China has agreed to strengthen its relationship with Russia, after a meeting between Russia foreign minister Sergey Lavrov and China’s foreign minister Wang Yi. They both used the occasion to criticise the west’s “cold war thinking” and accuse it of bullying. International affairs editor Rachael Jolley asked Natasha Kuhrt, an expert on the Russia-China relationship from King’s College London, to explain why the conversation was important.
What was the Lavrov/Yi meeting about? What did they cover?
On the agenda of the two ministers in Beijing on April 9 were a number of economic and security issues, including cooperation in the Arctic, where they have shared economic interests in opening up a northern sea route. According to Lavrov, the two were also due to discuss security issues including terrorism in the Eurasian region (the landmass stretching from China to Europe).
Both are also concerned about US influence in the region and its talks with Japan about possibly joining the Aukus security alliance. This currently includes Australia, the UK and the US. Lavrov hinted at the formation of alternative organisation to push back at this alliance.
Why is this meeting important economically? What do Russia and China want out of it?
The meeting reaffirms certain aspects of the relationship between the two which have been developing for decades, in particular certain economic trends, such as Russia’s growing economic dependence on China. Russia’s exports to China are predominantly composed of raw materials, chiefly hydrocarbons, and this trend has been exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Moscow.
China has been importing vast quantities of crude oil from Russia. This is in addition to the oil that is pumped to China via the Eastern Siberian Pacific Ocean pipeline and the gas it receives via the Power of Siberia gas pipeline which almost exclusively goes to China. Discussions on construction of a Power of Siberia 2 pipeline from western Siberia to northern China have stalled however, as China tends to drive a hard bargain on price, although China would likely prefer not to become overdependent on Russia for energy, particularly in the current political and security climate.
In the early phases of the relationship, there were regular warnings by Russian analysts as well as foreign and military decision-makers in Russia, that the nature of trade between the two risked Russia becoming a “raw materials appendage” of China. In the context of US power and a rising China, Russia fears a decline in its status. Today the Russian regime is heavily dependent on the income from oil and gas, which significantly offsets the effects of western sanctions.
It seemed that the relationship had cooled after Russia invaded Ukraine. Does this mark a new era for the China-Russia relationship?
Yes and no. Just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in Beijing, the two sides declared that theirs was a partnership with “no limits”. It seemed as if Moscow and Beijing were moving closer to an alliance as they declared that they would oppose attempts to undermine security and stability “in their adjacent regions”.
But those paying attention will have noticed that the “no limits” slogan had disappeared from Beijing’s official rhetoric since the beginning of the Ukraine war. China’s president, Xi Jingping, has spoken instead of a “permanent good-neighbourly friendship”, and comprehensive strategic coordination, a somewhat less expansive characterisation.
It is believed that Xi was taken off guard by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, and had been weighing up their relationship, while not condemning Russia’s attack on another nation. Their joint statements from this meeting suggest a further strengthening of the relationship.
Does this signal any further military cooperation between the two countries? And if so, what will this mean for the Ukraine war?
At a meeting in February 2024, Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu and his Chinese counterpart Dong Jun spoke of increasing military cooperation, albeit Shoigu stressed that “unlike some Western countries, our two countries do not form a military bloc”. Russia and China have conducted joint drills in the Indo-Pacific region since 2019, including flights over the Sea of Japan, and in summer 2023 conducted a joint flotilla maritime patrol close to Alaska . It continues the trend of regular joint military exercises (since 2019).
While there is not yet interoperability between the two militaries, the exercises allow China to learn from Russia’s more experienced military. China can also learn much from Russian failures, in particular in the area of logistics where Russia struggled in Ukraine, and which would be key to Chinese success in retaking Taiwan .
While China denies that it is providing Russia with military assistance in its war on Ukraine, evidence suggests that China is exporting a number of items to Russia that could be classed as battlefield goods, for example machine tools (such as diggers and heavy trucks). Russia’s industrial sector is now fully dependent on China for machine tools and other parts critical to arms manufacturing
The use of central Asian countries to circumvent sanctions means that Russia can import ballbearings (for use in tank production) via Kyrgyzstan. In 2023 China’s exports of ballbearings to Kyrgyzstan rose by more than 2000% since 2021.
Despite these trends in the military and security dimensions, as well as increasingly close views on political issues and joint opposition to US power, in economic terms the relationship is reaching some limits. Even Russian analysts note that political cooperation far outstrips economic cooperation and that room for further development of trade and economics is shrinking
Why should the rest of the world care? Does this have ramifications outside the region?
Chinese purchases of Russian crude are helping to oil Russia’s war machine. Russia has largely accommodated China’s economic presence in central Asia and has assisted China in seeking an economic presence in the Arctic, while Russia has increased its militarisation of the Arctic. Russian militarisation there could potentially lead to incursions into other Arctic states, such as Finland.
In the Indo-Pacific, Russia seems to be increasingly willing to assist China in its efforts to intimidate US allies. At the 2022 Madrid summit Nato belatedly acknowledged the importance of the Russia-China relationship, and the worst-case scenario of a two-front war. This meeting does not diminish those fears.