been falsely claiming NATO is directly involved in the fight against Russian forces.</p>
<p>And if Putin isn’t prepared to initiate a peace process, then really only one escalation pathway remains.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-is-fighting-three-undeclared-wars-its-fourth-an-internal-struggle-for-russia-itself-might-be-looming-189129">Russia is fighting three undeclared wars. Its fourth – an internal struggle for Russia itself – might be looming</a>
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<hr>
<h2>Arrange a radiological ‘accident’</h2>
<p>The Kremlin has obliquely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/accidents-can-happen-european-nuclear-plants-too-russian-ex-president-says-2022-08-12/">hinted</a> at this for a while.</p>
<p>Russian forces have controlled the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant near the city of Kherson since March, turning it into a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-army-turns-ukraines-largest-nuclear-plant-into-a-military-base-11657035694">military base</a>. Rocket and artillery fire is actually not a huge concern, since the plant is heavily <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/08/12/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-war-zone-disaster/">hardened</a>.</p>
<p>But if the plant loses connection to the Ukrainian grid – which has already <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62782497">happened</a> several times – the reactors are only controlled by their own power generation, with no fail safe. </p>
<p>Arranging a false flag “accident” blamed on Ukraine is certainly possible, raising the nightmare prospect of a new Chernobyl.</p>
<h2>Use tactical nuclear weapons</h2>
<p>Look, it’s unlikely. But it can’t be ruled out.</p>
<p>Realistically, using tactical nuclear weapons would be of <a href="https://theconversation.com/are-vladimir-putins-nuclear-threats-a-bluff-in-a-word-probably-187689">dubious military value</a>. There would be no guarantee NATO would back down, or that Ukraine would capitulate. It would be very difficult for Russia’s few remaining partners to continue supporting Putin, either tacitly (like China) or indirectly (like India).</p>
<p>Indeed, while much has been made of Russia’s supposed “<a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia%E2%80%99s-crazy-nuclear-war-strategy-escalationto-de-escalate-180680">escalate to de-escalate</a>” doctrine, involving using nuclear weapons to force others to blink, there’s plenty of evidence it’s a <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/myths-and-misconceptions-around-russian-military-intent/myth-9-russian-nuclear-strategy">myth</a> designed to increase fear of nuclear war among Moscow’s adversaries.</p>
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<p>In summary, Putin’s choices remain poor, both domestically and internationally. He may soon feel forced to pick between those that are unpalatable, and those that are risky.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, identifying what he will choose is guesswork: we simply don’t know enough about how Putin’s mind works, or how he prioritises information to make decisions.</p>
<p>But perhaps there’s one hint. Throughout his tenure, Putin has consistently invited NATO and its allies to blink. At this crucial time, <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-ukraine-invasion-is-slowly-approaching-an-inflection-point-is-the-west-prepared-to-step-up-186388">the West owes it to Ukraine</a>, and for the sake of its own credibility, to ensure it does not give the Russian president what he wants.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190046/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Lowy Institute, the Carnegie Foundation, and various Australian government agencies.</span></em></p>Vladmir Putin has a new problem. His invasion of Ukraine is not just bogged down. It’s going backwards.Matthew Sussex, Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1902932022-09-08T16:59:59Z2022-09-08T16:59:59ZUkraine recap: Putin remains popular at home, unlike his puppet rulers in occupied regions<p>Once it became clear – which it did, early on in this conflict – that Ukraine’s defenders would not wilt before the onslaught of Vladimir Putin’s war machine, analysts predicted a long and drawn-out war of attrition, particularly in the east of the country where Russia already controlled a fair bit of territory. </p>
<p>And so it has proved. More than six months in, Russia controls only a fraction of the country and, close observers excepted, if you were to look at the war maps we have been publishing in these updates over the weeks, it was hard to discern terribly much movement in the lines of occupation.</p>
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<p>But now <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global/2022/sep/07/ukraine-launches-surprise-counterattack-kharkiv-region-russia">reports coming out of Ukraine</a> are of sudden rapid advances by the Ukrainian army in the Kharkiv region in the north-east, where Kyiv has begun a counteroffensive that has taken the rest of the world by surprise, coming hot on the heels of the launch of a push in the Kherson region in the south. Analysts are speculating that one of the reasons Ukrainian troops are meeting less resistance around Kharkiv is that the Russian military command moved troops and equipment south to the Kherson region. We’ll have more on that next week.</p>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
<em>The Conversation, a not-for-profit newsgroup, works with a wide range of academics across its global network to produce evidence-based analysis. Get these recaps in your inbox every Thursday. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapTop">Subscribe here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>The Ukraine general staff announced this week that more than <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-war-death-toll-50k-kherson-counteroffensive-1740202">50,000 Russian troops had been killed</a> since the conflict began in February. That’s a lot of grieving families. But Vladimir Putin appears to retain the support of a majority of Russians, if opinion polls are to be believed. </p>
<p>Alexander Hill, a professor of military history at the University of Calgary <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-vladimir-putin-still-has-widespread-support-in-russia-189211">writes</a> that the Russian leader has the support of pretty much all of the country’s news media (unsurprising, as he controls pretty much all of it). So ordinary citizens have been fed a non-stop diet of propaganda since before the invasion was launched. Meanwhile, thanks to oil and gas revenues, the economy is in reasonable shape still. And, Hill asserts, people may just be too scared to admit their opposition to the war.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-vladimir-putin-still-has-widespread-support-in-russia-189211">Why Vladimir Putin still has widespread support in Russia</a>
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<p>Supporters of Russia are not faring so well in Ukraine’s occupied territories though. According to Stephen Hall, who researches Russian politics at the University of Bath, Ukrainians who turned coat to become pro-Russian officials in Kherson and other areas under Russian control, have been the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-a-dangerous-time-to-be-a-russian-installed-official-in-occupied-territory-190101">targets of assassination plots</a>, many of them successful.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-a-dangerous-time-to-be-a-russian-installed-official-in-occupied-territory-190101">Ukraine war: a dangerous time to be a Russian-installed official in occupied territory</a>
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<h2>Nuclear threat</h2>
<p>One area where there is fierce fighting is in the Zaporizhzhia region, where Ukraine built Europe’s largest nuclear power plant. In recent days the power cables to the plant have been cut, leaving the plant disconnected from the electricity grid and relying on backup power to keep cooling systems operating. </p>
