Rowat is an economic theorist whose interests have centred on weak property rights. He has published on dynamic commons problems, in which property rights are lacking, as well as on 'pillage' problems in which balances of power determine resource allocations. He currently applies tools from artificial intelligence to auction theory.
Rowat has researched for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and taught at New York University. He directs Birmingham's MSc in Mathematical Finance. He is a member of the American Economic Association, the CFA Institute and the Econometric Society.
He has studied Iraq since 1997, and has submitted testimony to committees in the US Senate and the UK House of Lords. He has written on Iraq's economy for the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Middle East Economic Survey, the Middle East Research and Information Project, Oxford Analytica, Lebanon's Daily Star and the International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies.
Experience
2001–present
Lecturer in Economics, University of Birmingham
Education
2009
Baruch College, Certificate in Advanced Risk and Portfolio Management
2001
University of Cambridge, PhD in Economics
1993
Carleton University, BA in Psychology
Publications
2014
Sufficient Conditions for Unique Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games, Mathematical Social Sciences
2013
A Qualitative Comparison of the Suitability of Four Theorem Provers for Basic Auction Theory, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
2013
Efficient sets are small, Journal of Mathematical Economcis
2011
A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games, International Journal of Game Theory
2011
Optimal voting rules for two member tenure committees, Social Choice and Welfare
2011
Using Theorema in the Formalization of Theoretical Economics, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
2007
Non-linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
2007
The commons with capital markets, Economic Theory
2006
Intermediation by aid agencies, Journal of Development Economics
Grants and Contracts
2012
Formal representation and proof for cooperative games
Role:
co-investigator
Funding Source:
EPSRC
2005
Weak Property Rights: Financial Markets and Development