The broad and ill-defined new powers outlined in the government's new telecommunications bill are neither necessary nor proportionate – and contain significant scope for abuse.
It is hard to know whether metadata retention has been effective or necessary. We can only hope that the debate over accessing and analysing encrypted services is a little more enlightening.
Scholars dig in to the debate on whether police should be able to defeat or circumvent encryption systems.
The FBI and police officials say they need to decrypt secure communications to fight crime. But they have other options, and modern threats make clear the importance of strong encryption.
Governments' efforts to weaken communications security undermine and distract from the need to protect the real weak points in our online communications.
Apple's design decisions don't please everyone, but in the iPhone the company created something truly revolutionary that has lasted.
Cracking down on extremism online won’t solve the problem of extremist violence, will inevitably censor speech that's important to protect and risks harming political dissidents and democracy itself.
The technical consensus is clear: Adding 'backdoors' to encryption algorithms weakens everyone's security. So what are the police and intelligence agencies to do?