<p>There have been calls for a safety and security zone be put around the plant in south-eastern Ukraine to avoid a nuclear disaster. Ross Peel, of King’s College, London, who specialises in nuclear safety and security, says this sort of intervention <a href="https://theconversation.com/zaporizhzhia-proposals-for-demilitarised-zone-around-europes-biggest-nuclear-power-plant-are-unprecedented-expert-reveals-189927">would be unprecedented</a> – nuclear plants that have been attacked in the past have not been operational. It would also be very dangerous and legally difficult.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/zaporizhzhia-proposals-for-demilitarised-zone-around-europes-biggest-nuclear-power-plant-are-unprecedented-expert-reveals-189927">Zaporizhzhia: proposals for demilitarised zone around Europe's biggest nuclear power plant are unprecedented – expert reveals</a>
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<p>But, in this fascinating Q&A published by our colleagues in the US, Najmedin Meshkati, professor of engineering and international relations at the University of Southern California, <a href="https://theconversation.com/un-nuclear-agency-calls-for-protection-zone-around-imperiled-ukrainian-power-plant-a-safety-expert-explains-why-that-could-be-crucial-189429">explains the risks involved</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-nuclear-agency-calls-for-protection-zone-around-imperiled-ukrainian-power-plant-a-safety-expert-explains-why-that-could-be-crucial-189429">UN nuclear agency calls for protection zone around imperiled Ukrainian power plant – a safety expert explains why that could be crucial</a>
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<h2>Echoes of the second world war</h2>
<p>There is also increasing concern (and a fair bit of international outrage) at evidence suggesting that Moscow has authorised the mass deportation of Ukrainian citizens to unknown destinations in Russia. These are not prisoners of war, but perhaps <a href="https://www.state.gov/russias-filtration-operations-forced-disappearances-and-mass-deportations-of-ukrainian-citizens/#:%7E:text=Estimates%20from%20a%20variety%20of,regions%20in%20the%20Far%20East.">as many as</a> 1.6 million men, women and children who – according to US secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, are being “interrogated, detained, and forcibly deported … from their homes to Russia – often to isolated regions in the far east”.</p>
<p>Christoph Bluth, professor of international relations and security at the University of Bradford, says this has <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-reports-of-mass-deportations-recall-russias-dark-history-of-forcible-relocations-190272">long been a tactic used by Russia</a> and previously by the Soviet Union going back before the second world war. </p>
<p>Bluth says this is in direct contravention of the 1949 Geneva Convention which quite clearly rules mass deportations or forced relocations as a war crime.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-reports-of-mass-deportations-recall-russias-dark-history-of-forcible-relocations-190272">Ukraine war: reports of mass deportations recall Russia's dark history of forcible relocations</a>
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<p>Finally, Tim Luckhurst, a former BBC war reporter, now dean of South College at Durham University, specialises in the history of journalism and has a particular interest in the way the British press covered the second world war. He has delved into the archives to give us a flavour of <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-how-the-uk-press-reported-the-nazi-invasion-1941-45-189638">how Fleet Street covered</a> the plucky Ukrainian resistance in the face of the Nazi invasion and occupation between 1941 and 1945. </p>
<p>Interestingly, while the daily newspapers were happy to slavishly follow the government briefings, weekly magazines such as the Economist gave a more nuanced account in which some Ukrainian nationalists sided with the German invaders.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-how-the-uk-press-reported-the-nazi-invasion-1941-45-189638">Ukraine: how the UK press reported the Nazi invasion 1941-45</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a weekly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190293/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Some of the key articles from our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past week.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1899272022-09-07T13:46:20Z2022-09-07T13:46:20ZZaporizhzhia: proposals for demilitarised zone around Europe’s biggest nuclear power plant are unprecedented – expert reveals<p>Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-62816114">has welcomed an international proposal</a> for a demilitarised zone around Europe’s biggest nuclear plant, currently occupied by Russia. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/09/ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf">a much-anticipated September 6 update</a>, the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommended this safety and security zone be put around the Zaporizhzhia plant in southeastern Ukraine to avoid a nuclear disaster.</p>
<p>“What is urgently needed, now, today, is that we agree on establishing a protection … a shield, a bubble around the perimeter of the facility,” IAEA director general Rafael Grossi <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/06/europe/iaea-report-ukraine-nuclear-plant-intl/index.html">told CNN</a>. He urged all parties to cooperate in the protection of the facility and establishment of the zone, saying the IAEA would reach out to all sides “very very soon, with very concrete steps <a href="https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1k/k1k7je8du6">for your consideration</a>”.</p>
<p>This would be the first time an international body has overseen an endangered nuclear plant during a war. In previous military actions involving nuclear power plants, they were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.559021">destroyed outright</a> by aerial bombing – but mostly while under construction, before they were operational, or before building up inventories of hazardous spent nuclear fuel in vulnerable <a href="https://www.radioactivity.eu.com/site/pages/IS_Spent_fuels.htm">cooling ponds</a>. </p>
<p>Previously, the IAEA has only been able to gain access to such sites afterwards, <a href="https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1k/k1k7je8du6">“to pick up the pieces”</a>. For the IAEA to intervene directly in the delivery of safety and security would be unprecedented, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340210381421">legally and practically very challenging</a>.</p>
<p>There has been no agreement yet from Russia to these proposals.</p>
<p>The IAEA has <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/09/ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf">also asked</a> for:</p>
<p>1) The return of full control over plant security to Ukrainian personnel;</p>
<p>2) The removal of Russian military vehicles from safety- and security-critical areas;</p>
<p>3) The removal of Russian nuclear experts and military personnel from control over nuclear operations at Zaporizhzhia, where they compromise established chains of command in safety/security incident management;</p>
<p>4) The urgent repair and reconnection of off-site electrical supplies, which are vital for the plant’s safety systems to have sufficient backup power sources; and</p>
<p>5) The re-establishment of supply chains for necessary equipment and materials to the plant, and of reliable communications with key bodies in Ukraine and internationally. </p>
<p>This report follows a long-awaited visit by IAEA experts, who began inspecting the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-united-nations-ce8c3e254c8dd44b8ae4eb3cea3c5907#:%7E:text=ZAPORIZHZHIA%2C%20Ukraine%20(AP)%20%E2%80%94,the%20urgency%20of%20the%20task">Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant</a> on September 2. The plant has been occupied by Russian forces since March, with Ukrainian staff working under stressful conditions to prevent <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/director-general-grossi-alarmed-by-shelling-at-ukraine-npp-says-iaea-mission-vital-for-nuclear-safety-and-security">a nuclear disaster</a>. Since August, the plant has been shelled many times, damaging critical safety equipment and services. Both Russia and Ukraine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-accuse-each-other-shelling-around-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-2022-08-27/">blame each another</a> for these attacks.</p>
<p>IAEA member states, including Russia and Ukraine, are responsible for their own nuclear <a href="https://www.iaea.org/publications/factsheets/nuclear-facility-safety#:%7E:text=Nuclear%20facility%20operators%20are%20ultimately,people%2C%20society%20and%20the%20environment.">safety and security</a>. They have a right to use nuclear technology <a href="https://npolicy.org/the-npt-iaea-safeguards-and-peaceful-nuclear-energy-an-inalienable-right-but-precisely-to-what/">for peaceful purposes</a>, even in times of war. </p>
<h2>What is the IAEA?</h2>
<p>Based in Vienna, the IAEA is a UN body that brings together nuclear experts and diplomats, and is often called the world’s “nuclear watchdog”. It was set up in the 1950s as a result of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2015.1129607">international nuclear fears</a>. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/shelling-of-europes-biggest-nuclear-power-plant-exposes-multiple-risks-a-nuclear-expert-tells-us-what-they-are-189078">Shelling of Europe's biggest nuclear power plant exposes multiple risks – a nuclear expert tells us what they are</a>
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<p>The IAEA upholds the deal that states, including Russia and Ukraine, made in the international <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</a>, under which they agree to not develop nuclear weapons and, in return, are eligible to receive help on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.</p>
<p>To do so, the IAEA implements <a href="https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1525379">“safeguards”</a> – inspections and technical measures to verify that nuclear materials are not being diverted from peaceful applications into weapons programmes. As one of the five nuclear weapons states under the treaty, Russia is not obliged to submit to safeguards, but <a href="https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/text-agreement-21-february-1985-between-union-soviet-socialist-republics-and-agency-application-safeguards-union-soviet-socialist-republics">does so voluntarily</a> for its civil nuclear facilities.</p>
<p>The IAEA also <a href="https://www.iaea.org/events">brings together experts</a> to address scientific and political issues in nuclear power, such as nuclear safety and security.</p>
<p>Normally, the agency conducts inspections at nuclear facilities globally on a regular, usually annual, basis. <a href="https://www.iaea.org/publications/8695/safeguards-techniques-and-equipment">It also receives data regularly from these nuclear facilities</a>, ensuring that it remains informed even when not on site. However, the war in Ukraine has disrupted this process greatly, with monitoring systems down and the information flow disrupted. In this information vacuum, both sides have made numerous claims about the Zaporizhzhia plant and one another, while documented evidence has been scarce.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Press conference with IAEA director general Rafael Mariano Grossi upon his return from Ukraine, September 2, 2022.</span></figcaption>
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<p>With IAEA experts now <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/two-iaea-inspectors-stay-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-permanently-russian-envoy-2022-09-02/">permanently on site</a>, the agency will be able to receive direct updates from its own personnel. They will be able to report on conditions for Ukrainian staff, as well as the status of nuclear safety and security equipment and military actions.</p>
<p>The best possible course of action for nuclear safety and security would be a halt to hostilities and a controlled but rapid withdrawal of occupying forces from around the Zaporizhzhia facility. However, the statement of the Russian envoy to the <a href="https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1k/k1k7je8du6">UN Security Council</a>, Vasily Nebenzya, on September 6 doesn’t suggest the Kremlin is about to agree to the IAEA plan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ross Peel is affiliated with the Centre for Science and Security Studies, a multi-disciplinary research and teaching group within the Department of War Studies at King's College London. Through King's, he is also a member of the World Nuclear Association.</span></em></p>Plans to create a safe zone around the massive nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia require Russian agreement, which so far looks unlikely.Ross Peel, Research and Knowledge Transfer Manager, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1894292022-08-26T12:19:56Z2022-08-26T12:19:56ZUN nuclear agency calls for protection zone around imperiled Ukrainian power plant – a safety expert explains why that could be crucial<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483071/original/file-20220906-22-a9szl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C52%2C1022%2C714&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Damage at the Zaporizhzhya facility.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/iaea_imagebank/52328919198/">International Atomic Energy Agency</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The United Nations’ nuclear watchdog has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-united-nations-government-and-politics-d65a057bbb9dc1e59171fdad1fd3c3f0?utm_source=homepage&utm_medium=TopNews&utm_campaign=position_1">called on Russia and Ukraine</a> to set up a “safety and security protection zone” around the embattled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station in the Ukrainian city of Enerhodar. The plea, made on Sept. 6, 2022, by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), comes amid mounting concern that the facility – Europe’s largest nuclear power plant – is vulnerable to nearby fighting, and that damage to the site could cause a catastrophic accident.</em></p>
<p><em>Shelling has already <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-93-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine">damaged power and communication lines to the plant</a>, prompting <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-nuclear-plant-escapes-meltdown-zelenskiy-says-moscow-kyiv-trade-blame-2022-08-25/">fears for the plant’s safety</a> and evoking painful memories in a country still scarred by the world’s worst nuclear accident, at Chernobyl in 1986.</em> </p>
<p><em>In addition, Russian authorities have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/24/revealed-russian-plan-to-disconnect-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-from-grid">developed plans to disconnect the plant</a> from Ukraine’s power grid – in the event of damage to the plant, according to the Russians, as a prelude to switching the plant to the grid in Russian-occupied territory, according to the Ukrainians. Disconnecting the plant from the grid is a risky operation.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked <a href="https://sites.usc.edu/meshkati/">Najmedin Meshkati</a>, a professor and <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/thirty-three-years-catastrophe-chernobyl-universal-lesson-global-nuclear-power-industry">nuclear safety expert</a> at the University of Southern California, to explain the risks of warfare taking place in and around nuclear power plants.</em></p>
