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Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of Birmingham

Rowat is an economic theorist whose interests have centred on weak property rights. He has published on dynamic commons problems, in which property rights are lacking, as well as on 'pillage' problems in which balances of power determine resource allocations. He currently applies tools from artificial intelligence to auction theory.

Rowat has researched for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and taught at New York University. He directs Birmingham's MSc in Mathematical Finance. He is a member of the American Economic Association, the CFA Institute and the Econometric Society.

He has studied Iraq since 1997, and has submitted testimony to committees in the US Senate and the UK House of Lords. He has written on Iraq's economy for the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Middle East Economic Survey, the Middle East Research and Information Project, Oxford Analytica, Lebanon's Daily Star and the International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies.


  • 2001–present
    Lecturer in Economics, University of Birmingham


  • 2009 
    Baruch College, Certificate in Advanced Risk and Portfolio Management
  • 2001 
    University of Cambridge, PhD in Economics
  • 1993 
    Carleton University, BA in Psychology


  • 2014
    Sufficient Conditions for Unique Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games, Mathematical Social Sciences
  • 2013
    A Qualitative Comparison of the Suitability of Four Theorem Provers for Basic Auction Theory, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
  • 2013
    Efficient sets are small, Journal of Mathematical Economcis
  • 2011
    A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games, International Journal of Game Theory
  • 2011
    Optimal voting rules for two member tenure committees, Social Choice and Welfare
  • 2011
    Using Theorema in the Formalization of Theoretical Economics, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
  • 2007
    Non-linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
  • 2007
    The commons with capital markets, Economic Theory
  • 2006
    Intermediation by aid agencies, Journal of Development Economics

Grants and Contracts

  • 2012
    Formal representation and proof for cooperative games
    Funding Source:
  • 2005
    Weak Property Rights: Financial Markets and Development
    Funding Source: