When Attorney-General George Brandis was asked on Q&A about a parliamentary vote on the decision to go to war, he said that was not part of the Westminster tradition. Is that right?
Blair testifies to the Chilcot Inquiry in 2010.
PA
Iraq’s supposedly sky-high child mortality rate was a key part of Blair’s case for war, and he was still making it years later – but it seems to have been based on a single dubious study.
Compared with other attempts to mend deep wounds after wars and conflicts, the Chilcot Report falls depressingly short.
John Howard confirms the nation’s involvement in the war in Iraq in March 2003, a decision subject to remarkably little oversight by comparison to Australia’s allies.
AAP/Alan Porritt
It is important to restore public trust in any future decision for Australia to go to war. For this, a system that provides better democratic accountability is essential.
So now we know. Saddam Hussein didn’t present an imminent threat. He could have been contained. He didn’t have any weapons of mass destruction. And the consequences of the invasion were profoundly underestimated…
Intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction was a core part of the case for war. The Chilcot Report has examined how it came to be so distorted.
‘Just a warning – it’s quite long…’
EPA/Dan Kitwood
The Iraq Inquiry has found that the case for invading Iraq was far from watertight and made without proper care. Deception, however, is another matter.
Iraqi doctors weighs a child at a Baghdad clinic.
Jamal Nasrallah/EPA
Too many people still believe that Iraq collapsed because there was no plan for it; others think the West has learnt from its mistakes. Wrong and wrong.