<h2>How safe was the Zaporizhzhia power plant before the Russian attack?</h2>
<p>The facility at Zaporizhzhia is the largest nuclear plant in Europe and one of the largest in the world. It has six <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/pwrs.html">pressurized water reactors</a>, which use water to both sustain the fission reaction and cool the reactor. These differ from the <a href="https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/appendices/rbmk-reactors.aspx">RBMK</a> reactors at Chernobyl, which used graphite instead of water to sustain the fission reaction. RBMK reactors are not seen as very safe, and there are <a href="https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/appendices/rbmk-reactors.aspx">only eight remaining in use</a> in the world, all in Russia.</p>
<p>The reactors at Zaporizhzhia are of moderately good design, and the plant has a decent safety record, with a good operating background.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant uses pressurized water reactors.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Ukrainian authorities tried to keep the war away from the site by asking Russia to observe a 30-kilometer (nearly 19-mile) safety buffer. But Russian troops surrounded the facility and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-everything-you-need-to-know">seized it in March</a>.</p>
<h2>What are the risks to a nuclear plant in a conflict zone?</h2>
<p>Nuclear power plants are built for peacetime operations, not wars.</p>
<p>The worst thing that could happen is if a site is deliberately or accidentally shelled. If a shell hit the plant’s <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/pools.html">spent fuel pool</a> – which contains the still-radioactive spent fuel – or if fire spread to the spent fuel pool, it could release radiation. This spent fuel pool isn’t in the containment building, and as such is more vulnerable.</p>
<p>Containment buildings, which house nuclear reactors, are also not protected against deliberate shelling. They are built to withstand a minor internal explosion of, say, a pressurized water pipe. But they are not designed to withstand a huge explosion.</p>
<p>As to the reactors in the containment building, it depends on the weapons being used. The worst-case scenario is that a bunker-buster missile breaches the containment dome – consisting of a thick shell of reinforced concrete on top of the reactor – and explodes. That would badly damage the nuclear reactor and release radiation into the atmosphere, which would make it difficult to send in first responders to contain any resulting fire. It could be another Chernobyl.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier stands in the foreground as a half dozen people in hazmat suits and gas masks stand near stretchers outside a large tent" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian Emergency Ministry personnel conducted a drill in the city of Zaporizhzhia on Aug. 17, 2022, to prepare for a possible radiation leak from the nuclear power plant near the city.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-emergency-ministry-rescuers-attend-an-exercise-in-news-photo/1242554458">Photo by Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What are the concerns going forward?</h2>
<p>The safety problems I see are twofold:</p>
<p><strong>1) Human error</strong></p>
<p>The workers at the facility are working under incredible stress, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/23/world/europe/ukraine-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant.html">reportedly at gunpoint</a>. Stress increases the chance of error and poor performance.</p>
<p>There is a human element in running a nuclear power plant – operators are the first and last layers of defense for the facility and the public. They are the first people to detect any anomaly and to stop any incident. Or if there’s an accident, they will be the first to heroically try to contain it.</p>
<p>This concern was highlighted in the International Atomic Energy Agency report, which noted that the Ukrainian staff at the plant were working under “constant high stress and pressure” – something that could have consequences for nuclear safety.</p>
<p><strong>2) Power failure</strong></p>
<p>The second problem is that the nuclear plant needs constant electricity, and that is harder to maintain in wartime.</p>
<p>Even if you shut down the reactors, the plant will need off-site power to run the huge cooling system to remove the residual heat in the reactor and bring it to what is called a <a href="http://neinuclearnotes.blogspot.com/2011/12/what-is-cold-shutdown.html">cold shutdown</a>. Water circulation is always needed to make sure the spent fuel doesn’t overheat.</p>
<p>Spent fuel pools also need constant water circulation to keep them cool, and they need cooling for several years before they can be put in dry casks. One of the problems in the 2011 <a href="https://theconversation.com/10-years-after-fukushima-safety-is-still-nuclear-powers-greatest-challenge-155541">Fukushima disaster</a> in Japan was the emergency generators intended to replace lost off-site power got inundated with water and failed. In situations like that, you get “<a href="https://allthingsnuclear.org/dlochbaum/nuclear-station-blackout/">station blackout</a>” – and that is one of the worst things that could happen. It means no electricity to run the cooling system.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="hundreds of square openings lie at the bottom of a large pool of water in an industrial building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Spent nuclear fuel rods are stored at the bottom of this pool, which requires constant circulation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-shows-the-cooling-pool-of-the-switched-off-unit-1-news-photo/524200126">Guillaume Souvant/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>In that circumstance, the spent fuel overheats and its zirconium cladding can create hydrogen bubbles. If you can’t vent these bubbles, they will explode, spreading radiation.</p>
<p>If there is a loss of outside power, operators will have to rely on emergency generators. But emergency generators are huge machines – finicky, unreliable gas guzzlers. And you still need cooling waters for the generators themselves. </p>
<p>My biggest worry is that Ukraine suffers from a sustained power grid failure. The likelihood of this increases during a conflict because power line pylons may come down under shelling, or gas power plants might get damaged and cease to operate. And though Ukrainian intelligence services <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russia-plans-disconnect-nuclear-plants-blocks-grid-2022-08-19/">claim that the Russians intend to stockpile diesel fuel</a> to keep these emergency generators going, it is unlikely that Russian troops will have excess fuel given their need to fuel their own vehicles.</p>
<h2>How else does a war affect the safety of nuclear plants?</h2>
<p>One of the overarching concerns about the effects of war on nuclear plants is that war degrades <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK253947/">safety culture</a>, which is crucial in running a plant. I believe that safety culture is analogous to the human body’s immune system, which protects against pathogens and diseases. Safety culture is pervasive and has a widespread impact. “It can affect all elements in a system for good or ill,” <a href="https://www.safetymattersblog.com/2014/11/a-life-in-error-by-james-reason.html">according to</a> <a href="https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/fellows/jim-reason-FBA/">psychologist James Reason</a>.</p>
<p>The tragic situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant violates every universally accepted tenet of <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1500/ML15007A487.pdf">healthy nuclear safety culture</a>, especially the maintenance of an environment where personnel can raise safety concerns.</p>
<p>War adversely affects safety culture in a number of ways. Operators are stressed and fatigued and may be scared to death to speak out if something is going wrong. Then there is the maintenance of a plant, which may be compromised by lack of staff or unavailability of spare parts. </p>
<p>Governance, regulation and oversight – all crucial for the safe running of a nuclear industry – are also disrupted, as is local infrastructure, such as the capability of local firefighters. In war, everything is harder.</p>
<h2>So what can be done to better protect Ukraine’s nuclear power plants?</h2>
<p>The only solution is declaring a demilitarized zone around nuclear plants, similar to the the protection zone urged by the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, Russia has previously rejected United Nations Secretary General António Guterres’ <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15003.doc.htm">plea for declaring a demilitarized zone around the plant</a>. </p>
<p>I believe an optimal though not ideal solution is to bring the two operating reactors to a cold shutdown before any further loss of off-site power and risk of station blackout, store more fuel for emergency diesel generators at different locations at the plant site, and keep only a skeleton caretaker staff to look after the spent fuel pools.</p>
<p>Admittedly, this is only a stopgap measure. In parallel with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s effort under the leadership of its Director, General Rafael Mariano Grossi, I believe that the U.N. Security Council should immediately empower a special commission to mediate between the warring parties. It could be modeled after the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations-Monitoring-Verification-and-Inspection-Commission">United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission</a> in 2000, and appoint a prominent, senior international statesman as its head. </p>
<p>I believe the person should be of the caliber and in the mold of the legendary former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, <a href="https://worldleaders.columbia.edu/directory/hans-blix">Hans Blix</a> of Sweden. Blix led the agency at the time of the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and commands respect in today’s Russia and Ukraine.</p>
<p>War, in my opinion, is the worst enemy of nuclear safety. This is an unprecedented and volatile situation. Only through active, pragmatic <a href="https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/sites/default/files/engineering_diplomacy_science__diplomacy.pdf">engineering and nuclear diplomacy</a> can an amenable and lasting solution to this vexing problem be found.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-troops-fought-for-control-of-a-nuclear-power-plant-in-ukraine-a-safety-expert-explains-how-warfare-and-nuclear-power-are-a-volatile-combination-178588">an article</a> originally published on March 4, 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189429/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Najmedin Meshkati received research funding from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in mid-1990s.</span></em></p>Artillery shelling, stressed-out technicians and power supply disruptions increase the chances of catastrophe at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Europe’s largest.Najmedin Meshkati, Professor of Engineering and International Relations, University of Southern CaliforniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1799392022-03-24T03:16:21Z2022-03-24T03:16:21ZAtomic disruption: how Russia’s war on Ukraine has rattled the nuclear world order<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454042/original/file-20220324-17-1asnfod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C14%2C1885%2C1011&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has upended all kinds of certainties, created new possibilities and closed off old ones. This is certainly true for the world’s use of nuclear power.</p>
<p>Late last month, Russia <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-25/why-russia-seized-chernobyl-nuclear-power-plant/100859766">seized</a> the defunct Chernobyl nuclear plant in northern Ukraine. The move rekindled fears about nuclear safety, decades after the plant’s catastrophic meltdown in in 1986.</p>
<p>And the war has prompted a scramble for new energy supplies in Europe – including potentially extending the life of existing nuclear plants.</p>
<p>All this points to the folly of nations exiting nuclear power while continuing to use coal, gas and oil – fuels that are more polluting, more expensive and often sourced from brutal dictatorships.</p>
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<h2>Danger at Chernobyl</h2>
<p>The Chernobyl nuclear plant no longer produces nuclear power. But Russian-Ukraine combat damaged a high-voltage power line to the plant, temporarily cutting off electricity needed to cool spent nuclear fuel and run other safety systems.</p>
<p>Radiation around the plant spiked after the occupation – probably due to
<a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/2309700-chernobyl-radiation-spike-probably-from-russian-tanks-disturbing-dust/">dust</a> disturbed by Russian tanks. </p>
<p>This week, radiation monitoring systems in the Chernobyl exclusion zone were <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/599071-chernobyl-exclusion-zone-radiation-monitoring-system-not-working-firm">not working</a> and yesterday, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/22/chernobyl-forest-fires-ukraine-nuclear-plant">forest fires</a> broke out around the plant. </p>
<p>And Chernobyl staff were reportedly <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/20/chernobyl-workers-leave/">close to collapse</a> recently after working for weeks at Russian gunpoint.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, Russian forces this month seized Ukraine’s large Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, in an attack which started a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/ukraine-nuclear-power-plant-fire-zaporizhzhia-russian-shelling">dangerous fire</a> near one of its reactors. This underscores the risk to Ukraine’s four operating nuclear power plants and their 15 reactors. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-shelling-caused-a-fire-at-a-ukrainian-nuclear-power-plant-how-close-did-we-actually-come-to-disaster-178549">Russian shelling caused a fire at a Ukrainian nuclear power plant – how close did we actually come to disaster?</a>
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<h2>Global shockwaves</h2>
<p>These events will raise concerns about nuclear plants operating anywhere in potential conflict zones. They are also likely to trigger more stringent safety requirements at plants, further increasing the cost of nuclear power.</p>
<p>What’s more, Russia – and its state-owned company Rosatom – will no longer be a welcome partner anywhere in the democratic world.</p>
<p>Within weeks of Russia’s invasion, the Finnish government announced it would not grant a permit to a long-planned power station in that country. The project <a href="https://yle.fi/news/3-12333330">included</a> a Russian owner and Russian nuclear reactor, and Rosatom’s <a href="https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Fennovoima-applies-for-VVER-reactor">design</a>.</p>
<p>The break with Russia is also likely to make governments even more skittish about dealing with unpredictable regimes.</p>
<p>As tensions worsen between the West and both China and Russia, nations will want to avoid risky deals which may see them lose control of crucial infrastructure.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-energy-clout-doesnt-just-come-from-oil-and-gas-its-also-a-key-nuclear-supplier-179444">Russia's energy clout doesn't just come from oil and gas – it's also a key nuclear supplier</a>
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<p>For example, the UK government is <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c4a3fe02-8535-45a4-aacf-0c4fbce8409d">reportedly seeking</a> to remove China’s state-owned nuclear energy company from all future power projects in that country.
But it’s <a href="https://www.cityam.com/the-nuclear-option-ministers-weigh-up-state-company-as-sunak-doubts-uk-energy-strategy/?amp=1">struggling</a> to attract other private investors.</p>
<p>With China and Russia out of the picture, the design options for new nuclear plants will shrink drastically.</p>
<p>Contenders from the West have run into <a href="https://www.power-eng.com/nuclear/westinghouse-could-build-ap1000-reactors-at-czech-nuclear-site/#gref">financial</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/edf-areva-nuclear-idUSL8N1OZ295">problems</a> in recent years, and a Korean <a href="https://pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/P1500_CD_Web/htm/pdf/topic3/3S09_Hangon%20Kim.pdf">design</a> has had no international orders for over a decade.</p>
<p>The great remaining hope for new construction of nuclear plant design rests on “small modular reactors”. The most advanced proposal, <a href="https://www.nuscalepower.com/technology">put forward</a> by United States-based company Nuscale, involves modules produced in factories then shipped to sites to be installed as needed. </p>
<p>This technology has been hyped for many years, but has not progressed past the prototype stage. Its arrival is likely still <a href="https://johnquiggin.com/2019/08/08/are-smrs-vaporware/">years away</a>, if it ever happens.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="artist impression of nuclear reactor" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454046/original/file-20220324-27-1wbdokd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454046/original/file-20220324-27-1wbdokd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454046/original/file-20220324-27-1wbdokd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454046/original/file-20220324-27-1wbdokd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454046/original/file-20220324-27-1wbdokd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454046/original/file-20220324-27-1wbdokd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454046/original/file-20220324-27-1wbdokd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">So-called ‘small nuclear reactors’ appear far from commercial viability.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">NuScale</span></span>
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<h2>Postponing nuclear retirement</h2>
<p>By contrast, there is good news for the world’s existing nuclear reactors. </p>
<p>The European Union relies heavily on Russian fossil fuels, but the threat posed by Moscow means it must wean itself off this source. </p>
<p>Every other energy source must be considered. It’s too late to start building new nuclear plants, but the life of existing plants could be extended.</p>
<p>Belgium has already deferred its planned closure of a nuclear plant, <a href="https://taketonews.com/belgium-keeps-nuclear-power-stations-open-longer-partly-because-of-war-ukraine-abroad/">possibly until 2035</a>.</p>
<p>Germany <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/correction-germany-nuclear-shutdown-story-82051054">shut down half</a> its nuclear plants in January, as part of a plan to phase out atomic power. This misguided decision was taken even as Putin’s armies were massing on the Ukrainian border, and before Germany had eliminated its reliance on gas and coal.</p>
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<p>Germany’s remaining nuclear plants are due to close at the end of the year. The country is now <a href="https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/russias-invasion-ukraine-forces-germany-come-clean-energy-transition-strategy">under pressure</a> to revisit this plan – but that will not be easy. </p>
<p>Germany has long been working towards the nuclear exit, including ending orders for new fuel. Reversing the process now would require special legislation and urgent intervention to secure new fuel supplies. </p>
<p>For the moment, the German government <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/germany-rules-out-prolonging-its-nuclear-power-plants/">rejects</a> both an extension of nuclear power and an embargo on Russian gas. But the second position may prove untenable.</p>
<p>The US has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/8/russia-ukraine-war-biden-bans-us-imports-of-russian-oil-and-gas">banned</a> imports of Russian coal and gas, and Europe will come under growing international pressure to follow. Alternatively, Russia could make good on its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/8/eu-plans-to-slash-2-3-in-russian-gas-imports-this">threat</a> to cut off gas supplies to Europe.</p>
<p>In that case, Germany is likely to find ways to overcome the legal and technical obstacles to extending nuclear power.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>Russia’s war on Ukraine <a href="https://www.npr.org/2017/08/06/541582729/how-the-dream-of-americas-nuclear-renaissance-failed-to-materialize">won’t produce </a> the resurgence in new nuclear plants predicted 20 years ago. </p>
<p>But it accentuates the urgent need for nations to free themselves from dependence on coal, oil and gas. Until then, our best option is to keep nuclear plants running as long as possible.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/yes-australia-is-buying-a-fleet-of-nuclear-submarines-but-nuclear-powered-electricity-must-not-come-next-168110">Yes, Australia is buying a fleet of nuclear submarines. But nuclear-powered electricity must not come next</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179939/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Quiggin is a former Member of the Climate Change Authority</span></em></p>The conflict highlights the folly of nations exiting nuclear power while continuing to use coal, gas and oil.John Quiggin, Professor, School of Economics, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785882022-03-04T23:36:53Z2022-03-04T23:36:53ZRussian troops fought for control of a nuclear power plant in Ukraine – a safety expert explains how warfare and nuclear power are a volatile combination<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450124/original/file-20220304-23-pfhpx5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C5%2C3442%2C2282&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rafael Mariano Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, points to the training facility hit by Russian artillery at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/AustriaNuclearRussiaUkraineWar/86fb83c01e9149b3a9bb7c09dccc0157/photo">AP Photo/Lisa Leutner</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Russian forces have taken control of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-everything-you-need-to-know">shelling the Zaporizhzhia facility</a> in the Ukrainian city of Enerhodar.</em></p>
<p><em>The overnight assault caused a blaze at the facility, prompting fears over the safety of the plant and evoking painful memories in a country still scarred by the world’s worst nuclear accident, at Chernobyl in 1986. The site of that disaster is <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-action-in-radioactive-chernobyl-could-be-dangerous-for-people-and-the-environment-177992">also under Russian control</a> as of Feb. 24, 2022.</em> </p>
<p><em>On March 4, Ukrainian authorities <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-11-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine">reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency</a> that the fire at Zaporizhzhia had been extinguished and that Ukrainian employees were reportedly operating the plant under Russian orders. But safety concerns remain.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked <a href="https://sites.usc.edu/meshkati/">Najmedin Meshkati</a>, a professor and <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/thirty-three-years-catastrophe-chernobyl-universal-lesson-global-nuclear-power-industry">nuclear safety expert</a> at the University of Southern California, to explain the risks of warfare taking place in and around nuclear power plants.</em></p>
<h2>How safe was the Zaporizhzhia power plant before the Russian attack?</h2>
<p>The facility at Zaporizhzhia is the largest nuclear plant in Europe, and one of the largest in the world. It has six <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/pwrs.html">pressurized water reactors</a>, which use water to both sustain the fission reaction and cool the reactor. These differ from the <a href="https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/appendices/rbmk-reactors.aspx">reaktor bolshoy moshchnosty kanalny</a> reactors at Chernobyl, which used graphite instead of water to sustain the fission reaction. RBMK reactors are not seen as very safe, and there are <a href="https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/appendices/rbmk-reactors.aspx">only eight remaining in use</a> in the world, all in Russia.</p>
<p>The reactors at Zaporizhzhia are of moderately good design. And the plant has a decent safety record, with a good operating background.</p>
<p>Ukraine authorities tried to keep the war away from the site by asking Russia to observe a 30-kilometer safety buffer. But Russian troops surrounded the facility and then seized it.</p>
<h2>What are the risks to a nuclear plant in a conflict zone?</h2>
<p>Nuclear power plants are built for peacetime operations, not wars.</p>
<p>The worst thing that could happen is if a site is deliberately or accidentally shelled and the containment building – which houses the nuclear reactor – is hit. These containment buildings are not designed or built for deliberate shelling. They are built to withstand a minor internal explosion of, say, a pressurized water pipe. But they are not designed to withstand a huge explosion.</p>
<p>It is not known whether the Russian forces deliberately shelled the Zaporizhzhia plant. It may have been inadvertent, caused by a stray missile. But we do know they wanted to capture the plant.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/kK7xG_Q0Tkg?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Tracer rounds and flames can be seen in this video of the fight for control of the nuclear power plant.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If a shell hit the plant’s <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/pools.html">spent fuel pool</a> – which contains the still-radioactive spent fuel – or if fire spread to the spent fuel pool, it could release radiation. This spent fuel pool isn’t in the containment building, and as such is more vulnerable.</p>
<p>As to the reactors in the containment building, it depends on the weapons being used. The worst-case scenario is that a bunker-buster missile breaches the containment dome – consisting of a thick shell of reinforced concrete on top of the reactor – and explodes. That would badly damage the nuclear reactor and release radiation into the atmosphere. And because of any resulting fire, sending in firefighters would be difficult. It could be another Chernobyl.</p>
<h2>What are the concerns going forward?</h2>
<p>The biggest worry was not the fire at the facility. That did not affect the containment buildings and has been extinguished. </p>
<p>The safety problems I see now are twofold:</p>
<p><strong>1) Human error</strong></p>
<p>The workers at the facility are now working under incredible stress, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-04-22/h_1f73598a8edc48dcd10cea81c3c37be5">reportedly at gunpoint</a>. Stress increases the chance of error and poor performance.</p>
<p>One concern is that the workers will not be allowed to change shifts, meaning longer hours and tiredness. We know that a few days ago at Chernobyl, after the Russians took control of the site, they <a href="https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/IAEA-chief-warns-over-pressure-on-Ukraine-nuclear">did not allow employees</a> – who usually work in three shifts – to swap out. Instead, they took some workers hostage and didn’t allow the other workers to attend their shifts.</p>
<p>At Zaporizhzhia we may see the same.</p>
<p>There is a human element in running a nuclear power plant – operators are the first and last layers of defense for the facility and the public. They are the first people to detect any anomaly and to stop any incident. Or if there’s an accident, they will be the first to heroically try to contain it. </p>
<p><strong>2) Power failure</strong></p>
<p>The second problem is that the nuclear plant needs constant electricity, and that is harder to maintain in wartime.</p>
<p>Even if you shut down the reactors, the plant will need off-site power to run the huge cooling system to remove the residual heat in the reactor and bring it to what is called a “cold shutdown.” Water circulation is always needed to make sure the spent fuel doesn’t overheat.</p>
<p>Spent fuel pools also need constant circulation of water to keep them cool. And they need cooling for several years before being put in dry casks. One of the problems in the 2011 <a href="https://theconversation.com/10-years-after-fukushima-safety-is-still-nuclear-powers-greatest-challenge-155541">Fukushima disaster</a> in Japan was the emergency generators, which replaced lost off-site power, got inundated with water and failed. In situations like that you get “<a href="https://allthingsnuclear.org/dlochbaum/nuclear-station-blackout/">station blackout</a>” – and that is one of the worst things that could happen. It means no electricity to run the cooling system. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="hundreds of square openings lie at the bottom of a large pool of water in an industrial building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Spent nuclear fuel rods are stored at the bottom of this pool, which requires constant circulation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-shows-the-cooling-pool-of-the-switched-off-unit-1-news-photo/524200126">Guillaume Souvant/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In that circumstance, the spent fuel overheats and its zirconium cladding can cause hydrogen bubbles. If you can’t vent these bubbles they will explode, spreading radiation.</p>
<p>If there is a loss of outside power, operators will have to rely on emergency generators. But emergency generators are huge machines – finicky, unreliable gas guzzlers. And you still need cooling waters for the generators themselves. </p>
<p>My biggest worry is that Ukraine suffers from a sustained power grid failure. The likelihood of this increases during a conflict, because pylons may come down under shelling or gas power plants might get damaged and cease to operate. And it is unlikely that Russian troops themselves will have fuel to keep these emergency generators going – they <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60596629">don’t seem to have enough fuel</a> to run their own personnel carriers.</p>
<h2>How else does a war affect the safety of nuclear plants?</h2>
<p>One of the overarching concerns is that war degrades <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK253947/">safety culture</a>, which is crucial in running a plant. I believe that safety culture is analogous to the human body’s immune system, which protects against pathogens and diseases; and because of the pervasive nature of safety culture and its widespread impact, according to <a href="https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/fellows/jim-reason-FBA/">psychologist James Reason</a>, “<a href="https://www.safetymattersblog.com/2014/11/a-life-in-error-by-james-reason.html">it can affect all elements in a system for good or ill</a>.”</p>
<p>It is incumbent upon the leadership of the plant to strive for immunizing, protecting, maintaining and nurturing the healthy safety culture of the nuclear plant.</p>
<p>War adversely affects the safety culture in a number of ways. Operators are stressed and fatigued and may be scared to death to speak out if something is going wrong. Then there is the maintenance of a plant, which may be compromised by lack of staff or unavailability of spare parts. Governance, regulation and oversight – all crucial for the safe running of a nuclear industry – are also disrupted, as is local infrastructure, such as the capability of local firefighters. In normal times you might have been able to extinguish the fire at Zaporizhzhia in five minutes. But in war, everything is harder.</p>
<h2>So what can be done to better protect Ukraine’s nuclear power plants?</h2>
<p>This is an unprecedented and volatile situation. The only solution is a no-fight zone around nuclear plants. War, in my opinion, is the worst enemy of nuclear safety.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 150,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Najmedin Meshkati received research funding from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC in mid-1990s.</span></em></p>The world held its collective breath as Russian troops battled Ukrainian forces at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. The battle is over and no radiation escaped, but the danger is far from over.Najmedin Meshkati, Professor of Engineering and International Relations, University of Southern CaliforniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785492022-03-04T10:00:58Z2022-03-04T10:00:58ZRussian shelling caused a fire at a Ukrainian nuclear power plant – how close did we actually come to disaster?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450022/original/file-20220304-15-5xnow4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=55%2C23%2C5265%2C3518&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It sounds like a nightmare come true. During a military offensive as part of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, fire broke out at Europe’s largest nuclear power station, the Zaporizhzhia power plant in the southern city of Enerhodar. </p>
<p>From what we understand of the situation, Russian troops were shelling the area during a battle for control of the facility, which supplies 25% of Ukraine’s electricity.</p>
<p>The plant has six large 950-megawatt reactors, built between 1980 and 1986 – crucially to a different design to the notorious and now decommissioned Chernobyl power station. </p>
<p>The fire evidently broke out in a multi-storey training building but has since been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-04/russia-ukraine-war-invasion-updates/100880512">reportedly extinguished</a>.</p>
<h2>Was there a real risk of nuclear contamination?</h2>
<p>The incident understandably raised the spectre of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. But it’s important to remember these are two different types of reactor. Chernobyl used <a href="https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/appendices/rbmk-reactors.aspx">RBMK-type reactors</a>, a Soviet design from the 1970s that was never built in the West because of inherent safety flaws. </p>
<p>The Zaporizhzhia power station features Russian-designed VVER reactors, which use broadly the same design as the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/pressurized-water-reactor">Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR)</a>, the most popular reactor design used worldwide and also the type used in nuclear-powered submarines. </p>
<p>A PWR has a self-contained primary cooling water system to transfer heat from the reactor core to a steam generator. This system is kept pressurised so the water doesn’t boil - hence its name. A second, separate water loop transfers the steam produced in the steam generator to the turbine that produces the electricity. </p>
<p><img src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/2026/PressurizedWaterReactor.gif?1646377213" width="100%"></p>
<p>Another crucial contrast with Chernobyl is the fact that VVER and PWR reactors have a massive concrete containment around the reactor to stop any radioactive release. This completely surrounds the reactor and steam generators, ensuring any water that could potentially be radioactive is within the containment. </p>
<p>The containment is typically constructed from pre-stressed concrete with a steel liner. In contrast, the Chernobyl-type reactor was physically very large, meaning a similar containment to enclose that system would have been very expensive. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/military-action-in-radioactive-chernobyl-could-be-dangerous-for-people-and-the-environment-177992">Military action in radioactive Chernobyl could be dangerous for people and the environment</a>
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<p>Besides the normal cooling systems, VVER reactors have emergency core cooling systems consisting of four “hydroaccumulators” – vessels pressurised with gas and filled with water that can be automatically released into the reactor to cool it. These are called “passive” systems because they rely only on gas pressure to inject the water, rather than pumps that would require electrical power. </p>
<p>They also have multiple systems that use pumps to inject water into the reactor to prevent a core meltdown if the normal cooling systems are not available, for instance as a result of a loss of electrical power.</p>
<p>If the connection to the grid is lost, standby diesel generators can provide electrical supplies to essential plant. This backup plant has several “trains” - identical and independent sets of plant that are physically separated and perform the same safety function. For example, this VVER has three trains of high-pressure water injection and three trains of low-pressure injection. </p>
<p>The four trains of passive hydroaccumulators do not need diesel supplies and will still provide the necessary cooling.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="View of several of the reactor units at Zaporizhzhia power station" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450006/original/file-20220304-27-1xiaml5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450006/original/file-20220304-27-1xiaml5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450006/original/file-20220304-27-1xiaml5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450006/original/file-20220304-27-1xiaml5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450006/original/file-20220304-27-1xiaml5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450006/original/file-20220304-27-1xiaml5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450006/original/file-20220304-27-1xiaml5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Zaporizhzhia power station features multiple containment and cooling systems.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Previous disasters</h2>
<p>In 1979, one of the PWRs at Three Mile Island in the US state of Pennsylvania suffered a core meltdown, but there was practically no radioactive release to the environment because of the concrete containment system.</p>
<p>After the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan, Ukraine’s nuclear regulator examined the capability of its nuclear power plants to withstand extreme events so all nuclear plants are better prepared to cope with these situations. This led to the installation of mobile diesel-driven pumps that can be connected to the reactor’s cooling system to provide water in an emergency.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-fukushima-still-safe-after-the-latest-earthquake-69213">Is Fukushima still safe after the latest earthquake?</a>
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<p>The Zaporizhzhia plant supplies 25% of Ukraine’s electricity, and Russia presumably wanted to gain control of it so as to control the electricity supply. Despite the self-evident recklessness of fighting near a nuclear power plant, it would not be in Russia’s interest to cause a radioactive release because this would immediately affect its army personnel in the vicinity, and also potentially cause a radioactive cloud to spread over western Russia and particularly the annexed region of Crimea, just to the south of the plant.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Irwin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The fire at Europe’s largest nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine understandably raised the spectre of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. But thankfully this time another nuclear catastrophe was avoided.Tony Irwin, Visiting Lecturer, Nuclear Reactors and Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.